

Humphreys

From Saladin to the Mongols

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The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260

R. Stephen Humphreys

State University of New York Press


FROM SALADIN TO THE MONGOLS

*The Ayyubids of Damascus,
1193-1260*

By R. Stephen Humphreys

Upon the death of Saladin in 1193, his vast empire, stretching from the Yemen to the upper reaches of the Tigris, fell into the hands of his Ayyubid kinsmen. These latter parceled his domains into a number of autonomous principalities, though some common identity was maintained by linking these petty states into a loose confederation, in which each local prince owed allegiance to the senior member of the Ayyubid house. Such an arrangement was of course highly unstable, and at first glance Ayyubid history appears to be no more than a succession of unedifying squabbles among countless rival princelings, until at last the family's hegemony was extinguished by two events: 1) a coup d'état staged by the palace guard in Egypt in 1250, and 2) the Mongol occupation of Syria, brief but destructive, in 1260.

But appearances to the contrary, the obscure quarrels of Saladin's heirs embodied a political revolution of highest importance in Syro-Egyptian history. The seven decades of Ayyubid rule mark the slow and sometimes violent emergence of a new administrative relationship between Egypt and Syria, one in which Syria was subjected to close centralized control from Cairo for the unprecedented period of 250 years. These years saw also the gradual decay of a form of government—the family confederation—which had been the most characteristic political structure of Western Iran and the Fertile Crescent for three centuries, and its replacement by a



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TO MY PARENTS,
IN LOVE AND
GRATITUDE

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Preface and Acknowledgments

The pages that follow are thickly strewn with names and dates, arranged in a loosely chronological order. Many of my readers may thus suppose that this book is merely a detailed account of the doings of some rather obscure princelings in thirteenth-century Syria. It is not. It is rather a study of the values and attitudes which underlay political behavior at a crucial period in the history of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. It is true that I have cast this study in the form of a narrative, though it opens with a long discursus and is interrupted by several others. I have done so because I believe that no other framework is so well suited to the problems entailed by the topic at hand. These problems are basically two.

First, we are dealing with a period in which neither the chief actors nor contemporary witnesses chose to spell out the ideas and assumptions which governed political conduct, so that these things can be inferred only through a close scrutiny of events. As it happens, even the major political events of this period are only poorly known to modern scholarship, and though the sources at our disposal are strikingly rich and varied, they are exasperatingly reticent even in regard to such consciously established and visible institutions as the army or the financial administration. In this situation, where only the external phenomena of politics can be directly derived from the sources, narrative reconstruction provides the most reliable avenue to a level of understanding which comprises not only immediate motives and goals, but also those deeper-lying values and attitudes which shaped policy and action into a meaningful

structure of politics. For if the characteristic vice of narrative is superficiality, at least this approach compels the historian to deal with the purposes, expectations, hopes, and fears of those whom he studies, and it is after all only a step from the thoughts of individuals to the shared ideas of a group. Nor will a carefully made narrative, with its demand that the historian comprehend the totality of known events as they unfolded in time and space, allow him to restrict his attention to a few facts chosen in accordance with the standards of relevance laid down by a perhaps unsuitable or anachronistic model of explanation.

The second problem connected with our topic stems from a major thesis of this book—viz., that the structure of political life in Egypt and Syria suffered a fundamental transformation in the first five decades of the thirteenth century. If that is so, it follows that any valid analysis of the period requires as precise a portrayal of this change as possible. Change can indeed be described by simply asserting its existence and citing a set of facts in illustration. But narrative can produce a more adequate characterization in a case like the one at hand, where a major political transformation seems the product not of any vast social and ideological upheaval, but of a clash of interests and ambitions among a restricted and definable group of men. In the case of Ayyubid Syria and Egypt, change is best understood when it is perceived from a narrative perspective as the product (often unconscious and involuntary) of innumerable small acts, done most often to serve some immediate, even trivial end.

In preparing this book I have tried to stick close to my sources. But since these are so taciturn in regard to my real interests—values, attitudes, patterns of behavior—any statements on such matters are necessarily an extrapolation from the explicit testimony of the texts. But extrapolations of this kind must be made if Ayyubid history is ever to be brought within the mainstream of modern historical enquiry rather than relegated to the marginal status of an “exotic society.” Thus even in those areas where my documentation is inadequate or incomplete, I have often decided to venture interpretive hy-

potheses, on the grounds that an explicit hypothesis open to empirical testing is more useful than silence. The latter may be more becoming or even more scholarly, but from a scientific point of view it is worthless. I have tried to make a clear distinction between surmise and documented statement; on the whole I think I have succeeded.

Many readers may well feel less offended by an excess of hypotheses than choked by a constant succession of wars and conspiracies in the pages that follow. If I claim that these were by far the most visible forms of political activity in that period, they may protest that to concentrate on them is misleading and superficial, that this approach cannot represent the reality of Ayyubid political life. I must demur. In that age the state was run largely by and for the benefit of a military class—a class whose fundamental social function was fighting. Moreover there were no regular institutions (e.g., parliaments or administrative courts) for resolving conflicts within the ruling group peaceably. The incessant wars and conspiracies of the age merely reflect these realities. Not everything was decided on the field of battle or in whispered conversations, and negotiation and compromise were far from alien to the Ayyubid mind. Nevertheless, an adequate history of the Ayyubids must recognize that violence was not incidental, but an integral part of the political process.

The preparation of this study has occupied me for many years and I have naturally incurred many debts of gratitude along the way. I should first thank those teachers and colleagues whose advice and criticism have materially improved this work and who have encouraged me to have it published: Prof. Andrew Ehrenkreutz, who supervised it in its first incarnation as a dissertation at the University of Michigan (1969); Prof. George Scanlon; Prof. Oleg Grabar of Harvard; and Prof. George Makdisi of the University of Pennsylvania. I would also thank Mr. Norman Mangouni, Director of the State University of New York Press, for his willingness to take on a book of the size and complexity of this one; and Margaret Mirabelli, for her astute and sympathetic editing of the manuscript.

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I am grateful to the Institut Français d'Études Arabes de Damas and to Prof. Nikita Elisséeff of the Université de Lyon for their permission to reproduce the map of Damascus and its environs. Mr. John Hanner, cartographic assistant in the Dept. of Geography, University of Chicago, ably prepared the other maps. Toni Hoefelmeier gave devoted and skillful assistance in the hateful tasks of proofreading and indexing.

Finally, there is my family. My children have not really understood what their father has been up to all these years; still, they have generally been willing (though with some skepticism) to take my word that it is "important," and have been very good about letting me have enough time to get it finished. To my wife I owe not only a vigorous criticism of many pages in the book, but also an energy and sense of purpose which saw me through many moments of frustration and discouragement.

R. Stephen Humphreys

Introduction

At the time of Saladin's death in 589/1193, the empire which he had founded was but one of many powerful and expanding kingdoms in the Islamic world. In spite of the disproportionate attention which Saladin's wars against the Crusaders have earned him, it would be difficult to prove that Hattin was a more fateful battle than Myriokephalon, that his conquests were vaster or more durable than those of his Almohad, Ghurid, and Khwarizmian counterparts, or even that the issues at stake in his struggles in Egypt and Syria were truly of greater moment for Islam than those which underlay contemporary events in North Africa, Anatolia, and Eastern Iran. And if such is the case with the achievements and historic role of the great Saladin, what are we to say of his Ayyubid epigoni, even of such considerable figures as al-'Adil, al-Kamil, and al-Salih Ayyub, let alone the dynasties of minor kinglets among whom Syria was divided?

Despite the inevitable impact of Saladin's fame on our thinking, it is nevertheless true that his reign introduced no essentially new element into the political life of his age; rather, it represents the culmination of a process already a half-century old when he first came to power. It is to the obscure quarrels of his successors that we must look to discover a profound transformation in the very structure of Syro-Egyptian politics, one which divides quite abruptly the later Middle Ages from all that preceded it. In this light the Ayyubids occupy a place of highest importance—as yet largely unrecognized—in the political history of the Nile Valley and the Fertile Crescent.

As to the period of time during which the Ayyubids held sway, few would contest its immense intrinsic interest. The sixty-seven years from 589/1193 to 658/1260 saw the great crusades against Damietta, not to mention the fascinating expedition of Frederick II or the lesser ventures of the Emperor Henry VI and Theobald of Champagne; they witnessed the apogee of the Georgian and Rum Seljukid kingdoms and the inevitable repercussions on Syria of their expansion into the upper Jazira; finally, they beheld the terrible impact of the Mongols, at first as reflected in the incursions of Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, and then directly, with the expedition of Hülegü, which simultaneously completed the ruin of the Ayyubids and sanctioned the authority of the new Mamluk regime. This same era, for all its violence, was one of a great cultural efflorescence in Ayyubid lands, the continuation and zenith of the Syrian renaissance inaugurated under Zangid auspices. Though the Abbasid caliphate was still alive, Damascus (and to a lesser extent Cairo and Aleppo) were more and more supplanting Baghdad as the chief centers of Sunni thought in the Arab world.

But if, in these terms, the importance of the period has never been in dispute, the internal history and structure of the Ayyubid polity have attracted much less interest. Perhaps we have been too seduced by the martial splendor of the reigns of Saladin and Baybars to think of the Ayyubid domination as anything more than a sort of disorderly interregnum, a period of political regression which reintroduced the territorial fragmentation and petty rivalries surmounted by Nur al-Din and Saladin only at the cost of forty years of unremitting labor. Or perhaps our occidental disposition to regard the crusades as the central fact of Syro-Egyptian political life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries makes the Ayyubid period seem essentially an unexpected and unearned respite for a Latin regime tottering on the edge of extinction.

When one studies the Arabic chroniclers of that era, however, it soon becomes clear that the Ayyubids were seldom attracted by the prospect of large-scale territorial expansion

beyond the sphere of interest defined by Saladin's wars, nor were they any more involved with the crusaders than immediate circumstances compelled them to be. Rather, their primary policy concern was to regulate their internal relations. And in their perpetually renewed struggles to achieve a stable and mutually satisfactory division of territory and sovereignty, they wound up creating, perhaps unconsciously, both a decisive change in the ages-old relationship of Syria to Egypt and a remarkable shift in the goals of political ambition.

If one is permitted any generalization about the mutual history of Egypt and Syria, it would be that the profound differences in their geography and ethnic composition have kept them in quite distinct and self-contained spheres, both socially and politically, despite a tradition of cultural interpenetration which reaches back at least five thousand years. In periods of great vigor, indeed, the rulers of the Nile have often been able to impose their suzerainty (and at rare intervals even a direct administration) on inland Syria as far north as the Litani River and the Ghuta of Damascus, as well as on the ports of Palestine and Phoenicia. But such Egyptian hegemony has lasted only until the rise of some local power in Syria or internal weakness in Egypt herself compels the latter's withdrawal at least to the eastern edge of Sinai.

In this light the Mamluk period seems very much an anomaly, for it saw an Egyptian monarchy retain, without effective internal challenge, direct administrative control over all Syria up to the Taurus and the Euphrates for 250 years.¹ It may well seem obvious, even trivial, to say that in this regard the Mamluks must have been acting in some way as heirs of the Ayyubids. More striking is that this Egyptian domination, almost unparalleled both in degree and duration, represents a complete reversal of the conditions obtaining a century before the Mamluk seizure of power. Until the rise of Saladin in 563/1168, Egypt had been progressively slipping into near-helplessness for a half century. Saladin's reign perhaps represents the starting point of the new order, for under him Egypt again supported a powerful military machine capable of undertaking an expansionist policy.

But one must not exaggerate: Saladin did not reside in Egypt for the last decade of his life and, like Nur al-Din before him, he regarded Egypt as essentially a source of revenue for his wars in Syria and the Jazira.² Certainly there is no question of Egypt's ever having been the administrative center of all his dominions. Only in the decades following his death did Egypt become more and more the center of gravity of the Ayyubid world.

As a part of this great change in Egypt's role, there occurred a crucial alteration in the goals of the quest for power. Between the rise of Nur al-Din and the beginning of the Mamluk regime, one sees a transition from an age of many states, in which the dominant hope was to ensconce oneself in a local principality, there to play an independent if restricted role, to an age of one state, in which the sole locus of political power and the goal of all ambition was the sultanate in Cairo. One might easily suppose that this is no more than the victory of the ancient centralizing tradition of Egypt over the equally hoary Syrian tendency to localism and fragmentation. Such a statement is not without truth, of course, but it ignores important evidence of increasing centralization within Syria itself during the Ayyubid domination. What is certain is that this transformation cannot be dated earlier than the thirteenth century and that it did not come about under Nur al-Din and Saladin. If they succeeded, by combining skillful diplomacy with a judicious application of force, in creating unified kingdoms out of the chaos which they had inherited, they signally failed to stop the centrifugal tendencies which they had spent their lives combating. Indeed, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that they implicitly accepted the old tradition and tended to work within it. Certainly it was tenacious, as is at once apparent from the fate of the successive empires of Tutush, Zangi, Nur al-Din, Saladin, al-'Adil, and al-Kamil.

In addition to these changes in the territorial character of sovereignty and very much bound up with them both as cause and consequence are certain important trends in the nature of the governing elite—trends which end by divorcing the Mamluk

regime from its twelfth-century origins. First, within the membership of the ruling elite, one can detect a growing (if uneven) tendency to exclude civilian and religious elements from the higher levels of decision-making. Second, the key institution within the ruling class, the army, begins to change from a mixed corps containing a large and influential body of free-born men into a corps whose elite units and highest commands were reserved for men of slave origin. Finally, the army becomes aware that its monopoly of force makes it the final arbiter of politics, and it ceases to be bound by loyalty to a hereditary dynasty.

It must be emphasized that this threefold evolution was far from complete when the Ayyubid domination collapsed. While the Ayyubid empire was flourishing, it certainly seemed to contemporaries to be conserving without substantial alteration the institutions and political roles which had been established during the twelfth century. And in fact the concrete changes (rather few and elusive) which one can discern in the first half of the thirteenth century do no more than imply a trend, a possible line of development, if taken in themselves. But the brutal and unexpected coup d'état of 648/1250 proved that these changes had been decisive and irreversible; slight in appearance, they still enabled the new Mamluk regime, with little delay or opposition, to reorder the structure of politics.

In the first half of the twelfth century, both in Syria and Egypt, the presence of urban notables and members of the religious elite within the ruling group guaranteed a considerable degree of political participation to the indigenous, Arabic-speaking elements of the population. That is, the leaders of local society were included among the small group of men whose standing and influence with the prince gave them an effective voice in state policy. In Syria these local leaders were high administrative and religious officials or chiefs of the local militias; in Egypt, where there was no militia as such, there were many Arabs in the provincial governorships and the high command of the regular army. In Syria, such local participation is to be connected with the multiplicity of small

city-states; these could furnish their Turkish princes with only limited financial and military resources, even while the system as a whole ensured a local ruler a host of rivals. Active indigenous support was essential to survival; the political power of local groups could not have been suppressed had the rulers so wished.³ In late Fatimid Egypt, where the political participation of the various ethnic groups has received less study, we must be content for the moment to notice the ruling dynasty's Arab descent, its reliance on a multi-national army, and its origins as a religious as well as a political movement whose success depended on engaging the commitment of local leaders.

Beginning with the reign of Zangi, these circumstances began to alter drastically; nevertheless, even at the height of Nur al-Din's and Saladin's power the political influence of the indigenous notables did not disappear, although it was transmuted into quite a different form. Their power now flowed from their vital role as the agents and propagandists for a policy which sought to combine religious and political ends into a common program: revivification of the *Sunna* in order to consolidate and unify Syro-Egyptian society for the war against Frank and Isma'ili.⁴

After Saladin's death, however, their position must have begun to erode, for by the early Mamluk period the indigenous notables no longer played an active political role. It is undeniable that the Mamluks ostentatiously supported orthodox religion and that the highly placed members of the religious establishment were much honored. Nevertheless even the religious chiefs had no real access to the sources of power, while the executive positions in the civil bureaucracy increasingly fell to military men, with the indigenous officeholders becoming mere functionaries.⁵ The steps which led to this loss of power remain obscure, but a few aspects of the problem are clear. On the one hand, the indigenous notables continued to influence the throne to the end of the Ayyubid dynasty, and they could obtain the highest positions in the state, even (occasionally) military command. On the other hand, the partial return to a

system of city-states in Syria did not bring with it revival of the old militia organizations and the Ayyubids were much less energetic prosecutors of the *jihad* than their two immediate predecessors. As a consequence fewer diplomatic and propaganda positions were available to local religious leaders.

These changes in the overall membership of the ruling elite were by themselves tantamount to a militarization of the government. But their effect was reinforced by a parallel process within the structure of the army. If one compares the armies of twelfth-century Syria (to which those of Nur al-Din and Saladin clearly belong) with the Mamluk forces of the late thirteenth century, it is obvious that the latter were a distinctly heavier burden on society and that they formed a more tightly knit and self-conscious body, one better able to act in its own interests, yet more alien to the society which it dominated. Again the change from the older system to the new cannot be thought of as a simple linear progression; it is more a building up of inner tensions under the Ayyubid regime which suddenly burst forth with the Mamluk seizure of power.⁶

One must not exaggerate: similarities between the armies of the Zangids and early Ayyubids and those of the Mamluks are quite as evident as differences. Both institutions were formed around a corps of *mamluks* (usually Turkish), but both permitted, and sometimes encouraged, the recruitment of free-born soldiers, either individual adventurers or tribal groups. Such free troopers were sometimes used in *ad hoc* auxiliary units (the usual status of the Türkmen and Arab Bedouin tribes), sometimes in the army's standing regiments. Moreover both armies were largely financed through some form of the *iqta'* system; in both cases, its use implied a degree of administrative decentralization and meant that a significant part of the state's troops were supplied by and owed their primary (albeit unofficial) allegiance to its own high-ranking officers.

Nevertheless, it is the differences which really define the nature of the two forces. The Mamluk army was constructed on an altogether vaster scale than its twelfth-century predecessors. Two examples will serve to make the point: Saladin's

reformed army in Egypt numbered about 10,000 regular cavalry, while the Egyptian army of Baybars eventually reached 40,000; the standing garrison of Damascus under Nur al-Din was probably about 1000 cavalry, but in the early Circassian period, the garrison attained a nominal figure of 3000 *mamluk* cavalry and 12,000 free troopers drawn from the *halqa*.⁷ Second, the Mamluk army at its best had a meticulously organized system of training and hierarchy of ranks, while the Zangid and even early Ayyubid armies had no clear system of ranks and command and seem to have been assembled and organized according to *ad hoc* considerations. By far the most fundamental difference, however, is that the officer corps from Seljukid well into Ayyubid times had a distinctly hereditary character: sons routinely inherited their fathers' *iqta's*, and even when they did not, they could almost take for granted promotion to the very small body of amirs. This is precisely the opposite of the Mamluk system, which rigorously reserved the highest ranks and honors for men of slave origin, while systematically relegating the sons of amirs (let alone free troopers and tribal leaders) to inferior positions with no real hope of advancement.⁸

It was the Mamluk coup d'état of 648/1250 which showed how far both the evolution of the army and the exclusion of civilian and religious elements from effective power had gone by the late Ayyubid period. But this coup was also the final stage in the creation of a new political role for the army. Military intervention in politics was hardly foreign to twelfth-century Syria and Egypt, to be sure. Nevertheless even in the most troubled periods of that century the army tended to act within a framework of support for the established dynasty. The struggles which revolved around the last Fatimids were seldom aimed at the occupant of the throne, but rather represented factional conflicts over control of the vizierate; in the rare instances where they resulted in the deposition or assassination of a caliph, he was replaced by another member of the Fatimid house, not by his assassin. In Syria an army commander would not try to take power in his own name unless the throne fell

vacant at a time when the established dynasty could provide no clear or competent heir. The more normal pattern was for the military chiefs to assume the role of an electoral college in disputed or problematic successions—when the heir was a minor, for example, or when there was more than one claimant to the throne. Moreover when the previous sovereign had expressed his will explicitly in the matter, these military conclaves almost always acted accordingly. To all appearances this same procedure continued in the Ayyubid period, and at least twice the decisions of the generals were crucial for the dynasty's future: once after the death of al-'Aziz 'Uthman (595/1198), when his designated successor was a young boy and a regent was needed, and a second time after al-Kamil's passing in Damascus in 635/1238, when the provincial government in central Syria stood vacant.

Given this tradition, it is striking that after the assassination of Turanshah (itself an unparalleled event in Ayyubid history), the military chiefs should have made so little serious effort to designate a legitimate successor to the throne. Just as important, not only the exclusively *mamluk* Bahriyya regiment, but also some of the dynasty's oldest and most respected supporters, had been involved in this event. By 648/1250 the army no longer felt compelled to secure its interests within the context of dynastic loyalty. Its electoral role now differed from that of the preceding period in a crucial respect: the amirs could not only confirm or arbitrate the succession, they might even name candidates for the throne from among their own number.

It is clear that all three lines of evolution within the governing institutions of Syria and Egypt between the early twelfth and late thirteenth centuries led insensibly but steadily to a single result: the militarization of the body politic. Civilian and religious elements were effectively excluded from the formation of state policy in favor of an army ever more narrowly recruited and more isolated from the society which it dominated. Not only did the military thus become the chief arbiter of public policy, it also made of itself the sole source of political authority. In each case it seems clear that the critical stages of

transition must have occurred during the seven decades of Ayyubid rule.

Both the transformation in the nature of territorial sovereignty and the militarization of politics represent a fundamental change in the political organization of medieval Egypt and Syria. Thus it seems ironic that they should have arisen within a framework which ought to have enshrined and fostered the old order of things. For insofar as so vital and changing an organism is subject to static definition, the Ayyubid empire was never a unitary monarchy, save during the first decade of Saladin's regime or the last ten years of al-Nasir Yusuf II. Rather it was a confederation of local principalities, each ruled by a prince of the Ayyubid house⁹ and each with its own political and strategic interests as well as its own autonomous administrative system. Although the various local princes had to be invested by the senior member of the dynasty (the sultan, as we shall call him)¹⁰ and owed him the formal allegiance expressed in the institutions of the *khutba* and *sikka*, their petty states were otherwise quite autonomous, and they resented bitterly any attempt by the sultans to meddle in their internal affairs. Each of the local principalities tended to develop its own dynastic succession, and if the sultan tried to install his own candidate, he did so at the conscious risk of civil war. The Ayyubid sultans, then, for all the prestige which they enjoyed, were properly suzerains rather than autocrats. To understand the true sources of their authority, one must examine their role within the Ayyubid family rather than their formal constitutional status.

Paralleling the looseness of the empire's constitutional structure was the lack of a stable territorial identity within its constituent principalities. Any given principality was not necessarily a contiguous mass; it was indeed quite likely to be divided into a number of scattered parts. Moreover, towns and even entire regions were exchanged wholesale among the princes, usually for transient diplomatic or strategic purposes and with little concern for geographic stability or some "natural" equilibrium. In this light an Ayyubid principality is

best defined as a group of towns and districts whose inhabitants, at a given time, owed allegiance to one prince and were subject to his officials. A principality, in short, was identified not by the regions which it comprised but by the man who ruled it.¹¹ The only places (except for Egypt) which enjoyed an on-going political identity independent of their rulers were the major cities of Syria and the Jazira, whose size, location, and prestige ensured their becoming the capitals of the more powerful princes. These urban centers did lend a certain geographical continuity to the Ayyubid principalities, for each great prince would be certain to hold one as the core of his domains. But the fact that a man was lord of Damascus or Mayyafariqin does not in itself define the other territories he ruled.

Such a political system would seem inescapably destined to ever greater fragmentation, for its only cohesive aspects were the administrative structure of the Nile Valley and the traditions of the Syro-Jaziran cities. The question confronting the modern historian is why, despite all apparent probabilities, the general political evolution was toward centralization and militarization. Unfortunately the very structure of the empire ensures that this process should appear impossibly tangled and complex. One must devise some approach which permits the presentation of all directly relevant data without obscuring the evolutionary pattern which is our chief concern. What seems altogether the most feasible approach emerges from a recognition that the Ayyubid empire was fundamentally a confederation of principalities. By focusing on the history of a single principality—its internal political structure and evolution and its changing role within the empire as a whole—one can achieve an otherwise very elusive sense of unity and continuity. But for this method to work, one must focus on a principality so in the thick of affairs that its history faithfully reflects the whole.

From this point of view, the principality of Damascus is indisputably the most useful choice. Its vital political role in the empire is clearly revealed by two facts. It was under siege no less than twelve times between 589/1193 and 658/1260; and in

six of the seven periods of serious internal conflict which the empire suffered after Saladin's death, the prince of Damascus led one of the primary factions. Moreover, Damascus was the only one of the four major Syrian principalities which never succeeded in establishing a stable, uncontested hereditary succession; on six occasions an established prince was driven from the city by his Ayyubid brethren, even when he had an unassailable right to the throne. In contrast the succession in Aleppo was never disputed, although the succession twice fell to very young minors, while Egypt witnessed a successful coup d'état only twice, in 596/1200 and 637/1240. Clearly control of Damascus was a crucial issue throughout the incessant struggles in which the Ayyubids tried—and ultimately failed—to resolve the internal tensions and contradictions of their constitutional structure.¹²

Damascus would have been an important town in any event, for among its natural dependencies were three agricultural areas of great fertility—its own superb Ghuta, the Biqa', and the plateau region east of Lake Tiberias and the upper Jordan (the Balqa', the Jaulan, and the Hauran). But Damascus owed its sometimes unenviable importance in Ayyubid affairs chiefly to its location. The major overland trade routes of southwest Asia terminated there—the roads from Anatolia, north Syria and the Jazira, and the northern end of the Persian Gulf-Euphrates River route to India—making the city the chief entrepôt for three of the leading Frankish ports (Acre, Tyre, and Beirut), although it does not seem to have played a major direct role in the Mediterranean commerce. Damascus also picked up such commerce as entered Syria by way of Aden and Mecca. Its position on the trade routes inevitably gave it a tremendous importance in the pilgrimage traffic to Mecca and Medina; it was the gathering-place for one of the three principal hajj-caravans.¹³ These facts are all well known. What has received less attention is that Damascus commanded a vital node on the military road between north Syria and the Jazira on the one hand and Egypt and Palestine on the other. At a time when the Franks controlled both the sea lanes and the coastal route,

there was really no other way to get from one region to the other. Damascus was thus condemned to play a crucial part in any struggle involving the ruler of Egypt and the Syrian princes.

Such a struggle was inevitable, for the Ayyubid sultans were not content to be *primus inter pares*. Having inherited the unifying and dominating role of Saladin, their fundamental concern was to reduce the princes' autonomy sufficiently to retain some degree of cohesion and coordination among them. The princes of course tended to see any such initiatives as a threat to be resisted. The Ayyubid civil wars, then, arose essentially out of the sultan's attempts to assert his authority over princes who felt little obligation to obey him. And because the sultan's residence was ordinarily in Cairo, these civil wars took on the secondary character of a struggle between Egypt and Syria. To control the other princes of the dynasty the sultan had to dominate the Syrian cities which were their capitals, and this in turn required him to control Damascus, either directly or through a docile client prince. From the point of view of the Syrian princes, on the other hand, Damascus was not only their last bulwark against the sultan's ambitions, but also the necessary keystone of any coalition they might assemble. It is not surprising, then, that the incessant conflicts between the sultan and the princes almost always took the form of a war between Damascus and Cairo—or that when the sultan did succeed in exerting authority over the prince of Damascus, the empire was at peace.

The political life of the Ayyubids of Damascus, therefore, accurately reflects the constitutional evolution of the empire as a whole. Obviously not every crucial event or fateful change in institutions took place within the walls of this city, but every such event and change did impinge on its history and compelled an appropriate response from its princes. Their political behavior is our best single key to understanding the slow decay and abrupt collapse of those twelfth-century attitudes and institutions which seemed to the last so integral a part of the Ayyubid empire.

I The structure of politics in the reign of Saladin

Saladin's legacy to his heirs was not merely a mass of territories brought together by force and diplomacy. It was a functioning political system—a structure of expectations, rights, and duties within which men sought power and influence. This political system had been shaped by Saladin's goals and imbued with his personality, but it did not evaporate upon his death. Indeed it gave his immediate successors a framework of attitudes and behavior within which to define their own policies and goals. It was also the initial point for the entire subsequent political evolution of the Ayyubid empire. From both points of view, then, the structure of politics under Saladin requires careful analysis—all the more as this task has not previously been undertaken in any systematic way.

Since in Muslim states politics begins with the throne, it seems best to base this analysis on an enquiry into the nature of Saladin's authority within his dominions. What measure of effective political authority did Saladin have, what powers of government was he personally able to exercise? By what means did he compel (or perhaps only encourage) obedience to his authority? And last, what groups did he enlist to support him and how did he try to bind them to himself?

By Saladin's political authority we mean specifically his capacity to control the crucial institutions of government, especially those (e.g., the army or the *iqta'* system) where there was a real possibility of resistance or rebellion. Most important in this regard were the regular armed forces. Although the bulk of his army was recruited and maintained by the princes and amirs

on the basis of the revenues yielded by their appanages and *iqta's*¹, this did not imply *in principle* that there were intermediate loyalties separating him from the ordinary soldier. In Saladin's state, as in its Seljukid and Zangid antecedents, the *iqta'* system was meant to be an administrative device only, whose purpose was to relieve the financial strain on a state which had not the monetary resources to pay the regular cash salaries required by a standing army.² In the sultan's mind, the troops raised by an amir did not represent a private army for the latter's use, but simply the fulfillment of certain administrative obligations delegated to him.³ The amirs' regiments could be used only for those purposes which Saladin had sanctioned in pursuit of his own political goals. Likewise when Saladin called out the army for a major campaign, the possibility of a refusal to participate was not entertained, and in the field he disposed forces and named unit commanders as he saw fit, with little concern to preserve the feudal identity of the army's component regiments.⁴

Obviously he suffered certain constraints. In Syria at least, a major *iqta'* implied territorial administration as well as troop supply; an amir or prince holding such a grant had to return (with his forces) to the lands under his administration for the autumn and winter. Only Saladin's personal guard could stay mobilized for extended periods of time. Saladin also had to contend with his amirs' discontent, especially after long or discouraging campaigns. Although this never degenerated into open mutiny, he could not ignore it; at crucial points in the wars of reconquest and the Third Crusade, he had to bring a hitherto promising campaign to an untimely end. But by and large, his authority among his amirs was such that he could manage campaigns of many months' duration for years on end without provoking serious dissension.

The second major aspect of Saladin's political control was that he retained exclusively in his own hands the authority to assign *iqta's* and princely appanages. Until his death all such assignments were subject to recall or modification, even those of such powerful subjects as his nephew Taqi al-Din 'Umar or

his brother al-'Adil. Moreover, although the major *iqta's* and appanages seem normally to have been granted on the presumption that their holders would transmit them in hereditary succession, all new heirs were obliged to obtain a decree or diploma of confirmation from Saladin, which he sometimes refused to give. When al-Mansur Muhammad requested confirmation in all the possessions of his father, Taqi al-Din 'Umar (late 587/1191), Saladin permitted him to succeed only to that segment of them which was politically weakest and most restrictive.⁵ Again, there were limits to Saladin's freedom of intervention; he could not afford to offend his more powerful relatives and *muqta's*, and any alteration in their status and holdings required a suitable *quid pro quo*. But the rule stands: under Saladin, all *iqta's* were held directly from him and at his discretion. There was no subinfeudation, nor any pattern of overlapping political loyalties.

Finally, in certain situations Saladin would interfere directly in the internal affairs of the appanages which he had established for the princes of his house, even though these were ordinarily considered to be self-contained and autonomous administrative units. This seems to have occurred when he doubted the prince's competence or in the case of newly conquered districts. Two examples will suffice. After recuperating from his near-fatal illness in Harran at the beginning of 582/1186, Saladin returned to Damascus, stopping in Homs to secure the administration of al-Mujahid Shirkuh, a youth of twelve who had just succeeded his father (and Saladin's cousin) Nasir al-Din Muhammad. He issued two decrees, one confirming Shirkuh in his father's territories and the second abolishing the *mukus* in al-Rahba (one of the towns included in Shirkuh's patrimony). In addition he named an amir from the Asadiyya regiment⁶ to serve as regent during the young prince's minority and a second amir to be commandant of the citadel of Homs. Finally he oversaw the proper distribution of the legacy of Shirkuh's father. The second example is Palestine following Saladin's lightning reconquest of 583/1187. Although this region was assigned to the appanage (centered on Damascus) of

Saladin's eldest son and heir-apparent as sultan, al-Afdal 'Ali, there is no evidence that al-Afdal ever had a word to say about its administration during his father's lifetime. It is not surprising that Saladin kept all these affairs in his own hands in 583/1187, when Palestine was still a military zone and his son but seventeen years of age. More worthy of note is that al-Afdal took no part in Saladin's administrative reorganization in Jerusalem and Galilee after the truce of 588/1192.⁷

By virtue of his capacity to control or at least supervise the army, the *iqta'* system, and local administration, Saladin was largely able to direct the policy-making process, whether on the scale of overall imperial evolution or of specific objectives. If there were cases where he felt it expedient to defer to the ambition and adventurism of some of his relatives or to the doubts and fears of his great amirs, it nevertheless seems clear that the empire developed according to his own ideas and purposes, and that no policy which did not contribute to his aims was long or seriously pursued.⁸

In view of the strength and comprehensiveness of Saladin's authority, which no other Ayyubid sultan, not even al-'Adil, would ever have, it is all the more remarkable that the institutional apparatus at his disposal was very weak. The *iqta'*-based organization of the Ayyubid armies meant that very few troops were under Saladin's direct command. It seems probable that the empire as a whole (excluding the Zangid and Artukid client states) could supply some 16,000 regular cavalry at the height of its expansion (ca. 582/1186). Of this figure, Saladin's guard (the *halqa*)—i.e., the troops recruited and supported from the revenues furnished by his personal estates (his *khassa*)—could never have surpassed 1000 men.⁹ Beyond this tiny corps there simply was no royal force which could be used to police or garrison the provinces of his empire. In case of rebellion, Saladin would have had no effective instrument of coercion and repression.

Nor did the civilian institutions of government allow Saladin any real control over affairs in the provinces. It does not seem that he ever established a central financial administration

which could collect and distribute in a rational manner revenues drawn from all parts of the empire. Nor did he subject the provincial financial organs to the constant and rigorous supervision which one would assume to be necessary in so vast an empire. Very probably he (or rather al-Qadi al-Fadil) did receive periodic reports from the provincial financial *diwans*, which provided him with some knowledge of the overall situation. But while this would allow him to discipline local officials if need be, the procedure still falls short of centralized financial control. Saladin apparently thought it good enough to rely on the established and internally autonomous fiscal administrations of Egypt (where the system was highly centralized and closely supervised by Cairo officials—a Fatimid legacy), Damascus, Aleppo, et al. And although we may suppose that Saladin had a privy purse (*bayt mal al-khassa*) whose revenues derived from his crown lands and could be spent at his discretion, the sources never specify anything like a true central treasury, established to supply funds for matters relevant to the empire as a whole. His practice was to have each provincial treasury meet the ordinary expenses of its region (military or otherwise). If some extraordinary need arose, Saladin simply took the necessary monies from the nearest source. When he undertook the siege of al-Karak in the autumn of 579/1183, for example, he instructed his brother al-'Adil (then his viceroy in Egypt) to join him, bringing with him his immediate family, his possessions, and his personal wealth. Saladin intended to assign his brother to the governorship of Aleppo, but when the latter arrived, he found Saladin lacking the funds to continue the siege. At his request, al-'Adil loaned him 150,000 *dinars* from his personal fortune until the situation should ease.¹⁰

In fact, the only organ of central control and surveillance at Saladin's disposal was his *diwan al-insha'*—the Chancery or Bureau of Official Correspondence. The role of this agency far surpassed the implications of its name, for (partly due to the prestige of its chief, al-Qadi al-Fadil) it functioned as a sort of combined ministry of foreign affairs and interior. And by keeping Saladin informed on the course of affairs and communi-

cating his will to the provincial governments, it established the crucial foundation for policy-making. But while “knowledge is power,” it is equally true that the Chancery could not supply Saladin with the material means to compel obedience to his policy.

If, as we have maintained, Saladin’s regime was supported by such a weak institutional framework, what was the “glue” that held his empire together, not only during the years of expansion and triumph, but also through periods of stagnation and defeat? Two plausible answers present themselves: first, that Saladin’s state had a profoundly ethical character, a sense of mission, which allowed it to overcome the rampant factionalism and petty ambition of the age; second, that Saladin’s authority ultimately rested on a complex network of personal relationships by which the ambitions of his powerful subjects were inextricably bound to his own career. These two answers are by no means contradictory. Nevertheless, the degree to which either is felt to be the “fundamental” or “predominant” element in Saladin’s success will condition our conception of the nature of politics in his time and of the relationship between his regime and that of his successors.

It is the efficacy of his political and religious idealism which has attracted by far the most scholarly attention. The strongest and most uncompromising statement of this hypothesis is Gibb’s; Saladin’s true and ultimate goal, says Gibb, was “to restore and revive the political fabric of Islam as a single united empire, not under his own rule, but by restoring the rule of the revealed law, under the direction of the Abbasid Caliphate.”¹¹ As to the means he used in pursuit of this majestic goal, Gibb asserts:

Himself neither warrior nor governor by training or inclination, he it was who inspired and gathered round himself all the elements and forces making for the unity of Islam against the invaders. And this he did . . . by his unselfishness, his humility and generosity, his moral vindication of Islam against both its enemies and professed adherents. . . . Guileless himself, he never expected and seldom understood guile in others—a weakness of which his own family and others sometimes took advantage, but

only (as a general rule) to come up at the end against his single-minded devotion, which nobody and nothing could bend, to the service of his ideals.¹²

In fact Gibb was not so awed by Saladin's idealism that he failed to see some serious flaws in his statesmanship. He notes that the amirs' growing discontent after the fall of Acre (587/1191) had tarnished his charisma and—far worse—that the behavior of his own relatives more than once nearly destroyed all he had created.¹³

Other scholars have been less certain than Gibb of Saladin's moral leadership. Sivan's recent study of the ideology of the Muslim countercrusade demonstrates conclusively that the effects of a half century of intensive propaganda on behalf of the *jihad* by Nur al-Din and Saladin evaporated almost instantly upon the latter's death.¹⁴ Though he reserves judgment as to the fundamental sincerity of these two leaders, he points out that no group, neither amirs nor '*ulama*', became independently committed to the countercrusade or made it of first importance in its scale of values. On the contrary, the amirs continued in their traditional pursuit of power and position, while the '*ulama*' concentrated on the Sunni renaissance within the lands of Islam. Interest in the countercrusade depended on the living presence of Nur al-Din and Saladin, either because of their personal examples, or, more realistically, because their policy compelled anyone who wanted political influence to go along with them.

The final step away from Gibb's apotheosis of Saladin has been taken by A. S. Ehrenkreutz, who presents Saladin as no more than another ambitious general, one whose activities left Syro-Egyptian society in a shambles from which it never entirely recovered. Far from ascribing any potency to Saladin's idealism, he asserts that "his alleged moral and religious attributes influenced neither the course of his public endeavours nor the conduct of his contemporaries" and concludes that Saladin's successes "should be attributed to his military and governmental experience, to his ruthless persecution and execution of political opponents and dissenters, to his vindictive belligerence and calculated opportunism, and to his readiness to

compromise religious ideals to political expediency.”¹⁵

The problem of Saladin’s personal sincerity may well be insoluble. Motives are hard to fathom in any case, and with Saladin the difficulty is all the greater because the duty implied by his professed goals coincided so closely with the policies which mere selfish ambition might have suggested. Nor, although his propaganda changed little throughout his reign, should we assume that he did not alter in his devotion to his publicly proclaimed mission, for the same man who had been rather diffident about confronting the Franks in the earlier phases of his career proved a steadfast and unwavering soldier throughout the three-years’ agony of the Third Crusade.

But whatever our answer to this difficult question, Sivan and Ehrenkreutz are certainly right in contending that political and religious idealism was not the major cohesive element in Saladin’s state. This must be sought among those things which conditioned the patterns of ordinary political conduct in the twelfth century. Here two matters are especially important. First, Saladin’s primary political problem was not the mobilization of mass opinion, however desirable that may have seemed in itself, but the satisfaction of the interests and ambitions of a tiny elite—and, indirectly, of the somewhat broader groups from which this elite was recruited. In simplest terms, the political elite consisted of those who had regular access to the sultan and hence some capacity to affect both the formation and execution of state policy. More narrowly it might be restricted to those who could influence any change of government, whether it took place by coup d’état or by legitimate succession. If by political participation we mean the right and capacity to have a direct role in policy-making and in the choosing of leaders, then this elite was the only politically relevant group in Syro-Egyptian society. Only after satisfying its demands could Saladin—or any ruler—turn his attention to broader segments of society.

Second, the ruler could only ensure the long-term loyalty of this elite by establishing some network of personal ties between himself and its members. These might be bonds of

personal alliance (family or marriage ties), personal dependence (master-slave or patron-client relationships), or what may be termed political dependence—i.e., where one's hopes of power and wealth were linked to the success or failure of a particular prince and would presumably be less well fulfilled under anyone else. Given the political assumptions of his age, it seems inconceivable that Saladin could have tried to rule without creating such a network of ties between himself and the disparate elements of his ruling elite. But in fact neither the composition of this elite nor his relationship to it has yet been the subject of serious study.

In Saladin's time the basic criterion for admission to the political elite was occupational; one had to be either an amir (i.e., a military officer) or a "man of the turban"—a term which included both scholars and officeholders in the civil or religious administrations.¹⁶ One group often found in traditional Islamic power structures is conspicuously absent: the officers and servants of the royal household. The reason is probably that Saladin himself was a parvenu and a mature man when he first came to power; a palace establishment therefore had no role to play in the foundation of his regime. But it is worth noting that the palace was a very important element in the government of his youthful rival in Aleppo, al-Salih Isma'il, and would likewise be so among many of the later Ayyubids.

Mere membership in the class of amirs or of *muta'ammimin* did not suffice; it merely made one part of the large pool from which the true political elite was selected. There is no way to give rigorously accurate figures in this matter, but some useful indications can be derived. Saladin's reformed Egyptian army of 577/1181 had 8640 regular cavalry, of whom 111 were amirs.¹⁷ This yields an average of one amir for every seventy-eight troopers (a figure which happens to equal the minimum size of the basic combat formation, the *tulb*). If the whole Ayyubid army of Egypt, Syria, and the Jazira totaled some 16,000 regular cavalry, we can reasonably assume the presence of about 200 amirs at any given time, by no means a large body of men. But in fact for the entire twenty-four years of

Saladin's rule we know only sixty to seventy of his amirs by name, and of these perhaps half appear to have been guiding forces in political life.

Information on the numbers of the men of the turban is necessarily even vaguer, but what we do know points to a very similar conclusion. During Saladin's regime there were 600 men of religion in Damascus alone who received some sort of official stipend. Damascus was very much the intellectual center of the empire at this time—it possessed half the *madrasas* in Nur al-Din's domains as of his death in 569/1174; thus a figure of 3000 "clergy" in Saladin's entire empire serves as a very rough guess as to the size of this body. But very few of the religious establishment could have entertained any real hope of ever getting into the political elite as such—only the *madrasa* professors and the *qadis* of the major towns, who together constituted the upper layer of the learned class. As to the civil bureaucracy, most are obscure figures of no name; only the *wazirs* of the larger Syrian towns and the chiefs of the more important Egyptian *diwans* could seriously hope to attain a position of real influence with the sultan. The whole of this elite group of scholars, jurists, and administrators could hardly have surpassed 150 persons.¹⁸ And as in the case of the amirs, the number whom we can actually show to have had political influence is much smaller: a few close advisors, such as al-Qadi al-Fadil or Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad; an occasional figure who had risen through the ranks of the bureaucracy, like Safi al-Din ibn al-Qabid; and some members of the great notable families of Damascus and Aleppo. At any one time no more than a score of the men of the turban had sufficient access to the throne to ensure that their opinions would carry weight in Saladin's councils.¹⁹

In sum, then, Saladin's political elite probably numbered some 50 individuals all told, out of the estimated 350 persons (amirs and highly placed *muta'ammimin*) who might be considered as direct candidates. As to the whole body of men—soldiers of all ranks, officials, and "clergy"—whom the elite represented and from which it was ultimately drawn, it equaled

no more than 20,000.

The occupational division of the ruling group into amirs and *muta'ammimin* was paralleled by certain social and ethnic distinctions. But here we must begin with a *caveat*: it is commonly assumed that in Saladin's period the *muta'ammimin* were a long-established indigenous aristocracy, whose power was based on its religious leadership and its large-scale mercantile and landowning interests, while the amirs were aliens and parvenus—*mamluks*, or Kurdish or Türkmen interlopers. This view has some merit, of course. Examples of a deep-rooted native religious aristocracy can be seen in such families as the Banu al-'Adim and the Banu al-'Ajami of Aleppo, or the Qurashis, the Banu 'Asakir, the Shirazis, and the Banu al-Munajja of Damascus. Concerning the mercantile connections of the religious notables, we may note that the *faqih* Jamal al-Din ibn Rawaha, killed by the Franks outside Acre in 586/1190, was almost certainly a relative of the great merchant Zaki al-Din ibn Rawaha (d. 622/1225), who founded important *madrasas* in Aleppo and Damascus. Or, finally, it is interesting to learn that part of al-Qadi al-Fadil's vast income derived from his interests in the India and Maghribi trade.²⁰ As far as the amirs are concerned, there is absolutely no question that many of the most important in Saladin's time were indeed *mamluks* or Kurdish immigrants—the point is too clear to require specific documentation here.

Impressive as this evidence may seem, however, equally weighty proofs can be cited to suggest that the military class and the *muta'ammimin* were by no means sharply distinct entities during the second half of the twelfth century. Dominique Sourdel has already pointed out that a very large proportion of the *madrasa* professors in Aleppo between ca. 550/1155 and 650/1252 were "Easterners"—i.e., scholars from Kurdistan, upper Mesopotamia, and Iran—no less, in fact, than 57 out of 113, or 50.5 percent.²¹ And every encouragement was given to such new arrivals by the state. Nur al-Din undertook the Madrasa 'Adiliyya Kubra expressly on behalf of the newly arrived Hanafi *faqih* Qutb ad-Din an-Nisaburi and built *madrasas*

in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Baalbek for Sharaf al-Din ibn Abi 'Asrun, a famed Shafi'i jurist of Mosul whom Nur al-Din invited to come to Aleppo in 545/1150–51.²² The bulk of the new arrivals probably entered Syria in the time of Nur al-Din, but even if (as seems to be the case) the current did slow under Saladin, these men continued to represent a new element, only partly integrated into the established religious aristocracy of Syria and Egypt. They derived their social influence not from local family connections, but from their religious and intellectual prestige and from the official support which they received. It is true that many of these immigrants soon became ensconced in the local religious aristocracy, but that occurred after Saladin's generation.

The case of the civil bureaucracy is altogether less clear, so that we can only propose a few probable hypotheses. The great figures of the Egyptian bureaucracy all appear to have been Egyptians by birth and education, albeit there were men whose ancestors had come from Palestine in the days when that region was still a Fatimid province. The reason for this inbred character of the Egyptian bureaucracy probably lies in the unique intricacy of its procedures, which newcomers could not easily master, and perhaps also in an exceptionally strong hereditary tendency among its officials. It may be noted in contrast that Saladin's Egypt was certainly not resistant to outsiders in her *madrasas*, courts, and military establishment. Syria presents a rather more mixed profile, insofar as we can say anything definite about her administration. To some extent, clearly, the indigenous bureaucrats and notable families (e.g., the ubiquitous Banu al-'Ajami of Aleppo) continued to hold their own under the new regime. But there was also an influx of new men, some of them from Egypt, coming in Saladin's entourage as he occupied Syria, and some of them from the old Seljukid territories of Iraq and al-Jibal, who were both discouraged by the political and administrative decay of their homelands and attracted by the prospects of Nur al-Din's and Saladin's Syria. Unfortunately we can say nothing as to their numbers or the proportion of newcomers to native officials. One can only point

out that Saladin's two highest-ranking administrators were both foreigners to Syria—al-Qadi al-Fadil of Egypt and 'Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani of southern Iraq. Presumably, the would-be bureaucrats attracted to each man's entourage included a number of his own relatives and countrymen.²³

In dealing with the amirs we must make a sharp distinction between Egypt and Syria. The Ayyubid amirs—indeed the entire military establishment—constituted an unequivocally foreign body grafted onto Egyptian society. The Fatimid army which Saladin had inherited in 564/1169 was quickly disbanded, partly through brutal massacre, in order to make room for the Turco-Kurdish forces with whom he had come to Egypt and who had raised him to power.²⁴ The new army was at once smaller and more effective than the old. There is no reason to doubt that its chiefs administered their *iqta's* as well as had their Fatimid counterparts, but at least at the outset, during Saladin's reign, it had no roots or historical ties whatever with the country which it would henceforth defend and dominate.

The situation in Syria was far more complex, although Saladin's forces there were organized on much the same principles as his Egyptian army (for which Syria had in fact provided the model) and even included many of the same amirs at various times during their careers. The Syrian military structure dated back to the turn of the sixth/twelfth century and as an institution was thus well integrated into the life of the region.²⁵ Moreover the Syrian amirate of Saladin's day had a partially hereditary character: several were men whose ancestors had risen to prominence in the time of Zangi—as had, of course, Saladin's own forebears. One can say that there existed a small, fairly recent, but well-established hereditary military aristocracy in Syria, to which belonged Saladin himself, his relatives on both sides, and about a dozen other amirial families who held important administrative *iqta's* in Syria and the Jazira.²⁶

These families were variously *mamluks*, *Türkmen*, or (less commonly) Kurdish. They did not constitute a closed caste by any means; rather, the assumption was that new amirs, whatever their origin, could expect to be assimilated to this class as

they rose in status and influence. They too could bequeath to their descendents their rank and—in principle—their *iqta's* as well. While it is dangerous to exaggerate—this hereditary aristocracy was still in process of formation in Saladin's time, and its members remained closely dependent on the sultan—nevertheless it provided an instrument of assimilation for newcomers, and its existence meant that the military elite had long-term interests in and commitments to Syrian society. The army's ethnic composition provided another point of contact between it and the indigenous population, for it contained substantial numbers of Kurds, enrolled both as individual soldiers of fortune and as tribal units.²⁷ Many, of course, were rough tribesmen, mountaineers and pastoralists who could have had little in common with the agriculturalists and sophisticated townsmen of Syria. But it must be remembered that the Kurds had been Islamized for centuries and that they had a sufficiently developed political tradition to have enabled them to found a series of successful dynasties in Diyar Bakr, Armenia, and Azerbaijan during the tenth and eleventh centuries. Moreover the existence of numerous Kurds in the Syrian religious establishment provided yet another bridge between Kurdish soldiers and local society. In short the Kurdish element in the military faced no real barriers to integration within the Syrian social and political structure.²⁸ Obviously the Syrian amirs did enjoy a unique status in the political system—not only because they held the monopoly of force, or because they were in effect the executive and police arm in urban and provincial government, but because Saladin's doctrine of *jihad* made them the very kernel of the state. Likewise the Turkish and Kurdish ethnic makeup of the amirate contrasted with that of the men of the turban, which was generally Arab (Syrian, Egyptian, and Jaziran) with a Kurdish and Iranian admixture. Nevertheless the Syrian amirs had too longstanding and widespread a connection with the indigenous society for us to call them a self-contained alien elite superimposed upon it.

Because Saladin's political elite was so disparate a body, he clearly could not ensure its loyalty by any one set of relation-

ships, nor did every subgroup within it present the same problems for his authority. On the most general level of difference, that between the amirs and the *muta'ammimin*, the former group's control of the army meant that it would always pose a direct and immediate threat to his regime—not to mention his life. The men of the turban had by themselves no means to do this. Those in the religious establishment could seriously embarrass Saladin by publicly calling him to account for his actions; they could also undercut his claims to be the true spiritual heir of Nur al-Din by refusing him moral and propaganda support. But lacking access to military force, they were not a direct threat to his regime.²⁹

The military class in itself was no more a unity than the political elite as a whole. Three subgroups in particular can be distinguished: 1) the free-born amirs, consisting of the Kurds, the Türkmén, and the hereditary amirial families (whose forebears of course were often of *mamluk* origin); 2) the *mamluk* amirs, usually Turkish freedmen who had been imported as youths from the pagan nations of Central Asia (most commonly the Kipchak),³⁰ but including a certain number of Rumis—i.e., Armenians and Anatolian Greeks—as well; 3) and Saladin's relatives. Had Saladin not become sultan, of course, his family would have enjoyed no particular importance, but since he did, they have a special status. Not only were they his most partisan adherents, they were also his intended heirs. The study of his relationships with them is thus the study of the origins of the Ayyubid constitution.

Among the free-born amirs the Kurds would seem the most dependent on Saladin's success for the progress of their own fortunes. He too was a Kurd, after all, and under his aegis they might hope for broader opportunities in rank, estates, and political influence than they could otherwise expect in the predominantly Turkish dynasties of the age. Conversely his regime might well have appeared to them a shield which could protect them against the ethnocentrism and racial prejudice of the Turks. That ethnic consciousness and friction did exist in Saladin's reign there can be no doubt. Saladin obtained the

Fatimid vizierate partly on the strength of it. After Shirkuh's death, Saladin's close associate Diya' al-Din 'Isa al-Hakkari (a Kurd) visited the leaders of each faction contending for power to try to win them over to the election of Saladin, and to one Kurdish amir (Qutb al-Din Khusrau b. al-Talal) he used the following argument: "Verily, everybody is for Saladin except you and al-Yaruqi [a Türkmen amir from the north Syrian Yürük tribe]. What is needed now, above all, is an understanding between you and Saladin, especially because of his Kurdish origin, so that the command does not go from him to the Turks."³¹ It is worth noting that within a few months of Saladin's elevation, all the Turkish amirs had returned to Syria save those in the late Shirkuh's Asadiyya corps.³² There is more than this: Saladin was at least twice subjected to taunts about his origins by the Turkish soldiers of Mosul, and in one passage of his *al-Barq al-Shami* 'Imad al-Din indulges in a lengthy attack on the Kurdish troops of the Artukids. Treachery on the part of a group of Kurds among its defenders enabled Saladin to take Sinjar in 578/1182. Most indicative of all is the letter submitted to Saladin by his amirs as he was trying to prepare the defense of Jerusalem against the expected attack of Richard Coeur-de-Lion: "If you wish us to remain [here], then either you or one of your family should be present with us, so that we may rally together around him. Otherwise, the Kurds will not be subject to the Turks, nor the Turks to the Kurds."³³ None of this suggests deep-seated hatred; the Kurds did not have to worry about massacre or expulsion. But the undeniable mutual jealousy of Turk and Kurd suggests that the apparent Kurdish fear of being relegated to an inferior status was not unjustified.³⁴

If the Kurds expected Saladin's patronage and protection, they had no reason to be disappointed. That he recruited them in considerable numbers appears not only from the numerous Kurdish amirs who appear in the chronicles, but also from the fact that in his later armies at least (the period 583/1187–588/1192) there were independently organized contingents from four tribes—the Hakkaris, the Humaydis, the Zarzaris, and the Mihranis. Among the Kurdish amirs Diya' al-Din 'Isa al-Hak-

kari, was one of his closest counselors, while another Hakkari, Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Ahmad al-Mashtub, had been prominent since Saladin's election to the Fatimid vizierate—an office for which he himself had been a candidate for a brief time. Finally we may mention Husam al-Din Abu-l-Hayja' al-Hadhbani (called al-Samin, "the Obese"), the first commandant of Saladin's Salahdiyya regiment and later a prominent figure in the defense of Acre.³⁵

But one must be cautious. Even if Gibb is correct in asserting (for he cites no evidence) that Saladin's armies contained a much higher proportion of Kurds than had those of his master Nur al-Din,³⁶ it is still true that Saladin relied on other elements quite as much as on the Kurds and that he was no innovator either in recruiting large numbers of Kurds or in raising them to high rank. Indeed he even singled out his Kurdish troops for special punishment for their role in the humiliating defeat of Mont Gisard (573/1177).³⁷ As for favoritism in the distribution of *iqta's*, not only is there no evidence that the Kurds benefited from such a policy, but it even seems doubtful that any of them ever received *iqta's* to match the largest of those held by Turkish free-born amirs.³⁸ Large-scale recruitment of Kurds began in fact with Zangi, who even undertook to subjugate the mountainous Hakkari region north of Mosul to facilitate this object, and Nur al-Din continued his father's policy. Saladin's father Ayyub and uncle Shirkuh were considerable figures even under Zangi, while Nur al-Din established them in positions of immense power and influence. Even among the three Kurdish amirs most prominent in Saladin's time, two of them—Diya' al-Din 'Isa al-Hakkari and Sayf al-Din 'Ali al-Mashtub—were high-ranking and influential officers before the Egyptian expedition of 564/1168–9 which eventually brought Saladin to power.³⁹ Undoubtedly Saladin's relations with his Kurdish amirs were strengthened by common race and the broad role in affairs which he gave them. But since their rise to influence had begun and progressed nicely well before his time, this cannot be the whole story.

Something of the same problem faces us in dealing with the other groups comprising the free-born amirs: we can detect

certain bonds between them and Saladin, but nothing that would in itself ensure their loyalty to his regime. Saladin's relationship to these free-born amirs (whether their ancestors had been *mamluks* or Türkmén) was particularly ticklish, not because they considered him in any sense an outsider, but precisely because he was one of them. He had no better right to the throne than any of them, nor any claim on their gratitude—they, like Saladin himself, owed all that they were to those same Zangids whom he had dispossessed. How, then, was he to justify his position and make himself acceptable as their master? To a limited extent, he availed himself of marriage alliances, which both created a familial bond (not always reliable) and constituted an open recognition of their high status. Among the most important examples are Saladin's own marriage in 572/1176 with 'Ismat al-Din, daughter of the former dictator of Damascus Mu'in al-Din Anar (d. 544/1149) and the sister of Saladin's leading supporter among the Syrian amirs, Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud b. Anar; and the marriage of Saladin's sister Rabi'a Khatun with the same Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud, and then after his death in 581/1185 with Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri, at that time lord of Harran and Edessa.⁴⁰ By itself, of course, such a policy was bound to be insufficient, not only because of a shortage of Ayyubid princesses, but also because it did not give the amirs the material rewards of power, on which political loyalty in twelfth-century Egypt and Syria ultimately depended. Saladin had to assure the Turkish free-born amirs (and many Kurdish and *mamluk* amirs as well) that they had nothing to fear and much to gain by supporting his regime.

In some cases his task could not have been a difficult one; others demanded the most tactful diplomacy. For the Banu al-Dayā—and they were not alone—the rise of Saladin was in the nature of a deliverance rather than a threat. At the death of Nur al-Din, this group of three brothers had been one of the most powerful in Syria. They controlled the administration and police of Aleppo, while their *iqta's* included 'Ayntab, 'Azaz, Tall Bashir, Harim, Qal'at Ja'bar, and Shayzar—i.e., fortresses that stood astride the major roads leading to Aleppo from all

four directions. But in the coup d'état of 569/1174 which made Sa'd al-Din Gümüshtigin the chief power in Aleppo, they were thrown into prison and stripped of all their lands. Only by virtue of Saladin's intervention did they obtain their release, for this was one of the conditions of peace in his treaty with Aleppo in 572/1176. The Banu al-Daya never entirely recovered their former grandeur, possibly because the two elder and more powerful (Shams al-Din 'Ali and Badr al-Din Hasan) may have died before Saladin gained control of their former territories in 579/1183. Nevertheless Shayzar was restored to the youngest, Sabiq al-Din 'Uthman, who also played a prominent role in the reconquest and the Third Crusade.⁴¹

The case of Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam presented Saladin with a more delicate challenge. Soon after occupying Damascus in the autumn of 570/1174, Saladin awarded Shams al-Din the valuable *iqta'* of Baalbek, probably as a reward for his instrumental role in establishing the sultan in Syria. This *iqta'* seems not to have been the ordinary unilateral and revocable grant, but rather a kind of private treaty between the two men. In the summer of 574/1178 Saladin's older brother al-Mu'azzam Turanshah demanded the surrender of Baalbek to himself. The sultan felt obliged to accede to this awkward request, but Shams al-Din refused to step down despite Saladin's offer of a generous substitute. In the end Saladin was reduced to leading his army against Baalbek, and by the following winter Shams al-Din was compelled to surrender. The striking thing is that at this point the latter neither fled to the service of another sovereign nor stood trial as a rebel. He received a new *iqta'*, hardly less desirable than his old one (Barin, Kafartab, certain villages in the district of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, and probably Apamea), and lost nothing of his high status and influence with the sultan. Indeed in 578/1182 he was given the sensitive position of viceroy in Damascus, a post which had been held exclusively by Saladin's relatives since 570/1174.⁴² The rebellion of Shams al-Din was a crucial test for Saladin: on the one hand, he could not permit any amir to oppose his authority; on the other, he could not be seen to be

penalizing a man to whom he owed much and who was merely defending his rights. Had he failed in either respect, he would have lost the loyalty of the hereditary amirs at least and perhaps of any who were in some sense independent of him.

A priori one might surmise that Saladin's authority vis-à-vis the *mamluk* amirs must have been far stronger and more immediate. As Ayalon has demonstrated, the ties binding the *mamluk* to his *ustadh* or *sayyid* are among the most powerful known to us in medieval Islamic societies, and they were in no way weakened by the act of manumission, but remained intact throughout the lifetimes of the two principals.⁴³ From a purely political point of view as well, the *mamluk* or freedman was heavily dependent on his master, for in him rested all his hopes of advancement. A *mamluk* who abandoned or betrayed his master was like a man without a country—no other patron could trust him, nor even admit him without injuring the prospects (and hence sapping the loyalty) of his own *mamluks*. On the other hand once a *mamluk's* master was dead, his loyalty was not necessarily transferred intact to the latter's son, let alone more distant relatives. In this situation *mamluks* and freedmen became much more unreliable, and their loyal service required suitable outlays of money and power.⁴⁴

It is therefore surprising to learn that Saladin's own *mamluks* played a relatively small part in affairs of state until the very end of his reign; we do not find them awarded the major *iqta's* and governorships, nor used in sensitive diplomatic missions, nor assigned high field commands, nor appearing in the sultan's councils. One reason for this may be that Saladin purchased no *mamluks* on his own account until he became Fatimid *wazir* and undertook to form his own Salahdiyya regiment. Thus even the slave youths entering his service at the outset (in 564/1169) would not have attained sufficient experience and maturity for high office until the last years of his regime. But even so, of the *fifteen* amirs who enjoyed the greatest long-term prominence in affairs under Saladin, only *one*—Husam al-Din Sungur al-Khilati—was his own *mamluk*.⁴⁵

This is not tantamount to declaring that the *mamluk* amirs

had no importance in Saladin's time, however, for among these fifteen amirs, six were originally *mamluks*. Two had been Nur al-Din's men, two Asad al-Din Shirkuh's, and one Najm al-Din Ayyub's. We have already noted that the relationship between a *mamluk* and his master's son was relatively weak, while the two Nuri amirs would have had no personal bond whatsoever with Saladin. Their loyalty was purely political in character. As for Baha' al-Din Karakush al-Asadi, he had been instrumental in obtaining for Saladin the Fatimid vizierate, so in a sense the sultan owed him an equal debt. And although Sayf al-Din Yazkuch attained his greatest prominence under Saladin's aegis, he was already a high-ranking and powerful figure at the time of his accession; he could have made his way in the world without him. Saladin was thus compelled to treat these *mamluk* amirs with much the same deference he showed to the hereditary group if he expected to retain their services.

In summarizing the bonds between Saladin and all the various classes of his amirs a curious fact emerges—none of them was entirely subject to those ties of personal dependence or alliance which, within the value system of his society, were thought most likely to induce loyalty and obedience. Moreover it seems unlikely that Saladin's personal status and prestige—at least in the opening years of his reign—was perceptibly greater than that of many of his great amirs; nor, as a usurper himself, could he hope to gain much from the majesty of his office. But despite this, all three amirial groups provided him with reliable and even devoted servants. There seems to be something of a paradox here, and it is only when one ceases to regard the groups of amirs as isolated entities and tries to see them as parts of a functioning political system that a satisfactory solution emerges. For viewed in this latter context Saladin's amirs were linked to him by very clear bonds of political dependence.

This political dependence proceeded in the first instance from Saladin's personal qualities and political skill. The sources (even Ibn al-Athir) unanimously attest his generosity, his patience, and his tact. How well these served him can be seen by recalling the affair of Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, and it

only remains to add that they indicate less his simplicity and naiveté—as Gibb would have it⁴⁶—than his astuteness. His extravagant generosity to those around him, though undoubtedly fiscally irresponsible, was also a widely used and much-esteemed political device for ensuring the loyalty of doubtful supporters; it had even received Koranic sanction under the name *ta'lif al-qulub*—“the winning-over of hearts.”⁴⁷ His oft-noted reluctance to examine the activities of his provincial governors and administrators too closely was likewise more the product of calculation than of carelessness. Or at least even when he did learn of some malfeasance, he moved to punish the guilty official only in certain circumstances. Two anecdotes from 'Imad al-Din will establish the point:

. . . at the beginning of my journey with him [Saladin] to Egypt in 572 [1176], an accounting was demanded of his *sahib al-diwan* to cover the period of his term in office. The audit of his books indicated a deficit of 70,000 *dinars*. [The sultan] neither sought nor mentioned [this sum], and caused him to think that he knew nothing of it, although the *sahib al-diwan* did not deny it. . . . Nor was [the sultan] pleased to dismiss him, but put him in charge of the *diwan al-jaysh*.⁴⁸

Safi al-Din ibn al-Qabid [Saladin's Intendant of the Treasury in Damascus, 584/1188] had constructed for the sultan a residence in the Citadel overlooking the two *sharafs*. He had spent a great deal on it, and went to extremes in embellishing and beautifying it, supposing that the sultan would be most gratified. But he did not so much as glance at it, and did not think it a good thing. And this was but one of his offenses in the sultan's eyes which compelled his removal from the *diwan*. [The sultan] said, “What good are mansions to him who expects to die? We were created only for God's service and to strive for eternal joy. We did not come to Damascus to reside permanently, and we do not desire never to leave again.”⁴⁹

The first example concerns corruption or misadministration of a kind which only a few persons would ever know about; by making little of it, Saladin could retain the services—and reinforce the sense of gratitude—of a presumably valued official. In the second case, however, Saladin's public image as the disinterested protagonist of the *jihad* and the Sunni faith stood

to be seriously compromised by Safi al-Din's new palace. A warrior of God could not well appear to be a man devoted to luxury. Where Saladin's public reputation was at stake, in short, official misbehavior could not be condoned. This is not to say that Saladin was a cynic; the sources give us little direct insight into his motives. Nevertheless he was of necessity a politician and had to make a politician's choices. His generosity and forbearance were attractive qualities in themselves, but they were also of great political utility. Sometimes he had to decide whether to be guided by his natural inclinations or by the demands of strict justice, and his decision was at least partly conditioned by needs of state.

Saladin's personal qualities were important not only in dealing with individual cases, but also in handling his amirs as a body. He might have tried to exploit the latent rivalries between the disparate groups composing his amirate in order to neutralize the powers of each—a commonplace in the theory and practice of medieval Muslim states⁵⁰—but the evidence is that he tried to tamp down such feelings. Each group could be confident that its chiefs were heard by the sultan, that it would receive a reasonable share of the *iqta's* and governorships, that it would not be shunted aside in favor of some other group. For Saladin the political benefits of such a policy were immense: his treatment of individuals meant that he had to face only a few cases of personal discontent, and even if some disgruntled amir had tried to mount a conspiracy against him, he would have found no faction at hand to support him.

It was of course much to Saladin's advantage that he was the only political leader in the region who had both the personality and the political insight to establish such a relationship with his amirs. Sa'd al-Din Gümüshtigin opened his brief career as dictator of Aleppo by imprisoning a number of amirs and alienating several others who should have been among the most loyal supporters of the Zangid house. By the same token when 'Izz al-Din Mas'ud of Mosul and his chief advisor Muja-hid al-Din Kiymaz occupied Aleppo in 577/1182, they could not avoid favoring their own Mosul amirs over the Aleppan

Nuriyya, with consequent discontent and at least one important defection to Saladin.⁵¹ In the face of such treatment Saladin's generosity and equitableness were bound to seem more attractive than the duty of loyalty to the house of Zangi.

The political bond which Saladin's personal qualities created was a strong and effective one, but by itself it could not have sufficed. Saladin's amirs were ambitious men, after all, and like most professional soldiers in a position to choose their master, they would serve the man who assured them the richest rewards. Had Saladin been the chief of a small passive state—a comfortable but stagnant backwater—it is doubtful that he could long have retained the services of most of his amirs. The reality was quite the opposite, of course: from the outset his kingdom was clearly the most vigorous and dynamic power in the Nile Valley and Fertile Crescent. Even before Nur al-Din's death, he had undertaken important conquests in Nubia, Libya, and the Yemen, and within two years of that event, he was the master of all Syria save Aleppo, itself reduced nearly to the status of a client state. For a man of ambition, then, by far the brightest prospects lay with Saladin. There was little temptation, and it grew less with each passing year, to abandon Saladin's cause for that of Aleppo or Mosul, whose spheres of influence were constantly shrinking and were at last absorbed into the Ayyubid orbit.

But to participate in Saladin's success was to implicate oneself and one's whole future in it. By defecting or rebelling, one would not only cut oneself off from a constantly developing set of opportunities, but one would even threaten the entire edifice of newly secured interests (in land and political power) which the amirs now enjoyed. Having joined Saladin's service, an amir had no viable choice save to continue in it, at least during the years of imperial expansion. But if Saladin's success was his surest guarantee of the amirs' loyalty, would not failure and stagnation loosen the bond between them? If Saladin's service no longer seemed the only way—or even a very promising way—to attain one's ambitions, would not the inherent egotism and adventurism of most amirs resurface and lead to serious

tensions and political breakdown? Certainly this is suggested by the events of the Third Crusade. The Armenian adventure of Taqi al-Din 'Umar in 587/1191 and the amirs' reluctance to commit themselves to Jerusalem's defense in the summer of 588/1192 both imply that the amirs were no longer so ready to identify their interests with those of Saladin. Although the sultan emerged from the struggle with his territorial possessions almost intact, the political bond woven by the years of triumph was already somewhat frayed.⁵²

The system of loyalties created by Saladin thus rested equally on successful expansion and on his perceptiveness in dealing both with individuals and the disparate groups among his amirs. Expansion bound the amirs to his cause because it promised material reward, and this bond grew all the more effective as Saladin became the only prince in the region able to offer such inducements on a grand scale. But in the inevitable rivalries and disappointed hopes which accompany rapid imperial expansion, or in the face of frustration and defeat, a material tie of this kind was subject to quick dissolution. It was the cement of personal trust and mutual obligation which could (at least in part) sustain the commitment of his amirs under such circumstances.

But in this system of loyalties, remarkably solid and stable though it proved under Saladin himself, there was nothing which could be transmitted to a successor: events could not be ordered by an act of will into the favorable configuration of Saladin's reign, nor could his response to the needs, interests, and personalities of the amirs be duplicated by a man of necessarily different endowments. His death would inevitably cause the collapse of the particular set of loyalties which had heretofore bound the amirs to the throne. To create a new set would require new principles of loyalty. Given the political conceptions of the time, one would expect such principles to be quite as *ad hoc* and subjective as Saladin's, but there was also the possibility that his successors would begin to search for bonds of a more impersonal, institutional kind.

2 The origins of the Ayyubid confederation

The emergence of the principalities

One of the more tangled aspects of Saladin's history concerns his dealings with his own family. On the one hand their ties to him were more permanent and compelling than those between him and any amir. The fact of kinship created the possibility of a kind of moral solidarity which (at its best) surpassed any other known to traditional Islamic societies in strength and effectiveness. This natural bond, moreover, was strongly reinforced by the political dependence of Saladin's family on him. Without him most of the Ayyubids would probably have remained obscure troopers in the service of some Zangid prince. Finally, his relatives held a unique place in his policy, since one of his chief aims was to secure the succession in his dominions for them. He was their hope of future glory; they his one hope for a state that could outlive him.¹

However, Saladin's relatives were a numerous clan, proud and talented men with high ambitions of their own. As members of his family and his most partisan adherents, they would naturally expect rewards commensurate with their status and services. At the same time he had to ensure that by the time of his death they dominated the positions of power within the empire, for as a usurper himself he could hardly rely on the principle of dynastic succession to secure his heirs' authority. His task, then, was to accomplish these things without simultaneously surrendering his own capacity to control affairs. It was in working out this problem, and not by long-term, sys-

tematic planning, that Saladin evolved the distinctive Ayyubid constitution which he would bequeath in 589/1193.

From a constitutional point of view, his solution to this problem represents a transition from a unitary monarchy to a confederation of petty principalities—or rather, the division of his kingdom into the set of appanages which were the nuclei of the later Ayyubid principalities. In this process Saladin's relatives were converted from generals and administrators into autonomous princes (at least in principle). Paradoxically Saladin's own position as head of state was markedly strengthened in this process; by 582/1186 his authority was far less open to challenge from his relatives than in 570/1174.

During his first years in Egypt (564/1169–569/1174), Saladin's state-building suffered severe constraints. First of all he was only Nur al-Din's lieutenant during this period. Though the latter could seldom get Saladin to do what he wanted, he at least set limits to his ambitions and was a standing threat to oust him from Egypt. Beyond his uncertain legal status, Saladin had also to face the constant danger of Frankish attacks on Egypt and of rebellion by the remnants of the Fatimid establishment, who bitterly resented the new regime.² Under such circumstances he was bound to be more concerned with consolidating his immediate position than attempting a permanent organization of his state, and in attaining this goal his family was of first importance.

A key element in Saladin's seizure of power, was his assignment of vast tracts of the Nile Valley in *iqta'* to his Syrian troops. In Saladin's Egypt a small *iqta'* was properly an administrative device to ensure an adequate living allowance to the soldier who held it; it is not even clear that an assignee of this class was responsible for the direct administration of the lands granted him. The larger *iqta's*, those granted to the senior amirs, did require such direct administration (though always under the control of the central financial offices in Cairo) and in addition called for the *muqta'* to maintain a specified number of regular cavalry out of his revenues. The largest *iqta's* were in effect provincial governorships, but included the duties of the smaller assignments as

well. By introducing this system Saladin was able to place control of Egypt's land, revenues, and military machine into a few loyal hands without disrupting the country's complex central administration. Of the seven adult relatives with him during these years, we know the *iqta's* of two only—but that is enough to confirm the strength of his grip on Egypt's resources: between them his father, Najm al-Din Ayyub, and older brother al-Mu'azzam Turanshah held *iqta's* valued at one million *dinars* per annum. The former governed vital parts of the Delta: Alexandria, Damietta, and the Buhayra province; while the latter's chief holdings were the upper Egyptian provinces of Qus and Aswan.³

In addition to their great role in the civil government of Egypt, Saladin's family provided the military commanders who tided his regime over the incessant crises of his Egyptian years. Al-Mu'azzam Turanshah crushed the Sudanese rebellion in Cairo in the summer of 564/1169, defeated the Nubian invasion of upper Egypt during a winter campaign in 568/1172-73, and led the successful Yemen expedition of winter-spring 569/1174. Saladin's maternal uncle Shihab al-Din al-Harimi conducted the mopping-up operations in upper Egypt against the Sudanese rebels and was co-commandant (together with Taqi al-Din 'Umar) of the Damietta garrison during the abortive crusader attack against this strategic port in the autumn of 565/1169. His younger brother al-'Adil put down a serious pro-Fatimid rebellion in upper Egypt in the late summer of 570/1174 in a quick and well-conducted campaign. As for Saladin's nephew (but near contemporary, for he was only two years younger) Taqi al-Din 'Umar, he was perhaps the guiding spirit in the Libyan expedition of 568/1173; at least it was undertaken largely with his troops and under the command of his *mamluk*, Sharaf al-Din Karakush. Saladin's father was by this time too old for active military command, but he appears as one of the most influential of his son's advisors until his accidental death in Dhu'l-Hijja 568/August 1173. Among the non-Ayyubid amirs during this period, only Baha' al-Din Karakush seems to have been remotely as powerful as the preceding figures, and he had been a *mamluk* of Asad al-Din Shirkuh.⁴

Never again during Saladin's reign would his relatives so dominate affairs of state, nor would he ever be so dependent on one homogeneous group for his political survival. Moreover three of his family were his seniors not only in age, but in experience and prestige—viz., Najm al-Din Ayyub, Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, and al-Mu'azzam Turanshah.⁵ Under such circumstances Saladin could not compel these men to serve purposes which they found uncongenial. Though no mere puppet of his family, he was a rallying point for their ambitions, and his authority would be recognized only insofar as his policy was based on these ambitions. Turanshah especially appears to have been casting about for a career in his own right, and among all the complex motives and calculations which led to the Yemen expedition of 569/1174, his intense desire to carve out a kingdom for himself was clearly a direct and immediate cause. It throws additional light on Turanshah's role in affairs that Saladin thought it important to have his older brother out of Egypt during this period, even at the cost of critically weakening the country's army, lest he interfere with the planned suppression of a newly discovered pro-Fatimid conspiracy.⁶ The role of Saladin's father was quite different, for his career was coming to a close, and he needed no new worlds to conquer. Indeed he acted as a brake on his son's hopes for greater independence of action. Nur al-Din had sent him, we are told, to be his man in Cairo, and Saladin could not refuse all honor and deference to this immense figure, who was not only his father but also one of the oldest and most powerful of the Zangid amirs. His offer to surrender the vizierate to Ayyub was probably only a charade, but Ayyub's immense power cannot be gainsaid; in addition to his vast *iqta's* in the Delta, he served as Saladin's vice gerent during the latter's occasional absences from Cairo and was overseer of the central financial offices—a position which in effect gave him the supervision of all the *iqta's* in Egypt.⁷ Ayyub's status and influence are confirmed by a well-known passage in Ibn al-Athir: in the course of a council in Cairo in the autumn of 567/1171, when an invasion of Egypt by Nur al-Din seemed imminent, he gave his son a severe

tongue-lashing for having so much as contemplated resistance and claimed that he would himself behead him if Nur al-Din so ordered. The story seems apocryphal and was probably never meant to be taken literally,⁸ but Ibn al-Athir's choice of Ayyub as his protagonist—one whom he allows publicly to humiliate Saladin—implies that contemporaries at least thought the old amir to be the dominant figure of Egyptian politics.

Saladin's personal standing was thus somewhat improved by his father's accidental death, however much his guidance must have been missed, and the removal of Turanshah to Yemen the following winter lifted another constraint on his authority within Egypt. But only with the passing of Nur al-Din (11 Shawwal 569/15 May 1174) was Saladin's political situation fundamentally altered. And with the vast new prospects that opened before him, there were new roles he could assign his family.

As before, his political relationship with them during the twelve years of expansion into Syria and the Jazira was partly determined by external circumstances and by his overall policy needs. The fundamental new determinant was rapid and indefinite territorial expansion, accomplished largely at the expense of neighboring Muslim dynasties—the Zangids of Aleppo and Mosul, in the first instance, but also the Artukids of Diyar Bakr and even (for a short time) the Rum Seljukids. This implied in itself that there could be no serious attempt to organize a permanent administration; the situation was too fluid, the ultimate result not clearly visible, and Saladin needed to be able to shift his generals and administrators at will, according to the needs of the moment.

But the Ayyubid expansion contained a second and perhaps more important implication. When Saladin had established his regime in Egypt, he had been dealing not only with a heretical and decadent dynasty but also with the overinflated, militarily valueless army which supported it. In ridding himself of the Fatimid dynasty, he did not have to try to win the chiefs of the existing Egyptian army over to his cause or to make a place for them within the new state. Quite the opposite: his

first order of business even as Fatimid *wazir* was to eliminate the old army in favor of one new both in organization and personnel. But the amirs of the Zangid armies could not be alienated or shunted aside in favor of some new group. Saladin had in fact no choice in this matter, on either material or moral grounds. By drawing the Zangid amirs into his own service he would sap the strength of his opponents, and since his Egyptian forces, totaling some 10,000 regular cavalry, were altogether too small for the tasks he had set himself (especially in view of Egypt's own security needs), the Zangid amirs were a crucial reinforcement to his military power. Moreover the armies created by Zangi and Nur al-Din constituted the finest military machine in the Fertile Crescent, and it was quite natural that Saladin should have wished to incorporate them into his own forces. Morally Saladin claimed that his regime was endowed with an ethical purpose, that of uniting the forces of Islam for the struggle against heresy and the infidel. He further claimed that he was the only prince of his day so motivated, hence that he alone was the true heir of his master Nur al-Din. But if either claim was to seem plausible, Saladin had to demonstrate to Nur al-Din's old amirs (now mostly in the service of Nur al-Din's successors and very much inclined to view Saladin as an arrant usurper) that their services were desired and would be amply rewarded. If he had restricted high office and influence to the supporters of his Egyptian years, he would have stood revealed as just another ambitious dynast.⁹

It was thus within the context of two policy imperatives—the need for administrative flexibility and the need to gain the support of the Zangid amirs—that Saladin had to shape his relationship to his relatives in the period 570/1174-581/1185. The first of these effectively ruled out the creation of major, hereditary appanages for his family at this point, even had he so desired. The second clearly implied that his relatives could not expect to monopolize affairs of state as they had done during the Egyptian period. It should occasion no surprise that the Ayyubids were assigned *iqta's* in Syria, just as the other amirs were, or that they were Saladin's preferred choice as field

commanders and administrators. The significant thing is that they no longer dominate the annals of the age to the exclusion of all others.

Putting aside their role in Saladin's field campaigns (which are well chronicled elsewhere and not strictly germane to our present enquiry), Saladin's family provided the governmental backbone of his regime during this decade of expansion in that the major centers of power were generally put in their charge. They were established as *muqta's* in three of the major central Syrian towns—Homs, Hama, and Baalbek—and served as his vicegerents in Cairo and Damascus during his absences from either city. After Aleppo had been added to his dominions in 579/1183, it too was assigned to one of his relatives. But it would be wrong to suppose that this pattern sprang into existence full-blown with Saladin's first penetration into Syria in 570/1174-75. Rather it emerged gradually over the course of a decade—and, as always with Saladin, out of trial and error, out of response to problems and possibilities as they arose, rather than as the result of a long-term, preconceived plan.

Cairo and Damascus had a unique status in Saladin's empire, for the former was his original base and always remained the economic foundation of his power, while the latter was not only his first major conquest in Syria but also his major base of operations against both Muslim and Frankish opponents. During these years the two cities were always regarded as crown possessions (if I may use a term which nowhere appears in the sources), not alienable in *iqta'*; together they constituted his twin capitals. But if the constitutional status of the two cities was very much the same, their administrative histories were very different indeed, for one man sat in the governor's chair in Cairo throughout almost the entire period, while Damascus saw a succession of six different individuals.

Al-'Adil seems to have first emerged into public life when Saladin appointed him, at the age of thirty, to suppress the pro-Fatimid rebellion of Kanz al-Daula in upper Egypt during the summer of 570/1174. Al-'Adil carried out his task with great efficiency in a one-month campaign, and his striking success

here may have induced Saladin to name him as his vicegerent in Egypt when he departed on his expedition to Damascus later that autumn. At any rate al-'Adil clearly proved worthy of the immense trust his elder brother placed in him, for he held this office until 579/1183, when he obtained Aleppo as his *iqta'* and the vicegerency of Egypt was turned over to Taqi al-Din 'Umar. According to Ehrenkreutz, Egypt enjoyed a considerable economic revival during the first decade of Saladin's independent reign, and it seems only reasonable to suppose that al-'Adil deserves some of the credit for this, even though he was perforce acting within guidelines his older brother established and (after the autumn of 571/1175) sometimes had the skilled assistance of al-Qadi al-Fadil. Certainly he did have executive authority in the country, as is clearly indicated in two inscriptions from the period, one from Qal'at Guindi (578/1183), a new fortress being constructed in Sinai, and the other from the Cairo citadel (579/1183). The latter inscription shows al-'Adil to have been no mere vicegerent, for he is there entitled Saladin's *wali al-'ahd*, his heir-apparent. How long he had held this honor is unknown, since the texts seem never to refer to it, but it is clear evidence of Saladin's high assessment of his capacities at a time when his own children were clearly too young to assume the responsibilities of office.¹⁰

In the language of the sources the vicegerency in Cairo was simply a *niyaba*, a "lieutenancy." In principle it was only a temporary appointment, in contrast to the theoretically permanent tenure of the *iqta'*. It was made on a strictly *ad hoc* basis, usually to cover a projected absence by the sultan, and lapsed as soon as the sultan returned to Cairo. Moreover it could be assigned to anyone whom the sultan chose, with no necessary presumption that the same man would receive it from one occasion to the next.¹¹ Under Saladin there certainly was no question of something like the superficially similar office of *na'ib al-saltana* in the Mamluk empire, which existed on a standing basis and was in some periods one of the most powerful positions in the state.¹² Moreover, the vicegerency implied in itself no personal rights over the soil of Egypt or

over its revenues—again as opposed to the *iqta'*, all of whose revenues were at the disposal of the *muqta'* so long as he met his stipulated obligations to the state. The office *per se* was strictly an administrative position. But both as a reward for his services and to enable him to meet the heavy expenses of his office, the vicegerent (*na'ib*) was granted extensive *iqta's* in his own name within Egypt. The rules governing such grants are unclear: specifically, we do not know if there were specified districts which were attached, by custom if not by formal regulation, to the vicegerency; nor whether the vicegerent had a right to the revenues of some of his *iqta's* only during the sultan's absence. It must be admitted that the question is academic in the case of Taqi al-Din 'Umar (579/1183-582/1186), since Saladin never returned to Cairo after 578/1182, but it would throw light on the principles of his administration to know how these matters had worked during the preceding decade, when he had often resided there.¹³

Constitutionally the vicegerent in Damascus was in much the same position as his colleague in Cairo, but some differences should be noted. First, and most important, the vicegerent in Cairo was in charge of affairs for all Egypt, but Damascus had administrative responsibility only for its immediate dependencies. There was no hierarchy of authority or precedence within Syria which would have brought Homs, Hama, or Aleppo under its aegis. Second, the *niyaba* of Damascus seems to have been a permanent office: when Saladin was in residence, the vicegerent surrendered his general executive and administrative authority, but continued to act as urban prefect (i.e., the officer ordinarily called *wali* or *shihna*) for the city and the Ghuta.¹⁴ There is also an interesting parallel between the vicegerencies of Cairo and Damascus, in that Saladin's *na'ib* in either city often held extensive *iqta's* outside the region of his *niyaba*. 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah was simultaneously vicegerent in Damascus and *muqta'* of Baalbek, while his successor Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam held Barin, Kafartab, and Apamea. A more extreme case is Taqi al-Din 'Umar, who retained his appanage of Hama when he was appointed

vicegerent in Cairo in 579/1183.¹⁵ In Saladin's state *iqta'* and *niyaba* in no sense defined territorially coextensive, or even overlapping, spheres of authority.

The brief tenure of most of Saladin's vicegerents in Damascus, however, did not reflect a different political structure so much as immediate policy problems and needs. His first *na'ib* there, his younger brother Tughtigin, was replaced after a year by Taqi al-Din 'Umar because Saladin felt obliged to reward Taqi al-Din's superb services (especially at the Horns of Hama), but at the same time, fearing his ambition and adventurism, wanted to keep him in Syria under his own supervision.¹⁶ But in Safar 572/August-September 1176, Taqi al-Din had to make way for al-Mu'azzam Turanshah. No reasons are given, but Saladin undoubtedly felt compelled to show his turbulent elder brother all due honor, and his military skill and administrative experience appeared to commend him as well. But when Saladin returned to Syria after nearly two years' absence, he found Turanshah's administration lax and his relations with Zangid Aleppo suspiciously friendly.¹⁷ Forced to remove him, Saladin settled on 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah, Taqi al-Din 'Umar's younger brother. Farrukhshah had on many occasions already proven himself a superb soldier, and he seems to have met his uncle's requirements as an administrator as well, for he was vicegerent in Damascus until his death in Jumada I 578/October 1182.¹⁸ Until this point all of Saladin's vicegerents in Damascus had been close relatives, but to replace Farrukhshah he named Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, one of the earliest Zangid amirs to support him, to be sure, but no Ayyubid. And when Saladin launched his campaign against Mosul in 581/1185, he introduced another innovation by appointing not only a non-Ayyubid, but a civilian, as his *na'ib*—Safi al-Din ibn al-Qabid.¹⁹

These two appointments did not signal the beginning of a period of consolidation and relative internal security, as one might suppose, for both were made on the eve of critical developments in Saladin's empire. Rather they point to an important change which was taking place in Saladin's family: there were no longer enough adult men to hold all the major

governorships and *iqta's* without a dangerous concentration of power. Besides Saladin himself, only Tughtigin, al-'Adil, Taqi al-Din 'Umar, and his cousin Nasir al-Din Muhammad were still alive at the time of the 579/1183 expedition against Amida and Aleppo. Of these Tughtigin had been sent to reestablish Ayyubid authority in the Yemen in 577/1181, and Nasir al-Din Muhammad was not really at Saladin's disposal. When Aleppo was incorporated into the empire and assigned to al-'Adil in *iqta'*, Saladin had to call on Taqi al-Din 'Umar for the vicegerency in Egypt, while leaving him in possession of his *iqta'* of Hama. This new situation was not without advantages for the sultan, of course, since he had to account for fewer ambitious and importunate relatives who felt he owed them the best choice of governorships and *iqta's*. But it did mean that the family solidarity, which had been so vital to the establishment and expansion of his empire, would henceforth become a weaker factor in affairs.

Although Damascus remained a *niyaba* down to the end of our period, the other major towns of Syria were all held as *iqta's*. Formally these *iqta's* were the same as those granted to the senior amirs in Syria and followed the model established in Nur al-Din's time: they were intended to be hereditary, and they were autonomous—i.e., the *muqta'* was entirely responsible for their internal administration and was subject only to sporadic surveillance by the sultan. The only difference was that they were larger than the other *iqta's* and they were granted to members of the Ayyubid family. But these "accidental" differences were obviously of great importance, since they ensured that by the end of the period under review (581/1185) Saladin had gone a long way towards securing the succession for his own family.

The first distribution of these royal *iqta's* or appanages took place soon after Saladin's victory at the Horns of Hama (19 Ramadan 570/13 April 1175), which had given him control of all Syria south of Hama. Homs was assigned to his cousin Nasir al-Din Muhammad, along with Palmyra and al-Rahba. This grant was really by way of restoration, since these territories

had constituted the *iqta'* of Nasir al-Din's father, Shirkuh, but had been confiscated by Nur al-Din when Saladin became Fatimid *wazir*, even though Nasir al-Din himself had remained in Syria. Hama was assigned to Saladin's maternal uncle Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, while Baalbek was given to Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam.²⁰ This first distribution, then, came nowhere near making Syria an Ayyubid preserve and in fact continued Zangid practice.

Only in 573/1177-78 did an event occur which would set the stage for a broader Ayyubid grasp on Syria. In Jumada II 573/December 1177 Shihab al-Din al-Harimi died, leaving no heirs; Hama was thus left without a *muqta'*, and Saladin did not immediately appoint anyone. For almost a year the city was governed by its garrison commandant (*muqaddam 'askar al-sultan*) Nasir al-Din Mengüverish b. Khumartigin. Finally in Rabi' II 574/September-October 1178, Saladin decided to assign Hama and a number of lesser nearby towns to Taqi al-Din 'Umar, on the grounds that the threat posed by Antioch and Tripoli required a more adequate arrangement.²¹ The other town which was made an Ayyubid *iqta'* in this period was Baalbek. We have already discussed the process of transition in another context,²² and here we need note only two points. Al-Mu'azzam Turanshah's demand that Saladin turn Baalbek over to him was made because he had been deposed from his vicegerency in Damascus. Turanshah was not a man to accept docilely such an insult from his younger brother, and Saladin apparently felt unable to oppose him without a serious conflict. Second, Turanshah did not retain his new *iqta'* for long; in Dhu'l-Qa'da 574/May 1179 Saladin ordered him to escort the Egyptian troops then in Syria back home, at about the same time appointing him governor of Alexandria, a post where he spent the last two years of his life in tranquil obscurity. Early in 575/spring 1179 Baalbek was transferred to the more reliable 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah, in whose family it would remain for the next half century.²³ Farrukhshah himself died in Jumada I 578/September 1182, leaving only a young boy — al-Amjad Bahramshah — as his heir, but Saladin did not hesitate to confirm

him in his father's *iqta'*.²⁴

The events of 574/1178-79, trivial in themselves, nevertheless mark an important transition in the structure of the Ayyubid empire, for the three most important towns between Damascus and Aleppo had now been established as hereditary appanages for members of the Ayyubid family. This was a major step towards both of Saladin's major political goals—assured access to the military and financial resources of Syria and securing an undisputed succession for his heirs. On the other hand it is important to realize that as yet Saladin had given no *iqta's* which surpassed in size and importance those held by the greater amirs of Nur al-Din's time. One has only to think of the vast possessions of Zayn al-Din 'Ali Küchük (Irbil, Shahrzur, Takrit, Sinjar, Harran, and several castles in the Jabal Hakkari) or of Fakhr al-Din Mas'ud b. 'Ali al-Za'farani (Hama, Edessa, Homs for a brief period, and their dependencies) to see the point.²⁵ In short, Saladin was continuing to work within the Zangid political framework; the only difference—admittedly a significant one—is that Saladin was reserving the largest *iqta's* for his own family. But even this difference is somewhat muted by the fact that all the Ayyubid *iqta's* up to this point were held by his collateral relatives rather than by his own children, who as yet held nothing in their own names. The major Syrian *iqta's*, then, were not assigned to Saladin's heirs, but to his ablest, oldest, and most ambitious supporters.

His first tentative experiment in installing one of his direct heirs in a major *iqta'* came about with his occupation of Aleppo (17 Safar 579/11 June 1183). But examination of his actions shows this was not done within the framework of a definitive settlement of his territories; indeed it is hard to be sure just what his intentions were.

A brief anecdote cited by Ibn al-Athir suggests the possibility that Saladin's original intention had been to assign Aleppo to his youngest brother, Taj al-Muluk Böri.²⁶ But Böri was mortally wounded in the course of the siege, so that this plan (if it indeed existed) could not be carried out. But at some point in Rabi' I/July, after Saladin returned from his successful siege of

Harim to organize the administration of Aleppo, he decided to give it to his fourth son, al-Zahir Ghazi, at that time only eleven years of age. His reasons are not given, but clearly it could not have been as a reward for service or an inducement for future loyalty; nor does it seem to have been part of a scheme to incorporate his sons in the structure of state, since none of the others were assigned *iqta's* at this time. Very possibly it was simply a desire to honor his favorite son and to give him an *iqta'* commensurate with his status and future hopes.²⁷

According to Ibn Abi Tayy, Saladin established his son "as *sultan*,"²⁸ and this would imply that he intended al-Zahir's appointment to be permanent and to confer on him the same administrative autonomy as was enjoyed by the other Ayyubid *muqta's* of Syria (though of course his youth required the appointment of an *atabeg* to direct affairs in his name). Presumably, then, Aleppo was to be the appanage of al-Zahir Ghazi and his descendants, though Saladin seems not to have considered the implications this had for the future structure of the empire as a whole. But al-Zahir's exalted status as holder of the largest Syrian *iqta'* did not last long, for six months later his father transferred it to al-'Adil. The sources are quite vague as to how this important change came about. According to 'Imad al-Din (the "official" version), al-'Adil, at that time vicegerent in Cairo, wrote to Saladin shortly after the latter had returned to Damascus (Jumada I 579/September 1183) and requested that Aleppo be assigned to him, offering to step down from his position in Cairo. Saladin responded that he was leaving to besiege al-Karak and that al-'Adil should meet him there. Al-Qadi al-Fadil seems to have favored the proposal and suggested Taqi al-Din 'Umar as the most suitable replacement for al-'Adil in Cairo. In late Rajab or Sha'ban/November-December, al-'Adil did come to al-Karak; the siege was shortly thereafter broken off and the two brothers returned to Damascus, where Saladin formally assigned Aleppo to al-'Adil (2 Ramadan 579/19 December 1183). Three weeks later al-'Adil had arrived in Aleppo and taken over the administration.²⁹ The version given by Ibn Abi Tayy, on the other hand, states that the initiative in

this matter lay with Saladin or that he had at least conceived of the exchange quite independently of his brother. In the longest (but unfortunately anonymous) tradition of the several which he cites, Ibn Abi Tayy has al-'Adil extending Saladin a desperately needed loan of 150,000 *dinars* during the siege of al-Karak. In return for this assistance, al-'Adil requests his brother to assign Aleppo to him and is told by Saladin that this had been his precise intention when he called him from Cairo. And thus al-'Adil was given in *iqta'* a tract stretching from Ra'ban in the north to the Euphrates on the east and Hama in the south, on condition of supplying stipulated sums of money and Aleppan infantry for the *jiḥād*.³⁰

Although neither account has anything explicit to say about the motives of either man, it is possible to read between the lines. From both men's points of view, the problem was that al-'Adil's great services to the state and proven reliability had yet to find their reward; of all Saladin's adult relatives, he alone had failed to receive an appanage of his own. Aleppo was an excellent way to rectify this. More than that, Aleppo had always resisted Saladin more strongly than any other place. It was far more closely tied to the Zangid dynasty than the other Syrian towns, and both its amirs and religious notables had a clear sense of cohesion and local identity. In addition its urban militia was still a lively organization, as Saladin had discovered on three occasions.³¹ Saladin may well have felt that al-'Adil was both a strong enough administrator to control these local forces, which might be tempted either to rebel or support a Zangid *revanche* by Mosul, and reliable enough not to try to enlist them for his own purposes. The extent of the discretion permitted al-'Adil may be seen from the fact that all the crucial departments of the urban administration—commandant of the citadel, police, chancery, the fisc, and the military administration—were assigned to his *mamluks* and protégés, while Saladin had no one there to look after his interests as head of state.³²

In Cairo, the vicegerency was turned over to Taqi al-Din 'Umar. But though Saladin respected his nephew's great talents,

he did not quite trust him; when Taqi al-Din left al-Karak for Cairo, Saladin sent al-Qadi al-Fadil with him to assist him in the complexities of the Egyptian administration and, undoubtedly, to keep Saladin posted on his activities. In addition Taqi al-Din was given the great privilege of retaining his *iqta'* of Hama. This made him a man of immense power, perhaps second only to Saladin himself—all the more as the Egyptian *iqta's* given him in support of his office there included Alexandria, Damietta, the Buhayra province in the Delta, and the Fayyum.³³

The changes of 579/1183 served Saladin's purposes well enough for the next two years. But at the end of 581/1185 events forced him to reorganize his empire again and to assign his family new roles. Saladin's previous administrative changes had been *ad hoc* responses or provisional arrangements. But the changes of 582/1186 were more wide-ranging than the preceding ones, more systematic, and more clearly aimed at securing long-term goals. They broke the Zangid mold to which Saladin's state had heretofore conformed and created a new and distinctively Ayyubid framework, one which would characterize the empire for the next half century.

There is no evidence that such basic reforms had long been contemplated. Indeed the two primary goals of Saladin's Mosul campaign of 581/1185 would both suggest that he was continuing to think in terms of immediate problems and short-range solutions. His minimum goal was to reduce the Zangid and Artukid princes to vassaldom. This would end any possibility of a Jaziran alliance that could threaten his position in Syria, while at the same time giving him control of that region's military resources. And should he be able to take Mosul, he would give it in *iqta'*, to his cousin Nasir al-Din Muhammad, the lord of Homs. Not only would this wholly integrate Mosul within the Ayyubid orbit, but in addition Saladin would have rewarded a man who had served him loyally and who had expressed a desire for Mosul even in 578/1182. Perhaps the sultan also thought of balancing the immense concessions already granted to al-'Adil and Taqi al-Din 'Umar.³⁴ But the campaign proved

a discouraging one, and when Saladin was stricken by illness before the walls of Mosul and forced to retreat (30 Ramadan 581/25 December 1185), it appeared that the entire venture had been a waste.

Saladin fell back to Harran, where his condition continued to worsen. Learning of the gravity of the situation, his brother al-'Adil came out from Aleppo to meet him, bringing skilled doctors in his train. Saladin was still able to conduct affairs of state, but as it appeared quite likely he would not survive his sickness, he had his officers and high officials ("*al-nas*") swear allegiance to his children as his successors. To each child he assigned a certain portion of the empire (*nasib ma'lum*), appointing al-'Adil as trustee (*wasiy*) for the whole.³⁵ Although both al-'Adil and one of Saladin's sons (al-'Aziz 'Uthman) were present with him in Harran when the oath was sworn, it hardly seems likely that this arrangement could have been executed had Saladin died. Taqi al-Din 'Umar, ensconced in Egypt and a brilliant soldier, would hardly have deferred to al-'Adil or put aside his own intense ambition for the sake of his uncle's adolescent children. And in fact Nasir al-Din Muhammad did attempt to secure at least Syria for himself. As Saladin's condition became critical, he slipped away to his own appanage of Homs to make plans for the future. Passing through Aleppo, he met with leaders of the still powerful *ahdath* and paid them in return for their support. Back in Homs, he made an agreement with certain unnamed Damascenes to surrender their city to him in the event of Saladin's death, which he confidently expected to occur in the near future.³⁶

But at this moment, when the labors of sixteen years seemed undone by a trick of fortune, Saladin's affairs abruptly and unexpectedly were set aright. The rulers of Mosul must have felt that they would never again have as good an opportunity for a favorable settlement with Saladin. Momentarily, at least, he was in no position to dictate terms. Mosul's negotiators arrived in Harran early in Dhu'l-Hijja 581/late February 1186, and by 9 Dhu'l-Hijja/3 March a definitive agreement had been reached: Saladin would keep his new conquest of Mayyafariqin, which

controlled the road leading from the Jazira to Armenia (and which had been an Artukid possession anyhow), the *khutba* and *sikka* throughout the Zangid and Artukid territories was put in his name, and Mosul's armies would be at his disposal for the *jihād*; in return, Saladin would respect their autonomy and would retrocede a small tract of land to Mosul.³⁷ With this treaty Saladin had obtained both the minimum goal of his campaign and one of the major goals of his reign, for he now could call on all the military resources of Egypt, Syria, and the Jazira.

The schemes of Nasir al-Din Muhammad likewise evaporated, for on the morning of 10 Dhu'l-Hijja 581/4 March 1186 he was found dead, apparently from an excess of wine the night before. He left as his heir someone who could be no threat to Saladin, his thirteen year old son al-Mujahid Shirkuh. Around the turn of the new year Saladin was well enough to leave Harran, and after stopping briefly in Homs to regulate the succession there,³⁸ he returned to Damascus on 2 Rabi' I 582/23 May 1186.

At some point during the next two months, Saladin decided on a major reconstitution of his empire. 'Imad al-Din presents a detailed account of the charges, but the direct evidence which he cites as to Saladin's motives is thin and unpersuasive. Ibn al-Athir, on the other hand, tells an anecdote which is extremely useful. According to him, shortly after returning to Damascus Saladin was visited by the amir 'Alam al-Din Sulayman b. Jandar, a friend of the sultan's since Nur ad-Din's time and established by him as *muqta'* of 'Azaz after the conquest of Aleppo.

Sulayman said to him, "What made you think that your testament would be executed and your command accepted? It's as if you thought you were going out hunting and would be back, and they wouldn't oppose you. By God, aren't you ashamed that the bird understands its interests better than you?"

Laughing, [the sultan] said, "How is that?"

"If a bird wants to build a nest for its young," he said, "it seeks the topmost [branches] of the trees to protect them. But you have turned the fortresses over to your relatives and put your children on the ground. Aleppo is in your brother's hands, Hama in those of Taqi al-Din, and Homs belongs to the son of Shirkuh. One of your sons is in Egypt with Taqi al-Din, who could drive him out anytime he wishes, and this other son of yours

[al-Zahir Ghazi] is with your brother in his tent, [and] he can do with him as he pleases.”

[The sultan] said to him, “You’re right. Keep this matter quiet.”

Then he took Aleppo from his brother and gave it to al-Malik al-Zahir. He turned Taqi al-Din out of Egypt and gave it to al-Malik al-‘Aziz, placing al-Malik al-‘Adil beside him. Later he gave al-Malik al-‘Adil the Eastern Territories and transferred him from Egypt as we shall relate. And he thus endeavored to prevent his dominions from slipping out of his childrens’ control.

...³⁹

Taken literally, the story is not only apocryphal but preposterous. For one thing it has a serious anachronism—Nasir al-Din Muhammad had died before Saladin ever left Harran. Moreover one can hardly imagine that so trivial a conversation engendered by itself such great changes. However if Ibn al-Athir’s anecdote is understood as his personal commentary on the situation confronting Saladin in the spring of 582/1186 and his judgment that Saladin’s reforms were made in response to this situation, then it is quite valuable as contemporary testimony on the kind of thinking that underlay these changes. It points to the unwise concentration of power in the hands of Saladin’s collaterals, especially al-‘Adil and Taqi al-Din ‘Umar, and it suggests that it was the crisis of the winter of 581/1186 which finally compelled Saladin to deal with the government and succession of the empire on a systematic, long-term basis. To Ibn al-Athir’s analysis we may add two further points: first, Saladin’s sons were now old enough (in their midteens) to be trained in the exercise of political authority; and second, the treaty of 581/1186 put an end to the period of expansion—the Ayyubid empire was now a relatively stable entity for which a permanent administration could be envisaged.

Upon arriving in Damascus, Saladin sent to Aleppo for al-‘Adil who left his capital on 24 Rabi‘ I/14 June and must have arrived in Damascus early the next month. At about the same time the sultan commanded his eldest son, al-Afdal ‘Ali, who was residing in Cairo but had no official status there, to bring his family and retainers to Damascus. The ostensible reason for

this was the tension between al-Afdal and the vicegerent Taqi al-Din, who felt that the sultan's son was interfering in his administration. In fact Saladin had decided to send his second son, al-'Aziz 'Uthman, to Egypt as his nominal vicegerent and intended heir for that land.⁴⁰ But his letter of recall to al-Afdal said nothing of this; on the contrary, he informed Taqi al-Din that his authority in Egypt would henceforth be untrammelled by the presence of the sultan's son. Al-Afdal arrived in Damascus on 23 Jumada I/II August, joining his father, his uncle al-'Adil, and his brothers al-Zahir Ghazi and al-'Aziz 'Uthman.

At about the same time (whether before or after the arrival of al-Afdal is not clear) Saladin was turning his attention to two other problems affecting the structure of his empire: reassigning the government of Aleppo and choosing a suitable *atabeg* for al-'Aziz in Egypt. According to 'Imad al-Din's account, the initiative for these changes came from al-'Adil. One day, quite without any preliminary discussion on the matter, al-'Adil visited al-Zahir Ghazi, who was both his nephew and son-in-law, and said he had decided to resign his *iqta'* of Aleppo in al-Zahir's favor and would accept in return whatever *iqta'* the sultan chose to give him. Al-'Adil then spoke with Saladin, stating that Aleppo had best be in the hands of one of the sultan's sons and that al-Zahir most desired it. Saladin responded that his chief concern was to find an *atabeg* for al-'Aziz, whom he had decided to invest with the kingship of Egypt. In a subsequent discussion, al-'Aziz requested his father to name al-'Adil to accompany him to Egypt, and Saladin acceded to this, giving his brother the *niyaba* in Egypt and granting him the Delta province of Sharqiyya as his *iqta'* there.⁴¹

One is reluctant to accept this account as a literal representation of what happened: it is too simple and schematic, and it presents al-'Adil as suspiciously genial and good-hearted. But from it one can at least reconstruct some of the considerations that went into Saladin's decisions. Even if al-'Adil may not have offered spontaneously to surrender Aleppo, it is certain that Saladin could never have removed him in favor of al-Zahir without his consent, and this involved al-'Adil's being restored

to his old position in Egypt, a position made even more important since he would now be acting as regent for the heir-apparent of that country. That al-'Adil's role in this exchange of territories may have been more active than we are told explicitly is suggested by a brief passage in 'Imad al-Din's account: after al-'Adil had resigned Aleppo but before the question of the *atabakiyya* in Egypt had been decided, he "solicited, in exchange for Aleppo, lands and districts within Egypt which he clearly specified."⁴² For al-'Adil, a move to Egypt had real political advantages, since it would place him in a far stronger position to protect his interests in the event of Saladin's demise than he had enjoyed in Aleppo during the crisis of 581/1185-86. From Saladin's point of view, al-'Adil had proven himself more loyal and reliable than any other of his supporters during the past year; he, far better than the headstrong Taqi al-Din, could be trusted with the sensitive post of Egypt. Moreover al-'Adil was apparently well liked by his putative ward al-'Aziz, whereas Taqi al-Din had had trouble getting on with a youth (al-Afdal) who enjoyed not even titular authority.

Whatever the exact course of events, soon after al-Afdal's arrival in Damascus, Saladin sent to Egypt to inform Taqi al-Din of his decisions and ordered him back to Syria. Taqi al-Din, predictably, was outraged. At first he threatened to abandon Saladin altogether and to go with his supporters to join his old *mamluk* Sharaf al-Din Karakush, who was still raiding profitably in North Africa. But cooler heads at length prevailed, and Taqi al-Din submitted to the sultan's commands. At the end of Sha'ban/mid-November, Saladin came out to meet him south of Damascus; in return for his obedience, Taqi al-Din was not only confirmed in his old *iqta'* of Hama but was granted in addition Mayyafariqin and the strongpoints in its vicinity. In the meantime al-'Aziz and al-'Adil had departed for Egypt, and they entered Cairo on 5 Ramadan/19 November. Al-Zahir Ghazi was likewise sent to Aleppo, in the company of two experienced amirs who were both to supervise the administration there and hold the key military posts of *shihna* and citadel commandant. Al-Zahir took possession of the city on 9 Jumada

II/29 August. Saladin's eldest son, al-Afdal, remained with his father in Damascus. We are not explicitly told that Damascus was assigned to him at this point, and he certainly had no voice whatever in its administration as long as his father resided there. Indeed during the Frankish campaigns of 583-84/1187-88, Saladin appointed a civilian vicegerent (*na'ib*), Safi al-Din ibn al-Qabid. But al-Afdal was always in his father's entourage during these years; moreover, he was given the governorship (*wilaya*) of all the former territories of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Both of these facts imply that Saladin at least intended to install him as ruler of Damascus, even if he did not formally do so in 582/1186.⁴³

That Saladin intended for these two (or perhaps three) new assignments to his sons to be more than *iqta's* on the Zangid model is suggested by two brief passages. According to 'Imad al-Din, Saladin wanted to transfer Egypt to al-'Aziz 'Uthman "so that he should be its '*aziz*." And Ibn al-'Adim states that after al-Zahir had taken control of Aleppo, his father sent him a rescript (*kitab*) instructing him "to command and prohibit, to distribute *iqta's*, and that the city (*balad*) was his city." There is also important circumstantial evidence to the same effect: the *wilaya* over Palestine which Saladin granted to al-Afdal after the reconquest of 583/1187 (presumably as part of an appanage centered on Damascus) included a number of *iqta's* held by some of Saladin's most powerful amirs.⁴⁴

Putting these various bits of data together, we see that for the first time Saladin was assigning autonomous, hereditary control over the great urban centers and large tracts of territory. These new assignments comprised not only the personal domains (*khassa*) of their grantees, but other *iqta's* held by high-ranking amirs as well. Finally the summary of al-Zahir Ghazi's rescript contains formulas implying sovereignty—i.e., that al-Zahir was in principle acting not as his father's representative but in his own name. 'Imad al-Din's language might imply that the same was true for al-'Aziz in Egypt; however there is no evidence to show that Saladin had surrendered sovereign authority in Damascus to al-Afdal 'Ali, even nominally.

For the duration of Saladin's lifetime, of course, these changes were more a matter of form than anything else. Like all other *muqta's*, his sons owed him unconditional obedience and whatever military service he demanded. And as in the case of the sultan's other servants, what he had given he could take away. It is certainly undeniable that all major administrative changes and new *iqta'* assignments throughout the empire remained in Saladin's hands even after 582/1186. One could argue, then, that the reforms of that year actually strengthened Saladin's position. Two key points, Cairo and Aleppo, were in the hands of persons bound to him by the closest of ties, those of son to father. Indeed every Ayyubid appanage save Hama and Mayyafariqin (both held by Taqi al-Din 'Umar) was in the hands of a youth too young to rule in his own name and was hence supervised by Saladin's own appointees. Only Taqi al-Din and al-'Adil, both of whom had always served him well, were of an age and capacity to launch into ventures of their own against his will.

The years following the establishment of the new confederate structure in 582/1186 are in a sense only an epilogue, but they deserve some attention, since they came near wrecking the whole system. It is not the Third Crusade which concerns us here, oddly enough, but rather the stunning victories of 583-84/1187-88 and their constitutional consequences. A great many of Saladin's amirs benefited from the near collapse of the Frankish states, of course, but among his family only al-Afdal, al-'Adil, and Taqi al-Din 'Umar received substantial accretions of territory. As we have already noted, al-Afdal received the *wilaya* for Palestine and Lebanon as far north as Jubayl.⁴⁵ Al-'Adil retained his position as *na'ib* and *atabeg* in Egypt, but after the campaign of 584/1188 (in Dhu'l-Hijja/January-February 1189) Saladin granted him al-Karak in addition. In a listing of al-'Adil's possessions as of 588/1192, several other places in Transjordan are attributed to him: the key fortress of Shawbak, controlling the eastern route between Egypt and Syria; al-Salt, overlooking the Jordan Valley opposite Jericho; and the important agricultural district of al-Balqa'.⁴⁶ It is reasonable to

suppose that he received these at the same time as al-Karak. If so, Saladin thereby gave his brother control of a region of critical importance for imperial communications, and this would indicate yet again the great trust he had in him.

But it was Taqi al-Din who reaped by far the greatest benefits from these campaigns. In the autumn of 584/1188 Saladin turned over to him the north Syrian ports of Jabala and Latakia, thus giving Taqi al-Din's appanage of Hama access to the sea. Two years later, while Saladin was mired down before Acre, struggling to break the Frankish siege of that city, an unforeseen accident gave Taqi al-Din a new power base in the Jazira. In Shawwal 586/November 1190, the young Lord of Irbil and Shahrzur, Zayn al-Din Yusuf b. 'Ali Küchük, died in Saladin's camp before Acre. His older brother, Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri, persuaded Saladin to confirm him in Zayn al-Din's possessions, but in return he was required to give up the towns he already held in Diyar Mudar—Harran, Edessa, Samosata, and al-Muwazzar. These Saladin reassigned to Taqi al-Din 'Umar, in addition to what he already held. It should have taken no great perspicacity to see that such a concentration of power potentially threatened the future of the empire, and this danger was not long in manifesting itself. During the winter of 587/1191 Taqi al-Din left Saladin's camp with his forces to inspect his new territories, but instead of returning the following spring to aid his hard-pressed uncle, he launched a private war of conquest in the Jazira. This netted him the towns of Hani and Suwayda' and thus went some distance towards uniting his new Jaziran lands with distant Mayyafariqin, but it also meant that he was absent during the final agony of Acre. Worse than that, these conquests were located in a region where Saladin ruled not as a sovereign but as the suzerain of somewhat jealous and resentful client states. Obviously they had to delay sending their forces to Palestine that year in order to protect themselves from Taqi al-Din. At the end of the summer Taqi al-Din left the Jazira for the Anatolian plateau, where he seized Akhlāt and then, incredibly, appeared before Manzikert. But here his astounding campaign came to an end,

for he died near Manzikert in Ramadan 587/October 1191. Saladin was heartbroken to hear of his nephew's death, but he was fortunate that it happened. By his selfish recklessness Taqi al-Din had contributed to the disaster at Acre and had almost wrecked Saladin's painfully assembled coalition in the Jazira. Moreover if his venture had succeeded, he would surely have been in a position to sabotage the Ayyubid succession.

Saladin's immediate problem was to dispose of his late nephew's territories. When al-Mansur Muhammad, who had accompanied his father Taqi al-Din to the East, had sent word of his father's passing, he had also requested investiture in all his territories. This request, coupled with certain unspecified demands, sent Saladin into a fury, and he threatened to dispossess al-Mansur altogether. On learning of this, al-Mansur asked al-'Adil to intercede with the sultan on his behalf and try to salvage something for him, either the original territories of Taqi al-Din around Hama or his recent acquisitions east of the Euphrates. In the meantime al-Afdal had seen his opportunity for a career free of his father's undoubtedly oppressive surveillance. He besought Saladin for Taqi al-Din's Jaziran possessions, offering to resign what he already held in return. (Possibly he thought he might well lose them anyway to the crusaders, whom his father had so far proved powerless to check.) This was granted him, and on 3 Safar 588/19 February 1192, he departed Saladin's winter quarters in Jerusalem for Aleppo.

Al-'Adil's task proved to be a difficult one; it would seem that the sultan was in no mood to create another such monster as had arisen in the person of his nephew. But al-'Adil was persistent, and in the guise of working only for the good of another and for the well-being of the dynasty, he managed to secure not only Hama and adjacent districts for al-Mansur Muhammad, but also the Ayyubid domains east of the Euphrates (including the newly taken towns of Hani and Suwayda') for himself. Al-'Adil was permitted to keep one-half his *khassa* in Egypt and Transjordan but had to surrender all other lands and positions. In addition, he was able to obtain the important Euphrates crossing

of Qal'at Ja'bar, heretofore in al-Zahir Ghazi's possession. Al-Zahir was reluctant to give it up, but obeyed his father's orders. Al-'Adil set out to establish his government in his new lands at rather an awkward moment for Saladin (Jumada I 588/May 1192, but returned two months later, in time to participate in the last stages of the Third Crusade. As for al-Afdal, he had not gotten beyond Aleppo when his father recalled him with the bitter news that his new lands were to be given to his uncle instead. Angry and humiliated, al-Afdal was only mollified by the promise of finer territories than those he had lost. It is probably at this time that he was assigned certain north Syrian towns that had belonged to Taqi al-Din: the ports of Jabala, Lattakia, and Bulunyas,⁴⁷ and the hill fortress of Balatunus. With this rather complicated series of events, in which Saladin seems to have reverted to his old penchant for *ad hoc* and provisional arrangements, the definitive shape of his empire at last emerged.⁴⁸

The political tradition of Saladin

Our analysis of Saladin's state-building has made him appear very much a practical politician, a man little interested in principles of political organization and behavior. This is not quite accurate, however. Though Saladin was not theoretically minded, his activity nevertheless conformed closely to the basic political concepts of his age. Since he exploited these concepts consciously and knowledgeably as instruments to attain his policy objectives, this political tradition demands a brief review.

It is well known that Saladin's conception of the sultanate was adopted almost unchanged from his Seljukid and Zangid precursors. He began his rise to power by proclaiming himself the true spiritual heir of Nur al-Din, and Emmanuel Sivan has shown that his political ideology was practically identical to his predecessor's: the necessity for a unity of command in Egypt, Syria, and the Jazira in order to expel the infidel, and the

fundamental duty of the sultan to support and propagate the orthodox *sunna* while struggling to extirpate heresy from the lands of Islam.⁴⁹ This program, which endowed the state with a profoundly moral character, was precisely that of the Great Seljukids, adapted to the circumstances of twelfth-century Syria. As Cahen comments, “Nur al-Din and Saladin are inconceivable without Toghril Beg and Nizam al-Mulk.”⁵⁰

Now, it is true to say that Saladin’s empire was a sultanate in the Perso-Islamic tradition—i.e., it was characterized by a single monarch (ultimately chosen by Providence rather than on the basis of some legal right) who was wholly responsible for the well-being of his state and subjects and who in turn alone had the authority to act in his own name.⁵¹ But after the reform of 582/1186, the Ayyubid empire was also a confederation of autonomous and hereditary principalities created by Saladin for the members of his family. Indeed for most of the empire’s history after his death, this rather than the sultanate seems the salient feature of its constitution. Moreover although Saladin established the Ayyubid confederation by trial and error, he did not do it absentmindedly; he made a conscious choice, no later than 582/1186, to divide his dominions among several putative heirs and to reduce his successor as sultan to the position of a (hopefully) strong suzerain.

In so doing, Saladin was adhering to a second line of Islamic political tradition, one as ancient as that of the Perso-Islamic sultanate—viz., the idea that the ruling family as a whole had a right to share in the sovereignty, a concept of collective sovereignty as opposed to autocracy. The tradition in its oldest and purest form seems to be found among the Turkish nations of Central Asia; Barthold gives it a classic definition when he speaks of the first *Islamic* state to be founded by Türkmen of the steppe (in the second half of the tenth century A.D.):

In the kingdom of the Kara-Khanids, as in all nomad empires, the conception of patrimonial property was carried over from the domain of personal law to that of state law. The kingdom was considered the property of the whole family of the Khan and was divided into a number of appanages, the large ones being in turn

divided into many small ones. The authority of the head of the empire was on occasion entirely disavowed by powerful vassals. The partition system was, as always, the cause of personal feuds and a constant change of rulers.⁵²

It would be erroneous, however, to think that this conception was entirely Türkmen or Central Asian in origin. Even as the Kara-Khanids were emerging as a power beyond the Oxus, the numerous kingdoms of Daylami and Kurdish origin being founded in Armenia and northwestern Iran exhibited a remarkably similar (but independently evolved) political tradition.⁵³ Nor did it remain confined to peoples on the margin of the Islamic world, able to affect the heartlands only for brief periods of time, for the Seljukids, emerging from the steppe tradition, carried it across the whole of western Asia. The political life of Saladin's time was thoroughly pervaded by it; it was indeed a more vital part of his and his associates' experience than the concept of a centralized, bureaucratically structured state could have been.

It is important to distinguish this tradition of collective sovereignty from the kind of extreme political fragmentation that prevailed in Syria and the Jazira in the early twelfth century, though at first glance they appear strikingly alike. The situation around 1100 A.D. had been brought about partly by the breakdown in Fatimid authority in Palestine and the Syrian littoral, partly by the collapse of Byzantine administration or suzerainty in north Syria and Anatolia. Both these crises had been precipitated, of course, by the Türkmen influx, which not only brought large numbers of a new ethnic group into the area, but also disrupted the political and social structures of those already there.⁵⁴ It contributed to the confusion that many of the groups struggling for power and land adhered to the principle of collective sovereignty, but the fundamental cause was a particular set of circumstances. Such a situation was inherently unstable, and the unifying activity of Zangi and Nur al-Din had definitely put an end to this chaos by the time Saladin came to power. He, obviously, could have had no desire to reintroduce the kind of anarchic pluralism which they had spent their lives

in overcoming.

Saladin inherited the tradition of collective familial sovereignty from the political experience of his ancestors in Armenia and from Seljukid-Zangid practice in Syria and the Jazira. It may seem strange to assert that Armenian politics could have had any influence on Saladin, for he was born in Takrit (in Iraq) and brought up in Baalbek and Damascus. But Armenia and Arran were the homeland of his grandfather Shadhi, his uncle Shirkuh, and his father Ayyub—and more than that, it was there that they had acquired their basic set of political assumptions. Shadhi was compelled to emigrate to Iraq sometime around 1130 A.D., together with his two sons, but the three men did not leave behind them all they had learned. As Minor sky argues, “they brought with them recollections of a whole system of politics and behavior.”⁵⁵

Before his departure for Iraq, Shadhi had been in the service of a Kurdish dynasty, the Shaddadids of Ani.⁵⁶ The history of the Shaddadids is excessively complicated and only fragmentarily known. However, it is clear that in the period from their occupation of Dvin (ca. 1022) down to the Seljukid seizure of Ganja (ca. 1075), the dynasty’s dominions were variously divided into two or three appanages. After 1075 Shaddadid authority was restricted to Ani and Dvin, but both places appear to have been governed autonomously by two brothers. Only the fall of Dvin in 1105 reduced the Shaddadids to a unitary kingdom based on Ani.⁵⁷ The evidence, such as it is, strongly implies two conclusions as to the structure of the Shaddadid state. First, this division of government was not accidental; it was the conscious policy of two senior chiefs of the family, who appointed their sons as wardens or governors of exposed border areas, with the latter retaining their position after their father’s death. Second, the Shaddadid princes do not seem to have been subject to any kind of institutionalized central control. Each prince of the family acted as he thought fit, so long as his policies did not betray the interests of the house as a whole or were not directed against the senior ruler. When they entered Iraq, then, Shadhi and his two sons (both of them

adults) were accustomed to the principles of collective sovereignty and appanaged provincial government; they indeed had known nothing else.

In Iraq Saladin's ancestors confronted a new political world, that of the Seljukids, and while political life here was conducted on a far vaster scale, there were many points of similarity. In particular, the Seljukids were deeply imbued with the political conceptions of the Turkish steppes, which could never be eradicated by or integrated with the newly adopted notion of the Perso-Islamic sultanate. The steppe tradition was a characteristic feature, perhaps even the fundamental constitutional element, of the Seljukid empire throughout its century and a half of existence.⁵⁸ It expressed itself chiefly in two tendencies of Seljukid practice:

1) The concept of collective familiar sovereignty did not imply an absolute lack of hierarchy or leadership within the family; there was always one acknowledged head of the clan and all that it ruled, who ordinarily carried the lofty title of *al-sultan al-mu'azzam*.⁵⁹ But except in the case of the most energetic and fortunate sultans, this was a precedence of honor rather than an effective universal authority. Nor was there any clear rule as to who should have it. Conservative opinion—that most closely attached to the dynasty's steppe origins—strongly preferred the oldest member of the family, whether or not he was the son of the previous sultan. But an opposing sentiment, deriving from the traditions of Perso-Islamic autocracy, asserted the right of hereditary succession. This conflict of outlooks provoked more than one civil war: Kutlumush b. Arslan Isra'il against Alp-Arslan, Kavurd b. Chaghri against Malikshah, Tutush b. Alp-Arslan against Berk-Yaruk, et al.⁶⁰

2) In order to satisfy the claims of several family members to a share in the sovereignty, the Seljukid empire was from the beginning divided into large autonomous principalities, one of which was held by the sultan. Again a vigorous sultan (like Alp-Arslan, Malikshah, or Sanjar) might make of these principalities a coordinated whole and ensure that his supreme authority was respected throughout the empire. But they were

commonly united only by their name, so that the Seljukid principalities of Syria and the Jazira, Iraq and western Iran, Kirman, and Khurasan were in effect four independent (and often hostile) kingdoms. Malikshah and his *wazir* Nizam al-Mulk, trying to convert their sprawling empire into a Perso-Islamic autocracy, had only reluctantly countenanced this system as necessary to placate traditional feeling, but Sanjar, even after obtaining the upper hand over the other Seljukids in the 1120s, never attempted to suppress the latter's principalities. The ruler of each large principality would often assign a portion of his lands to lesser princes of the family as their personal appanages. Such appanages were dependent on him directly rather than on the sultan and were seldom intended to become hereditary possessions, though some of them did. In the twelfth century at least, these appanages were termed *iqta's*, and they are not easily distinguishable from the provincial governorships assigned to non-Seljukid amirs.⁶¹

In sum, the Seljukid empire was a confederation of principalities with no institutional bonds linking them together save for a fragile family solidarity and a common loyalty to the sultan, who was both head of the empire and head of his family. The sultan owed such authority as he wielded to his position within the clan and his capacity to exploit a favorable set of circumstances.

The many similarities between this structure and that of Saladin's empire are obvious. But it is equally apparent that we would be dealing with a striking parallel rather than a likelihood of serious influence had Saladin's contact with Seljukid practice been confined to the six years his father and uncle spent in Takrit or to such information as he could glean in later years about affairs in Iraq and Iran in the time of Malikshah and Sanjar. Saladin's real awareness of the Seljukid political system—and that of his entire family as well—came about through their long service under Zangi and Nur al-Din. It has long been recognized, of course, that the Zangid empire was a Seljukid offshoot (specifically, the Seljukids of Iraq and western Iran). But it has drawn little attention that the Zangids

shared with their Seljukid progenitors a tendency towards succession by seniority and a confederate structure of territorial sovereignty. A brief sketch of Zangid dynastic affairs down to the end of Saladin's reign will suffice to establish the point.

When 'Imad al-Din Zangi died in 541/1146, his kingdom was divided in two, with Mosul going to the eldest son Sayf al-Din Ghazi and Aleppo to Nur al-Din Mahmud. Sayf al-Din held a precedence of honor, but in practice the two brothers cooperated quite harmoniously. Upon the death of Sayf al-Din Ghazi (544/1149), Mosul was bequeathed to a third brother, Qutb al-Din Maudud. But Nur al-Din was now the senior member of the family, and he was able to use his position not only to have the *khutba* and *sikka* put in his name in Mosul but also to obtain a substantial increase in his territories. Qutb al-Din's relative weakness and isolation brought him more and more under the domination of his brother in Syria, and Nur al-Din was able to dictate the succession in Mosul after Qutb al-Din's death in 565/1170. This involved ensconcing the latter's eldest son, 'Imad al-Din Zangi II, in a new appanage based on Sinjar, while recognizing his second son Sayf al-Din Ghazi II as ruler of Mosul. Nur al-Din remained in Mosul about a month to reorganize his nephew's administration, but his death four years later threw all into confusion again. Sayf al-Din Ghazi II of Mosul was now the leading prince of the Zangid house and took advantage of the confusion surrounding al-Salih Isma'il's succession in Syria to occupy all the places east of the Euphrates which had belonged to Nur al-Din. As is well known, the two chief branches of the Zangids, in Mosul and Aleppo, tried to cooperate against Saladin, but with disastrous results. Saladin, moreover, was able to exploit the resentment of 'Imad al-Din Zangi II of Sinjar at having been relegated to a secondary appanage in spite of his seniority. The demise of Sayf al-Din Ghazi II (576/1180) brought about the last dynastic change of importance to us here. Rightly concerned about Saladin's designs on Mosul, he named his younger brother 'Izz al-Din Mas'ud as his successor there, while creating for his son, the twelve-year-old Mu'izz al-Din Sanjarshah, a fourth appanage in

Jazirat ibn 'Umar. With the exception of Aleppo, which fell to Saladin in 579/1183, the Zangid states were thus divided—Mosul, Sinjar, Jazirat ibn 'Umar—until the dynasty's fall in the early thirteenth century.⁶²

We shall content ourselves with merely mentioning the Artukids of Diyar Bakr, divided into autonomous lines at Mardin, Hisn Kayfa, and Kharput. They represented more the Türkmén than the Great Seljukid tradition and hence were even more clearly oriented toward the political values of the steppe. Their presence meant that Saladin spent his whole life in a political milieu where the guiding principles were those of shared authority and local autonomy. A unitary kingdom could exist only when there was but one man fit to hold power; two or more claimants to royal authority implied a division of the realm. On the other hand, the notion of a centralized autocracy (as articulated by the Iranian spokesmen of the Great Seljukids) remained a powerful ideal, one to which any respectable state had to conform, at least in its forms and ceremonies. But the men of the twelfth century, their political outlook dominated by the traditions of the family confederation, could devise no administrative institutions which would make this ideal an effective force. It remained but a latent possibility, realizable only by isolated individuals in special circumstances and incapable of being transmitted intact from generation to generation. Thus Saladin's problem, like that of the Seljukids, was not to choose between a unitary and a confederate structure for his empire, for such a choice was hardly even conceivable, but to balance the ultimately irreconcilable claims of the absolutist sultanate and collective sovereignty.

In our analysis of Saladin's political tradition, we have left out one obvious and crucial element—the highly centralized and bureaucratic structure of Fatimid Egypt. Saladin became ruler of Egypt at thirty, and it was his chief place of residence for the next thirteen years. He displayed from the outset an intense interest in Fatimid administrative practice and did his utmost (as the works of Ibn Mammāti and al-Makhzūmi attest)⁶³ to inform himself about it and maintain it intact insofar

as conditions permitted. Moreover the place of honor held throughout his reign by a former Fatimid civil servant, al-Qadi al-Fadil, surely suggests ongoing contact with the old Egyptian tradition. Nevertheless it seems true that Saladin regarded Egypt as a special case; he certainly made no attempt to impose Egyptian administrative models on his Syrian territories, which continued to be run according to the established Zangid patterns. On the contrary, it is Egypt whose previous regime was modified to conform more closely to the Zangid outlook which Saladin had brought with him.⁶⁴

For an explanation of this one may look to Egypt's unique characteristics and to the nature of Saladin's political elite. Egypt's administrative system flowed from her geography. Effective agricultural exploitation of the Nile valley demanded centralized control, the very narrowness of this strip of land imposing a certain uniformity of technology, social and economic structure, and even of psychology. The Nile River itself was Egypt's only feasible trade route to Africa and India. Goods which entered the Mediterranean ports of Alexandria or Damietta were funneled down to Cairo and only from there reshipped to the Red Sea.⁶⁵ Commercially too, then, centralization was a fact of Egyptian life, in contrast to the intense competition among the Syrian ports. Finally we may point to the rather startling fact that the techniques of agricultural fiscal administration used in Saladin's Egypt were essentially identical with those used in Ptolemaic times. Highly specialized and inflexible, these techniques only suited the special conditions of Nilotic agriculture and depended on a hereditary corps of officials who alone understood their intricacies.⁶⁶ These factors alone would surely have hindered any attempt to transfer Fatimid traditions of government to Syria and the Jazira.

But the basic impediment to any such transferal was the nature of Saladin's political elite: not only he himself, but all his family and his great military lords were Syrians and hence imbued with Seljukid-Zangid values and traditions. On these men he could not have imposed a unitary autocracy which ruled through a bureaucratic hierarchy. They (especially Sala-

din's family) took it for granted that some share in the sovereignty, some segment of territory, would be reserved for them and their descendants. Had Saladin disappointed this expectation, he would quickly have been supplanted. But in fact he conceived his duty as they did and never thought to generalize Egyptian practice over the rest of his dominions.

The distribution of lands in the Ayyubid empire at the death of Saladin

It is impossible to know if the adjustments which Saladin made in his family's appanages during the winter and spring of 588/1192 were intended to be definitive, but his death less than a year later permanently fixed them. While he had not distributed his dominions according to any systematic plan, the final result does have a certain logic and was to prove remarkably stable. Throughout the turbulence and change of the following decades, it remained the framework of Ayyubid politics, suffering no fundamental alteration until the final two decades of the empire. It thus seems appropriate to examine these principalities as they stood at Saladin's death, when they first were free to shape their relations one to another as independent forces.

In principle the most important principality was that assigned to al-Afdal 'Ali, Saladin's eldest son and designated heir as sultan. And in fact al-Afdal held an impressive group of territories. It comprised Damascus as his capital, together with its immediate dependencies. To the south, he controlled the fertile (though relatively arid) volcanic plain of the Hauran, with the important towns of Banyas and Bosra; the Jabal al-Duruz and its fortress of Salkhad; and, beyond the Yarmuk river, the new fortress of 'Ajlun overlooking the Jordan valley into the Samarian hills.⁶⁷ West of the Jordan, al-Afdal held all Palestine as far south as the fortress of Daron. In the Lebanon he possessed all the hill strongpoints behind Sidon and Tyre.

Finally he was master of every city on the Syrian littoral which was still in Muslim hands after the Third Crusade—i.e., Sidon, Beirut, Jubayl, al-Batrun, Valania (Ar., Bulunyas, sometimes corrupted to Banyas), and Lattakia. In addition the important fortress of Balatunus, guarding the road from Lattakia into the Jabal Ansariyya, was also part of al-Afdal's principality.⁶⁸

Within al-Afdal's broad holdings, it is possible to identify several major *iqta's* and their possessors, although there are contradictions and lacunae in our sources which cannot be satisfactorily resolved. In particular it is often impossible to reconcile the ascriptions given for the last years of Saladin's reign with those given for the opening of al-Afdal's (before any of his recorded reassignments). Other things being equal, I have tended to prefer the latter on the grounds that many of the governorships Saladin assigned in Palestine and north Syria during the lightning campaigns of 583-84/1187-88 were only temporary, being altered as soon as he had time for a more carefully considered distribution of lands. In many instances these changes are identified, but one may reasonably suppose that other cases went by unnoticed.

1) Bosra: the *iqta'* of al-Afdal's younger brother al-Zafir Khidr, who was thus presumably responsible for the eastern Hauran (the Hauran narrowly defined) as well. Ibn Wasil states that al-Zafir was in the service (*fi khidma*) of al-Afdal. The meaning of this expression is rather variable, but here it would most likely indicate that al-Zafir's position in Bosra was that of an ordinary *muqta'*—i.e., that he was considered an administrative agent for al-Afdal rather than a sovereign prince with the power to command or forbid in his own name. It is an intriguing question why al-Zafir had this lowly status, since he was militarily as experienced as al-Afdal and was older than al-Zahir Ghazi of Aleppo, but the sources relate only a trivial anecdote in this connection.⁶⁹

2) Salkhad: our only evidence is a very fragmentary inscription which names an amir Badr al-Din, the *mamluk* of al-Afdal, as in some way responsible for the construction of a tower there commanded by his master.⁷⁰

3) The Sawad or Terre de Suète: the *iqta'* of Sarim al-Din Kiymaz al-Najmi, whom we have mentioned above as one of the most powerful of Saladin's amirs.⁷¹

4) 'Ajlun and Kaukab al-Hawa (Belvoir), two strategic fortresses commanding the Jordan valley, the latter in Galilee and the former in Transjordan: these were the *iqta'* of 'Izz al-Din Usama. Kaukab was formerly a Frankish castle, of course, built around 1140 A.D., but 'Ajlun was a new Muslim construction, presumably founded after the reconquest of Transjordan in 584/1188. Just when cannot be determined: Qalqashandi dates it to 580/1184-5 (and ascribes it to the well-known belle-lettrist Usama b. Munqidh), but this is hardly possible; Ibn Shaddad refers it to the reign of al-'Adil, and this is plausible enough if one understands it to mean the years after 584/1188, when Saladin assigned Transjordan to his brother in *iqta'*. All writers speak of it as if it were already in existence by the time of Saladin's death, so 589/1193 is the *terminus ad quem*. We have seen that Saladin, in return for bestowal of the Eastern Territories, required al-'Adil to give up all his Syrian *iqta's* save those south of the Wadi Zarqa', and this would indicate that the construction of 'Ajlun must have been underway by 588/1192, when it passed into the *wilaya* of al-Afdal 'Ali. The castle was built, again according to Ibn Shaddad, to control the depredations of a Bedouin tribe, the Banu 'Auf.⁷²

5) Banyas, Toron (Ar., Tibnin), and Chastel-Neuf (Ar., Hunin): the *iqta'* of Husam al-Din Bishara. Husam al-Din is called Sahib Banyas as early as 582/1186 by Ibn al-'Adim, but no other chronicler adopts this usage until after Saladin's death. His possession of Toron and Chastel-Neuf, of course, could not antedate their capture in 583/1187.⁷³ These possessions gave Husam al-Din control of the road from Damascus to Tyre and hence were of utmost importance in blocking any Frankish attempt at a reconquest.

6) The Bilad al-Shaqif, in the hills behind Sidon, containing the superb castle of Beaufort (Ar., Shaqif Arnun) and the lesser strongpoint of Tyron (Ar., Shaqif Tirun): these were the *iqta'* of one of Saladin's *mamluks*, Fakhr al-Din Ayaz Jaharkas, a

man of no particular note in Saladin's reign but destined to be a crucial figure in the decade following his death.⁷⁴

7) Sidon: assigned in *iqta'* to two amirs, Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri and Shams al-Din Sungur al-Kabir, who were to share its revenues jointly. Both men had been *mamluks* of Saladin, but otherwise we know little about them. According to the *Eracles* (but no Muslim source), half of the territory and revenue of Sidon were restored to its former lord Renaud in 588/1192. But Sidon had been a major seigneurie, and it seems likely that at least the town proper remained solely under Muslim jurisdiction.⁷⁵

8) Beirut: one 'Izz al-Din Usama is listed as its *wali* or *mutawalli*, an office which he had held since the Third Crusade, when Beirut was instrumental in intercepting Frankish shipping on its way to join the siege of Acre and in sending sea-borne supplies to that beleaguered city. It is tempting to suppose that this is the same man who was lord of Kaukab and 'Ajlun, but he is never cited in any one place as filling both capacities, so the issue must remain in doubt. Ibn Shaddad says that Usama held Beirut in *iqta'*, a possibility which is neither confirmed nor denied by his attributions of *wali/mutawalli*.⁷⁶

9) Tiberias and Safad, in Galilee: the *iqta'* of one Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud b. Mubarak b. Tamirak, who was the brother of the *shihna* of Damascus, Badr al-Din Maudud and thus in some sense a relative of Saladin's.⁷⁷

10) Nablus and Sabastiyya, the former being the chief town of Samaria, and the latter the site of the Biblical city of Samaria: these were the *iqta'* of 'Imad al-Din Ahmad, the son of Saladin's famous Kurdish amir Sayf al-Din 'Ali al-Mashtub. Upon his father's death in the autumn of 588/1192, Saladin had confirmed 'Imad al-Din in their possession.⁷⁸

11) Jerusalem: according to the historian 'Imad al-Din, in Ramadan 588/ September-October 1192 (shortly after the truce with Richard), Saladin appointed 'Izz al-Din Jurdik al-Nuri, a *mamluk* of Nur al-Din's and one of his oldest adherents among the Syrian amirs, as *wali* of Jerusalem. In an inscription of 589/1193, the same figure is identified as *mutawalli al-harb*

bi-l-bayt al-muqaddas. Finally, Ibn Shaddad states that he held Jerusalem in *iqta'*. Again it should be pointed out that these three terms are not mutually exclusive and simply indicate the variety of attributions that might be attached to one and the same position. Taken together they probably imply that Jurdik was given full discretion to administer the revenues of Jerusalem, so long as he generally met its needs in defense and the upkeep of the holy places (especially the Haram al-Sharif). On the other hand the consistently brief tenure of the Ayyubid governors of Jerusalem and the immense religious importance of the place would suggest that Jurdik's position was not granted in life-tenure or as a presumptively hereditary possession. Unfortunately we do not know how broad an area he held outside Jerusalem itself. That his territory lacked sufficient revenues to meet its own expenses is implied by the fact that one-third of the revenues of Nablus were reserved for the needs of Jerusalem.⁷⁹

12) Southern Palestine (Hebron, Gaza, Ascalon, and Daron): Saladin named his *mamluk* 'Alam al-Din Qaysar as *wali* of these lands during his administrative reforms in Palestine after the end of the Third Crusade. The strategic value of 'Alam al-Din's governorship was somewhat reduced, though hardly nullified, by the requirement in Saladin's truce with Richard that the fortifications of Ascalon be dismantled for the duration of the treaty.⁸⁰

Al-Afdal's territories were thus distributed among a rather diverse group of men; some of them had been among the leading figures of Saladin's time, while others were now first coming into prominence. But even this new group was almost entirely composed of Saladin's own *mamluks* and had received its offices and *iqta's* from him. In either case, then, al-Afdal's governors and *muqta's* owed nothing of what they were to him, and his only right to their loyalty was that which the son of their master could claim. His capacity to interfere in the administration of his own principality, to adjust it to suit his own needs and policy, was thus severely limited, unless he were willing to risk the consequences of an established amir's wounded pride.

In short al-Afdal was in precisely the same position vis-à-vis his amirs as Saladin had been during the first decade of his independent rule.

The potential difficulties created by his inherited administrative structure were not the only ones to confront al-Afdal; others quite as serious flowed from the basic geographical characteristics of his dominions. The territories under his control, though very extensive, were not contiguous, hence they were difficult to defend or maintain under adequate central supervision. Moreover al-Afdal's principality was the one most exposed to any new crusade: not only did it include the lands of the old Kingdom of Jerusalem, but the Frankish ports of Acre, Tyre, and Jaffa provided an excellent springboard for expeditions into the Palestinian and Lebanese hinterlands. However a new crusade might affect the rest of Ayyubid empire, Damascus would almost surely have to absorb the first shock. Finally it is questionable whether the revenues of Damascus were able to support an army large enough to meet such emergencies as a major Frankish attack or rebellion by one of the other Ayyubid princes. All of Syria during Saladin's reign had not supported more than 4000 regular troopers, and Saladin's expeditionary armies there were ordinarily composed at least half of Egyptian troops, since Syria's military resources were so inadequate for his needs.⁸¹ None of this is to say that the problems of al-Afdal's principality were insurmountable, but his position was such that the effective assertion of his authority, either within his own dominions or as head of the empire, would demand the greatest skill and tact.

If Damascus held the place of honor within the empire as the residence of the new sultan, it is nevertheless obvious that Egypt was by far the strongest and richest of the principalities. Its strength lay not only in its agricultural and commercial wealth, which enabled it to support an army never (during the Ayyubid period) less than three times the size of that fielded by Damascus, but also in its centralized bureaucracy, which allowed the ruler a close control over its provincial administration. However when al-'Aziz 'Uthman succeeded to indepen-

dent rule, the country's resources could not be fully exploited. Throughout the last decade of Saladin's regime, Egypt had been undergoing an increasingly severe financial crisis, as is indicated by the drastically uneven standard of fineness in contemporary Egyptian *dinars* and by the despairing letters al-Qadi al-Fadil sent from Cairo to the sultan. That these troubles did not end with the Third Crusade is apparent in the constant loans contracted by al-'Aziz during the first three years of his reign.⁸² But there is evidence that Syria was afflicted by similar problems at this time, and in any event Egypt remained the economic and military center of gravity of the Ayyubid world, the only principality in the confederation with the capacity to dominate all the others.

The last of the appanages held by Saladin's sons was Aleppo, assigned to al-Zahir Ghazi. It comprised a vast area, stretching from Mar'ash and Ra'ban in the north to Barin in the south, and from the Euphrates on the east to the Jabal Ansariyya and the Amanus mountains in the west. Unlike Damascus, the principality of Aleppo formed a contiguous area (with only trivial exceptions) of regular shape and fairly well defined frontiers. But it had no seaports, since its natural outlets to the Mediterranean were in the hands of al-Afdal. And whereas Damascus confronted but one non-Ayyubid power, the Kingdom of Jerusalem, al-Zahir's situation was complicated by the presence of three: the Principality of Antioch (admittedly harmless in itself) and the vigorous kingdoms of Cilician Armenia and the Rum Seljukids. Likewise the Assassins of the Jabal Ansariyya, though al-Zahir's vassals in some sense, were not entirely under his control.⁸³

Yet Aleppo's role within the empire, not to mention its internal political development, was less affected by these things than by the great military lords who resided within the principality. The *iqta's* they held had often been granted by Nur al-Din, but even when the territories themselves were of recent assignment, the amirs who had received them (or their families) had risen to prominence under the great Zangid. They thus constituted at least the germ of an independent landed nobility,

whose members had a permanent attachment to the land they governed. Although our purposes do not require a full survey of the *iqta*'s of Aleppo, four amirs deserve to be singled out, both because they were among the most powerful and best entrenched in the principality and because they would play a considerable role in the decade following Saladin's death. The Türkmen amir Badr al-Din Doldurum al-Yaruqi held two key strongpoints guarding the northern approaches to Aleppo: Tall Bashir and Tall Khalid. From his father, Nasir al-Din Mengüverish b. Khumartigin had inherited the castle of Abu Qubays on the eastern slope of the Jabal Ansariyya, and Saladin's Antiochene campaign of 584/1188 had yielded him the fortress of Saone (Ar., Sahyun) on the western slope overlooking Lattakia. The last survivor of the once powerful clan of the Banu al-Daya, Sabiq al-Din 'Uthman ibn al-Daya, held Shayzar on the Orontes north of Hama. Finally, flanking the Orontes valley on both sides were the possessions of 'Izz al-Din Ibrahim ibn al-Muqaddam, originally granted to his father Shams al-Din Muhammad by Saladin. These comprised Barin, Apamea, Kafartab, and Hisn Burzayh.⁸⁴

In addition to the two major Syrian principalities, held by Saladin's sons, there were three minor ones in the possession of his collaterals—Hama, Homs, and Baalbek. These were all administratively autonomous entities, each held in hereditary succession. But each was likewise in a special relationship to one of the two larger principalities, the exact significance of which is difficult to identify. According to Ibn al-Athir, al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs "obeyed" al-Afdal, while al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama "obeyed and supported" al-Zahir Ghazi.⁸⁵ Ibn Wasil is more precise but not necessarily more enlightening: according to the treaty signed by the Ayyubid princes after al-'Aziz's first (unsuccessful) siege of Damascus in 590/1194, al-Amjad of Baalbek and al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs were to "support al-Malik al-Afdal and be subject to his authority," and al-Mansur of Hama would "be in al-Malik al-Zahir's sphere of influence and support him."⁸⁶ Unfortunately the concrete duties implied by these phrases of clientship or

vassaldom are never spelled out; presumably, they included the provision of troops on demand of Damascus or Aleppo respectively and refraining from independent policy initiatives.

As to the territories held by these minor princes, they may be summarized as follows:

1) Al-Amjad Bahramshah's possession of Baalbek probably implies that he ruled a substantial portion of the Biqa', but we have no way to identify the northern and southern limits of his authority.

2) al-Mujahid Shirkuh's realm, stretching across the Syrian desert to the Euphrates, included Homs, Palmyra, and al-Rahba.

3) al-Mansur Muhammad's dominions were oddly scattered. In addition to his capital, Hama, they included Salamiyya to the southeast, Ma'arrat al-Nu'man (north of three important possessions of Aleppo—Shayzar, Apamea, and Kafartab), and—northeast of Aleppo and standing astride one of the major routes between it and the Jazira—Qal'at Najm and Manbij.⁸⁷

The last group of territories was that controlled by Saladin's younger brother al-'Adil. Of all the principalities his was by far the most scattered and disparate, consisting of parts of Transjordan, Diyar Mudar, and Diyar Bakr. No part was contiguous with any other. In Transjordan he held everything south of the Wadi Zarqa'—i.e., the districts of al-Salt and al-Balqa' and the great fortresses of al-Karak and al-Shaubak. Not a rich region, it was of the highest strategic importance, for it controlled both the caravan route to the Hijaz and the Red Sea and the desert road between Egypt and Damascus.

Al-'Adil's possessions east of the Euphrates fell into two groups, one centered on Edessa and Harran, the other on Mayyafariqin.⁸⁸ In addition to the major centers of Edessa and Harran, his normal residence in this period, he also held the Euphrates crossing at Qal'at Ja'bar; Samosata, on the Edessa-Malatya road; Suwayda', to the northeast about half-way to Amida; and the fortress of al-Muwazzar, covering the route eastwards from Edessa to Mardin. In Mayyafariqin al-'Adil held a superb fortress situated at the bottom of the long pass which

leads from the Jazira to Lake Van and Armenia. Some distance to the northwest, on the road leading from Amida north into the upper Euphrates valley, he controlled another strongpoint named Hani.⁸⁹

From all points of view al-'Adil was a wise choice as ruler of these outlying regions, especially the Eastern Territories. On the one hand they were exposed to a Zangid *revanche*; on the other they were superbly placed for any new Ayyubid offensive against the remaining Artukid and Zangid possessions in the region. In either case al-'Adil, both in diplomatic skill and military experience, was far better fitted than any of Saladin's sons to represent Ayyubid interests. And the very fact that al-'Adil's lands were rather isolated frontier provinces of no great wealth meant that he could not easily use them as a base from which to dominate his nephews. He would of course be an important element in the balance of power among them, but his real role in the evolution of the empire would almost necessarily stem from his shrewdness and prestige.

Seen in general perspective Saladin's division of his empire displays certain anomalies—especially the confiding of southern Transjordan to al-'Adil rather than al-Afdal, the shapeless sprawl of al-Afdal's principality, and the intermingling of the possessions of Hama and Aleppo. But all these can be accounted for by observing how the various parts of the empire came gradually to be assigned and shifted among Saladin's relatives. Even had Saladin been a more theoretical or systematic thinker, he could not easily have removed these peculiarities without arousing hurt feelings and inflaming petty rivalries within his family. But there is one anomaly that still requires explanation: why, when Damascus was strategically exposed (not only to new crusades but to a hostile coalition of Ayyubid princes) and economically relatively weak, did Saladin choose it as the appanage of his successor to the sultanate? The answer to this question reveals a fundamental flaw in the empire, and one which, given the tradition of collective sovereignty and the lack of a strong institutional structure, could probably not have been remedied even if Saladin was aware of it.

The crucial element in Saladin's choice was probably subjective: although he had begun his independent career in Egypt, and Egypt always remained the foundation of his power, he nevertheless always considered himself more at home in Syria, where he had spent his life until age thirty and which was the focal point of his struggle against the Franks.⁹⁰ He would thus have tended to think of Damascus as the head of his dominions and the most appropriate residence for his successor. Nor in fact was Damascus without objective virtues in this regard. In the hands of a skillful and energetic ruler, its central location would allow him relatively quick access to any place where his presence was required and would lend him a unique control over communications within the empire. Nevertheless Damascus did lack the military and economic resources to sustain the sultan, especially in a structure of divided authority, where supplementary money and troops from the other principalities (especially Egypt) were not *predictably* available to him. Egypt did have the necessary resources, of course, but it too was flawed as a possible residence of the sultan. Egypt was so distant from north Syria and the Jazira that it was extremely difficult for the sultan to assert his authority there effectively if their princes chose to pursue an independent policy—the Litani River and the Ghuta ordinarily marked the northern limit of direct Egyptian domination in Syria. In short there was no geographical foundation for the unity of the Ayyubid Empire, unless the sultan could somehow manage to gain control of Egypt and Damascus simultaneously. This was a problem which had more than one solution, as we shall see. But whereas Saladin had accomplished the task easily, even light-heartedly, his successors' efforts led universally to disruption and civil war. And just as Saladin's union had dissolved at the moment of his death, so too none of them ever achieved a resolution which could outlast his own reign.

3 The rise of al-‘Adil (589/1193-598/1201)

When Saladin returned ill to Damascus on a wintry February day, after having met the pilgrimage caravan on its way back from Mecca, those close to him must have guessed that he would not recover. The long struggle with Richard Coeur-de-Lion, ended not six months previously, had left him a beaten and profoundly discouraged man. After the truce had been signed (22 Sha‘ban 588/2 September 1192), Saladin had been able to muster the energy to establish a permanent administration in Jerusalem and make an inspection tour of his territories in Galilee and south Lebanon before reentering Damascus (which he had not seen for more than three years) on 25 Shawwal/4 November. But once there he became increasingly listless and apathetic, as if he had lost the will to govern, or even to live.

The reasons for so shocking a degeneration in a man previously characterized by immense energy and ambition are not difficult to surmise. Advancing age undoubtedly had a role (Saladin was now fifty-five), together with the strain of six almost unbroken years of combat. But more devastating was the depression—one is tempted to say the trauma—induced by the Third Crusade. Saladin had indeed managed to retain the bulk of his conquests—among the major towns, only Acre, Caesarea, and Jaffa had reverted to Frankish control—but he had very nearly lost a great deal more. He had been helpless to break the long siege of Acre, even when the Franks were outnumbered and almost cut off from outside support by his own forces. He had had to surrender Ascalon without a fight,

and Jerusalem itself might well have fallen if Richard had not been so impatient to get back to England. Nor had Saladin been able to obtain a single victory in the open field after the fall of Acre. And more disturbing than the fact of defeat was what had underlain it: the sorry performance of his cavalry against the Frankish knights and infantry, his amirs' weakness of will, the capacity for disloyalty and treason in even his closest adherents which had been revealed by the rebellion of Taqi al-Din. Moreover the administrative and fiscal structure of Saladin's territories, already strained by the years of war against the Zangids, had suffered grievously during the wars of reconquest and the Third Crusade. Saladin had been able to give it no personal attention at all, and for lack of cash reserves all his expenses had had to be met out of current receipts or forced loans.¹ Saladin could have been left with no illusions by the Third Crusade: his territories were fearfully vulnerable to any new expedition, something which was almost inevitable, while he did not have a military machine which he could rely on to repel it. It is not surprising that these things should have drained the energies and will of a man who had hitherto achieved a succession of ever more brilliant and exhilarating triumphs.

Whatever the causes may have been, Saladin showed no resistance to the disease that ravaged him. As he lay in his chambers in the Damascus citadel, his condition deteriorated steadily, despite the presence of several of the most highly skilled physicians in the empire. At last by late Safar/early March it was apparent that death was close at hand. The sultan's oldest son and *wali al-'ahd*, al-Afdal 'Ali, began preparing the way for his own accession to the throne. He first took his father's place at the head of the table during the weekly ceremonial banquet (*khiwan*) which expressed the bonds of loyalty and fellowship between the sovereign and his amirs.² The following day, he required those amirs present in Damascus to swear allegiance to him as sultan, effective on his father's passing. The historian 'Imad al-Din registers some consternation at these acts, but in fact they are intelligible enough. Al-Afdal

had been kept very much in the shadows by his father, with little opportunity to earn in his own right the respect and loyalty of the high officers of state. He had no reason to suppose that Saladin's amirs would not respect his long-standing designation as heir-apparent. But in view of his obscurity and lack of experience, it was clearly prudent for him to assert and confirm his status while his father was still alive, lest they consider him as in some sense their nominee and creature. There was no difficulty: when Saladin died on 27 Safar 589/4 March 1193, al-Afdal became sultan without incident.³

One of the new sultan's first official acts was to dispatch an embassy to Baghdad to inform the caliph of Saladin's death and to request investiture, as designated heir, in all his dominions. Given the political realities of the day (al-Afdal ruled a far larger and more powerful kingdom than al-Nasir li-Din Allah), this gesture might be dismissed as a mere formality. But in fact it was rather more than that. Saladin's relations with the caliphate during the latter half of his reign had been rather strained, and it was incumbent on al-Afdal to try to patch them up if possible.⁴ Moreover it could not be forgotten that in the eyes of many, Saladin had begun his independent reign as a usurper, and although he had eventually been able to obtain caliphal investiture for the lands he conquered, he and his heirs would always be considered usurpers by the Zangids whom he had dispossessed. Thus a caliphal confirmation of al-Afdal's authority would strengthen his position against any attempted return of the Zangids of Mosul. Practically speaking, the caliph was a real diplomatic force in Mesopotamia; if al-Afdal did establish good relations with Baghdad, he could hope to call on its services as a sympathetic mediator in case of a Zangid-Ayyubid conflict.

The importance which al-Afdal attached to this embassy may be seen in his choice of its leader: Diya' al-Din b. al-Shahrazuri, a distinguished scholar, former chief qadi of the Ayyubid empire, and the nephew of the Kamal al-Din b. al-Shahrazuri, who had served Zangi and Nur al-Din both as an influential counsellor of state and as chief qadi.⁵ (His Zangid

connections were perhaps intended to underline the legitimacy of the transfer of power to the Ayyubids.) In addition to making a careful choice of ambassador, al-Afdal sent not only the normal complement of kingly gifts but also the unusual present of Saladin's weapons and armor, intending thereby to remind the caliph of the late sultan's services to Islam. In spite of al-Afdal's elaborate preparations, there is no record that a diploma of investiture (or honors of any kind) ever arrived. But Baghdad often took its time about such things, and there is no reason to suppose that his position was in any way compromised by this fact.⁶

If al-Afdal was acting with one eye on the Zangids, his concern was well placed. As soon as news of Saladin's death reached the Jazira, the two chief members of that family—‘Izz al-Din Mas‘ud of Mosul and his brother ‘Imad al-Din Zangi II of Sinjar and Nisibin—concerted their plans to drive the Ayyubids back to the Euphrates and reestablish Zangid domination east of the river, which had stood unchallenged until a bare decade previously. In the face of their joint attack, al-‘Adil judged his own forces inadequate and called on the support of his nephews in Damascus, Egypt, and Aleppo. Like his two brothers, al-Afdal did not go personally, but contented himself with dispatching units of his army. He commanded al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs and al-Amjad of Baalbek to bring their troops to Damascus, where he named his brother al-Zafir Khidr of Bosra as commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force.

Before the Damascene troops could reach al-‘Adil, however, the chief of the Zangid coalition, ‘Izz al-Din Mas‘ud, had fallen desperately ill and retreated to his capital, leaving ‘Imad al-Din Zangi to try to negotiate a settlement with al-‘Adil. There was apparently little progress in this direction, for when al-Afdal's expeditionary force arrived, it was sent (along with independently commanded units from Aleppo and Hama) to seize Saruj, a town held by ‘Imad al-Din twenty miles southwest of Edessa on a major road to Aleppo. Having occupied it, the Ayyubid armies then marched south down the Balikh River to Raqqa and occupied that town. Turning north again, they

moved against one of 'Imad al-Din's chief possessions, Nisibin. 'Imad al-Din could not risk the loss of a third town and decided to accept a peace on the basis of the *status quo*. The instigator of the invasion, 'Izz al-Din Mas'ud, had died very shortly after his return to Mosul, but his son and successor Nur al-Din Arslanshah felt compelled to follow 'Imad al-Din's lead, and by the end of Rajab 589/July 1193, the war in the East was over, no more than five months after it had begun.⁷

For the Zangids the campaign had been disastrous: they had lost their last possessions in Diyar Mudar, leaving their core cities—Nisibin, Sinjar, Jazirat ibn 'Umar, and Mosul itself—directly exposed to future Ayyubid expansion. More importantly Ayyubid control in the western Jazira, of such recent origin and apparently so fragile, was shown to be vigorous and well-established. Zangid hopes of again playing a major role in the region, though far from crushed, were at least severely chastened. The action had also revealed that Saladin's passing had not led to a complete breakup of Ayyubid unity: against a common outside threat, at least, the several principalities could cooperate effectively. On the other hand the major Ayyubid princes had acted independently during this crisis, each supplying forces under separate command and according to his own discretion. Although al-Afdal was nominally sultan, he had attempted to exercise no overall leadership. Rather it was al-'Adil—the prince immediately concerned—who had assembled an Ayyubid counteroffensive, decided on the appropriate goals, directed field operations, and (entirely on his own authority) negotiated a settlement.

Al-Afdal had so far met his larger responsibilities ably enough, but he proved less competent in the internal politics of his own principality. His basic problem was the existence of an established group of amirs and officials who had risen to prominence under his father and who controlled most of the high offices of state. He could either govern through this group, in which case he would have to establish his authority among men who owed nothing of their status and power to him, or he could attempt to supplant it with new men. That the choice

was understood in precisely these terms is clear from a statement which the historian ‘Imad al-Din ascribes to one of al-Afdal’s closest associates, the *wazir* Diya’ al-Din Nasr Allah b. al-Athir al-Jazari.⁸ Speaking to al-Afdal, he says,

These men are the personal entourage [*khawass*] of the late sultan, and they will regard you from that point of view. They will suppose that their rights [in your regard] are as compulsory as a debt. Because they have known you from your youth, they will be at ease with you; they will go too far, observing no proper bounds. The lands of Damascus will not satisfy them; to them, Egypt is wider and more spacious. But outsiders will be content with anything you give them, and they will acknowledge your rights and exalt you.⁹

Diya’ al-Din’s comments are most perceptive, albeit plainly self-serving as well, and it is not surprising that al-Afdal chose to heed his *wazir*’s advice. Nevertheless it was a foolhardy decision, for al-Afdal was a young man, only twenty-four years of age, who had been systematically excluded by his father from administration and serious politics. As a result he had had little opportunity to create a large personal entourage with which he could replace the established elite quickly and smoothly. In alienating or shunting aside key members of this latter group, therefore, he was fatally weakening the foundations of his regime.

We do not know precisely what this process of replacement involved as far as the older men were concerned; we do not read of imprisonments or confiscations of land and wealth or seizures of fortresses. Nevertheless it is clear that many of the most powerful and influential no longer felt able to remain in his service. Possibly the first to leave was his *qadi al-‘askar*, Baha’ al-Din b. Shaddad, one of the closest and most trusted advisors both of al-Afdal and his father. Baha’ al-Din’s departure may not have been a direct consequence of the new policy, since he had been invited by al-Zahir Ghazi to come to Aleppo as chief *qadi* of that principality, but it seems at least symptomatic of the developing state of affairs.¹⁰ More serious for al-Afdal was the decision of three leading amirs to abandon him (for reasons which are not given us). These were Fakhr al-

Din Jaharkas, *muqta*‘ of the Bilad al-Shaqif, and Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri and Shams al-Din Sungur al-Kabir, joint *muqta*‘s of Sidon. They took refuge with al-‘Aziz ‘Uthman in Cairo, where they were most honorably received. Fakhr al-Din became *ustadh al-dar* to al-‘Aziz,¹¹ while Maymun al-Qasri and Sungur al-Kabir were confirmed in their *iqta*‘ of Sidon. At about the same time a number of al-Afdal’s civil and religious officials had decided to remove to Cairo, the most damaging loss among them being that of al-Qadi al-Fadil. In his case too, we know nothing concrete as to time or circumstances; we are told only that he was discouraged by the trend of events in Damascus.¹²

The decision of these exiles to attach themselves to al-‘Aziz injected a critical new element into the developing governmental crisis confronting al-Afdal. It was no longer merely an internal conflict between the sultan and one faction of his advisors, but now began inevitably to involve the ambitions of another Ayyubid prince. And since this was the ruler of Egypt, the inherent instability of a sultanate based on Damascus and the natural tendency of Egypt to dominate the confederation also came into play.

The immediate causes of the rapidly developing rivalry between al-Afdal and al-‘Aziz, already clearly visible within some months of Saladin’s death, are not easy to identify. We are told that those who had taken refuge at the court of al-‘Aziz persistently urged their new master to rebel and seize the sultanate, since al-Afdal had proven himself unworthy of this office. Whether al-‘Aziz had had ambitions in this direction from the outset we do not know, but at least he lent a ready and sympathetic ear to their pleas. Certainly it is possible that the Damascus exiles had come to Cairo because they knew that al-‘Aziz would be more than willing to take up arms on their behalf.

However this may be, there was no direct clash between al-Afdal and al-‘Aziz until an odd incident over Jerusalem. Sometime late in 589/1193 or early in 590/1194 al-Afdal’s *wazir* Diya’ al-Din b. al-Athir advised him to transfer Jerusalem to

his brother, thus ridding himself of its costs while simultaneously earning the goodwill of al-'Aziz. Al-'Aziz of course accepted this unexpected offer quite readily, but certain of al-Afdal's lieutenants in Jerusalem were badly upset by the news, and in particular the governor and *muqta'* of Nablus, 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Mashtub. One-third the revenues of his *iqta'* were to be set aside for Jerusalem, but he and another (unnamed) Kurdish amir had been dipping their hands rather freely into these reserved funds, and now they feared that al-'Aziz would uncover their malversations. They wrote to al-Afdal, therefore, and offered to meet *all* the expenses of Jerusalem and its garrison (*rijaluhu*) from the reserved revenues of Nablus alone. With incredible naiveté, al-Afdal rescinded his offer to al-'Aziz and went along with this scheme. Outraged at this breach of faith, al-'Aziz retaliated by reassigning Nablus as a second *iqta'* (in addition to Sidon) to the refugee amirs Maymun al-Qasri and Sungur al-Kabir. It is hard to see what the real effect of this act could have been, since he does not seem to have had time to send his own officers to take control of Jerusalem and had no way of evicting Ibn al-Mashtub from Nablus. But at least it implied a claim that central Palestine was by right under his control.¹³

In the spring of 590/1194 tensions between Cairo and Damascus reached the breaking point. Al-'Aziz sent an ultimatum to his brother, demanding that the right of the *khutba* and *sikka*—i.e., the symbols of the sultanate—be surrendered to him. Simultaneously he began to assemble his armies for an invasion of Syria.¹⁴ The *casus belli*, if there was one, is not identified; possibly al-'Aziz simply thought that al-Afdal's weakness and incompetence were already amply demonstrated and he should dislodge him from the sultanate before he had time to place his regime on firmer foundations. For in the Muslim states of the middle period, a monarch gained a less effective presumption of legitimacy from hereditary succession or formal designation by his predecessor than from perceived effectiveness and the simple passage of time once he had taken possession of the throne.

Learning of his brother's intentions, al-Afdal now tried to mend his fences with those amirs who remained loyal to him. But even now he continued to prove either *maladroit* or unfortunate. The powerful Sarim al-Din Kiymaz al-Najmi had recently left Damascus in a fit of anger and gone to reside in his *iqta'* in the Sawad. Al-Afdal sent an envoy to patch up the quarrel, knowing that he would need Sarim al-Din's forces in the coming struggle, but the messenger betrayed his trust and persuaded the amir to abandon al-Afdal altogether and join al-‘Aziz. The envoy blandly excused his conduct to al-Afdal by proclaiming, "Now you have become the master of your own regime and are freed of his control. You have his *iqta'* as booty, and you can assign it to twice the number of his men."¹⁵

Al-Afdal's first impulse had been to give in to his brother's demands, for at this point these merely entailed the surrender of the mostly formal prerogatives of the sultanate, while leaving his dominions intact. The remnants of Saladin's old circle of advisors, most prominently ‘Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani, strongly favored this practical if ignoble course of action. But the young sultan's own entourage, whose power and influence were of course closely dependent on his status, found no difficulty in talking him out of this line of conduct. Recognizing that he was too weak to resist al-‘Aziz alone, all the more as the latter was now reinforced by many of his own amirs, al-Afdal sent urgent appeals for aid to the other Ayyubid princes of Syria—to al-‘Adil in the first instance, but also to al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama and to his own dependents al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs and al-Amjad of Baalbek. On his way south from the Jazira al-‘Adil stopped in Aleppo to solicit the support of al-Zahir Ghazi.¹⁶

At the beginning of Jumada II 590/May 1194, al-Afdal led his troops out of Damascus to Ra's al-Ma', a point on the great pilgrimage road to Mecca lying just north of the Yarmuk River and hence well located to allow him to meet an Egyptian army coming either through Transjordan or Palestine.¹⁷ But when he heard of al-‘Aziz's approach, he lost heart and scurried back to the relative security of Damascus. Two days after his hasty

reentry, on 7 Jumada II/29 May, al-'Aziz brought his army up from al-Kiswa to the Midan al-Hasa (Field of Pebbles) south of the city.¹⁸

But shortly thereafter al-Afdal's Syrian allies began arriving in Damascus, apparently without opposition from Egyptian forces. Al-'Aziz had probably supposed that a simple demonstration would suffice to obtain al-Afdal's surrender; certainly neither he nor any of the other Ayyubids had wanted a major civil war, the effects of which could not be foreseen or controlled. When al-'Adil proposed an informal parley between himself and al-'Aziz, therefore, his offer was quickly accepted. To facilitate negotiation of a full settlement, al-'Aziz then agreed to withdraw his forces some miles to the south, between Darayya and al-Kiswa. The princes did not meet directly, each instead appointing an amir to represent him. (Among these, we are given only the name of Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas, spokesman for al-'Aziz.) A preliminary agreement was reached as early as 12 Rajab/2 July, but al-'Aziz had been seriously ill during most of the negotiations, and he now demanded some unspecified changes in the terms. It was thus not until 3 Sha'ban/24 July that a final settlement could be achieved and the princes begin to take leave of one another.¹⁹

Although we do not have a full summary of the treaty, it was apparently intended to regulate and define the relations among all the Ayyubid princes and not merely to settle the dispute between al-'Aziz and al-Afdal. At least this is implied by a statement in Ibn Wasil that the subordinate status of Homs, Hama, and Baalbek was to be confirmed.²⁰ The dispute between Cairo and Damascus was settled on the basis of the *status quo ante*: al-Afdal would retain all the lands which he had possessed (presumably including Jerusalem and its dependencies) before the outbreak of hostilities, with the proviso that Nablus should become the joint *iqta'* of Shams al-Din Sungur al-Kabir and Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri.²¹

This first campaign of al-'Aziz against Damascus, though altogether indecisive, was not without broader significance. At least it demonstrated a strong will to unity within the Ayyubid

empire, a desire that the passions and issues of the moment should not be allowed to destroy it as a coherent political entity. Although institutions of hierarchy and leadership within the empire as a whole were weak and embryonic, the various princes still felt bound together by a common heritage. It is also clear that there was as yet no general consensus that al-Afdal was unfit to hold the sultanate; the Syrian princes, at any rate, still felt that he was the legitimate occupant of the throne, however weak or misguided he may have been in certain respects. These events provide a clear example of a kind and degree of legitimist thinking which was uncommon in Muslim dynasties of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Among both princes and amirs, we see here a marked tendency to favor the claims of a man who had received the sultanate by inheritance and formal designation. Such a presumption of legitimacy was subject to quick erosion, both in this and later cases, but it did much to moderate the dynasty's inevitable succession struggles and to ensure at least a brief period of stability when a new man ascended the throne.

To all appearances the events of 590/1194 had changed very little, but in hindsight we can note an increase in the prestige and influence of al-'Adil. The previous year he had taken the lead in repelling the Zangids and driving them from their last possessions in Diyar Mudar. Now he had played a decisive part in arbitrating a grave family dispute. Slowly, and possibly not even consciously, he was moving to fill the leadership vacuum. Although al-'Adil had come to Damascus to oppose the pretensions of al-'Aziz, he did not lose the opportunity to strengthen his ties with the prince of Egypt: sometime before the beginning of Sha'ban/mid-July, the two men contracted a marriage between al-'Aziz and one of al-'Adil's daughters.²²

The confrontation with al-'Aziz over, al-Afdal's standing conflict with the established elite flared up again. It was all the fiercer now, as al-Afdal is said to have begun abdicating the responsibilities of kingship for its pleasures, leaving affairs of state to his *wazir*, Diya' al-Din b. al-Athir, who was a committed partisan of the new elite. The powerful lord of Kaukab

and 'Ajlun, 'Izz al-Din Usama, was the first to leave, closely followed by one Shams al-Din b. al-Salar. Like the previous exiles, they went to Egypt, there devoting their energies to persuading al-'Aziz to undertake a second expedition against Damascus. Only he, they urged, could prevent al-Afdal and his *wazir* from wrecking Saladin's heritage. At about the same time al-Afdal suffered a damaging blow to his prestige when he was abandoned by the qadi Muhyi al-Din b. Sharaf al-Din b. abi 'Asrun, whom al-'Aziz rewarded generously with the offices of chief qadi and supervisor of *waqfs* (*nazir al-auqaf*) in Egypt.²³

The treaty of 590/1194 had been in effect only a few months when al-'Aziz again demanded that al-Afdal step down from the sultanate in his favor. As before al-Afdal's counselors were divided, the older group advising submission, which would cost only a title that he could not defend, while his own entourage advocated an alliance with al-'Adil. This was not only self-serving advice, it was dangerous as well, for al-Afdal's throne was becoming increasingly dependent on his uncle's attitude towards him rather than on his own efforts. But one cannot really blame the young prince for preferring such counsel above that of Saladin's men, who would always have had him humble himself before al-'Aziz, and who displayed no respect for his courage or intelligence.²⁴

Al-Afdal decided this time to seek al-Adil's assistance in person and left Damascus on 14 Jamada I 591/26 April 1195. He met with his uncle at Qal'at Ja'bar on the Euphrates and at once obtained promise of aid. By the beginning of Jumada II/mid-May al-'Adil had gathered his forces and set off for Damascus, where he arrived on 9 Jumada II/21 May. Al-Afdal did not return with him, but instead went on to Aleppo and then Hama, enlisting the support of al-Zahir Ghazi and al-Mansur Muhammad. Only at the end of the month did he at last regain his capital. Following the advice of his companions, al-Afdal displayed the utmost deference to his uncle. The executive authority in Damascus was turned over to him for the duration of his stay. Even more striking, al-'Adil was accompanied by the royal banners (*al-sanajiq al-sultaniyya*) and rode at the head of the

column during public processions, while al-Afdal rode behind him as a member of his cortège.²⁵

Al-Zahir Ghazi's adherence to the new alliance had been hard to obtain. First of all al-Afdal had had to surrender to him his northernmost possessions, Jabala and Lattakia (and presumably Valania and the castle of Balatunus as well, although these are not explicitly named). Practically speaking, however, this constituted no great loss to al-Afdal, since these places were isolated from his capital and hard to defend. Giving them up only rationalized the principalities of both men.²⁶

But the basic difficulty did not concern al-Afdal at all, but rather the relationship between al-Zahir, his great feudatories, and al-'Adil. Among al-Zahir's most powerful and strategically placed dependents were al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama and two senior amirs, 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, lord of Barin, and Badr al-Din Doldurum, lord of Tall Bashir.²⁷ But distrusting al-Zahir's intentions towards themselves and their possessions, they had during the past year decided to switch their loyalty and services to al-'Adil, and all three had now gone with him to Damascus. At some point before al-Afdal's visit to his brother, al-'Adil seems to have promised that he would compel his new clients to return to al-Zahir's obedience, and the prince of Aleppo made it clear to al-Afdal that his adherence to the coalition was contingent on al-'Adil's honoring this agreement. However, when Aleppan envoys accompanied the sultan to Damascus, al-'Adil flatly refused to do anything about their demands.²⁸

With this series of events originates the suspicion and hostility which characterized the relations between al-'Adil and al-Zahir for the next twenty years. It must have been plain to al-Zahir that al-'Adil was rapidly becoming the arbiter of disputes within the dynasty and that he had attained a considerable influence over both the contenders for the sultanate. Now, quite abruptly, he had deprived al-Zahir of three of his most important vassals—a grave personal affront and a serious blow to al-Zahir's position both in north Syria and within the confederation. Already the dominant power in the empire, if

al-'Adil's role continued to grow, he would soon eclipse the three young princes who represented the house of Saladin. From this point on al-Zahir made opposition to his uncle the very keystone of his policy. Learning of al-'Adil's perfidy, he at once withdrew from the alliance, and in Rajab 591/June-July 1195 he wrote to al-'Aziz to propose a counteralliance aimed at the conquest of Damascus.

Al-'Adil reached Damascus some two months before al-'Aziz was prepared to set out from Egypt, and he used his time effectively. Knowing that the forces assembled in Damascus might be too small to sustain a long siege and distrustful of the fortunes of war in any case, he tried to exploit a rift which had appeared between al-'Aziz and certain segments of his army. Al-'Aziz had tended to favor his father's personal regiment, the *Salahiyya*, somewhat to the prejudice of two other important corps, the *Asadiyya* and the Kurdish *Mihraniyya*.²⁹ Since most of the refugee amirs from Damascus had originally been members of the *Salahiyya*, when they and their followers came to Egypt a considerable strain must have been placed on the number of available *iqta's* and high offices, thus increasing the tension. With some skillfully placed letters al-'Adil succeeded in fanning the resentments of the two less-favored regiments into vivid mutual fear between them and al-'Aziz.³⁰

In Ramadan 591/August 1195 al-'Aziz left Cairo at the head of an army of 7000 regular cavalry (an unusually large force, in view of Saladin's practice of never taking more than half his Egyptian troops out of the country at one time). As his vicegerent in Cairo he left the famous Baha' al-Din Karakush, an *Asadi* amir. But at his camp in al-Fawwar (a point in the Hauran, roughly thirty miles south of Damascus),³¹ on the night of 4 Shawwal/10 September, he was deserted by the commandant of the *Mihraniyya*, Abu-l-Hayja' al-Samin, who took with him not only his own corps but the *Asadiyya* as well. Deprived of a substantial part of his army and fearing a coup d'état by elements of the *Asadiyya* still in Cairo, al-'Aziz began a hurried retreat to his capital.³²

One point of the agreement between al-Afdal and al-'Adil

was that, if an opportunity materialized, they would attempt to seize Egypt. The sources differ on the precise terms, but the most likely account would have al-'Adil becoming ruler of Damascus, while al-Afdal became prince of Egypt. This would have given al-Afdal the material basis to support the sultanate and enormously increased al-'Adil's power, for he would have controlled, directly or indirectly, everything in Syria except Aleppo. As soon as the two princes learned of al-'Aziz's flight from Syria, they set out in forced marches to try to cut off his retreat. On the way south al-Afdal rewarded Abu-l-Hayja' al-Samin with the governorship of Jerusalem, while compensating the former governor, 'Izz al-Din Jurdik al-Nuri, with another *iqta'*. By the time they reached Bilbays, they found the city already garrisoned against a siege under the command of Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas. In their haste al-Afdal and his uncle had brought no heavy siege equipment, and although they did capture a supply flotilla sent up the Nile from Cairo, they were in no position to mount a long siege of the city.

Al-'Adil was nothing if not a thoroughgoing realist. Faced with the probability of a long Egyptian campaign, he quickly concluded that a negotiated peace might prove much more to his advantage. After all he had enjoyed a close personal and political relationship with al-'Aziz for many years, not only as his father-in-law, but as his *atabeg* in Egypt. Al-'Aziz agreed to a conference and sent the aged al-Qadi al-Fadil as his representative to Bilbays. The peace provided that al-Afdal would retain undisputed control of all Palestine, al-'Aziz would reinstate without penalty the Asadiyya and Mihraniyya corps, and al-'Adil would henceforth reside in Egypt as advisor to al-Aziz, receiving as his *iqta'* the Buhayra province, which he had once held as Saladin's *na'ib*.³³

With the treaty of 591/1195 al-'Adil emerges clearly as the central figure in the dynasty. Up to this point he had intervened in, and sometimes prudently exploited to his own benefit, the crises created by others. Henceforth he would be the motivating force and guiding spirit in events. Living in Egypt, he could exercise a constant influence over the head of the largest

principality in the empire, and he made full use of his opportunity. Al-'Aziz was neither lazy nor dissolute, but he had no taste for administration, and he was not reluctant to turn over full responsibility in this field to his uncle. Al-'Adil even had the authority to act in his own name, as is evidenced by a decree of Muharram 592/December 1195 confirming the privileges of St. Catherine's monastery on Mt. Sinai. It is issued in the name of al-'Adil alone—al-'Aziz is nowhere mentioned—and he is given at least a quasi-sovereign titulature.³⁴ His administration would appear to have been efficacious in restoring some fiscal health of Egypt, though admittedly circumstances were now far more propitious than they had been in Saladin's later years. At least the gold currency issued under al-'Aziz, though of uneven weight, maintained a consistently high standard of fineness. Moreover after the the campaign of 592/1196 we read no more about the kind of forced loans al-'Aziz had constantly employed heretofore.³⁵

Al-'Adil was hardly established in Egypt when he began trying to persuade his nephew to undertake yet a third campaign against al-Afdal. Possibly he was encouraged to move so quickly by news of disloyalty among al-Afdal's amirs. Al-'Aziz was not difficult to convince, and it was decided that he should become sultan, while al-'Adil would govern Damascus as his *na'ib*. As for al-Afdal, he would be assigned some other place in exchange for Damascus.³⁶ The expression "*na'ib*" would imply that al-'Adil was in principle to act as a governor replaceable at al-'Aziz's discretion and not as an autonomous prince invested with the city on life or hereditary tenure. But in practice the agreement gave al-'Adil what he would have obtained in 591/1195 had his alliance with al-Afdal been successful—i.e., control of all Syria and Diyar Mudar except for the principality of Aleppo.

The affair of 591/1195 had been settled before al-Zahir Ghazi could intervene. He was profoundly disturbed with the outcome, especially al-'Adil's rise to power in Egypt. In Rabi' I 592/February 1196, therefore, he decided to send an embassy to Egypt to try to resolve the disputes which were rending the

dynasty, knowing that only a rapid stabilization of the situation could save al-Afdal's throne and secure his own position in the north. But nothing came of his attempt, for when his envoys arrived in Cairo, they saw that al-‘Adil and al-‘Aziz were already preparing a new campaign. On their return journey they stopped in Damascus to warn al-Afdal.³⁷

As always al-Afdal was torn between opposing schools of opinion, and as before the more bellicose faction, led by Diya' al-Din b. al-Athir, carried the day. Al-Afdal's shaky determination to resist was shored up by his younger brother, al-Zafir Khidr of Bosra, who took personal charge of preparations for the coming siege. And there was further encouragement when new envoys arrived from Aleppo, promising the loyal support of al-Zahir Ghazi. In a last effort to fend off a war which he must have known would be fatal to him, al-Afdal sent the amir Falak al-Din Sulayman, al-‘Adil's half-brother, to Cairo. He was honorably received but apparently informed that there was no way out save through al-Afdal's submission. Al-Afdal refused, and the die was cast.³⁸

In early to mid-Rajab 592/June 1196, the Egyptian armies made camp at the Midan al-Hasa south of Damascus. There was one last attempt to obtain al-Afdal's voluntary surrender, when a former advisor now resident in Cairo, ‘Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani, received permission from al-‘Aziz to enter Damascus and speak personally with the sultan, but his representations too were refused. Al-Afdal's forces had been strengthened by a contingent from Aleppo, although al-Zahir himself had been unable to come, so al-Afdal could at least hope to make the siege difficult for his enemies. But when, on 26 Rajab /25 June, the city was stormed, one of his most trusted soldiers opened the Bab Tuma before the onrush of al-‘Adil's troops. Simultaneously al-‘Aziz's forces burst through the Bab al-Faraj. Treachery may well have been at work here also, though we are not told so explicitly, but it is at least clear that, as in the first two campaigns, al-‘Adil had left little to the fortunes of battle. The Aleppans and the troops under al-Zafir Khidr did not know that the whole thing was a charade and

fought on valiantly for a time. But seeing that they were alone, they threw down their arms and fled. Al-'Aziz and al-'Adil entered the city, taking up separate residence to await al-Afdal's descent from the citadel to offer his surrender. In the three attacks directed against Damascus since the death of Saladin, the city had been stormed but once, and even in this last and most violent campaign there had been almost no loss of life or property.³⁹

In exchange for the sultanate and the broad principality which had been his inheritance, al-Afdal received the isolated fortress of Salkhad in the Jabal al-Duruz. Al-Zafir Khidr, guilty of no crime save loyalty to the established succession, was treated even more shamefully: he was divested of his *iqta'* of Bosra and imprisoned in the Damascus citadel. But he was soon afterwards released and made his way to Aleppo to join the service of al-Zahir Ghazi. Diya' al-Din b. al-Athir had gone into hiding in fear for his life and only escaped from Damascus by being smuggled out in al-Afdal's baggage. This faintly preposterous event was far from the end of the *wazir's* career, however; after three years of exile in Mosul, he reentered al-Afdal's service in 595/1199 and remained with him through all vicissitudes until 607/1210-11. We know very little about how the *iqta's* in al-Afdal's former territories were assigned, but scattered references indicate that at least some of the refugee amirs in Egypt were restored to their former possessions. Al-'Aziz did not leave Damascus until 14 Sha'ban 592/13 July 1196, three weeks after the city's capture. Returning to Egypt, he stripped Abu-l-Hayja' al-Samin of the governorship of Jerusalem and assigned it to Shams al-Din Sungur al-Kabir. Abu-l-Hayja' was compelled to go into exile; abandoning the Ayyubids altogether, he went to Iraq to seek service with the caliphate.⁴⁰

The Ayyubids were now to know a brief period of internal stability. Al-Afdal had lost the sultanate largely because of his demonstrated incapacity to rule, and if al-'Aziz had no great merits except geniality and personal courage, he was at least not afflicted with his predecessor's weakness of character. He knew how to fulfill his obligations as head of the empire and he

did not permit himself to become embroiled in factional disputes within his court. Moreover as ruler of Egypt he had the necessary material foundation to support his rank.

Al-'Adil, probably without really intending to at first, had wrested more than anyone else from the struggles of the past three years. Beginning with the unremunerative castles of Transjordan and a precarious hold on the East, he now ruled in addition the core of al-Afdal's territories (though Palestine appears to have been transferred to al-'Aziz's realm). We may assume that Homs and Baalbek were still dependent on Damascus, though we have no explicit statement to that effect. Likewise al-'Adil remained the overlord of al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama, 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam of Barin, and Badr al-Din Doldurum of Tall Bashir. He thus ruled directly, or at least had access to the military resources of, all the lands of Nur al-Din at his zenith with the exception of Aleppo. And there al-Zahir Ghazi, in spite of his insight into what had been happening, lay isolated and flanked by his uncle's possessions both to the south and east. However al-Adil's power did rest on things ultimately beyond his control—the continued acquiescence and tranquility of the Salahi amirs in his dominions, hitherto so turbulent an element in affairs; the willingness of the other princes to accept the growth in his territories; and his capacity to contain or subdue the Zangids and Artukids of the Jazira. Were the present equilibrium to be disrupted, al-'Adil's position might quickly deteriorate.

Although the empire's internal difficulties had been resolved, it received no respite from war. By the end of 591/1195 the truce between Saladin and Richard Coeur-de-Lion had elapsed, and Latin Europe could again attempt to regain Jerusalem and the lost dominions of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This time the Empire took the lead, under the young and intensely ambitious Henry VI, who was eager to retrieve the humiliation suffered by German forces in the Third Crusade as well as to assert his authority throughout Christendom. During the summer of 593/1197, though not prepared to go personally to Syria at that time, Henry sent a large advance force to Acre, led by Henry,

Duke of Brabant, and the Chancellor Conrad, Archbishop of Mainz.

In Shawwal/August, the first German contingents, under the Duke of Brabant, reached Acre and immediately began preparing to march inland. Al-'Adil, as the Ayyubid prince immediately concerned, hastily assembled his forces and sent to al-'Aziz and Mosul for reinforcements. He then brought his combined armies forward to 'Ayn Jalut in order to block any attempt by the crusaders to move from Acre towards Jerusalem. But when the latter proved unwilling to meet his army in the open field, he decided to launch a lightning strike against the almost undefended city of Jaffa. It was taken by storm on 5 September. Al-'Adil could not afford to weaken his forces by garrisoning the place and therefore had the fortifications razed and the city left in ruins before withdrawing.⁴¹

Duke Henry of Brabant, having been unable to come in time to the relief of Jaffa, now determined to march northwards, against Sidon and Beirut. Al-'Adil learned of this plan, and in Dhu-l-Hijja 593/October 1197 he detailed a force to raze the walls of Beirut and its citadel, perhaps feeling that it was too isolated from the rest of his possessions to try to hold. The city walls were successfully dismantled, but the governor of the city, 'Izz al-Din Usama, forbade the destruction of the citadel, insisting that he could defend it. On the evening of 9 Dhu-l-Hijja/22 October, the advancing German forces clashed with the returning Muslim force outside Sidon. By the end of the day the crusaders held the field, and the next day they pressed on to Beirut. 'Izz al-Din suddenly lost his will to fight and fled, leaving the place wholly undefended. It fell to the crusaders without resistance. Although Sidon remained in Muslim hands, al-'Adil hurriedly sent a force to raze its defenses as well. With this event al-'Adil lost his last strongpoint on the Palestinian and Lebanese coast, for Jubayl had already reverted to Frankish control in the winter of 590/1194. (Its dowager lady, Stephanie of Milly, had induced its Kurdish governor and garrison to surrender it to her for the sum of 6000 *dinars*, and though al-Afdal had learned of the conspiracy and tried to organize a

relief force, by the time he reached the Biqua' in central Lebanon, the town had already fallen.)⁴² To complete al-'Adil's difficulties, his Jaziran and Egyptian contingents now demanded leave to return home for the winter. Although al-'Adil badly needed their services, he was compelled by established custom to permit their departure.⁴³

To this point the German crusade had displayed no particular prowess in the field, nor had it posed any threat to the Muslim possessions in the interior. It was almost by the mere fact of its presence that the coastline between the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the County of Tripoli had been restored to Frankish control. But now the crusaders were prepared to move inland. Under the command of Archbishop Conrad they set siege to the great fortress of Toron on 17 Muharram 594/29 November 1197. Toron was a well-chosen objective: it would restore a defensible hinterland to Tyre, provide an important foothold for a possible later conquest of Galilee to the south, and give the Franks a strongpoint on the road from Tyre to Banyas and thence to Damascus. Nor would it require a large garrison, of the kind that the Syrian Franks could no longer provide.

The defenders, commanded by Toron's *muqta'* Husam al-Din Bishara, were fearfully hard-pressed and could not have held on had al-'Adil not come to their rescue with an army comprising all his major vassals and clients: al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs, al-Amjad of Baalbek, 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, Badr al-Din Doldurum, and others who are not named. But even with these, the siege could not be broken, and he was forced to send the chief qadi of Damascus, Muhyi al-Din Muhammad b. al-Zaki al-Qurashi, to Cairo to plead for the direct support of the sultan al-'Aziz. The latter, who had so far left al-'Adil in complete control of the situation, was able to bring his army to Toron only on 23 Rabi' I 594/2 February 1198. But the Franks, hindered by the winter rains, were further discouraged by recently received news that the Emperor Henry VI had died the preceding September. On hearing of al-'Aziz's approach, they bolted and fled to Tyre, suffering numerous

casualties from harassment by the armies of al-‘Aziz and al-‘Adil. Al-‘Aziz commanded the defenses of Toron to be restored, and then, deciding that his responsibilities were met, returned to Cairo, leaving his uncle to negotiate a truce with the Franks.⁴⁴

It was only on 1 July 1198 that an accord was at last reached between al-‘Adil and Amalric of Lusignan, the recently crowned king of Cyprus and Jerusalem. The treaty was to last for five years and eight months (i.e., until the spring of 600/1204) and recognized the *status quo*. Al-‘Adil would retain Jaffa but could not refortify it, while Beirut would remain in Frankish hands without restriction. As for Sidon, its revenues were to be divided equally between the two parties.⁴⁵ On the whole this agreement distinctly favored the Franks, but it should be noted that al-‘Adil surrendered nothing of crucial importance—none of the holy places, no major crossroads or strongpoints in the interior. Beirut, with its fine harbor, was undoubtedly a real loss, but the Ayyubid navy (though it still existed) was too weak to exploit effectively isolated ports on the Syrian littoral. Even Saladin had considered Beirut and Sidon as negotiable items in his clandestine discussions with Conrad of Montferrat during the Third Crusade. In short this treaty involved minor readjustments of territory, but no fundamental changes from Saladin’s practice as to the kinds of concessions which could be made to the Franks.

During al-‘Aziz’s brief sojourn in Syria in the winter of 594/1198, he made two important appointments, both of which indicate that he enjoyed direct authority in al-‘Adil’s territories when he was resident there. Soon after the assault on Jaffa, the governor of Jerusalem, Shams al-Din Sungur al-Kabir, had died. As his successor al-‘Aziz named another member of the old guard, Sarim al-Din Khutlukh al-‘Izzi, a former *mamluk* of Saladin’s nephew Farrukhshah—the fourth appointment to this post in five years. Much more important was that the sultan invested al-Mu‘azzam Sharaf al-Din ‘Isa (al-‘Adil’s second son, now some eighteen years of age) with Damascus. Al-‘Aziz performed this act at the behest of his uncle, and in so doing, he

strengthened the latter's position considerably, for Damascus was now made again an autonomous principality rather than a simple province, and its ruler a prince in his own right instead of a vicegerent subject to the sultan's will. From al-‘Adil's point of view, Damascus was now permanently and securely incorporated into the body of his possessions. Moreover by having it assigned to al-Mu‘azzam, he had made good provision for the future: he was ensuring that the succession in a crucial region would go to his descendents, while the nominal government during his own lifetime would be exercised by one who was almost certain to be loyal to his interests. In this he was of course following the example set by Saladin in 582/1186, but at a far earlier stage in his career and probably more consciously.⁴⁶

Once the German crusade—in al-‘Adil's eyes more a nuisance than a threat—was done with, he had the leisure to turn his attention to the East, where he had been presented with an excellent opportunity to expand his sphere of influence as the result of a feud between the two main branches of the Zangid house. Nur al-Din Arslanshah had attacked Nisibin, which was a possession of his cousin Qutb al-Din Muhammad of Sinjar.⁴⁷ The latter asked al-‘Adil to assist him, sending a large sum of money to ensure a favorable decision. Al-‘Adil arrived in the Jazira in Ramadan/July to find that Arslanshah had retreated to Mosul because of an epidemic which had shattered his army, thus permitting Qutb al-Din to reoccupy Nisibin without difficulty. Al-‘Adil was of no mind to waste an army, so he turned his forces against the great fortress of Mardin, at that time ruled by the Artukid Husam al-Din Yavlak Arslan. His immediate motives are obscure, but it is not difficult to understand his general reasons for wanting the place. In taking Mardin he would annex the last major stronghold of a principality which had once included Mayyafariqin as well, thereby erasing the power of one of the two main branches of the Artukid house. The capture of this city would also mean that the chief place of the other major Artukid principality, the great city of Amida overlooking the Tigris, would be surrounded on all sides by

Ayyubid fortresses—Mayyafariqin and Hani to the north, Suwayda’ to the west, Mardin to the south. The fall of the Artukids of Amida and Hisn Kayfa would thus be only a matter of time, and at any rate they would be unable to participate in hostile coalitions. Finally, the possession of Mardin would put al-‘Adil within easy striking distance of Nisibin (twice a target of his already) and even the Zangid heartland along the middle Tigris valley. But however attractive the prospects, this conquest was not to be. Al-‘Adil quickly seized the town proper, though it was set on a steep hillside, but the citadel on its lofty crag resisted him stubbornly.⁴⁸

At this point all his calculations, and those of every other prince in the empire, were thrown askew by the news that on 17 Muharram 595/19 November 1198 al-‘Aziz had died in Cairo as the result of a hunting accident a few days before. As his heir apparent he had named his eldest son al-Mansur Muhammad, a young boy ten years of age. The senior amirs accepted this designation, but it was clear that the young sultan would require an *atabeg*. And on this matter the still-smoldering rivalry between the Salahiyya on one side and the Kurds and the Asadiyya on the other again emerged into the open. The latter faction wanted al-Afdal, presumably because he was the senior member of Saladin’s house and thus both deserved so high an office and could be depended on to protect the interests of the youthful sultan, his nephew. Al-Afdal had also shown himself to be rather pliable, and they may have seen in him a chance to improve their status vis-à-vis the Salahiyya. As to the Salahiyya, they wanted al-‘Adil, a far more able and experienced man. This dispute was resolved only when Sayf al-Din Yazkuch, commandant of the Asadiyya, at length persuaded his Salahi counterpart, Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas, that the advice of al-Qadi al-Fadil should be sought and followed. The aged chancellor replied that al-Afdal was the most suitable candidate—a surprising opinion from a man who had deserted al-Afdal as incompetent and even supplied a loan to al-‘Aziz to help bring about his downfall.⁴⁹ But he knew al-‘Adil well and was in a position to estimate not only his great abilities but his ambition

and opportunism. Moreover if al-‘Adil became *atabeg* to al-Mansur, he would control the richest principality in the empire in addition to his established power base in Syria and the Jazira; if this happened, the eclipse of Saladin’s direct heirs was almost a certainty.⁵⁰

The decision having been made, Fakhr al-Din almost immediately repented it. At once he sent a courier to the Salahi lord of Nablus, Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri, asking him to refuse to swear allegiance to al-Afdal and even to try to intercept him on his way from Salkhad to Egypt. But the message never reached Nablus; al-Afdal, threading his way towards Egypt and concerned lest al-‘Adil’s forces in the area try to stop him, captured Fakhr al-Din’s courier. On 5 Rabi‘ I 595/5 January 1199 the lord of Salkhad, now regent of Egypt, arrived in Bilbays, where he was greeted by the amirs of the country. When Jaharkas discovered his envoy among al-Afdal’s entourage, he knew that his treason was discovered. He left Egypt as quickly as possible in the company of two other Salahi amirs, Zayn al-Din Karaja and Asad al-Din Kara-Sungur. Riding to Jerusalem, he succeeded in enlisting the support of its governor, Sarim al-Din Khutlukh, for a conspiracy designed to overthrow al-Afdal’s regency in favor of al-‘Adil. The scheme was joined by two other important Palestinian amirs, ‘Izz al-Din Usama of Kaukab and ‘Ajlun and Maymun al-Qasri of Nablus. The latter had under his command at this point a select force of 700 regular cavalry, an important addition to the military resources of the conspirators. Finally they sent to al-Adil, still besieging the citadel of Mardin, and called on him to come and seize Egypt from al-Afdal. But al-Adil felt himself on the verge of success at Mardin and was reluctant to commit himself to a very risky project at this point.⁵¹

Al-Afdal was not unaware of the threat which his uncle represented, although at the outset he seems not to have known of the blooming conspiracy among the Salahiyya. Soon after establishment in his new office, he sent an almost obsequious letter to al-‘Adil, to which he received an evasive and rather arrogant response. But a more disturbing blow was his dis-

covery that his court had been deserted by Jaharkas and some other Salahi amirs. As usual he did not respond to the crisis intelligently, but instead began mass arrests and confiscations among the Salahiyya who had remained in Egypt, thereby creating a new group of embittered exiles.⁵²

Sometime during Rabi‘ I-II/January-February, al-Zahir Ghazi sent an embassy to al-Afdal, ostensibly to congratulate him on his election as *atabeg*, but in fact to urge him to seize Damascus while al-‘Adil was still preoccupied before Mardin.⁵³ Al-Zahir’s reasons for proposing this policy are apparent, but al-Afdal’s motives for committing himself to a course of action which would certainly destroy him if he did not succeed are altogether less clear. Rational calculation might have suggested that his uncle was sure to move against him at some point, so that his only real chance to save himself was to strike first and hard. Very probably, too, al-Afdal felt a strong desire to avenge himself on a man who had not only deprived him of his throne but made a fool of him in the process.

In Jumada I 595/March 1199 al-Afdal called on the Egyptian armies to assemble outside Cairo, but things moved slowly and he was ready to set out only on 3 Rajab/1 May. As soon as news of the concentration of Egyptian forces reached Damascus, al-‘Adil’s lieutenants there sent urgently to Mardin to inform him. Leaving his eldest son al-Kamil Muhammad to continue the siege, al-‘Adil set off with 200 men and no baggage. His entourage included only three amirs: Badr al-Din Doldurum, ‘Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, and one Husam al-Din, lord of ‘Ayntab. On 11 Sha‘ban/10 June he and his little force entered Damascus, and two days later al-Afdal’s army made camp on the Midan al-Akhdar west of the city.⁵⁴

The first day of the siege was very nearly the last: a band of fifty Egyptian cavalry burst through the Bab al-Salama in the north wall, opened for them by the treachery of a Kurdish amir. The panic-stricken defenders of the sector streamed from the walls into the city, while the daring invaders penetrated as far as the souks around the Umayyad Mosque. The city seemed certain to fall momentarily, but incredibly enough no one had

followed the lead of the attackers. When al-'Adil and al-Mu'azzam, in the citadel, saw that these were isolated in the midst of the city, they led a fierce counterattack into the souks. The Egyptians fled back to the north wall, where they would have been trapped had not two noted Hanbali *shaykhs* of Damascus, Nasih al-Din al-Shirazi and his brother Shihab al-Din, opened the portals of the Bab al-Faradis to permit their escape.⁵⁵

After this astounding opening, the siege quickly settled down into a long, painful war of attrition. Al-'Adil's most effective tactic seems to have been large-scale bribery among al-Afdal's amirs. By this means he induced two to persuade their sovereign to remove his camp to al-Qadam, about two miles south of the walled city. Al-'Adil was then able to gain several important desertions to his own side, and this compelled al-Afdal to move even further south of the city, to al-Kiswa. Al-Afdal's will to persevere in the struggle now began to weaken, as it always did in the face of adversity. Left to himself, he would probably soon have broken off the siege.⁵⁶

In mid-Sha'ban/June, just as al-Afdal was setting siege to Damascus, his ally al-Zahir Ghazi departed Aleppo to join him. He stopped first at Hama, where al-Mansur Muhammad agreed to send a detachment of his forces with al-Zahir in exchange for permission to besiege Barin, the chief possession of al-Zahir's erstwhile vassal 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, who was at this time penned up with al-'Adil in Damascus. In Homs al-Mujahid Shirkuh personally joined al-Zahir with his standing regiment, and the two princes marched south to Damascus, apparently reaching the city in mid-Ramadan/July.⁵⁷ These reinforcements did much to restore al-Afdal's position, and a tight siege was now imposed on Damascus.

Up till now the Salahi amirs who had done so much to instigate the present troubles had remained in Jerusalem without participating in the fighting in any way. Al-'Adil, now in serious straits, sent for them to bring their forces to his support. Although al-Mujahid Shirkuh attempted to cut them off, they eluded him and were able to enter the city without difficulty.

In Shawwal/August al-Afdal sent out a raiding party to ravage the Jordan valley, perhaps with the intention of disrupting the *iqta's* of the Palestinian amirs in Damascus and thus undermining their willingness to stand a long siege for al-'Adil's sake. Al-'Adil dispatched a counterforce, which succeeded in breaking up this raid and then remained in Palestine to raid al-Afdal's supply lines. This tactic proved moderately effective, but it did not really relieve the pressure on Damascus. As the months wore on al-'Adil's treasury in Damascus became so depleted that he would soon be unable to pay his soldiers, let alone employ the bribery which had heretofore served him so well. He was compelled to demand forced loans from the great merchants of Damascus, promising them repayment when he again had access to his main treasuries in al-Karak and Qal'at Ja'bar. The populace was suffering from exorbitant prices and outright famine, his soldiers were morose and spiritless, and al-Zahir had brought up sappers to undermine the walls. The fall of Damascus appeared but a matter of time.⁵⁸

For a while things grew worse. In Ramadan/July al-Mansur of Hama had set siege to Barin, and though the place resisted valiantly, it fell to him at the end of Dhu-l-Qa'da/September. 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam thus lost his chief possession, though later al-Mansur gave him Manbij and Qal'at Najm as compensation.⁵⁹

Far more important to al-'Adil was a series of setbacks in the Jazira. At some point before setting out against Damascus the previous spring, al-Afdal (probably at the instigation of al-Zahir) had written to Nur al-Din Arslanshah of Mosul to propose an alliance against al-'Adil. Arslanshah had readily consented, for it was clear that al-'Adil's ambitions comprehended the entire Jazira and that the fall of Mardin would seriously weaken any attempts to oppose him. On 7 Shawwal/3 September the combined forces of Mosul, Sinjar, and Jazirat Ibn 'Umar appeared below Mardin just as it was preparing to surrender and drew al-Kamil into a pitched battle. He was badly defeated, and that night began a retreat north to Mayyafariqin. Arslanshah did not pursue him, but led the Zangid armies

southwest to Ra's al-'Ayn, from which he intended to take al-'Adil's capital in the East, Harran. But before moving against this city, he sent his forces to occupy Raqqa and Saruj, lost to al-'Adil only six years previously. Al-Kamil was unable to intervene, and al-'Adil's power in the Jazira seemed on the verge of disappearing. At this point al-Zahir was somehow led to commit a fatal diplomatic blunder—he demanded that the *khutba* and *sikka* should be put in his name throughout the Zangid realms. This was precisely the privilege enjoyed by Saladin after 582/1186, of course, and it strongly suggested to Arslan-shah that in defeating al-'Adil, he might simply be exchanging one Ayyubid threat for another. When, in addition to these misgivings, he was stricken with a serious illness, his decision to retreat to Mosul was confirmed. Al-Kamil was now able to make his way down to Harran, and on 2 Dhu-l-Hijja 595/26 September 1199, al-'Adil received from his son the welcome news that Harran was secure, along with the rest of the Eastern Territories.⁶⁰

But in Damascus itself matters were still desperate at the beginning of 596/late October 1199. It was now al-'Adil's turn to be deserted by several high-ranking amirs, including Sarim al-Din Kiymaz al-Najmi with his entire contingent, and he was told bluntly by his commanders that unless the funds held at Qal'at Ja'bar were brought promptly he could not save himself, for there was now no money left to pay his troops. An urgent message to al-Kamil in Harran brought him to Damascus on 12 Safar 596/4 December 1199 with 400,000 *dinars* as well as reinforcements. The winter rains had already set in, and al-Kamil's arrival so demoralized the besiegers that they withdrew south to Ra's al-Ma', hoping to remain there until they could resume the siege in spring. But a personal feud between al-Zahir and al-Afdal over a favorite *ghulam* of the former ended even this faint hope, and by 9 Rabi' I/29 December the allied princes had each begun his journey home.⁶¹

As soon as the besiegers had dispersed, al-'Adil led his forces out of Damascus in pursuit of al-Afdal. At Bilbays, al-Afdal learned that his uncle was approaching, but opposition was al-

most impossible because most of his amirs had scattered to their *iqta's* as soon as they arrived in Egypt. Gathering what forces he could, he met al-'Adil at al-Sanhi on 7 Rabi' II 596/26 January 1200. His little army was shattered, and during the night he fled to Cairo. Al-'Adil, following close behind, established camp at nearby Birkat al-Jubb. With his back against the wall and no possibility of further resistance, al-Afdal was forced to make whatever settlement he could with his uncle. He first proposed an exchange of Cairo for Damascus, and then, when al-'Adil rejected that out of hand, of Cairo for Harran and Edessa. But al-'Adil was in no mood to establish al-Afdal where he might cause further trouble, so al-Afdal had to be content with the offer of Mayyafariqin, Samosata, Hani, and the district of Jabal Jur—i.e., the northern marches of the empire—in addition to his present appanage of Salkhad. Al-Afdal left Cairo for the last time on 17 Rabi' II/5 February, and al-'Adil entered the city four days later. Al-'Adil had barely missed being stripped of everything he ruled, but within a month after the end of the siege of Damascus, he was in fact, though not yet in name, master of the Ayyubid empire.⁶²

Less than a week after his triumphal entry into Cairo, al-'Adil took the final step: on Thursday, 29 Rabi' II 596/17 February 1200, he dropped the name of al-Mansur Muhammad from the *khutba* and *sikka* and substituted his own, thereby proclaiming himself as head of the Ayyubid empire. His reasons for this act are not stated. Beyond his undoubted personal ambition, he may have thought that the state could not survive a long regency, followed by the accession of an inexperienced youth (al-Mansur). Among all the princes of the empire, al-'Adil alone had the experience, the prestige, and the military and administrative skills to govern it effectively. What he did not have was a broad consent, among either princes or amirs, that he had a legitimate right to the throne. In particular the chiefs of the *Salahiyya* were shocked by his assumption of the sovereignty. They had apparently assumed that all their plotting would benefit the house of Saladin, or at least do it no harm, and now the man whom they themselves had established as

atabeg of Saladin's grandson had seized the supreme authority for himself.⁶³

This discontent among the *Salahiyya* caused a new outburst of troubles, but for some months there was no outward evidence of the coming storm. The first sign of difficulty occurred in early 597/autumn 1200, when al-'Adil sent Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas to seize the fortress of Banyas from Husam al-Din Bishara. Husam al-Din had refused to join the sultan's campaign against Egypt the preceding winter, and Jaharkas's orders were probably explained as retribution for disloyalty as well as a reward for his own great services. But possibly al-'Adil had come to realize the depths of the dissatisfaction among the *Salahiyya* and thought it best to remove their commandant from Cairo without simultaneously seeming to exile him or reduce his status. However that may be, al-'Adil clearly thought the task important enough to have his son al-Mu'azzam come from Damascus to join the siege before Banyas.⁶⁴

In Rabi' I 597/January 1201 al-Zahir Ghazi of Aleppo sent an embassy to Cairo, ostensibly to pay his respects to the new sultan and to resolve outstanding differences. But the envoys were shabbily treated, and on their return to Aleppo, they stopped in Nablus, where they induced its powerful *muqta'*, Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri, to join al-Zahir in a second coalition against al-'Adil. Obviously they could not have done this on their own initiative; we must assume that al-Zahir's original instructions called for such action if negotiations with al-Adil failed. Having been won over to Aleppo's proposals, Maymun al-Qasri seems in turn to have been the instrument by which certain other *Salahi* amirs (most notably Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas and Zayn al-Din Karaja) as well as the Kurd 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Mashtub were brought into the conspiracy. Al-Zahir was also in correspondence with al-Afdal who had yet a new grievance against his uncle: al-'Adil's son al-Auhad Najm al-Din Ayyub had refused to turn Mayyafariqin over to al-Afdal. Al-'Adil would not intervene to enforce his own promise and had probably instructed al-Auhad to renege; after all, he had no interest in giving al-Afdal control of so important a

fortress if he could avoid it. Al-Afdal readily made common cause with al-Zahir and then, trying to broaden the conspiracy as much as possible, confided his schemes to 'Izz al-Din Usama. 'Izz al-Din pretended great sympathy, but secretly informed al-'Adil of the project.

The sultan responded by ordering al-Mu'azzam in Damascus to advance against al-Afdal in Salkhad without delay, although it was midwinter, and by directing Jaharkas and Maymun al-Qasri to support him with their forces. Al-Afdal hurriedly fled to Aleppo (where he arrived on 10 Jumada I 597/16 February 1201), leaving his brother al-Zafir Khidr to defend Salkhad on his behalf. Al-Mu'azzam now advanced to Bosra to begin his campaign, but when Jaharkas and Maymun al-Qasri refused to join him, he was compelled to retreat back to Damascus. At this point, of course, the two amirs proceeded quite voluntarily to Salkhad—to join al-Zafir, not fight him—and from there sent urgent appeals to Aleppo, calling on al-Zahir and al-Afdal to move against Damascus at the earliest opportunity.⁶⁵

It was some months before these appeals were answered, for at this juncture al-Zahir felt it expedient to pursue three separate lines of policy simultaneously. His first task was to undercut al-'Adil's ascendancy, and this involved not only driving him out of Damascus, clearly the keystone of his position in Syria, but also depriving him of his allies there. In particular he wished to detach al-Mansur of Hama and al-Mujahid of Homs, whose lands constituted a buffer zone between Aleppo and Damascus and who could furnish al-'Adil with a useful contingent of troops. Al-Zahir also wished to rationalize the frontiers of his own principality. In this regard Manbij and Qal'at Najm were of especial significance, for these controlled his communications northeastward to the Euphrates and Diyar Mudar but were under the suzerainty of al-Mansur of Hama. Finally al-Zahir had been pursuing since Saladin's death a policy of administrative centralization—i.e., of bringing the great castles of his realm under his direct control and thereby reducing or eliminating the autonomous role of the hereditary

muqta's of north Syria.⁶⁶ In 589/1193 al-Zahir had taken Harim from Badr al-Din Ibrahim b. Sharwa al-Hakkari, installed there as *wali* by Saladin in 579/1183. And in 594/1198, upon the death of Ghars al-Din Kilich al-Nuri, al-Zahir had seized the twin castles of al-Shughr and Bakas from his sons and forced them to reside in Aleppo, recompensing them with pensions instead of new territories. The campaign of 597/1201 was clearly intended to be a great step toward the achievement of al-Zahir's goal, for it would strike at the three remaining strongholds of the powerful Banu al-Muqaddam: Manbij, Qal'at Najm, and Apamea.⁶⁷

Al-Zahir and al-Afdal (under the former's leadership) began their joint campaign in Rajab/April-May by attacking Manbij and Qal'at Najm. Both fell in short order (by the end of Rajab/May 6), and the former netted an additional prize in the person of its defender, Shams al-Din 'Abd al-Malik ibn al-Muqaddam, who was thrown into prison in Aleppo. Shams al-Din was the brother and successor of 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, who had died in Damascus in early 597/late 1200. His capture spelled the end of the power of the Banu al-Muqaddam. Manbij was now annexed to Aleppo, while Qal'at Najm was handed over to the deputies of al-Afdal. Al-Zahir now turned his attention to the south. While Bedouin allies scoured the countryside, pillaging and burning, Aleppan forces seized Apamea (held by a loyal castellan of Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam) and then overran and sacked Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, a major possession of al-Mansur of Hama. Both places were annexed by al-Zahir, who was now free to turn his attention to Hama itself. The siege of this city began sometime in Sha'ban/May and lasted into Ramadan/June. At length, on 19 Ramadan/23 June, al-Mansur was able to obtain a peace by promising to pay al-Zahir the sum of 30,000 *dinars Suri* and to swear obedience to him when and if he conquered Damascus. Proceeding south, al-Zahir and al-Afdal were able to make similar agreements (without further violence) with al-Mujahid of Homs and al-Amjad of Baalbek.⁶⁸ These matters settled, al-Zahir and al-Afdal were at last in a position to

move on Damascus.

For a time al-Zahir had hoped to make this a two-front war. During the winter he reestablished his alliance of 595/1199 with the Zangids, and in Sha'ban/May Nur al-Din Arslanshah attacked the region of Harran and Edessa. But an epidemic soon set in and ravaged his armies—it had happened so often before that it must have seemed inevitable—and Arslanshah was forced to retreat to Mosul without accomplishing anything.⁶⁹

As the forces of Aleppo approached Damascus, they were met by al-Zafir Khidr and Maymun al-Qasri, coming from Salkhad, and by Husam al-Din Bishara of Banyas (who had apparently succeeded in retaining this fortress). However, Zayn al-Din Karaja and Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas refused to join the besiegers, until al-Afdal gave Salkhad in *iqta'* to Zayn al-Din and bestowed 20,000 *dinars* on Jaharkas. In the meantime al-'Adil had mobilized the Egyptian army to oppose a siege of Damascus, but he brought his forces only as far as Nablus. From there they could serve as a mobile striking force to cut al-Zahir and al-Afdal off from reinforcements and supplies or to attack the besiegers' camp, if the struggle were prolonged. As for direct support of Damascus, he contented himself with sending a detachment ahead to reinforce the city's garrison, which was under the command of al-Mu'azzam. This force reached its destination but a few days before al-Zahir and al-Afdal established their camp at al-Qadam.⁷⁰

The siege began early in Dhu-l-Qa'da/August, and on the fourteenth of the same month (16 August) Damascus was stormed three times in the same day. The suburb of al-'Uqayba, north of the walled city, was wrecked, and the assault was so fierce that it gained a portion of the walls. Only the coming of darkness prevented the city's fall. As in 595/1199, however, this was the single dramatic event of the war, which looked as if it would settle into another drawn-out, agonizing siege. At one point the amir 'Izz al-Din Usama and the *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque, Diya' al-Din al-Daula'i, negotiated with al-Zahir (apparently on their own authority) about the possible surrender of Damascus, but nothing came of this.⁷¹

As so often during the previous decade, this siege of Damascus was not turned back by military defeat. Rather it dissolved because of a dispute between al-Afdal and al-Zahir Ghazi. The two princes had originally agreed that al-Afdal would receive Damascus after its capture, and then both would press on against Egypt. If they succeeded in taking Egypt, then al-Afdal would turn Damascus over to al-Zahir and rule Egypt as his own domain. But at some point al-Zahir decided that he wanted Damascus in any circumstances. He would remain there after its fall, he told his brother, while providing him with a contingent of the Aleppan army to assist in the conquest of Egypt. Al-Afdal was obviously not enthusiastic about this proposal, and when he could not persuade al-Zahir to abandon or even modify it, he began to lose heart for the struggle.

Our sources suggest that al-'Adil was the true source of this disagreement—that he had written secretly to the brothers, causing each to fear that the other was trying to do him out of his share of the conquests. This is at least possible, and it is clear that al-'Adil was corresponding with al-Afdal, to whom he offered a stipend of 100,000 *dinars* per annum, the confirmation of his possession of Samosata, Hani, the district of Jabal Jur, and two additional towns—Ra's al-'Ayn and Saruj. For whatever reason al-Afdal lost all desire for further fighting. Calling his amirs together, he informed them that they could either join his brother al-Zahir or return to the service of al-'Adil, for he was giving up the struggle. On 1 Muharram 598/1 October 1201 the siege of Damascus came abruptly to an end. Al-Zahir set out for Aleppo and al-Afdal for Homs, where he had left his family before the commencement of the battle.⁷²

Al-'Adil entered Damascus in triumph on 9 Muharram 598/9 October 1201. Shortly thereafter al-Afdal returned from Homs to offer his submission to his uncle and then went off to the East to claim his possessions there. Al-'Adil waited out the winter in Damascus, but early the next spring, in Jumada II 598/March 1202, he marched north to Hama and poised for a strike against Aleppo. The very threat was enough to induce al-Zahir to

negotiate a definitive settlement. Under the circumstances he obtained a very generous one, for al-'Adil allowed him to retain even the places he had conquered during the preceding year's campaign. The sultan's lack of vindictiveness was also displayed in his treatment of the Salahi amirs. Some had decided to join the service of al-Zahir rather than take their chances with al-'Adil; of these, Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri received 'Azaz in *iqta'*, and Manbij was conceded to 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Mashtub. But others chose to remain with al-'Adil, and in spite of all he confirmed them in their *iqta's*. Thus Zayn al-Din Karaja kept Salkhad, only recently assigned him by the vanquished al-Afdal, while Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas at last obtained Banyas.⁷³

The most interesting question to arise from the nine years of turmoil which followed Saladin's death is also one of the most difficult to answer: did al-'Adil intend to seize the sultanate from the outset? It is tempting to assume that he did, for he had undeniably lost no opportunity to increase his influence and expand his territories during this period, at whatever expense to his brother's children. Nevertheless a close examination of his actions suggests that the sultanate did not become a direct policy goal until quite late—specifically until the winter of 596/1200, when he broke the siege of Damascus and drove al-Afdal out of Egypt. It was not al-'Adil, but his nephews al-Zahir and al-Afdal, who had initiated the war of 595/1199. Moreover there is no good evidence that al-'Adil ever contemplated disloyalty to al-'Aziz, either as his chief of administration in Egypt (591/1195-592/1196) or as his vicegerent in Damascus 592/1196-59/1198). He had indeed betrayed al-Afdal, but even here al-'Aziz had been the instigator, and most obvious beneficiary, of events. Rather it seems true to say that before 596/1200 al-'Adil made himself the arbiter of disputes between the princes and tried to gain sufficient power to have a preponderance of force in any crisis. In short he garnered the substance of power for himself and left its trappings for others. This may, after all, have been very much what Saladin had envisaged; al-'Adil had always been his closest advisor, and in his political

testament of 581/1186 he had named him as trustee for his sons.⁷⁴ Moreover al-'Adil's was an absolutely essential role if the empire was to survive, and there was no one else to fill it at that time.

Al-Zahir Ghazi, Saladin's fourth son, may well have had the natural capacity for this role, but he was too young and, as prince of Aleppo, too isolated to assert his authority effectively in a divided kingdom where others held the nominal right to power. He was nevertheless a worthy opponent of his uncle. If al-'Adil had shown good generalship and brilliant diplomacy, al-Zahir had been at least as able a warrior and had displayed remarkable skill and foresight in assembling one coalition after another to combat his uncle's inexorable rise. But he had been dogged by epidemics, bad weather, and petty feuds, and it had all come to nothing. For the next fifty years the house of Saladin would remain in eclipse, to emerge again only at the moment of the empire's demise.

4 Al-Mu‘azzam ‘Isa: The period of tutelage, 598/1201-615/1218

Although the turbulence of the preceding decade had starkly revealed the constitutional weaknesses of the Ayyubid empire, al-‘Adil had no desire to tamper with the political structure bequeathed by Saladin. Perhaps he was too much a man of the twelfth century (he was nearly sixty years old when he at last secured his throne) and too much immersed in his brother’s way of doing things to see that the problems of the 590s were inherent in any family confederation. At any rate he was content to change nothing save the names of those in power. He understood perfectly well that something like the Ayyubid confederacy could only work if the major principalities were held by princes who were politically and psychologically dependent on the sultan, and the men best fitted for this were of course his own sons. Thus al-‘Adil’s seizure of the throne represented a minor dynastic revolution, by which his descendants would dominate imperial affairs down to the last decade of the empire’s existence.

Even in 594/1198, as we have seen, al-‘Adil had arranged to have his second son, al-Mu‘azzam ‘Isa, invested as the prince of Damascus. In 596/1200, after al-‘Adil had proclaimed himself sultan, he had invited his eldest son, al-Kamil Muhammad, to come from the Eastern Territories and join him in Egypt as his viceroy (*na’ib*) in that country. In connection with that event his fourth son, al-Auḥad Ayyub, had been installed in Mayyafariqin and the other Ayyubid holdings in Diyar Bakr. Finally, after the failure of the last siege of Damascus in 597-8/1201, he had sent al-Ashraf Musa to be ruler of Diyar Mudar,

replacing the latter's younger brother al-Fa'iz Ibrahim. In all the towns east of the Euphrates and south of Homs, then, the sons of Saladin had been totally divested of power. The only significant possession left them was Aleppo, and by itself it could pose no threat to al-'Adil.¹

In the decade following the death of Saladin, Damascus and its princes had been very much at the center of the succession struggles, but the rise of al-'Adil to the sultanate profoundly changed that city's role. Al-'Adil's firm hand imposed on the state some fifteen years of internal stability, one might even say tranquility, and partly as a result of this, the politics of the Ayyubid empire now focused on its relations with neighboring states and regions. This in itself would have tended to reduce the role of Damascus in affairs because of its geographical location. But more than that, reunification of the empire deprived Damascus of its status as the capital of an autonomous principality. It is true that al-'Adil liked the city and made it his second residence, while it was his son al-Mu'azzam's nominal capital. But that is not at all the same thing—even if many important decisions were made within the walls of its citadel, the consequences of these decisions were played out elsewhere.

If Damascus had retained this reduced status for the rest of the Ayyubid period, it would be justifiable to focus our study narrowly on the city and its immediate dependencies. However, the years following al-'Adil's death saw Damascus again assume a role of critical importance for the political development of the empire. It is therefore important to be familiar with the broader trends of al-'Adil's empire and to understand events which seemed to have only local significance.

Al-'Adil found it necessary to carry on at least fitful wars on two fronts, in the Jazira and Armenia on the one hand, and against the Franks on the other; an understanding of the place these two regions had in al-'Adil's policy does much to illuminate the significance of his reign. Likewise al-'Adil's relations with the caliph imply much about how he conceived the nature of his authority. Within Damascus itself we shall first examine the distribution of lands among the amirs and princes.

Finally, we must consider the character of al-'Adil's government and the political role of the nominal prince of Damascus, al-Mu'azzam 'Isa.

The wars in the East

Perhaps the dominant theme of al-'Adil's reign is the Ayyubid expansion in the Jazira and Armenia. It is clear that this did not result merely from *ad hoc* responses to unforeseen situations; it was a deliberate policy, long contemplated but necessarily deferred by al-'Adil's involvement in the civil wars after the death of Saladin. In many ways it was the logical continuation of Saladin's persistent interest in these regions, which had occasionally involved him in remote conflicts having no discernable bearing on his professed policy goals.² But although al-'Adil was now the effective master of all the great financial and military resources of the Ayyubid empire, he put aside none of his native caution in pursuing his Eastern policy. Never did he commit the majority of his forces to the project, and only once did he personally participate in a campaign east of the Euphrates. For the most part the expansion was conducted with the forces and under the leadership of the area's local princes, al-Auhad Ayyub and al-Ashraf Musa.

In Muharram 599/September-October 1202 al-Ashraf Musa led his forces from Harran to make a second attempt against the great fortress of Mardin, regarded both by the Ayyubids and their opponents as the key to Diyar Bakr and the upper Tigris basin. As in 595/1199 the attack was a failure, but the diplomatic intervention of al-Zahir Ghazi led to a settlement which yielded some profit to the Ayyubids: an indemnity of 150,000 *dinars* from the Artukid prince of Mardin, Nasir al-Din Artuk Arslan, and his agreement henceforth to make the *khutba* and *sikka* in al-'Adil's name.³

Hardly a year later, in Sha'ban 600/April 1204, a dispute among the Zangids gave al-Ashraf a new opportunity to inter-

vene in the region. Nur al-Din Arslanshah of Mosul had attacked his cousin Qutb al-Din of Sinjar, because the latter had begun to pronounce the *khutba* in the name of al-'Adil, thus seceding from Arslanshah's already shrunken sphere of influence. Al-Ashraf responded to Qutb al-Din's call for help by assembling a coalition of Jaziran princes who were uneasy about Arslanshah's ambitions; the alliance included Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri of Irbil, the Artukid al-Salih Mahmud of Amida and Hisn Kayfa, the Zangid prince of Jazirat ibn 'Umar, and al-Ashraf's own brother al-Auhad Ayyub of Mayyafariqin. The allies gathered near Nisibin, one of Qutb al-Din's possessions. Arslanshah brought his army to meet them in forced marches, as a consequence of which they reached the battlefield too exhausted to fight. They broke and fled at almost the first shock of battle. Al-Ashraf chased Arslanshah back to his capital and then ravaged the surrounding villages. By the beginning of 601/September 1204 a peace had been made on the basis of the *status quo ante*.⁴ On the surface this campaign was of no value to the Ayyubids, since they had neither demanded nor obtained anything. But by checking the growth of the only remaining Zangid prince with any real power, they had left the Jaziran principalities in a weak and fragmented condition which permitted little resistance to Ayyubid expansion and domination.

In the last half of 601/1205 al-Ashraf joined al-Salih Mahmud of Amida and Hisn Kayfa in an attack on the Anatolian fortress of Kharput in fulfillment of a promise given to gain al-Salih Mahmud's adherence to the alliance against Arslanshah.⁵ But the next significant involvement of the Ayyubids in this region took place in 603/1206-7. It began as a dispute between the army and people of Akhlat and their new ruler, the unnamed son of Beg-temür, who proved so malicious and incompetent that one of his *mamluks*, Balban, fled to Manzikert and made himself independent there. Soon thereafter Balban returned with a considerable army and laid siege to Akhlat. Almost simultaneously Nasir al-Din of Mardin also approached the city with a small force; he had once been the *wali al-'ahd* of

Beg-temür before the latter's son was born, and now the notables of Akhlat had invited him to become their prince and drive out the son of Beg-temür. But Nasir al-Din was compelled to retreat almost at once, both because his army was much inferior in size to Balban's and because al-Ashraf in Harran was threatening to seize Mardin if he did not. Al-Ashraf was not eager to see any non-Ayyubid prince of the Jazira expand his dominions or influence, and in order to demonstrate this to Nasir al-Din, he led his army up to Dunaysir, only a few miles south of Mardin.⁶

Soon after Nasir al-Din's retreat, the people of Akhlat decided to surrender to Balban. Hardly had Balban established himself there, however, when al-Auhad Ayyub made a surprise attempt to seize the city and thus gain control of the major road between Diyar Bakr and eastern Anatolia. Although he succeeded in occupying some minor fortresses, he failed in his main purpose. But the next year (604/1207-8) his father al-'Adil, taking an overt role in Eastern affairs for the first time since he had become sultan, sent al-Auhad additional troops to enable him to try again. In the meantime Balban, accurately surmising that al-Auhad would soon return, had sought the aid of the Seljukid prince Toghril Shah of Erzurum. Together the two drove the Ayyubid army from the field, but Toghril Shah now turned on his erstwhile ally and assassinated him. But when he tried to occupy Akhlat, the populace refused to admit him; worse, they invited al-Auhad to return, and this time he took possession of the city without resistance. Along with Akhlat he acquired the important fortresses controlling the plain north of Lake Van—Manzikert, Arjish, and Van.⁷

But al-Auhad quickly learned that in these regions possession was not control; in the same year of 604/1207-8 he had to face a series of dangerous revolts in his new dominions. These first broke out in Arjish and Van, and while he was dealing with them, Akhlat revolted. Learning of the situation in Armenia, al-'Adil instructed al-Ashraf to lead the army of Harran (a maximum of 1,000 troopers) to his brother's support. These new forces soon bloodily suppressed the rebellion in Akhlat (which

seems to have involved a social struggle of popular elements—*fityan*—against the local notables—*al-nas*—in addition to anti-Ayyubid feeling).⁸

Even now the Ayyubid grasp on the Lake Van region was not secure, for the Christian kingdom of Georgia, at its apogee under Queen Tamar, was at this time threatening all the Muslim states of eastern Anatolia.⁹ In 606/1209-10 al-'Adil at last felt compelled to intervene personally to drive the Georgians from his empire's new acquisitions. He assembled a large army from all the Ayyubid principalities and was joined personally by the princes of Homs, Hama, and Baalbek. Even al-Zahir of Aleppo supplied a contingent. Once in Harran, al-'Adil was met by his sons al-Auhad and al-Ashraf as well as by al-Salih Mahmud of Amida. (Neither al-Kamil nor al-Mu'azzam seems to have participated in the campaign; presumably al-'Adil had taken personal command of the units from Damascus and Egypt.) As the Ayyubid army approached Akhlat, the Georgians, who had come out this time to raid and pillage rather than to conquer, decided to return to Georgia without a fight.

Al-'Adil now had a large army and no apparent enemy, but never one to waste such preparations he decided to strengthen his position in the Jazira. Possibly this had been his real intention all along, for Ibn al-Athir (hardly a disinterested witness, admittedly) claims that a secret agreement between al-'Adil and Nur al-Din Arslanshah to divide the territories of the Zangid princes of Sinjar and Jazirat ibn 'Umar was the real reason for al-Adil's expedition. However that may be (for Arslanshah's interests in contracting such an alliance are not easy to discern), as soon as the Georgian menace had evaporated al-'Adil marched on al-Khabur and seized it. He then divided his forces, sending al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama and al-Ashraf to besiege Nisibin, while he directed his own efforts at Qutb al-Din's capital of Sinjar. Nisibin fell easily, but Sinjar proved rather more stubborn.

By now, however, other powers were becoming involved. Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri of Irbil slipped into Mosul and convinced Arslanshah to break off his alliance with al-'Adil, who

would be on the verge of eliminating the Zangid dynasty altogether if his present campaign succeeded. The two men formed an alliance against the Ayyubid sultan, to which they added the Rum Seljukid sultan, Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusrau, and even al-Zahir Ghazi of Aleppo, still embittered at his uncle's coup d'état and fearful of his ambitions for the future. Indeed al-'Adil was being betrayed by the Ayyubid princes in his camp; al-Mujahid Shirkuh, for example, was openly sending supplies to the beleaguered garrison of Sinjar. But the new coalition never really took effect, for the caliph, anxious to assert his influence in Mesopotamia, sent an embassy to arrange a peace. Al-'Adil eventually agreed to a settlement which would leave Sinjar to Qutb al-Din but permit al-'Adil to keep his recent conquests of al-Khabur and Nisibin. Furious at al-Zahir for deserting him during this campaign, al-'Adil considered attacking Aleppo, but he soon thought better of it and returned to Damascus at the beginning of 607/June 1210.¹⁰

Although this expedition was inconclusive in itself, the year 607/1211 confirmed all the Ayyubid gains of the last three years. By an odd fluke the Georgian general Ivane Mxardgeli was captured outside Akhlat, and part of the price al-Auhad demanded for his release was a thirty-year truce. It was this accident, so typical of al-'Adil's luck, that ended the Georgian menace to Ayyubid Armenia. This same year, the last Zangid prince able to offer any challenge to the Ayyubid hegemony in the Jazira died; as his successor in Mosul Nur al-Din Arslanshah left only his ten-year-old son al-Qahir. One further event should be noted: al-Auhad died in Akhlat, leaving no heir to his considerable possessions. Al-Ashraf, who quite by chance was visiting him at the time of his death, thus took possession of Akhlat without opposition. He thereby added the Lake Van fortresses and Mayyafariqin to his established principality in Diyar Mudar, becoming one of the most powerful of the Ayyubid princes.¹¹

The wars with the Franks

Al-'Adil and the other princes of his empire often found it necessary to go to war against the Franks, and yet the struggle against the infidel is not really a salient feature of his reign. He seems to have played it down as much as possible; throughout his entire reign he undertook but one major campaign against the Latin states, and even this was a punitive expedition rather than a drive for reconquest. Nor was he averse to giving up a few villages or a town if he could thereby gain a truce. It is clear that he did not follow this careful, nonideological policy out of weakness, for his empire was remarkably stable and well administered, and his Jaziran wars show that he could conduct an expansionist policy effectively if not spectacularly. Besides his innate disposition, cool and calculating, one can propose three possible reasons for this approach to the Frankish problem, though the evidence admittedly does not prove any of them.

The first is that wars like those of Saladin cost vast sums of money. Indeed the serious fiscal and monetary problems of Saladin's empire had been largely caused by his incessant wars of expansion.¹² Al-'Adil had been too deeply involved in the administration at that time not to realize that continuing such a policy would produce bankruptcy and political disaster. It also seems that al-'Adil wanted to devote most of his military resources to the East. Finally al-'Adil must have been acutely aware that Saladin's brilliant victories had in the end almost proved a disaster, for they provoked the Third Crusade. By avoiding a new crisis in the Latin Orient, he might hope that Christian Europe would not mount a new crusade.

The importance of this should perhaps be stressed more strongly. The danger posed to Saladin's regime by the Third Crusade had been even more moral than material. It was not that he had lost several important coastal towns, or that his

navy had been shattered, or that Jerusalem itself had almost fallen, but that the long struggle had seriously strained the loyalty of his vassals and amirs. The exhilaration of so many easy victories, followed by the agonizing siege and heart-breaking loss of Acre, left Saladin's men dispirited and morose, unable to think of sacrificing for any cause beyond their own immediate gain. Al-'Adil's own attitudes and emotions had surely been colored by those events, and he could not have been willing to risk the foundations of his regime by undertaking a new war against the Franks.

Rather than make a general survey of Muslim relations with the Franks during the reign of al-'Adil, we shall concentrate on Damascus and its rulers, thereby learning how one city and region were affected by conflicts which no longer threatened them directly.

The first hostilities of al-'Adil's sultanate might not have involved Damascus at all had he not happened to be residing there at that time. In Ramadan 599/May 1203 al-Mansur of Hama led his army to Barin, intending to strike a blow at the County of Tripoli and the Hospitallers of the Crac des Chevaliers. He sought al-'Adil's support for his expedition, but the sultan, apparently on the grounds that this was a conflict of only local significance, declined to involve himself or the army of Damascus. He merely directed al-Mujahid of Homs and al-Amjad of Baalbek to join al-Mansur; since they were so close by it was in their interest anyway to aid the prince of Hama. In addition al-'Adil commanded al-Zahir of Aleppo to send a detachment to Hama, and that was the full extent of his involvement.¹³

In the latter part of 600/1204, however, al-'Adil was forced to deal more actively with the Franks. When those members of the Fourth Crusade who had not gone to Constantinople reached Acre, they began raiding the villages of the Jordan valley. In order to control them al-'Adil (then in Damascus) issued a general call-to-arms to the armies of Egypt and Syria, but the princes themselves were apparently not required to come. He led his assembled forces south to Mt. Tabor, over-

looking the Plain of Esdraelon, in order to intercept any new raids. But despite his precautions, a Frankish party rode out of Acre and pillaged the village of Kafr Kanna, a few miles northeast of Nazareth on the road to Tiberias.¹⁴ Although all its inhabitants were taken captive, al-'Adil refused to retaliate. Instead, as the new year (601/September 1204) opened, he negotiated a new truce of six years with the Franks. By its terms he surrendered to Frankish control the towns of Nazareth and Jaffa and altered the agreement of 594/1198 so as to give up his share of the revenues of Ramla, Lydda, and perhaps Sidon. He then dismissed his forces and himself led the Egyptian troops back to Cairo.¹⁵

The campaign had been a strange one in that al-'Adil had simply refused to take advantage of his undoubtedly overwhelming superiority to deal the Frankish marauders a sharp defeat. But he had no wish to expend his forces combatting raids which did not seriously threaten his capacity to rule Palestine. Nor did he have to surrender anything of importance to gain a new truce. Nazareth indeed gave the Franks a foothold further inland than they had enjoyed for many years; on the other hand it was not fortified and its population was mostly Christian, so that the surrender of this place did not involve the disgrace of handing Muslims over to infidel domination. As for Jaffa, it was an important town and port and might (as it had for Richard Coeur-de-Lion) provide a base camp for an expedition against Jerusalem, but al-'Adil had only a small navy and could not possibly have held Jaffa against a determined attack or used it as a commercial rival to Acre and Tyre.

The next two years appear to have passed quite tranquilly as far as Damascus was concerned, although the Hospitallers of the Crac des Chevaliers were constantly raiding the territories of Homs and Hama. Sometime in 601/1204-5 one such raid led to a sharp defeat for al-Mansur and then the death or capture of many of the townspeople of Hama when they went out to oppose the marauders themselves. At this point al-Mansur sent to al-Mu'azzam 'Isa (al-'Adil's vicegerent in Damascus) to seek his assistance. Al-Mu'azzam, acting for the first time on his own

initiative, obliged by sending a contingent to Hama. But in the end nothing further occurred, and al-Mansur was soon able to reach a truce with the Hospitallers.¹⁶

By the spring of 603/1207 the Frankish raids staged from Tripoli and the Crac des Chevaliers had become so destructive that al-'Adil could no longer avoid a major punitive expedition. Probably sometime in Sha'ban/March he led an army from Egypt to the Lake of Qadesh near Homs, where he was to be joined by all the princes of the empire. As the men most immediately affected by the Frankish attacks, al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs and al-Mansur Muhammad naturally participated, as did al-Amjad of Baalbek. Al-Mu'azzam and al-Ashraf were both present with their father, although al-Kamil seems to have remained in Egypt. Al-Zahir Ghazi, as ever a reluctant participant in his uncle's projects, was represented only by a detachment of his troops. In addition Saladin's old Jaziran vassals had also sent contingents—Mosul, Sinjar, Jazirat ibn 'Umar, and Amida. The total forces assembled at the Lake of Qadesh are said to have numbered 10,000 cavalry; it was thus the largest Ayyubid army assembled since the death of Saladin, and possibly the largest to be gathered for the rest of the empire's history.

At the end of Ramadan/April al-'Adil set out to besiege the Crac des Chevaliers. He succeeded in taking one of the outlying forts, A'nar, with its garrison of 500 men, but his attempt against the Crac itself was clearly a total failure, for he broke off the siege without obtaining any kind of truce with the Hospitallers. Moving on towards Tripoli, he stopped to lay siege to the castle of Qulay'at, some fifteen miles up the coast from that city, and was able to take it without undue effort. His line of communications thus secured, he laid siege to Tripoli itself. Mangonels were set up to pound at the walls, while his troopers ranged unmolested about the countryside, cutting down the trees, blocking the city's aqueducts, and pillaging villages and fields. But in Dhu-l-Hijja/July he could see that the place would not soon fall to him; moreover, his own forces were becoming restive. He thus decided to end the siege and

return to Homs. Peace was made by the end of the month, with al-'Adil receiving an unspecified tribute and the return of 300 Muslim prisoners. By Muharram 604/August 1207 he was back in Damascus.¹⁷

With the coming of summer 607/1210 the truce made between al-'Adil and King Amalric six years before expired. This time hostilities opened from the Muslim side with a raid carried out by popular forces from Damascus and the Ghuta in Rabi' I/October against the Frankish littoral. According to Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, this was provoked by a powerful sermon which he himself had given in the Umayyad Mosque. The next day a host of men (including 300 from the village of Zamalka alone) left Damascus, coming eventually to Nablus, where al-Mu'azzam was then residing. After a second rousing sermon by Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, the prince joined these irregulars in a destructive *razzia* of the ordinary sort, with trees hewn down, villages pillaged, and captives seized. The raiders were able to return to Mt. Tabor without having been challenged by Frankish forces at any time. The Franks apparently decided it would be wise to renew the truce and sent to al-'Adil in Damascus to arrange this. The exact date of this truce is unfortunately unknown.¹⁸

There are some difficulties concerning this raid, for which Sibt ibn al-Jauzi gives the only account: we know nothing of its leadership or organization and al-'Adil seems to play an uncharacteristically passive and vague role. Nevertheless, it is clear that the old militia organizations which had been so powerful in the early twelfth century still persisted in Damascus and its surrounding villages. Likewise, the *jihad* against the Franks had not entirely lost its power to arouse popular enthusiasm. The popular forces of Damascus remained well-armed and organized and could be an effective military force in certain circumstances.¹⁹

A by-product of the 607/1210 campaign was the rebuilding of the Mt. Tabor fortress. It had been a considerable stronghold under the Franks, which Saladin had razed after its capture in 584/1188. Al-'Adil's motives for rebuilding it are not stated; possibly he felt that it would strengthen his administration in

Galilee and perhaps too he hoped it would prevent the Franks from using Nazareth as a jumping-off point for raids deeper into the interior. He placed his son al-Mu'azzam in charge of construction, and work began in Dhu-l-Hijja 607/May 1211. The work had to be done almost in full view of the Franks, which is probably the reason that the castle was built under army guard and in part with army labor. We are told that there were more than 500 guards on duty, more than the total number of stonemasons and skilled workers. Al-Mu'azzam named one of his own *mamluks*, Husam al-Din Lu'lu', to be site superintendant. The outer wall was erected in short order, so that the army could be dismissed, but work on the fortress was not completed until 612/1215.²⁰

In the years preceding the Fifth Crusade there was but one further incident with the Franks in which Damascus had some involvement. It began when Raymond, the ruler of Tortosa, was murdered by the Assassins in 611/1214. Raymond was the son of Prince Bohemond of Antioch, who at once retaliated by laying siege to the Assassin stronghold of al-Khawabi. In desperation its denizens appealed for help both to al-Zahir Ghazi and al-'Adil. As al-Zahir's detachment approached al-Khawabi, it was ambushed and almost annihilated by the Antiochene forces. But at the same time al-Mu'azzam led the army of Damascus to the district of Tripoli (also a possession of Bohemond of Antioch) and ravaged all the villages in the area. Bohemond soon decided that vengeance on the Assassins was not worth the systematic destruction of his southern possessions and broke off his siege.²¹ For the next three years Damascus had no further conflict with the Franks.

Relations with the Caliphate

Although the caliphate in the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries was by no means the ineffectual anachronism which it had been earlier, the effect of its newly vigorous policy was

felt mostly in Iraq, Mesopotamia, and the Jibal. In Egypt and Syria material constraints limited it to exercising a kind of moral suasion over affairs. Sometimes this could involve an active attempt to reconcile conflicts between Muslim princes — it was a caliphal embassy which resolved the stalemate at Sinjar in 606/1210—but more often the caliph had to be content with legitimizing power which had in fact been won by main force.

Al-Nasir li-Din Allah, by his famous reorganization of the *futuwwa* under his own leadership, tried to change this almost empty ceremonial and legal function into something more positive and meaningful which would bind the princes of Islam together under his moral leadership.²² But we have relatively slight evidence that his efforts were successful among the Ayyubids. A brief passage in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī seems to demonstrate that al-'Adil did let himself be associated with the *futuwwa*: in Ramadan 599/May-June 1203, “the caliph sent robes of honor and the pantaloons of the *futuwwa* to al-'Adil and his sons with 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Jabbar and al-'Aqqab, and he attired himself in the robes of honor and the pantaloons in Ramadan in Damascus.”²³

No one else mentions this event at all, nor does Sibṭ himself give any further details. It does not seem to have been an event about which al-'Adil made a great show; on the contrary he was obviously bent on discretion about it. His behavior most likely stemmed from the unpopularity of the Caliph al-Nasir among the Syrian '*ulama*'—even the broad-minded Ibn Wasil accused him of dangerous tendencies towards Shi'ism and innovation.²⁴ Moreover al-'Adil's adoption of the *futuwwa* would probably not have gained him any great credit among popular elements, since the Iraqi-Iranian *futuwwa* organizations seem to have been quite distinct in their origins and development from their Syrian analogues, the *ahdath*.²⁵ But having been offered this honor by the caliph, al-'Adil could not very well have refused it without humiliating him. Considering al-'Adil's ambitions in the Jazīra, where the caliph was very influential, he would surely not have been willing to do this.

It was not until 604/1207 that al-'Adil sent an embassy to

Baghdad to request a diploma of investiture for Egypt, Syria, the Jazira, and Akhlat. As his envoys he appointed his *ustadh al-dar* Eldigüz al-'Adili and the *qadi al-'askar* Najm al-Din Khalil b. al-Masmudi al-Hanafi. The caliphate often took its time about responding to such requests, but on this occasion it seems to have acted quite promptly. As his ambassador al-Nasir named a leading scholar and high-ranking courtier, Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi.²⁶ The caliphal envoys travelled to Damascus by way of Aleppo, but the only honor which they accorded to al-Zahir Ghazi was that of having al-Suhrawardi give a sermon in the presence of the prince and his high officials.

Then the *shaykh* Shihab al-Din left Aleppo, and with him al-Malik al-Zahir sent the Qadi Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad. To this latter he had given 3000 *dinars* to be broadcast when al-Malik al-'Adil donned the caliphal robe of honor. Al-Malik al-Mansur and al-Malik al-Mujahid likewise sent money for the same purpose.

When the *shaykh* Shihab al-Din approached Damascus, al-Malik al-'Adil ordered his armies (*al-'asakir*) to go out to meet him at al-Ghassula, while he himself and his two sons, al-Malik al-Mu'azzam and al-Malik al-Ashraf, met him at the castle.²⁷ The markets were locked up, and the leading men [of the city] went out to meet him. It was a grand occasion.

The next day al-Malik al-'Adil took his seat in the Dar Ridwan²⁸ in the citadel of Damascus. The Qadi Baha' al-Din entered [the chamber], along with the two envoys sent by the lords of Hama and Homs. A long broad-sleeved tunic (*jubba*) of black satin with a band (*tiraz*) inscribed in gold was placed upon al-Malik al-'Adil and a black turban with a band inscribed in gold on his head. He was ringed with a collar of richly bejewelled gold and girded with a sword whose scabbard was completely embellished with gold. He rode a gray stallion outfitted in gold and above his head floated a black standard upon which the caliphal titles were written in white.²⁹

As [al-'Adil] put on the robe of honor, the Qadi Baha' ad-Din and the two envoys of the lords of Hama and Homs showered upon him their gold coins. Baha' al-Din presented to him fifty pieces of the most exquisite fabric, while the envoys from the other princes scattered gold upon him.

Then the caliphal ambassador bestowed on both al-Malik al-Mu'azzam and al-Malik al-Ashraf a black turban and a black

robe with broad sleeves,³⁰ and upon the *Sahib* Safi al-Din ibn Shukr the like was bestowed.³¹ Al-Malik al-'Adil, his two sons, and his *wazir* now rode in solemn procession outside the walled town and then returned to the citadel through the Bab al-Nasr. The *Sahib* Safi al-Din ibn Shukr, sitting on a chair set up for him, then read out the caliphal diploma of investiture, in which al-Malik al-'Adil was addressed as "Shahanshah, King of Kings, Friend of the Commander of the Faithful."³²

Then the *shaykh* Shihab al-Din proceeded to Egypt, where he bestowed a robe of honor on al-Malik al-Kamil. Events in Egypt were like those of Damascus in pomp and circumstance and in the glory accorded the caliph's envoy. Al-Malik al-Kamil likewise rode in procession attired in the caliph's gifts. Then Shihab al-Din returned to the caliphal court, having received high honors.³³

This splendid ceremony, described in such detail by Ibn Wasil, reveals a number of things. Al-'Adil clearly exploited the propaganda value of his official ceremony as if he were determined to obliterate all memory of the tortuous path by which he had risen to the sultanate. In addition only al-'Adil among all the princes of the empire had been formally recognized and invested with authority by the caliph. Even his three sons and heirs apparent, al-Mu'azzam, al-Ashraf, and al-Kamil, had received only honors from the caliph, not different in kind from those bestowed on the *wazir* Ibn Shukr. This amounted to a subtle reminder that al-'Adil's sons were in fact only his lieutenants, whom he could appoint and divest as he pleased. Al-Zahir Ghazi was frozen out altogether, undoubtedly with al-'Adil's wholehearted concurrence (or encouragement), for he did not want any hint of a special position or legitimacy clinging to the last son of Saladin who still ruled a major principality. Finally it ought to be noted that among the titles granted al-'Adil, one will *not* find that of *al-sultan*. Perhaps the last Seljukid was too recently dead for al-Nasir to be willing to concede that title again, with all its connotations of a helpless and dependent caliphate—especially to a prince as powerful, ambitious, and close at hand as al-'Adil. Indeed, until al-Salih Ayyub, almost forty years later, no Ayyubid ruler would obtain that title from the caliph.³⁴

The only other contact between al-'Adil and the caliphate of which we have any record is an embassy which al-'Adil sent to Baghdad early in 614/1217. At its head was Sadr al-Din b. Hamawiya al-Juwayni, *shaykh al-shuyukh* of the Sufi *khanqahs* of Syria. He is said to have received a robe of honor from the caliph and then to have returned in the same year, but of the purpose and results of this mission we know nothing.³⁵

The distribution of *Iqta's* within the principality of Damascus

As the result of almost a decade of civil war, one might have expected a considerable alteration in the distribution of *iqta's* and governorships in south Syria. But in fact a brief survey reveals a surprising degree of continuity between the sultanates of al-Afdal and al-'Adil; not only do the names remain in large part the same, but the distribution of lands is only slightly altered. If this seems remarkable after all the convulsions of the preceding eight years, one need only remember that al-'Adil could not have tried to expel these well-established amirs from their lands without committing the same fatal error as al-Afdal: he would have made enemies of the governors and commanders of his empire.

As of 598/1202, the year when al-'Adil finally achieved an unshakeable grip on the sultanate, *iqta's* and governorships stood as follows:

1) Al-Karak and al-Shaubak remained under the personal control of al-'Adil.

2) Jerusalem remained in the hands of the man to whom al-'Aziz had assigned it in 594/1198—Sarim al-Din Khutlukh al-'Izzi.

3) Nablus seems to have been without a *muqta'* after the departure of Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri. Two facts suggest that it may have become a part of al-Mu'azzam's *khassa* or "crown estates": we find no record of any new assignee, and

al-Mu'azzam maintained a personal residence there.

4) Tiberias and Safad were still held by Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud b. Tamirak.

5) Kaukab al-Hawa' and 'Ajlun remained the *iqta'* of 'Izz al-Din Usama.

6) Salkhad was retained by Zayn al-Din Karaja, in spite of his erratic behavior during the last part of the civil war.

7) Bosra, according to some texts, was already the *iqta'* of one of al-'Adil's younger sons, al-Salih Isma'il. However the inscriptions on the Bosra citadel during al-'Adil's reign are all in the name of the sultan himself, with the amir Rukn al-Din Mengüverish al-Falaki named as governor (*mutawalli*). This would seem to be strong evidence that Bosra was a crown possession, held by a castellan, and was not conceded in *iqta'* at all in these years.

8) The Bilad al-Shaqif, with its castles of Beaufort and Tyron, were still (as in 589/1193) an *iqta'* of Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas. But his opportunism had led him to prosper mightily, so that he now held in addition to Banyas, Toron, and Chastel-Neuf.

9) Saladin's agreement with Renaud Garnier in 588/1192, which was formally renewed in the treaty of 594/1198, had divided the revenues of the district of Sidon equally between Franks and Muslims. The Muslim portion (which probably included the entire town of Sidon proper) was assigned to a son of al-'Adil named al-Mughith 'Umar. According to one source, he had received this privilege in 592/1196, when his brother al-Mu'azzam, the original assignee, turned it over to him.³⁶

The role played by the great amirs during al-'Adil's sultanate is not very clear, for the sources seldom mention them. It was a time of relative peace and stability in south Syria, of course, so that they had less opportunity for the kind of conspiracy and war-making which would normally catch a chronicler's eye. But more important, it seems that they were simply less influential now than they had been previously. Al-'Adil had his own entourage, and his policies did not really engage the interests of these men. They gradually died off during his reign, and although their sons tended to inherit their lands and rank, they

certainly inherited nothing of the fathers' power.

Late in 602/spring 1206 two of Saladin's more prominent associates passed away. The lord of Safad and Tiberias, Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud, died at Safad on 5 Shawwal/15 May, while his brother Badr al-Din Maudud, the *shihna* of Damascus, who had held his office for nearly twenty years, died in that city on 5 Ramadan/15 April. According to Ibn Shaddad (who dates Sa'd al-Din's death to 608/1211-12) Sa'd al-Din was succeeded by his son Fath al-Din Ahmad. But a short time later al-Mu'azzam required Fath al-Din to surrender Safad and Tiberias, which he brought back under the direct control of the crown. In exchange Fath al-Din was conceded seventy or more villages in the districts of Nablus and Jerusalem, whose revenues had previously been devoted to maintaining the Dome of the Rock.³⁷

Zayn al-Din Karaja, a former *mamluk* of Saladin, died in 604/1207 at the Lake of Qadesh on his return from al-'Adil's expedition against Tripoli. Since al-'Adil's accession to undisputed power, Zayn al-Din had several times served as *amir al-hajj*, a position of very great prestige. To a certain extent, then, he had maintained his standing at court, though he had nothing like his former influence so far as we can see. His son Nasir al-Din Ya'qub succeeded him as the lord of Salkhad, but in 611/1214 al-Mu'azzam had his father cede Salkhad to himself. Al-Mu'azzam then assigned it in *iqta'* to one of his own *mamluks*, his *ustadh al-dar* 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Mu'azzami, who would retain it unchallenged for more than thirty-five years.³⁸ Karaja had died in Damascus and been buried there, but we do not know if that was his normal place of residence or if he ordinarily lived in Salkhad, as did his successor 'Izz al-Din.³⁹

On 20 Rajab 608/28 December 1211 Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas died; he had been perhaps the most powerful and important of the Salahi amirs in the decade after Saladin's death. He is said to have resided for the most part on his *iqta'*, though he traveled to Damascus from time to time and chose to be buried there. Al-'Adil confirmed Jaharkas's son (whose name is unknown) in his possessions, but since he was still a youth, the

real governor was the boy's guardian, a *mamluk* of Jaharkas's named Sarim al-Din Khutluba. When Jaharkas's son died in 615/1218, al-Mu'azzam repossessed his *iqta'*, and it was perhaps at this time that one of its major components, Banyas, was assigned in *iqta'* to the prince's younger brother al-'Aziz 'Uthman.⁴⁰

Only one of the great *muqta's* was stripped of his lands by force—'Izz al-Din Usama of Kaukab and 'Ajlun. In 609/1212 he happened to be in Cairo with several of his *mamluks*, while simultaneously al-Mu'azzam, al-Kamil, and al-'Adil were together in Damietta. Somehow al-'Adil became suspicious that Usama was engaged in treasonable correspondence with al-Zahir Ghazi in Aleppo, and when at the end of Jumada II/November, Usama bolted Cairo for his Syrian castles, al-'Adil told al-Mu'azzam that he could have all the amir's lands if he could catch him. Al-Mu'azzam set out in furious pursuit with only a small party, and by the time his quarry reached Jerusalem, he had caught up with him. The prince promised Usama that if he would voluntarily give up his castles of Kaukab and 'Ajlun, he could retain not only his life and liberty but all his other properties as well. But Usama proudly refused. Al-Mu'azzam threw him into prison in al-Karak and went to besiege the two fortresses in question. Usama's *mamluks* tried to defend them, but nothing could be done against the royal forces. Kaukab was close to the new castle of Mt. Tabor, and when it was taken, al-'Adil ordered it razed to the ground. With the fall of 'Izz al-Din Usama, the political role of the turbulent Salahiyya corps came to an end.⁴¹ We do not know precisely what became of Usama's *iqta'*; it seems reasonable to suppose that the districts around Kaukab were now attached to Mt. Tabor and were under the control of its governor, Husam al-Din Lu'lu' al-Mu'azzami—whether as *iqta'* or crown land we cannot say.

There was at least one other change of note. In 606/1209 al-Mughith 'Umar had died and was succeeded in his *iqta'* of Sidon (or rather the portion of its revenues appointed for the Muslims) by his son al-Mughith Mahmud, who held the place

until it was seized by the Franks in 625/1227.⁴² As for Jerusalem, at some point not later than 601/1204 it became the chief residence of al-Mu'azzam, who governed it directly with the assistance of one of his own amirs, Shuja' al-Din Khutlukh al-Mu'azzami. We are not told what had become of the city's former governor, Sarim al-Din Khutlukh al-'Izzi.

The government of al-'Adil in Damascus

In principle al-Mu'azzam was the prince of Damascus, responsible for local administration in south Syria, while al-'Adil, as sultan, was responsible for the affairs of the empire as a whole. Indeed al-'Adil had set aside no principality to be his personal dominion; even though his sons acted on his behalf, they had been formally invested with the lands which they were presently governing. Moreover his sons were adults and much more than the nominal heads of their principalities: as we have seen, al-Auhad Ayyub and al-Ashraf Musa had considerable discretion in the conduct of their policies in the Jazira, and even in Egypt, where al-'Adil often resided, al-Kamil had a good deal of personal influence and responsibility for local affairs—he oversaw much of the work on the Cairo citadel, he issued decrees in his own name, and he even succeeded in getting his father to fire the powerful *wazir* Ibn Shukr and send him into a long exile.⁴³ In this light it is curious that al-Mu'azzam enjoyed a very limited role in the government of his nominal principality; even Damascus itself was closely supervised by al-'Adil, and in such records as we have of public affairs in that city, al-Mu'azzam has left hardly a trace. A more shadowy prince cannot be imagined.

The basic characteristics of al-'Adil's regime in Damascus are easily defined: puritanism in public morality, careful financial administration, and a commitment to public works. Al-'Adil had been a faithful servant and close companion of his brother Saladin, but he was an aloof man, unable to inspire true

personal warmth or devotion. He had moreover inherited a nearly bankrupt kingdom and was unwilling to shower money and favors on his subordinates, as Saladin had done. Instead he devoted every effort to rebuilding his treasury. Likewise al-'Adil was a reluctant *mujahid* at best and so could not legitimize his regime on the basis of his military exploits against the infidel. Rather, he had to rely for this purpose on public evidences of his piety and orthodoxy. Neither policy makes for exciting reading, but one must admit that they represented the most prudent course to take and both seem to have been eminently satisfactory to his amirs and the '*ulama*'.

The texts give us very little direct information on the structure of al-'Adil's administration in Damascus, perhaps because so little happened that was untoward or out of the ordinary. But the tone of his regime is admirably conveyed by a passage from Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi, the only text we have which deals directly with the urban administration of his reign:

The whole length of his regime was free of corruption, wine-drinking, sin, gambling, homosexual behavior, and illegal and oppressive exactions. The income from these categories [of revenue] had been 100,000 *dinars*, but he abolished them all for the sake of God Most High. His urban prefect (*wali*) Mubariz al-Din al-Mu'tamid supported him in this policy by posting officers on the roads over Mt. Qasyun and Mt. Hermon, and in the environs of Damascus, to watch for anyone bringing contraband to the city. The evildoers would make use of clever ruses—putting wineskins inside drums and [thereby] bringing them into Damascus, but al-Mubariz put a stop to that.⁴⁴

More important than the chroniclers' texts for understanding the nature of al-'Adil's involvement in the urban administration of Damascus is the evidence of monuments, for he did a great deal in regard to the city's defenses, the Umayyad Mosque, and the Musalla al-'Idayn. There were numerous other monuments erected during his reign, of course—indeed his accession to power marks the beginning of a great architectural efflorescence in Damascus—but we shall restrict our attention here to those named, for they were connected with the spiritual and material well-being of the whole people and as such were the

special responsibility of the government and not merely of private charity.

The immediate cause of al-'Adil's remarkable activity was probably the terrible earthquake which struck Syria in Sha'ban 597/May 1201. The shock was felt even in the Taurus and the Jazira, and according to Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī 30,000 people died in the core area. Nablus was leveled except for a single quarter, while Acre, Tyre, and the coastal castles all suffered grave damage. The citadel of Baalbek was badly damaged, as were those of Banyas, Chastel-Neuf, and Toron. In Hama and Homs many houses collapsed on their occupants. In Damascus itself the Eastern Minaret of the Umayyad Mosque tumbled, and its sanctuary dome (Qubbat al-Nasr) was split and sixteen balconies fell. Two of Nur al-Din's chief monuments, the Maristan Nuri and the Madrasat al-Kallasa, were ruined. A second earthquake occurred just a year later, but though it was sharp it did much less damage.⁴⁵

Al-'Adil could do little until the civil wars ended, but in 599/1203 he took a first step towards repairing and strengthening the city's defenses by building a forewall (*fasil*) around at least some sectors of the main wall; it was brought up from the edge of a moat to a man's height, and the moat was then filled with water.⁴⁶

But by far his most important work on the fortifications of Damascus was the reconstruction of the city's great citadel. The citadel he inherited dated from the late eleventh century; it had been constructed by the Seljukid prince Tutush as his residence and center of government. In the course of the twelfth century, it was added to and restored by Shams al-Muluk Isma'il, Nur al-Din, and Saladin, apparently quite extensively. But by the contemporary standards of fortification it must have been hopelessly obsolete, for al-'Adil decided to raze the existing structure and build it anew. In 604/1207-8 he ordered construction to begin; the cost was to be met by requiring each prince of the Ayyubid house (and the great amirs as well, according to two sources) to build, at his own expense, one of the ten great bastions which would compose

the finished structure. According to the inscriptions, the first bastion was completed in 605/1208-9 and the last in 614/1217. Although al-'Adil had ordered all the princes to participate in the project, it was carried out in his name and under the supervision of the *wali* of Damascus, Mubariz al-Din Ibrahim b. Musa. Only al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama had his name included in one of the inscriptions and that after al-'Adil's. However we also know from the texts that al-Mu'azzam 'Isa was responsible for the wooden terrace placed over the main portal (the Bab al-Hadid, facing north *away from* the interior of the city) and the pigeon house (*tayyara*) as well. Likewise archeological evidence clearly suggests a major contribution by al-Zahir Ghazi.⁴⁷

The Damascus citadel was a structure of great military merit, and it would prove its worth even against the Mongols in 658/1260. But as Sauvaget points out,⁴⁸ its construction was as much a political as a military act. It would give al-'Adil a secure point of repair in case any vassal prince revolted, and—more significant—by compelling the princes to participate in construction of the citadel, al-'Adil was forcing them to give concrete proof of their submission and loyalty to him.

Of a more peaceful nature, and perhaps of greater benefit to the ordinary life of the city, were the sultan's extensive repairs to the Umayyad Mosque. In 602/1205-6 al-'Adil appointed his *wazir* Safi al-Din ibn Shukr to pave the vast courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque; this project involved razing a Roman arcade by the Bab al-Sharqi in order to obtain paving stone and could not have been completed before 604/1207 at the earliest. In 607/1211 further work was undertaken: the repaving of the arcades (*arwiqa*) around the courtyard, the mounting of new bronze portals at the Bab al-Barid, and the repair of the structure's water system. This work was assigned to an official identified as the *wazir* Jamal al-Din b. Faris al-Iskandari; he is otherwise unknown and may possibly have been the *wazir* of al-Mu'azzam, since Ibn Shukr was still in al-'Adil's good graces during these years. In 610/1213 the sultan personally intervened in the affairs of the Umayyad Mosque by ordering that

on Fridays the gates of the road leading to the mosque should be closed with a chain to prevent horses from approaching it. (Heretofore worshippers approaching the mosque had been soiled by ordure in the streets.) Unfortunately this command proved entirely ineffective and had to be rescinded. In 611/1214-15 repaving of the sanctuary was begun, this time under the authority of the *wali* Mubariz al-Din, for the original marble floor had become badly pitted and broken up in the course of time. Work was completed at the beginning of 614/1217, the *wali* placing the last stone with his own hands. Finally, in 613/1216-17, there were repairs made to the sanctuary cupola, though their precise nature is not clear.⁴⁹

In addition to the Umayyad Mosque, al-'Adil paid much attention to the Musalla, an open field south of the walls where the prayers opening the two chief Muslim festivals were celebrated. The site had clearly been there for a very long time, but it seems to have been al-'Adil who first gave it monumental form. In charge of the project he placed his *wazir* Ibn Shukr, and construction began in 607/1210-11 with the building of a rectangular crenellated stone wall around the sacred precincts, the purpose of which was to keep out passing caravans and dead animals. Then a stone *mihrab* and stone *minbar* were placed in the enclosed area. In 613/1216-17 a two-aisled arcade was erected on the south (*qibla*) side of the building, a wooden *minbar* put in to replace the stone one, and a *khatib* appointed. The new construction was apparently not completed until shortly after al-'Adil's death in 615/1218.⁵⁰

This survey of al-'Adil's work in Damascus may serve to indicate the very direct character of his rule there. The men who supervised construction were all al-'Adil's own appointees and remained immediately responsible to him. Except for the minor projects in the citadel assigned to him by his father, there is no evidence that al-Mu'azzam played any role at all in this work, even though it was of a kind which belonged to the basic duties of a Muslim government. The point is emphasized when one realizes that not a single inscription in Damascus dating from the reign of al-'Adil carries the name of al-Mu'azzam.⁵¹

The role of al-Mu'azzam in the reign of al-'Adil

It is only when we turn our attention from the empire as a whole and from Damascus towards Palestine, especially Jerusalem, that we will find traces of al-Mu'azzam's political and administrative activity during these years. Palestine was seldom a center of attention for chroniclers during al-'Adil's reign, since it was neither the capital of a principality nor a major center of conflict, so we must glean data on al-Mu'azzam's activities here from monuments and inscriptions.

We have already noted (p. 137) that al-Mu'azzam had been put in charge of constructing the new fortress at Mt. Tabor. The first inscription, dating from 607/1211, is in the name of al-'Adil and does not mention al-Mu'azzam at all, but later inscriptions marking the work's progress are all in al-Mu'azzam's name, and this would suggest that his father was permitting him a growing autonomy in governing at least a part of his nominal realm.⁵²

In Jerusalem there are eleven inscriptions from the reign of al-'Adil, dating from 601/1204 to 614/1217, which carry the name of al-Mu'azzam. One concerns the city's defenses and two more relate to other works of public character. No less than six mention his restorations in the Haram al-Sharif, and there is one more from the Haram al-Khalil in Hebron. Finally two inscriptions refer to charitable constructions, where he was acting as a pious Muslim rather than as the head of the Islamic community in Jerusalem.

The first of al-Mu'azzam's inscriptions is dated 601/1204-5; it says only that the Bab al-Nazir in the Haram al-Sharif was restored "in the days of our lord (*sayyidina*), the *Sultan* al-Malik al-Mu'azzam. . . ."⁵³ It gives no further information of any kind — no precise date, no reason for the restoration, nor the official who had been charged with carrying out the work. However

the formula "in the days of our lord" etc. normally seems to endow an act with an official character and implies that work was done on behalf of the sovereign acting as chief of the community. This very brief inscription may thus imply that within Jerusalem, at least, al-Mu'azzam was already considered the highest authority. (It is also excellent evidence that among the Ayyubids the title of *sultan* carried no great weight at this period.)

The inscription referring to al-Mu'azzam's work on the fortifications of Jerusalem dates from 610/1213; it is a construction text for one of the citadel towers. In addition to al-Mu'azzam himself, the inscription names two of his officials: 'Izz al-Din 'Umar b. Yaghmur al-Mu'azzami (whose name identifies him as almost certainly Türkmen and not *mamluk*, in spite of his *nisba*), who is said to have been charged with the construction (*tawalla 'imarataha*); and one Khutlukh al-Mu'azzami (probably the same as the Shuja' al-Din Khutlukh who is mentioned in connection with the Haram al-Sharif), who is identified by the inscription as the *shadd*.⁵⁴

The other two works of public utility connected with the name of al-Mu'azzam were in fact not directly sponsored by him. One is a cistern built in 607/1210, the other a cistern and kiosk built in 613/1216-17. Their inscriptions identify their patron—i.e., the man who ordered them built—as one Muhammad b. 'Urwa b. Sayyar al-Mausili,⁵⁵ but the inscriptions also say they were built "by the benevolence of" (*min ni'mat*) al-Malik al-Mu'azzam. As Elisséeff suggests in another context, this phrase probably indicates that the prince contributed a sum of money towards the work as a gesture of piety.⁵⁶

The remaining five inscriptions pertaining to the Haram al-Sharif and the one in the Haram al-Khalil in Hebron are best considered as a group, since these were two of the holiest places in Palestine, and all the work done on them by a given prince should predictably exhibit some common features.

The first inscription, from 604/1207-8 and located in the Dome of the Rock, is extremely fragmentary; the only elements of which we can be reasonably certain are the names. The first

is that of the amir Shuja' al-Din Khutlukh b. 'Abd Allah; though the verb and titles connected with him are effaced, the position of his name would imply that he was the official charged with the construction. There is also a name reconstructed as (Husam al-D)in Kiymaz al-Mu'azzami; of his function too the text says nothing, but the position of his name at the end suggests that he may have been the site superintendant. The inscription also says that this work was done "in the reign of" (*fi daulat*) al-Malik al-Mu'azzam.⁵⁷

In 608/1211, an inscription on one of the arcades of the Haram identifies a restoration here as done "in the days of the reign of" al-Mu'azzam.⁵⁸

An inscription of 610/1213 on another arcade gives the same information as the preceding, but adds that the work was done "during the governorship of (*fi wilayat*) the most illustrious amir 'Izz al-Din 'Umar b. Yaghmur."⁵⁹

The last of the Haram al-Sharif inscriptions is found in the Masjid al-Aqsa and dated 614/1217. It is similar to the others, except that it carries a full protocol both for al-Mu'azzam and his father.⁶⁰

The inscription from the Haram al-Khalil, dated 1 Muharram 612/2 May 1215, states only that certain unspecified work was carried out in the reign of al-Mu'azzam, but to this it appends a list of the properties with which the prince had endowed this shrine.⁶¹

The significance of these inscriptions emerges from four of their common characteristics. They are all placed in a major shrine, one whose extraordinary sanctity had been recognized from early Islamic times. In such places only the head of the Muslim community was privileged to undertake construction and restoration; in so doing, he acted not merely as a pious believer, but as the authority ultimately responsible for the material and spiritual well-being of the community. The individual who held such authority of course varied—in the early centuries he was the caliph, later he would be whatever sultan effectively controlled the region. Second, the official character of these inscriptions is confirmed by the use of the phrase

"*fi ayyam*" or "*fi daulat*" so-and-so. The person named as the object of this phrase was always the local community's political chief. Even if a local governor had actually commanded the work to be done, he was considered to be acting merely as the agent of the sovereign named in this phrase. In this group of six inscriptions from the two Harams, the sovereign so named is always al-Mu'azzam 'Isa. The third characteristic of these inscriptions is a negative one: al-'Adil is *never* mentioned independently. When his name occurs, he is identified simply as al-Mu'azzam's father; no higher authority or suzerainty is attributed to him. Finally throughout these inscriptions al-Mu'azzam's own officials and *mamluks* are named as the agents directly in charge of the work being done. No one associated primarily with al-'Adil is identified in them.

When these inscriptions are added to those concerning Jerusalem's defenses and the later examples from Mt. Tabor, it becomes clear that in Palestine al-Mu'azzam considered himself an independent ruler. In Damascus his position was nominal, but here he was the figure ultimately responsible for the community's well-being. The construction activity in Jerusalem mirrored that done in Damascus, but here al-Mu'azzam and his entourage represented the authority of the state.

5 Al-Mu‘azzam ‘Isa: The period of independent sovereignty, 615/1218-624/1227

The opening of the Fifth Crusade and the death of al-‘Adil

As the year 614/1217 began, al-‘Adil could look upon the state of his empire with great satisfaction. The chill which had characterized his relations with al-Zahir Ghazi for the last two decades had been markedly eased when his daughter Dayfa Khatun married the prince of Aleppo in Muharram 609/June 1212. When the couple in 610/1214 had a son, al-‘Aziz Muhammad, and al-‘Adil recognized him as the heir apparent to the principality of Aleppo, whatever tension and suspicion had still persisted was even further lessened. The sudden death of al-Zahir in Jumada II 613/September 1216, at the age of forty-three, gave al-‘Adil the opportunity to install one of his own sons in Aleppo, but al-‘Adil was not a man to push too hard. He was perfectly content to have his grandson al-‘Aziz mount the throne, with a trusted *mamluk* of al-Zahir’s, Shihab al-Din Toghril, as his *atabeg*. With al-Zahir gone, Aleppo would never again contest al-‘Adil’s right to the sultanate or even stand as a silent reproach to his usurpation of it.

Al-‘Adil had been a brilliantly successful ruler, in many ways the ablest of his line. Saladin, after all, was not the first military adventurer in Islam to carve out a vast empire for himself, but few rulers of the second generation were able to retain the founder’s possessions and even add to them while strengthening them administratively and financially. If al-‘Adil is a more obscure figure for us than his brother, it is partly because Saladin,

by a tremendous stroke of luck, had delivered Jerusalem, but also because al-'Adil lacked his brother's warmth and ease with others. His great talents compelled respect, however grudging, but not a single writer speaks of him with devotion or real affection.¹

In the second half of 614/1217, however, it began to look as if al-'Adil's accomplishments might be brought to nothing, for in Jumada II/September of that year, a new crusade began to disembark in Acre. This was the very occurrence which al-'Adil's whole Frankish policy had tried to forestall, and when it came, he was totally unprepared to meet it. He was then residing in Egypt. The Egyptian troops were apparently dispersed among their *iqta's*, for to counter the threat al-'Adil hastily assembled the Syrian regiments which were in Egypt at that time. He led his force (which surely numbered no more than a few thousand horse) north into Palestine, passing by way of Ramla and Lydda to Nablus, with the hope of reaching Galilee before the crusaders were sufficiently organized to leave Acre for the interior. The crusaders moved too quickly, however, so al-'Adil decided to take his forces only as far north as Baysan and await them there. In early Sha'ban/November the crusader army advanced against him. When the sultan saw how hopelessly outnumbered he was—according to Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi, the new crusade totaled 15,000 cavalry—he was forced to retreat towards Damascus without offering a shred of resistance. Militarily his action was prudent, but it meant sacrificing the town and people of Baysan to three days of pillage and destruction.²

After sacking Baysan, the Frankish army crossed the Jordan and raided the defenseless villages of the Hauran. Their path is not easy to reconstruct, but it seems that they first advanced along the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias to strike at 'Aqabat al-Kursi, then proceeded inland to Khisfin, Nawa, and Khirbat al-Lusus, and finally turned back toward the northwest, passing through Tall al-Faras to the town of Banyas. The Banyas garrison, housed in the citadel of al-Subayba, apparently did not intervene, for we read of no resistance to the Franks during

the three days which they spent pillaging the town. At last the marauders grew tired of these destructive but strategically pointless activities and returned to Acre.³

Al-'Adil had meantime retreated to Ra's al-Ma', from which he sent orders to the *wali* of Damascus, Mubariz al-Din Ibrahim, to prepare that city for a possible siege; measures included not only stockpiling grain in the citadel, but also flooding the suburbs of Qasr Hajjaj and al-Shaghur, which lay adjacent to the north and south walls of the city respectively. As the Franks made their way north through the Jaulan, al-'Adil retreated again, this time to the Marj al-Suffar, just south of the Ghuta, in order to ensure that his army would not be cut off from Damascus by the enemy advance. From the Marj al-Suffar, he sent a call to the other Ayyubid princes to join him, but only al-Mujahid of Homs responded, and he reached the sultan's camp after the Franks had already returned to Acre. Meantime al-'Adil assigned a detachment of his army to al-Mu'azzam, whom he posted at Nablus to shield Jerusalem from any unexpected forays.⁴

The crusaders had quite different intentions, however; their first goal was to strengthen their foothold in Galilee. On Wednesday, 28 Sha'ban 614/29 November 1217, a force led by King John of Brienne suddenly appeared below the great hilltop fortress of Mt. Tabor. The superb location of this castle, atop a steep conical hill, made it very difficult of access, but the Frankish task was lightened by a heavy fog on the morning of 2 Ramadan/3 December. The attackers crept up the hillside unnoticed until their spearpoints touched the walls. At the last moment the defenders were alerted to what was happening, and a quick sortie drove the Franks off the slope into their own camp. Two days later the Franks returned to the attack, this time storming the castle with a great scaling ladder. The defenders were in desperate straits and fought with the courage of despair, but in the end they were saved by a fluke. A shot from one of the castle's naphtha guns struck the ladder, and in its fiery collapse one of the Frankish commanders was killed along with all his companions. Discouraged by this disaster,

the rest of the attackers abruptly withdrew. But the Muslim garrison had no real hope of victory, for their assailants were still far more numerous and better equipped than they. Moreover they too had suffered grievous losses, including two amirs. But remembering how the defenders of Acre were slaughtered, after they had surrendered on safe-conduct to Richard Coeur-de-Lion, the garrison of Mt. Tabor resolved to fight to the death rather than risk the same fate. Then, on 6 Ramadan/7 December, a second miracle intervened, for they awoke to find that the Franks had slipped away during the night. Mt. Tabor was saved, and shortly afterwards al-Mu'azzam arrived from Nablus to mourn the dead and distribute honors among the survivors.⁵

The abortive expedition against Mt. Tabor was the last major crusader initiative of the year, although there were two further raids, both into the southern Lebanon. One of these succeeded in netting a considerable booty, but had no further significance, while the other, led by the nephew of King Andrew of Hungary (at this point the ranking leader on the crusade), ended in the massacre of almost the entire party, some 500 cavalry, when the local mountaineers trapped them in an ambush.⁶ With bad weather settling in, the Franks could do nothing but withdraw to Acre to wait out the winter and decide what to do next.

The new year of 615/1218 brought no relief to the hard-pressed Ayyubids. As soon as the weather permitted, in Safar/May, the crusaders left Acre. Their original force, at first depleted by the departure of King Andrew and the Hungarians in January, had received extensive reinforcements during the spring. Under the new circumstances they had decided that an assault on Egypt would be far more productive than a new attempt against Jerusalem or even Damascus. By crushing the center of Ayyubid power in Egypt, it would be possible not only to recapture but to retain the old Kingdom of Jerusalem. On 3 Rabi' I/30 May the crusader armies disembarked in Egypt, across the Nile and slightly upstream from Damietta. This city was their first target, and it was well chosen. An excellent seaport, it would permit—because the Franks controlled the

sea—the uncontested reinforcement and supply of crusader forces in Egypt. Moreover it stood at the mouth of a major branch of the Nile, so that in an advance on Cairo the Franks would enjoy both water and land communications with their base camp.⁷

As soon as he understood the crusaders' intentions, al-'Adil dispatched most of his forces at the Marj al-Suffar to Egypt in order to assist his eldest son al-Kamil in the defense of Damietta. At the same time he instructed al-Mu'azzam to destroy the new fortress at Mt. Tabor. With most of the army now in Egypt, it had become exceptionally vulnerable to attack, and if the Franks should capture it, the rest of Galilee would be threatened. Al-Mu'azzam, deeply upset over the loss of his finest castle west of the Jordan, would not speak to his father for several days, but he was eventually mollified with a generous gift of money and a promise of some new lands in Egypt. Thus in Rabi' I/June dismantling of the great castle began.⁸

Al-'Adil did not go personally to Egypt. The reasons for his conduct are unspecified, but they may well have been connected with a new crisis which had unexpectedly erupted in north Syria.

The Rum Seljukid 'Izz al-Din Kaykawus had managed to persuade al-Afdal 'Ali, still whiling away his long exile in Samosata, that the death of al-Zahir Ghazi would provide the two of them with an excellent opportunity to seize Aleppo and the Jaziran possessions of al-Ashraf. It was agreed that Kaykawus would annex any lands east of the Euphrates which might be conquered, while al-Afdal would become prince of Aleppo—though continuing, as for the last fifteen years, to make the *khutba* and *sikka* in the name of the Rum Seljukids. In mid-Rabi' I 615/June 1218 the two princes launched a joint attack on the northern possessions of Aleppo. Ra'ban, then Tall Bashir, fell to them without difficulty. However Kaykawus retained both places, contrary to the agreement with al-Afdal, who began to suspect that once again he was being used. We are not certain what al-Afdal did at this point, but it is clear that he took no further part in the campaign. His defection

did not discourage Kaykawus, however, and the Ayyubid foothold in north Syria and Diyar Mudar began to appear rather precarious.⁹

Shihab al-Din Toghril, the *atabeg* of Aleppo, had called on al-'Adil for help, and while the sultan did not come personally, he ordered his son al-Ashraf, who was at this time carrying out diversionary raids around Safita and the Crac des Chevaliers in a fruitless attempt to prevent the Franks from concentrating their resources on Damietta, to proceed to Aleppo and organize its defense. Al-Ashraf immediately marched north, and on 13 Rabi' II/9 July his advance force (consisting of a few regular troopers supplemented by Arab Bedouin) met the vanguard of Kaykawus's army at Manbij, which had just been overrun by the Rum Seljukids. The Seljukid forces were dealt a sharp defeat and fled in retreat to Kaykawus. For some reason he panicked and began to withdraw towards Anatolia. After al-Ashraf brought up the main body of his army and had recaptured Tall Bashir and Ra'ban, he decided to pursue the aggressor into Anatolia. He had advanced as far as Burj al-Rasas when he received the news of his father's death.¹⁰

Al-'Adil was finally forced to set out for Egypt by the shocking news from that country. On 30 Jumada I 615/24 August 1218, the crusaders had stormed and captured a key element in Damietta's fortifications, the great Chain Tower (Burj al-Silsila), situated in the middle of the Nile slightly downstream from the city. As the name indicates, a mighty chain stretched between this tower and the east bank of the river, so that the channel was closed to any Frankish vessels which might attempt to approach the city. As long as the Muslims had held the Chain Tower, the crusaders had no reasonable hope of capturing the city. Even with it gone Damietta remained a powerful and well-supplied fortress, but al-'Adil no longer wished to take any chances and set out at once from the Marj al-Suffar. But hardly a day's march away, in the village of 'Aliqin, he became critically ill and died on Friday 7 Jumada II/31 August.¹¹

The only person in attendance when the sultan died was his close companion Karim al-Din al-Khilati. He disclosed the fact

to no one, but instead sent a message by carrier pigeon to al-Mu'azzam 'Isa, still encamped at Nablus. Only two days before he had intercepted and severely beaten (at Caymont near Haifa) a Frankish force moving from Acre to the main battleground at Damietta. Now al-Mu'azzam hurried to 'Aliqin, where he connived with Karim al-Din to keep al-'Adil's death a secret until his body could be brought back to Damascus. Once there he secretly buried his father in the citadel and then invited the leading amirs to come swear allegiance to al-'Adil and then to himself as heir apparent in Damascus. Only when this had been accomplished did al-Mu'azzam disclose his father's death to the army and people of Damascus and send the news to the other princes of the dynasty. His first official act was to take control of the state treasuries in Damascus and al-Karak, the contents of which equalled 700,000 *dinars misri* in specie, exclusive of wealth in kind.¹²

With the death of al-'Adil, the Ayyubid empire was in effect divided between his three eldest sons: al-Kamil Muhammad in Egypt, al-Mu'azzam 'Isa in Palestine, Transjordan, and central Syria, and al-Ashraf Musa in north Syria and the Jazira. There were numerous other princes, of course, but all stood in some sort of dependency on one of these three. Thus there were three effectively independent rulers—although al-Kamil was immediately recognized as head of the family and enjoyed the primacy of honor which attached to his position. Since all were powerful, intelligent, and profoundly ambitious men, one might have predicted a lengthy succession struggle, but in fact nothing of the sort happened. The reasons for this remarkable lack of rivalry were two. The Ayyubids at this point were heavily beset both in Egypt and in north Syria, and to have given any rein to their mutual jealousies might have spelled the end of the empire altogether. But more important, the three brothers seemed willing to respect the rights and status which they had each inherited. Each felt that he had a principality and role worthy of his dignity. Such feelings of mutual respect and honor were a fragile thing, to be sure, but they lasted long enough to permit effective cooperation during the long and

terrible years of the Fifth Crusade.

The role of al-Mu'azzam in the Fifth Crusade

Although the Fifth Crusade was one of the most complex and ambitious expeditions in the entire history of the crusading movement, it has fortunately received a number of full and intelligent accounts by modern scholars.¹³ We can thus focus our attention on the direct role of al-Mu'azzam 'Isa. This is important not only because he carried out a significant "rear-guard" action in Syria or even because his intervention saved the dynasty at a critical moment, but also because his conduct in the years after 618/1221 cannot be properly evaluated until we understand his role during the crusade.

For more than a year after it began the crusade had been more of a nuisance than a serious threat. It seemed increasingly clear as the months rolled by that the Franks simply did not have the means to mount an effective siege against so powerful a fortress as Damietta. But in Dhu-l-Qa'da 615/February 1219 a tremendous stroke of luck gave them an opportunity which they could never have won by force of arms. The amir 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Mashtub, who had caused the unfortunate al-Afdal such grief twenty-five years earlier, had risen to become the commandant of the Hakkari Kurdish regiment in al-Kamil's army. He was an influential figure at court, and he saw in al-'Adil's death an excellent opportunity to realize some of his own ambitions. He persuaded some other amirs (whose names suggest that they were also Kurds, though little is known of them as individuals) to join him in a conspiracy to place the sultan with his younger and presumably more pliant brother al-Fa'iz Ibrahim. Al-Kamil somehow got wind of the scheme, but having no clear idea of who was involved and whom he could trust, he fled by night, with but a small band of companions, to the town of Ashmun Tannah, some fifteen miles south of his original camp. When the Egyptian army awakened the

next morning to find their sultan gone, they fled wildly in every direction, leaving all their supplies and equipment behind them. Thus it was that on the morning of 18 Dhu-l-Qa'da/5 February, the crusaders were able to cross the Nile absolutely unopposed and establish their siege lines directly before the walls of Damietta.¹⁴

While al-Kamil's scattered forces—including the brazen Ibn al-Mashtub—slowly regrouped at Ashmun Tannah, the desperate sultan contemplated fleeing to the Yemen, held by his son al-Mas'ud. But two days later, before either he or the conspirators could make up their minds to act, al-Mu'azzam arrived in Egypt, entirely by chance, bringing with him the Syrian reinforcements which al-'Adil had started to lead down five months earlier. When al-Kamil confided the situation to his brother, al-Mu'azzam at once took matters into his own hands. He rode over to Ibn al-Mashtub's tent and ordered him to come with him immediately, even refusing to allow the amir time to dress. As soon as they were well away from the camp, al-Mu'azzam handed Ibn al-Mashtub over to a group of his companions and told them to escort him out of Egypt.

Once in Syria Ibn al-Mashtub proceeded to Hama, where he received from al-Ashraf Musa an invitation to join his service, with Ra's al-'Ayn being assigned as his *iqta'*. That was the extent of Ibn al-Mashtub's punishment, nor do we hear of any other amir being arrested for his part in this affair; more lenient treatment for so disastrous an act of treason can hardly be imagined. As for the prince al-Fa'iz, al-Kamil ordered him to go to Syria to try to enlist active support from the other princes of the house. Some months after arriving in the Eastern Territories, however, al-Fa'iz suddenly died; a rumor said he had been poisoned, but no substantive evidence is reported which might substantiate this charge.¹⁵

After the crisis had eased, al-Mu'azzam remained some weeks more in Egypt to aid al-Kamil in his well-conducted but fruitless attempts to break the siege of Damietta. Finally at the end of Dhu-l-Hijja 615/early March 1219 he decided that he must return to Syria to see to its affairs. Before departing,

however, he took the grave step of sending ahead to Jerusalem to order the demolition of its walls. We cannot be sure why al-Mu'azzam stripped the second city of his principality of its defenses, but it was clearly not an act of panic or impulse. He refused to bend before the protests of his two governors there, his brother al-'Aziz 'Uthman and his *ustadh al-dar* 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad, that they were fully able to defend the city. He may have acted in preparation for negotiations in which al-Kamil would offer to give the crusaders Palestine in exchange for an end to the siege of Damietta. But, as the Muslim chroniclers indicate, al-Mu'azzam was probably chiefly motivated by the thought that his presence in Egypt had almost denuded his principality of troops, and if a new wave of crusaders should arrive in Acre he might not be able to provide for Jerusalem's defense. Jerusalem had been made a powerful fortress by Saladin, "its every tower like a citadel," and if it should fall to the Franks, they would have a solid base for further expansion and consolidation.¹⁶

On 1 Muharram 616/19 March 1219 the garrison of Jerusalem began the sorrowful task of dismantling the city's fortifications. The populace was entirely demoralized in the face of this evident surrender to the Franks; they streamed out of the city, wailing and rending their clothing, and scattered to those places where they might hope to find a temporary refuge — Damascus, al-Karak, and even Egypt. There was intense suffering from hunger and thirst among the refugees, and many died on the roads. Only a few persons decided to stay in Jerusalem.¹⁷

Al-Mu'azzam now decided that he could not afford to leave intact any of his fortresses west of the Jordan. He sent to Sarim al-Din Khutluba, *atabeg* for the son of the late Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas in south Lebanon, and ordered him to surrender the castles which he held. Then this entire group of fortresses was dismantled. The territories they had dominated were granted to al-'Aziz 'Uthman, whom al-Mu'azzam greatly esteemed. As for Sarim al-Din, he received a robe of honor and probably new lands from the hands of the prince.¹⁸

At the beginning of Sha'ban 616/October 1219 al-Mu'azzam returned to Egypt. The defense of Damietta was by now in desperate straits, and al-Mu'azzam arrived only shortly before the exhausted garrison capitulated, on 25 Sha'ban 616/5 November 1219. As soon as the disheartened Muslim forces had retreated upriver and reestablished their camp at the place which would become al-Mansura, he obtained from his brother permission to take his troops and return to Syria. It is not clear why al-Mu'azzam insisted on leaving at this crucial juncture, although Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī states that he hoped to divert the Franks' attention by harassing their possessions in Palestine. Perhaps, too, he felt that the Muslim cause in Egypt was all but lost, and rather than sacrifice himself and his soldiers in a hopeless struggle, he preferred to return home and try to save what he could there.¹⁹ In that event, his departure did no harm, since the crusaders stayed in Damietta for a year after its fall and did nothing, while al-Kāmil invested his time and energy in creating a fortified camp-city at al-Mansura.

As he made his way back to Syria, al-Mu'azzam apparently made a serious effort to involve the people of Damascus in the war, or so it seems from an obscure passage in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī. He reports that he received a letter from the prince ordering him to assemble a company of townsmen and villagers and to lead them to Nablus. When Sibṭ first read al-Mu'azzam's letter before the congregation in the Umayyad Mosque, there was great enthusiasm, but as the time of gathering approached, the people backed off from the expedition and would not go. Although al-Mu'azzam was disappointed and angry when he heard of this, he did not alter his plans. Coming up the coast from Egypt, he besieged and captured Caesarea, and then turned his attention to the powerful new Templar fortress of Chateau-Pèlerin (Ar., 'Athlith) south of Acre, but here the stubborn defense soon forced him to retreat. He seems to have made a second attempt in the autumn of 617/1220 against this place but again had to withdraw with heavy losses. In the summer of this year he had razed the remaining defenses of Jerusalem a second time, but otherwise we hear of no action by

al-Mu'azzam against the crusaders for the rest of 617/1220; in Syria as in Egypt the war had entered a period of stagnation.²⁰

During the winter of 618/1221, however, it became clear that the crusaders were preparing a major offensive against al-Kamil's camp at al-Mansura and ultimately against Cairo itself. The sultan sent out an urgent succession of messages to his brothers in Syria, calling on them to come at once to his aid. Al-Mu'azzam seems to have been willing enough to go, but he decided to go first to the Jazira in order to gain a fuller commitment to the cause from al-Ashraf. Al-Ashraf had so far contributed but one small detachment of cavalry to Egypt's defense, and that had consisted mostly of amirs who had compromised themselves in the invasion of Kaykawus and al-Afdal.²¹

Although al-Ashraf's motives for keeping aloof from the struggle in Egypt are not entirely clear, two elements at least can be identified: a certain vague distrust or dislike of al-Kamil, and a splendid opportunity, soon after Kaykawus's defeat, to enlarge his sphere of influence among the Zangid and Artukid principalities of the Jazira. Together these led him to concentrate on continuing his father's old expansionist policy in the East and to neglect the impending disaster in Egypt.

He had already succeeded in establishing himself as the dominant figure in north Syria. When he returned to Aleppo after learning of al-'Adil's death, he was able to conclude a remarkable accord with the *atabeg* Shihab al-Din Toghril: the *khutba* in Aleppo was to be pronounced first in the name of the Sultan al-Kamil, then in that of al-Ashraf himself, and finally in the name of the titular prince of the city, al-'Aziz Muhammad; the *sikka* would be issued in the names of al-Kamil and al-'Aziz only. The terms of this agreement reveal clearly that al-Ashraf was to be recognized as the protector of Aleppo. And the formal recognition of the *khutba* was given concrete meaning by the decision that al-Ashraf would be commander-in-chief of the army of Aleppo and receive the supervision of the principality's military *iqta's*. As compensation for these services, he was assigned the revenues of Sarmin, Buza'a, and al-Jabbul.²²

With this agreement al-Ashraf became the most powerful prince between the Orontes and the Tigris, dominating a sphere of influence larger than that of any other Ayyubid prince.

His chance to move in the Jazira had come not long after the death of the young 'Izz al-Din Mas'ud II of Mosul in Rabi' I 615/June 1218. His successor was a ten-year-old boy, Nur al-Din Arslanshah II; the education of this youth and the conduct of affairs of state were in the hands of a *mamluk* of the first Arslanshah—Badr al-Din Lu'lu'. The brother of the late Mas'ud, 'Imad al-Din Zangi, was furious that the throne had not been bequeathed to him, and his revolt against Badr al-Din in Ramadan 615/December 1218 threw the whole region into turmoil. Although the wars dragged on to the end of 617/1220, with occasional truces and many convolutions in the pattern of alliances, they never constituted any real threat to the Ayyubid domination in Diyar Mudar and Diyar Bakr. Nevertheless when the hard-pressed Badr al-Din called for al-Ashraf to intervene on his behalf, the latter willingly did so, and it was only due to his efforts that the *atabeg* of Mosul was able to retain his position. Al-Ashraf's services in putting down the rebellion (or rather, a series of rebellions) obtained for him the virtual protectorate of Mosul. He now controlled the politics of the two great terminals on the route between Syria and Iraq. Moreover he had gained the prize vainly sought by al-'Adil a decade before, the possession of Sinjar.²³ Within the context of Ayyubid affairs al-Ashraf's position had become unassailably strong. One can imagine that al-Kamil and al-Mu'azzam must have felt not only bitterly envious of his splendid success, attained at a time when their possessions were in terrible danger, but also profoundly uneasy at his immense power.

Upon the end of these campaigns, al-Ashraf decided to remain for a time in his new possession of Sinjar. It was apparently in this city that he received an embassy from al-Kamil, led by a figure who appears here for the first time, Fakhr al-Din Yusuf ibn al-Shaykh. This embassy, whose mission was to obtain al-Ashraf's aid against the crusaders, had no success. But at the beginning of 618/1221 al-Ashraf decided to return

to his regular capital of Harran, where he met with his brother al-Mu'azzam, who at last was able to persuade him that the situation in Egypt was so grave that his immediate presence in Egypt was necessary. Al-Ashraf simultaneously received an urgent appeal from the Georgians to assist them against a new enemy, the Mongols, who had, as it were, materialized *ex nihilo*. The significance of the Mongols was simply not comprehended at that time, and although al-Ashraf realized that they might be a threat to his dominions also, al-Mu'azzam was putting such strong pressure on him that he could not remain in the East. He appointed his younger brother al-Muzaffar Shihab al-Din Ghazi vicegerent in Armenia, with the cities of Akhlat and Mayyafariqin. Then he assembled his armies and set across the Euphrates towards Aleppo, having sent ahead to direct the *atabeg* Toghril to place that city's troops under his command.²⁴

In Aleppo the two brothers learned from Toghril that the new prince of Hama, al-Nasir Kilich Arslan, who had gained his throne by rather questionable means, was refusing to join the expedition unless he received al-Ashraf's assurance that he would intercede for him with al-Kamil and persuade the sultan not to divest him of his lands. To this al-Ashraf at once agreed, probably seeing in it a chance to create yet another client state. Al-Mu'azzam and al-Ashraf now proceeded south from Aleppo to Homs, where they were joined by al-Mujahid Shirkuh and al-Amjad of Baalbek. Every major prince in Syria had now joined the expeditionary force, but it was already Rabi' II 618/ June 1221, at least three months after al-Mu'azzam had first met with al-Ashraf in Harran. Such a delay in face of the danger confronting al-Kamil strongly suggests that al-Ashraf had not yet entirely shed his reluctance to participate in a venture whose success was most uncertain.

This possibility seems confirmed by events in Homs. Al-Mu'azzam was staying in the town proper, while al-Ashraf's camp lay at least a day's march to the north, in Salamiyya. For some reason the two brothers had planned an attack on Tripoli before advancing further south. Since it was rather late in the day for a mere diversionary campaign—especially one

against the prince of Antioch, who was not involved in the present crusade—perhaps they were hoping to obviate the possibility of attack against Homs and Hama in the absence of the princes of those two cities. Or possibly al-Ashraf had demanded it for reasons of his own, for there are some hints that it was his idea and not his brother's. In Homs al-Mu'azzam met tête-à-tête with his friend Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, to whom he confided that only his personal authority as al-Ashraf's older brother had induced the latter to come this far. He pleaded with Sibt to use his friendship with al-Ashraf to persuade him to go on to Egypt. It was only after these two men had gotten together that al-Ashraf finally dropped his reluctance. Now he even suggested that the proposed attack on Tripoli be abandoned, and on 14 Jumada I/6 July the Syrian armies at last reached Damascus. Here some of al-Ashraf's amirs tried to convince him to return to the East, leaving behind a portion of his army for the Egyptian campaign, but he had now made up his mind to press on, and no new crisis arose. It was not until the end of the month, however, that al-Mu'azzam could gather his own forces; only in mid-Jumada II/late July-August did the Syrians begin to arrive in Egypt. They were late, to be sure, but not too late to contribute decisively to the crushing and unexpected defeat imposed on the crusaders as they tried (beginning on 26 August 1221) to retreat from al-Mansura back to their base at Damietta. For a second time the efforts of al-Mu'azzam had been instrumental in rescuing the Ayyubids from potential disaster.²⁵

There is one further aspect of al-Mu'azzam's role in the Fifth Crusade which requires discussion. At least twice before the fall of Damietta to the crusaders, and then again afterwards, al-Kamil had proposed to his opponents a peace treaty by which he would regain Damietta, in return for his cession to them of large portions of the old Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. In its final form this offer comprised Jerusalem, Ascalon, Tiberias, Sidon, Jabala, and Lattakia—the core of Saladin's conquests, excluding only the castles of Transjordan, south Lebanon, and north Syria.²⁶ If the crusaders had been wise enough to accept this astounding offer, al-Kamil would surely have suffered a

grievous loss in prestige throughout the Ayyubid empire, indeed throughout all Islam, but he would have given up nothing from his own dominions. All the territories in question (save Jabala and Lattakia) belonged to al-Mu'azzam; in giving them up, he would have lost about a third of his principality, the very part to which he had the strongest personal ties. There is no record that he ever objected to al-Kamil's peace proposals, and it seems he was fully in accord with them. Al-Mu'azzam's contribution to the final victory, therefore, consisted not only in his opportune arrival in Egypt on two occasions and in his able diplomacy, but also in his willingness to sacrifice many of his most precious lands in order to save Egypt for the Ayyubids.

The Ayyubid Cold War, 618/1221-624/1227

The course of events following the Fifth Crusade is not only complex but baffling as well, for superficially it seems as though al-Mu'azzam had forgotten all his services to the dynasty and embarked upon a course of personal aggrandizement, no matter what embarrassment or danger it might cause to the Ayyubids as a whole. But such an interpretation will not quite do. When al-Mu'azzam's actions are viewed within the context of the events and personalities of the whole empire, it becomes clear that his policy was aimed only at the independence and security of his principality, although the pursuit of this end admittedly led him into an adventurous and ultimately very dangerous foreign policy.²⁷

In Rajab 618/September 1221 most of the Syrian princes returned to their own lands, but al-Ashraf stayed on in Egypt to smooth out his strained relations with al-Kamil. Of al-Mu'azzam, after his return to Damascus we hear nothing for about a year. But in Dhu-l-Hijja 619/January 1223 he abruptly set out on a campaign to occupy Hama. This move seems to have caught everyone by surprise, but in light of the events during the preceding years it is quite intelligible.

In 616/1219 al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama had called to-

gether the leading men of his capital to swear allegiance to his eldest son, al-Muzaffar Mahmud, as his heir apparent before sending him off to Egypt to aid al-Kamil. Sometime later the old prince sent his second son al-Nasir Kilich Arslan to join al-Mu'azzam in his campaigns against the Palestinian littoral. Then, as al-Mansur lay dying in Hama in Dhu-l-Qa'da 617/January 1221, several of his high officials, led by the *wazir*, decided to invite al-Nasir to Hama to usurp the throne, thinking that they could more easily dominate him (for he would have had no legitimate claim to the throne and could hold it only with their continued support) than his older brother. When al-Nasir received this invitation, he was eager to depart, but al-Mu'azzam would not let him go until he had extracted from him a promise to pay 400,000 *dirhams* after he had established himself on the throne of Hama. In return, presumably, al-Mu'azzam would ward off any attempts against him by the legitimate heir al-Muzaffar.²⁸

At this time al-Muzaffar was still in Egypt, but when he heard of his father's passing, he at once obtained al-Kamil's permission to go to claim his throne. When he reached the Jordan valley, however, he met al-Mu'azzam, who informed him that his brother was already firmly ensconced in Hama. He advised al-Muzaffar to go to Damascus instead, where he could try to persuade the ruling circles of Hama to support his claim (which was incontestable) to the succession. Al-Muzaffar followed this course of action, which of course availed him nothing, and in the end he was compelled to return to Egypt, where al-Kamil took him into his service and assigned him an *iqta'* in that country.²⁹

By this sequence of events al-Mu'azzam had made himself into Kilich Arslan's patron. Although he did not have the kind of direct influence in the affairs of Hama which al-Ashraf enjoyed in Mosul and Aleppo, at least he could hope that Kilich Arslan would avoid compromising his position in the empire. One can thus imagine al-Mu'azzam's chagrin when the new prince of Hama, only a few months after being installed in power, sought not his but al-Ashraf's intervention with al-

Kamil. From Kilich Arslan's point of view, this act had much to recommend it, since he thereby put himself under the protection of the most powerful man in Syria and the Jazira. But for al-Mu'azzam it increased his sense of isolation; he was already sandwiched between two far more powerful rulers, and now he had lost one of his few and weak potential allies.³⁰

The last straw came when Kilich Arslan refused to pay al-Mu'azzam the 400,000 *dirhams* he had promised. A pretext for attacking Hama was offered when one of al-Kamil's amirs fled from Egypt to Syria and the sultan directed al-Mu'azzam to capture him. Kilich Arslan was out of Hama hunting when he learned of al-Mu'azzam's approach; he dashed back to his capital and entered it just before him. Frustrated, al-Mu'azzam seized nearby Salamiyya and appointed a governor there on his behalf. He then marched on Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, whose governor fled, leaving the notables of the town (among whom was Ibn Wasil's father) to negotiate with him. One of the hereditary *muqta's* of the region, Shihab al-Din Yusuf ibn al-Daya of Shayzar, now came to enter al-Mu'azzam's service, while even the *atabeg* Toghril of Aleppo sent an envoy, probably to sound out his long-range intentions.

Early in 620/1223 al-Mu'azzam returned to Salamiyya to prepare for an assault on Hama itself. Obtaining the support of the local Bedouin tribes, he directed them to cut the supply routes to the city, and he forced the caravans in the area to reroute through Salamiyya. Rumors flew throughout the region that al-Mu'azzam had formed an alliance with the powerful and semiautonomous amir of Jabala and Lattakia and that he had even negotiated a marriage alliance with Nasir al-Din Mengüverish of Saone, the most powerful lord of the Jabal Ansariyya. These tales, however, soon proved groundless. Moreover al-Ashraf (who had returned to Egypt in 619/1222) had finally gotten word of what was happening around Hama—an area where he had supposed his dominance to be uncontested—and he argued to al-Kamil in the strongest terms that al-Mu'azzam's ambitions, if not checked now, would soon pose a serious threat to every other prince in the empire. Al-Ashraf also

instructed his vicegerent in Diyar Mudar, the Hajib Husam al-Din 'Ali b. Hammad al-Mausili, to ride personally to Hama and order al-Mu'azzam to break off his war on Kilich Arslan immediately. Al-Kamil, in full support of al-Ashraf's policy, sent another amir from Egypt with the same message. Faced with the firm opposition of his two brothers, al-Mu'azzam had no choice but to accede to their demands.³¹

With 'Afif al-Din b. Marahil al-Salmani, a member of a leading family of Hama, acting as intermediary, al-Mu'azzam negotiated a peace with Kilich Arslan, but we do not know the terms. It would seem that the treaty was based on the *status quo ante*, however, since al-Mu'azzam kept none of his conquests. On the other hand there was a protracted argument between al-Kamil and al-Ashraf over whether Hama should be left to Kilich Arslan or turned over to al-Muzaffar Mahmud, who was al-Kamil's client. It was finally decided to let Kilich Arslan keep all his possessions except Salamiyya, which would be given to al-Muzaffar. Reasonably enough, the latter had no desire to live in Salamiyya, so he sent one of his amirs, Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali al-Hadhbani (who was eventually to have a considerable role in Ayyubid history), to take possession of the place on his behalf. Al-Mu'azzam returned to Damascus deeply embittered against his two brothers and looking for a chance to avenge himself.³²

He soon found his opportunity in the rivalries and ambitions of the Jaziran princes. When al-Ashraf left for Egypt in the spring of 618/1221, he had assigned his possessions in Diyar Bakr and Armenia to his younger brother al-Muzaffar Ghazi; either at that time or later he took the additional step of naming this brother as heir apparent of all his possessions, since he had no sons of his own. This act of generosity so fired Ghazi's ambition and pride that al-Ashraf was forced to reprimand him at least once. Al-Mu'azzam found this situation most useful, and he formed a secret alliance with Ghazi against al-Ashraf. There was a third member of the alliance as well, Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri of Irbil, who during the troubles of 615/1218-617/1220 had caused considerable difficulty for Badr al-Din

Lu'lu' of Mosul and al-Ashraf. Gökböri's dislike for Badr al-Din had not lessened, for in 619/1222 Badr al-Din had dispossessed the last Zangid prince of Mosul, Gökböri's grandson, and taken power for himself under the throne name of al-Malik al-Rahim. The allies' plan was for Ghazi to begin a rebellion against al-Ashraf in Armenia; as al-Ashraf drew troops from his other possessions to put down the uprising, al-Mu'azzam would march north from Damascus to strike at his lands in Diyar Mudar, while Gökböri laid siege to Mosul.³³ It was a plan skillfully calculated to break up al-Ashraf's powerful empire in the north, but the coalition was not strong enough to destroy his power altogether and probably did not intend to. The point was to reduce it to less immoderate proportions. Al-Mu'azzam may well have felt that he could not afford to wait much longer before acting, for there were at least rumors afloat which said that al-Kamil and al-Ashraf had been conspiring to oust him from his lands.³⁴

At first all went well. When al-Muzaffar Ghazi began his rebellion in Armenia (probably sometime in Jumada I 621/May 1224), al-Ashraf called on the armies of Mosul and Aleppo to come to his aid. Then, when he set off towards the north, al-Mu'azzam assembled his own troops in Damascus in preparation for a campaign against Raqqa and Harran. Al-Ashraf got wind of this almost at once, however, and informed al-Kamil of the unfolding conspiracy. Al-Kamil, in turn, sent an ultimatum to al-Mu'azzam, now camped two days' march north of Damascus at 'Utna (a site which would suggest he intended to get to Raqqa by way of the desert road through Palmyra): if al-Mu'azzam did not immediately return to Damascus, he would be stripped of all his territories. In the face of the overwhelming force which al-Kamil could muster, al-Mu'azzam had no choice but to submit.³⁵

Al-Muzaffar Ghazi, meantime, had no better success. Learning of the size of the army which al-Ashraf was leading against him, he did not have the stomach to face him in a pitched battle. Instead he scattered his forces among the various strong-points in his possession, hoping that while al-Ashraf was entan-

gled in reducing these one by one, Gökböri and al-Mu'azzam would strike in the rear and compel him to divide his forces. But al-Ashraf, one of the best generals whom the Ayyubids ever produced, was not so easily deflected. He marched straight against the center of the rebellion, Akhlat, and laid siege to it. According to Ibn al-Athir (who is consistently sympathetic to al-Ashraf), the populace of the city opened the gates to him almost at once, for they much preferred his equitable government to Ghazi's oppression. The same night, 12 Jumada II 621/1 July 1224, Ghazi saw that further resistance was hopeless and slipped down from the citadel to beg his brother's forgiveness. Al-Ashraf gave him a tongue-lashing and stripped him both of the succession and of most of his lands, but he permitted him to retain Mayyafariqin. This city al-Muzaffar Ghazi ruled until his death in 645/1247.³⁶

Gökböri did not even begin his part of the grand strategy—the siege of Mosul—until 13 Jumada II/2 July. He had assumed that since most of the army was away on campaign with al-Ashraf, it would be no great matter to storm the city or starve it into submission. Moreover he would be aided by a severe shortage of foodstuffs which existed in the Mosul region at this time. But after a siege of only ten days, Gökböri saw plainly that Mosul was too strong for his small forces. By then, too, he had received the disturbing news that the instigator of the conspiracy, al-Mu'azzam, had been prevented from participating and that al-Muzaffar Ghazi had already surrendered to al-Ashraf. Abandoned by his allies, and with the smallest army of the group, he was compelled to break the siege and retreat posthaste to Irbil.³⁷

This first alliance against al-Ashraf had failed so abysmally that in hindsight it is hard to think that it ever had a chance of success. The basic causes of its failure were the effective accord between al-Kamil and al-Ashraf and al-Ashraf's able generalship, which manifested itself chiefly in his decisiveness. So far as we know he did not have to fight a single skirmish. But the first cause is surely the more important. To begin with, al-Kamil posed a severe threat to al-Mu'azzam by his very

presence; al-Mu'azzam could never campaign very far afield from Damascus, lest his brother launch a lightning strike against it. Moreover Egypt's overwhelming preponderance of force meant that al-Mu'azzam could not even risk the sultan's serious displeasure. Ibn Wasil estimates the size of al-Mu'azzam's army at 3,000 regular cavalry, and though they are said to have been superb troops, they were obviously no match for the 12,000 cavalry which al-Kamil could field.³⁸ Finally al-Mu'azzam had no allies among the Ayyubid princes except for al-Amjad of Baalbek (his brothers al-'Aziz of Banyas and al-Salih Isma'il of Bosra were properly his dependents and not autonomous princes). Without allies he could not hope to survive a siege of his capital, let alone face battle in the open field against al-Kamil or al-Ashraf. If he was to make a successful alliance against al-Ashraf, he would somehow have to neutralize al-Kamil's power. In addition he would have to look further afield to find a truly formidable ally, one whom al-Ashraf could not so easily dispose of as al-Muzaffar Ghazi.

A chance for a second, hopefully more effective, alliance appeared in the spring of 622/1225 with the sudden arrival in Khuzistan and the Tigris valley of that astounding adventurer Jalal al-Din Mingburnu al-Khwarizmshah. The Ayyubids had already had contact with the Khwarizmian dynasty in 615/1218 when al-'Adil, then encamped at the Marj al-Suffar, had received a delegation from Jalal al-Din's father Muhammad b. Tekish. We do not know the purpose of the mission, but possibly it had some connection with the Mongols, who were just beginning to emerge as a threat to Muslim Central Asia. Al-'Adil had sent off his *qadi al-'askar* Najm al-Din Khalil al-Masmudi and the *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque Jamal al-Din al-Daula'i,³⁹ but when they reached Hamadhan, they learned that Muhammad Khwarizmshah had already fled before the Mongols. This news was followed by that of al-'Adil's death, at which point the two envoys returned to Damascus.⁴⁰ For the next several years the Khwarizmians were too busy trying to survive to deal any further with the distant Ayyubids, but by 621/1224 Jalal al-Din had succeeded in piecing together a

strong enough army to try reestablishing his father's ruined empire, though now in western Iran rather than Khwarizm and Khurasan. One of his first acts was to resume his father's old quarrel with the caliphate. Leaving Khuzistan in Rabi' I 622/March-April 1225, he marched up the Tigris past Baghdad and attacked the town of Daquqa, which was taken by storm and subjected to savage massacre and pillage.⁴¹

While Jalal al-Din was staying in Daquqa, he received a succession of envoys from Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri of Irbil, who, as a vassal of the caliph, was obviously fearful of Jalal al-Din's intentions toward him. Once a peace treaty had been arranged, he came personally from Irbil to offer his submission to Jalal al-Din. Of even greater interest to Jalal al-Din, undoubtedly, was the correspondence which arrived from al-Mu'azzam of Damascus, in which an alliance against al-Ashraf was proposed. Jalal al-Din seems to have suggested in return that al-Mu'azzam should join him in a campaign against the caliph, but the prince of Damascus, out of the conviction either that this act would be sinful or that it was impractical, would not agree. After this inconclusive round of letters, Jalal al-Din moved north into Azerbaijan and Georgia. In Rajab 622/July 1225 he conquered Tabriz, and there he received a second embassy from al-Mu'azzam, this one headed by the *qadi al-askar* Najm al-Din Khalil al-Masmudi, who had already served al-'Adil numerous times as an envoy. It was apparently during this mission that a definitive alliance was concluded against al-Ashraf, the agreement being that Jalal al-Din would move into Ayyubid Armenia. (One might surmise that Jalal al-Din hardly needed the inducement of a formal alliance to do that.) After the alliance was concluded, Jalal al-Din resumed his campaign against the Georgians. In Sha'ban 622/August 1225 he seized Dvin (the original home of the Ayyubid family) after a crushing defeat of the Georgian army, and then in Rabi' I 623/March 1226 he managed to capture the great fortress of Tiflis, capital of Christian Georgia for more than a century.⁴²

The alliance between Damascus and the Khwarizmians, which boded disaster for al-Ashraf, was perceived as a threat

by the caliph as well. Even as Jalal al-Din was occupying Tiflis, therefore, the new caliph al-Zahir was sending an embassy to the Ayyubid princes, ostensibly to confirm them in their possessions and distribute lavish honors, but in fact to try to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the Khwarizmshah. In Damascus the caliphal ambassador Muhyi al-Din Yusuf ibn al-Jauzi (Sibt ibn al-Jauzi's uncle) argued with al-Mu'azzam that his own self-interest required him to break his ties with Jalal al-Din, for it was the caliph's hope to restore peace among the feuding Ayyubids. Al-Mu'azzam coldly pointed out that if he did break his alliance, and was then attacked by al-Kamil and al-Ashraf, he could not rely on the caliph to come to his defense, no matter what his assurances, since during the Fifth Crusade the Caliph al-Nasir li-Din Allah had failed to respond to the urgent pleas of the Ayyubids. He refused to consider the matter any further; but not wishing to insult the caliph any more than need be, in Rajab 623/July 1226 he sent an envoy to Baghdad to return the honor shown him.⁴³

In addition to al-Mu'azzam and the Khwarizmshah, the new alliance included three other members, none of them Ayyubids: Gökböri of Irbil and the Artukids Rukn al-Din Maudud of Amida and Nasir al-Din Artuk Arslan of Mardin. Nasir al-Din was probably induced to join through the marriage alliance which he had made with al-Mu'azzam during the Fifth Crusade, but we are not informed as to the details of the alliance.⁴⁴

The general strategy differed somewhat from that of the previous alliance. There, the idea had been to draw al-Ashraf and his major clients into the north and then to seize the relatively defenseless lands which they had left behind them. Here, the plan was for each of the allies to strike, more or less simultaneously, at a different target: al-Mu'azzam at Homs and Hama, Gökböri at Mosul, and Jalal al-Din at Akhlat. Each of the victims would be so fully occupied that they could not combine to help one another, and they could be conquered piecemeal.⁴⁵

Hostilities did not open, apparently, until Jumada II 623/June

1226. Al-Mu'azzam took at least two steps to forestall any attempted intervention by al-Kamil. He strengthened the defenses of Damascus by rebuilding the Bab al-Sharqi and the Bab al-Saghir, together with the adjacent sections of the wall. But the second, probably more useful, measure was creating such suspicion between al-Kamil and certain groups of the Egyptian army that the sultan could not risk an expedition to Syria for fear of treachery.⁴⁶

Al-Mu'azzam opened his campaign against Homs (now also under the protection of al-Ashraf) by dispatching Bedouin auxiliaries recruited from the environs of Damascus to raid the villages surrounding his target. Al-Ashraf perhaps did not understand quite what was happening, for he merely ordered a chieftain of the north Syrian Fudayl tribe to lead his men to the relief of al-Mujahid. Although numerous villages were sacked in this initial skirmishing, nothing else of importance had yet resulted.

When the Fudayl chief heard that al-Mu'azzam was bringing his regular forces from Damascus to invest Homs, he decided to retreat with his followers to the Marj Dabiq north of Aleppo to reform, but he quickly returned to engage the Damascus Bedouin, who were still in the area. At the same time the *atabeg* Toghril dispatched a force of regular cavalry from Aleppo to reinforce the garrison of Homs, and they reached the city simultaneously with the army of Damascus. A sharp battle took place before the walls, in which the Aleppans seem to have gained the upper hand, for afterwards they were able to enter the gates of Homs. Now al-Mu'azzam established a regular siege of the city, at the same time ravaging the villages and fields of its environs. He clearly maintained the siege for some time, because Toghril found it necessary to send most of his remaining troops in Aleppo to aid the defense of Homs. But in the end al-Mu'azzam's efforts came to nothing because of a pestilence which destroyed most of his army's animals. In Ramadan 623/September 1226 he returned to Damascus, having twice failed to impose his power on the cities of central Syria.⁴⁷

At about the same time al-Mu'azzam was beginning his campaign against Homs, in Jumada II/June, Gökböri set out for Mosul. But again he lacked the strength to besiege the city and had to content himself with ravaging the surrounding countryside, which was already in the grip of a severe famine of some years' duration. Badr al-Din did not wish to take chances with Gökböri, however, and called on al-Ashraf, at this time residing in Raqqa, to come at once to his support. But al-Ashraf was suddenly faced with a more urgent problem, a rebellion by Nasir al-Din of Mardin. Marching from Raqqa to Harran and Dunaysir, al-Ashraf launched an attack against Mardin. There was no question of trying to capture the lofty citadel, but the town proper was thoroughly sacked. According to Ibn al-Athir, al-Mu'azzam (presumably seeing that things were going badly again and desirous of getting a settlement before the war turned into a disaster) wrote to al-Ashraf at this point and offered to withdraw from Homs and to have Gökböri return to Irbil on condition that al-Ashraf should break off his siege of Mardin. Al-Ashraf agreed, and each of the warring princes now returned to his own lands.⁴⁸

The other Artukid, Rukn al-Din Maudud of Amida, was rather less fortunate than his cousin of Mardin. Al-Ashraf had been too occupied to deal with his rebellion himself and had called on the Rum Seljukid sultan, 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh, to attack Amida. Kayqubadh had already formed an alliance with al-Ashraf against Jalal al-Din's ambitions in Anatolia, and he was doubtless delighted at the chance to intervene south of the Taurus, for that had been a chief—and often frustrated—ambition of the Rum Seljukids at least since the time of Kilich Arslan II, a half-century before. Launching his attack from Malatya, he rapidly conquered the important Artukid strong-points of Hisn Mansur and Chemishgezek. Maudud quickly saw that his rebellion was leading him into a disaster, and he sent to al-Ashraf pleading his loyalty and beseeching forgiveness. Al-Ashraf, having no desire to see Kayqubadh ensconced in the Jazira, accepted Maudud's submission, and asked the Seljukid to desist from further attack and to return the captured castles

to the Artukids. Kayqubadh responded sharply that he was no vassal to al-Ashraf, and pressed on with his attack against Kakhta. Al-Ashraf had by this point (Ramadan/September) decided to go personally to Damascus to try to restore relations with al-Mu'azzam, but he could not ignore the Seljukid challenge. He dispatched the forces available to him in Diyar Bakr to relieve the garrison at Kakhta, but they were routed beneath the fortress in Shawwal 623/October 1226, and soon thereafter Kakhta fell to the Seljukid army. It was content with this prize, fortunately, and retired to Malatya.⁴⁹

Jalal al-Din, the key member of the alliance, had prepared to march on Akhlat within three months of the fall of Tiflis, but no sooner had he set out (in Jumada II/June) than he learned of a rebellion by one of his vassals in Kirman. He dashed off at once to deal with the situation, leaving the bulk of his army in Tiflis under the command of his *wazir* Sharaf al-Mulk. Supplies soon began running short and the *wazir* decided to lead the army on a foray into the region of Erzerum to gather new stores. But as the Khwarizmians were returning to Tiflis, they were attacked and savagely mauled by an Ayyubid force under the command of the *Hajib* Husam al-Din 'Ali, al-Ashraf's governor in Akhlat. Jalal al-Din learned of this setback in Isfahan, on his way back from Kirman. For the moment he did not retaliate but instead concentrated on the Georgian war. Then, on 15 Dhu-l-Qa'da 623/7 November 1226, he suddenly appeared before Akhlat. He stormed the walls almost without delay, and on the second assault his troops forced their way into the city. All seemed lost, but as the Khwarizmians set about slaughtering and pillaging, the populace and garrison, driven to rage and despair, rallied and at last expelled their assailants. Jalal al-Din now tried to establish a formal siege, but in Dhu-l-Hijja/December Akhlat was stricken by such intense cold and heavy snow that he could not maintain his camp. In addition news reached him that Türkmen raids were causing widespread destruction in his new possessions in Azerbaijan. On 24 Dhu-l-Hijja 623/16 December 1226 he raised the siege of Akhlat, and for the time being at least the Ayyubid foothold in Armenia was secure.⁵⁰

Sometime in Ramadan 623/September 1226, after hostilities had apparently come to a halt, al-Ashraf concluded that he must go to Damascus to try to restore some degree of trust and amity between himself and his brother al-Mu'azzam. At the very least he needed a free hand to deal with the Khwarizmian threat to Armenia, and he may well have believed that the existence of the Ayyubid dynasty itself was at stake. He left his army in the East and came with only a small personal escort. His brother received him handsomely with a great show of affection, but in fact he saw in this visit an opportunity to extort from al-Ashraf what he had not been able to gain by war and diplomacy. When two Aleppan envoys arrived in Damascus at the end of Ramadan/September, they saw that al-Ashraf was in effect a captive; he was treated with great deference and courtesy, but he could go nowhere without al-Mu'azzam. Certainly he was not at liberty to leave Damascus and return to his own lands.⁵¹

The Aleppan embassy had been sent by Shihab al-Din Toghril to obtain from al-Ashraf the renewal of his oath to protect the rights of himself and of the titular prince of Aleppo. This would undoubtedly have been a routine matter had not al-Mu'azzam prevented al-Ashraf from acting until he had agreed to several conditions, the chief of which were that Homs and Hama should belong to al-Mu'azzam's sphere of influence and that he should be free to use force against them if he saw fit. Al-Ashraf, powerless to reject these demands, nevertheless vacillated for some two months. Meantime, al-Mu'azzam was openly continuing his negotiations with Jalal al-Din, and 623/1226 saw a constant stream of embassies between Damascus and the Khwarizmians. Al-Ashraf thus had to confront the bitter fact that he was unable to achieve even his minimum goal of ending the alliance between al-Mu'azzam and Jalal al-Din. When the news arrived in Dhu-l-Qa'da/November that Jalal al-Din was besieging Akhlat, al-Ashraf was forced to yield on the question of Homs and Hama, in the hope that his brother would now let him go to the defense of his threatened territories. Al-Mu'azzam, however, was not yet satisfied, and in

Safar 624/January-February 1227, al-Ashraf sent a despairing letter to the *atabeg* Toghril, calling on him to take an oath that he would not join al-Kamil in any military ventures, but rather would make a defensive alliance with al-Mu'azzam against the sultan. To this Toghril sent an adamant refusal, stating that he would under no circumstances break an oath to the sultan which al-Ashraf himself had once required of him. So at last al-Ashraf was left with no alternative but total surrender to his brother's demands. In Jumada II 624/May-June 1227, after an enforced absence of some ten months, he was at last permitted to return to his own lands. Contemporary observers were quite astonished; they had simply assumed that al-Mu'azzam would never release al-Ashraf until he had stripped him of all his dominions.⁵² But in fact al-Mu'azzam had never intended the political destruction of al-Ashraf; his goal was rather to restrict his power and to secure himself against a hostile alliance between al-Ashraf and al-Kamil.

Al-Ashraf was of course in no mood to recognize the relative generosity of his brother. As soon as he reached Raqqa, he formally denounced his promises as invalid, since they had been extracted by coercion. Al-Mu'azzam, furious at this betrayal, at once unleashed the local Bedouin against villages around Homs and Hama. The situation appeared to be generating a third round of civil war.⁵³

But in Shawwal 624/October 1227 news reached Damascus that the advance force of a new crusade had disembarked at Acre and was awaiting the arrival of its leader, the Emperor Frederick II. This was a severe blow to al-Mu'azzam, not only because it would disrupt his efforts to strengthen his position within the Ayyubid confederation, but also because it was obvious that he would have to bear the brunt of the new crusade alone—there would be precious little support from al-Kamil and al-Ashraf. Indeed al-Kamil, if not actually in league with the emperor, had reached an understanding with him some time since. The sultan had been profoundly disturbed when al-Mu'azzam had allied himself with Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah, for a powerful and disruptive outside force had

thus been introduced into Ayyubid politics. Al-Kamil felt powerless to act against al-Mu'azzam by himself and looked around for some instrument by which he could compel his brother to resubmit to his authority. Reports that Frederick II was planning a new crusade suggested to him that Christendom might furnish an ally, and thus sometime in 623/1226 he sent Fakhr al-Din Yusuf ibn al-Shaykh, already one of his leading amirs, to the emperor to offer him the cession of Jerusalem in return for his assistance against al-Mu'azzam.⁵⁴

Al-Mu'azzam was not easily frightened into doing what the sultan wanted, however. With the arrival of the crusaders in Acre, he at once began trying to patch up his quarrels with the other Ayyubid princes of Syria. With Homs and Hama he had no trouble, since they would be exposed almost as badly as Damascus to the impact of the new crusade. Al-Ashraf, secure in the Jazira, proved more difficult to mollify. Whether al-Mu'azzam might eventually have succeeded in forgoing a Syro-Jaziran alliance against the new crusade we cannot tell, for in Dhu-l-Qa'da 624/October-November 1227 he was stricken with dysentery, and at the end of the same month, at the age of forty-seven, he died.⁵⁵

In spite of the strain put on the Ayyubid confederation by al-Mu'azzam's adventurism and his willingness to call in outside powers to defend his interests—a willingness shared by al-Kamil and al-Ashraf, it should be noted—he had no desire to break up the empire. Although he distrusted al-Kamil and would not defer to him in practical matters, he never abandoned the principles of a basic unity among the Ayyubid princes and loyalty to the sultan. It is true that during al-Ashraf's enforced sojourn in Damascus, al-Mu'azzam had accepted a robe of honor from Jalal al-Din and, riding through the city in solemn procession, had flaunted it before his brother's anguished eyes. Likewise he had negotiated a marriage between his daughter Khadija Khatun and Jalal al-Din (although the wedding never took place). But even so al-Mu'azzam continued to recognize al-Kamil alone as the sovereign of Egypt and Syria in the *khutba* and *sikka* of Damascus; his own name

was never pronounced or inscribed there at all, even in a secondary position.⁵⁶

Whatever al-Mu'azzam's intentions, however, it is undeniable that in the decade following al-'Adil's death, the empire underwent enormous strains—strains left unresolved with al-Mu'azzam's passing. The problem was simple enough: there were three brothers, each ruling a major principality. Although Egypt was clearly the strongest, it did not by itself provide al-Kamil with the material means to dominate the other two principalities. Even on purely material grounds a working alliance between two of the three brothers was necessary in order to guarantee the peace and stability of the empire. The three men were not envious or hostile individuals by temperament, and on a personal level they seem to have been able to get on well. But all three were proud men, jealous of the rights and status bequeathed them by their father, and none enjoyed a natural authority over the others. Al-Kamil, as the eldest (and as prince of Egypt), had a natural primacy of honor, but no authority to compel obedience. Each took it for granted that he had the right to conduct his own policy, in accord with his own conception of his interests. And here frictions were bound to arise, because their respective spheres of influence inevitably overlapped at sensitive points. Because of the general balance of power and prestige, of course, once frictions occurred, there was no way to keep them from degenerating into rivalries of an ever greater intensity. Only if one of the princes could succeed in establishing his undisputed leadership might these be stilled. This task, frustrated for six years by the resourcefulness and energy of al-Mu'azzam, still lay before the sultan al-Kamil.

Al-Mu'azzam in Damascus, 615/1218-624/1227

Al-Mu'azzam was that great rarity in medieval Islam, a prince with a real basis of popular support. Not only did he hold the loyalty of his amirs and officials to such an extent that his

regime suffered only one act of treachery, but he also won the affection of his subjects. He was certainly not a faultless man, for he was sometimes spiteful and vindictive, but to those around him he displayed an openness and ease which won them over in spite of their reservations.

From our slender evidence concerning al-Mu'azzam's government of his principality, two themes emerge clearly. First, he tried to create a high degree of centralization in the military-provincial administration of his lands. We find little trace of the great *muqta's* who had controlled the land during the earlier part of his father's reign. In general, his territories were governed either by his younger brothers, who held them as hereditary, but minor and dependent, appanages, or by castellans and deputies, who held office at his pleasure. As of 615/1218 the districts of Banyas, Toron, Chastel-Neuf, and the Bilad al-Shaqif were assigned to his brother al-'Aziz 'Uthman. The Muslim portion of Sidon's revenues continued to go to his nephew al-Mughith Mahmud, who had inherited these rights from his father in 606/1209. Bosra and the Hauran had been turned over to al-Salih Isma'il in 615/1218. Salkhad was an exception: it was held in *iqta'* by the prince's *ustadh al-dar* and *mamluk* 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Mu'azzami. In Palestine also, we know that the district and town of Jinin had been assigned to another of his *mamluks*, 'Izz al-Din Aydemir. Otherwise, however—for all of Transjordan, Palestine, and Galilee—the sources refer only to *nuwwab*, "deputies," of al-Mu'azzam.⁵⁷

Just as he did not have to contend with a powerful landed military class, so he was determined, from the outset of his independent reign, not to rely on the high nonmilitary officials of his father's regime. The first clash came in 616/1219. The Chief Qadi Zaki al-Din b. Muhyi al-Din, an eminent scholar of the Qurashi clan whose father and grandfather had held the office before him, incurred the prince's enmity because of two rather trivial incidents which al-Mu'azzam felt had violated his dignity as sovereign. In revenge al-Mu'azzam had some tattered military garb of his own sent to the qadi at his next court session and commanded him to don them, since he was

obviously unfit to wear the robes of a scholar. Zaki al-Din was driven into a state of depression as a result of this affair (which shocked public opinion in the city) and died sometime later, in 618/1221. As successor al-Mu'azzam appointed an old enemy of his, Jamal al-Din Yunus al-Misri, the superintendent of the public treasury (Ar., *wakil bayt al-mal*). According to Ibn Wasil, a qadi himself, Jamal al-Din was a man of mediocre accomplishments in *fiqh*. Nevertheless he seems to have done creditably until his death in 623/1226, when al-Mu'azzam replaced him with a scholar from Azerbaijan whom he had come to know in his salons (*majalis*), Shams al-Din Ahmad al-Khuwayi. He held office until his death in 637/1239. Shams al-Din was of a scholarly and retiring temperament and seems to have played little role in affairs under al-Mu'azzam.⁵⁸

Al-Mu'azzam's second conflict with a member of al-'Adil's entourage came in 617/1220, when he abruptly deposed and imprisoned the *wali* of Damascus, Mubariz al-Din Ibrahim al-Mu'tamid. This official had been born in Mosul, and as a young man had entered the service of Saladin's nephew 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah. His predecessor as *wali* of Damascus, Farrukhshah's half-brother Badr al-Din Maudud, had taken him on as his deputy. On Badr al-Din's death in 602/1206 Mubariz al-Din had succeeded him as *wali*. He had thus been a high-ranking officer in Damascus for almost forty years at the time of his fall from grace, which (as in the case of the Chief Qadi Zaki al-Din) came about because of a personal affront to the prince. While al-Mu'azzam was still under his father's tutelage, al-'Adil had ordered Mubariz al-Din to have his son shadowed at nights, lest he betake himself to some unsuitable sort of place. The *wali* had to obey, of course, but al-Mu'azzam was understandably furious, and he took his first opportunity for revenge after al-'Adil's death. To replace Mubariz al-Din, he named one Ghars al-Din Khalil, who remains a much more obscure character for us than his predecessor.⁵⁹

Beyond these two events, however, we hear of no political maneuverings in Damascus during the reign of al-Mu'azzam; such tranquillity was surely a remarkable achievement for a

prince who pursued so turbulent and controversial a course in his relations with other rulers. His policies obviously threatened the eventual destruction of his regime, but there is no record that anyone tried to take advantage of this weakness in his position by conspiring with al-Kamil or al-Ashraf against him. Likewise there is no sign of any jockeying for power and influence among al-Mu'azzam's entourage, even though he seems to have preferred new men to those whom he had inherited from his father.

His reign was not altogether free of internal troubles, to be sure, though he had to face nothing like the continual turbulence and sedition that beset al-Kamil from the moment of his accession. In 622/1225, while al-Mu'azzam was at al-Karak, a band of marauders led by an obscure figure named Shams al-Din ibn al-Ka'ki began terrorizing the Ghuta. Who these men were or where they came from we do not know, but at one point they sent to al-Salih Isma'il in Bosra and offered to seize Damascus on his behalf. But the *wali* of Damascus soon captured them, and at the end of Ramadan 622/September 1225 al-Mu'azzam ordered the ringleaders to be crucified. The fragmentary testimony at our disposal suggests that this event was entirely local in character, without outside inspiration. Nor were any individuals of high rank personally implicated.⁶⁰

This dominant tone of al-Mu'azzam's regime was a certain permissiveness and a remarkable lack of ostentation. The former aspect of his government emerged almost immediately after al-'Adil's death, when he reinstituted the illegal taxes (*mukus*) that al-'Adil had abolished. Sibt ibn al-Jauzi remonstrated with the prince on this matter, but al-Mu'azzam excused his action on the grounds that he needed the extra revenues to carry on the war against the Franks. But since such uncanonical exactions were in fact levies on activities such as wine-drinking, one may suppose that al-Mu'azzam also intended to relax the rather puritanical atmosphere his father had created in Damascus.⁶¹

His distaste for the display and grandeur which ordinarily attached to Muslim sovereigns is best revealed in a passage

from Ibn Wasil:

. . . in spite of his boldness and high sense of honor, he had little taste for ostentation. For the most part he rode without being accompanied by the royal standards, but only by a small escort. On his head was a yellow cap without a sash, and he would make his way through the markets and streets without the pathway being cleared for him, as is the custom with kings. In 623 [1226] I saw him in Jerusalem; men, women, and boys were in the Aqsa Mosque jostling him, and no one pushed them away. This mode of behavior was followed by no other prince, either of his house or of any other.⁶²

This testimony is paralleled by a statement in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī pointing to his friendly bearing towards both the great and the humble among his subjects.⁶³

His informality and friendliness were in one sense a political weapon: for him to maintain himself in Damascus in the face of pressure from his more powerful neighbors required not only military skill and diplomatic astuteness, but the active loyalty of his subjects as well. Al-Mu'azzam's army was a small one by comparison with those of his adversaries, and if he had needed to defend his capital against attack, he would have had to call on the local militia organizations. They would only fight effectively (as early twelfth-century history had demonstrated) for a prince whom they respected and towards whom they felt a personal loyalty.

It is somewhat surprising, considering the moral laxity of his regime and his spiteful treatment of the distinguished Qaḍī Zākī al-Dīn, that he was profoundly admired by the religious leaders of Damascus. But there can be no doubt that this was the case, and the reason is that he had become as one of them. Most of the Ayyubid princes, even those of Saladin's generation, were well-educated in the Arabic and Islamic sciences, but it is doubtful that any so fully immersed themselves in these studies and became so competent at them as al-Mu'azzam.

He had been educated in grammar and *adab* by Taj al-Dīn al-Kindī and in *fiqh* by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥasirī. He showed his respect for both men by going on foot to their homes for his studies, like any ordinary student, rather than having them

come to the royal palace in the citadel. Both these men were Hanafis, and their influence may have led him to abandon the usual Shafi'i *madhhab* of his family. He became a strong partisan of the Hanafiyya, in fact; at one point he wrote a polemic against the famous historian al-Khatib al-Baghdadi (d. 509/1114) for his attacks on Abu Hanifa. Ibn Wasil, himself a Shafi'i, thought this tract a very skillful piece of work. In addition to his own writings, al-Mu'azzam sponsored two major works of *fiqh*. He had considerable respect for the Hanbalis, who constituted a small but vigorous and influential community in Damascus, and in the last year of his life, he ordered the Hanbali *shaykh* Jamal al-Din 'Abd al-Ghani to undertake a new recension of his school's fundamental work, the *Musnad* of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, so that its contents would be arranged according to the divisions of *fiqh* rather than by their *isnads*. In addition he instructed the leading Hanafi *faqih*s of Damascus to assemble for him a ten-volume compilation of law according to their school. When this opus was completed, he kept it with him constantly and would study it even during his travels.⁶⁴

Al-Mu'azzam was hardly less devoted to the study of grammar, and here too he directed a great compilation to be assembled, one which would draw on the classic works of al-Jawhari, al-Azhari, and Ibn Durayd.⁶⁵ Nor were his literary interests entirely confined to these purely Arabic subjects, for it was at his court that Fath al-Din al-Bundari made his abridgement of 'Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani's famous history of the Seljukids and an Arabic translation of the *Shahnameh*.⁶⁶

The prince's commitment to the religious sciences, and to the religious life of his society in general, expressed itself also in a field more traditionally cultivated by Zangid and Ayyubid princes. We have already noted some evidence of this in his extensive works in the Haram al-Sharif. Jerusalem also benefited from a notable Hanafi *madrasa* constructed at his behest; the endowment (*waqf*) was established in 606/1209, but construction was not actually completed until 614/1217-18.⁶⁷

His patronage in Damascus, which he was free to exercise

apparently only after his father's death, displays both his concern to further the interests of his own Hanafi *madhhab* and his sympathetic interest in the small but highly prestigious Hanbali community of Damascus. In the suburb of al-Salihiyya, which by his time was rapidly becoming a center of religious life second only to the Umayyad Mosque itself, he caused a great Hanafi *madrassa* to be erected, which was also intended to double as a family mausoleum. It is possible that the mausoleum was built as early as 602/1205, but the *madrassa* proper seems to have come into service only in 621/1224.⁶⁸ In addition he undertook to restore the Maqsurat or Zawiyat al-Kindi in the Umayyad Mosque in the year of his death, 624/1227; this enclosure was not only an important center of instruction in Hanafi *fiqh*, but had also been endowed by al-Mu'azzam's old mentor Taj al-Din al-Kindi.⁶⁹ Finally the prince's Hanbali sympathies are visible in his decision of 617/1220 to permit this school to establish a *mihrab* in the Umayyad Mosque in order to mark a gathering place for its members. A number of such reserved spaces or enclosures (called *maqsuras*) already existed in the great edifice, including ones for the Hanafis and Malikis, but the Hanbalis had met with some opposition, which was overcome only through the support of a certain amir, Zaki al-Din al-Mu'azzami.⁷⁰

After al-'Adil's extensive repairs it was unnecessary for al-Mu'azzam to devote much attention to the Umayyad Mosque as a whole, but he did not neglect the structure. Probably at about the same time that he repaired the Maqsurat al-Kindi, he also replaced the damaged marble panelling on two walls of the mosque.⁷¹

Patronage of this kind was certainly important, both for the vitality of religious and intellectual life in al-Mu'azzam's dominions and for his public image, but it was all of a rather conventional sort. Much more striking and original was his scheme to improve the important road from Damascus to the Hijaz so that one could make the journey without a guide. The project had obvious religious significance, since Damascus was one of the three major gathering points (together with Cairo and

Baghdad) for the pilgrimage to Mecca. But the very fact of this religious significance also lent the route a considerable commercial importance, since the coming and going of the pilgrims brought an immense business to the city's merchants. (Al-Mu'azzam himself was clearly not blind to such lures, as is demonstrated by his construction of two major commercial structures—the Qaysariyyat al-Qutn and a *khan* located at the Bab al-Jabiya. This latter was the main gate on the city's west side, and it also opened into its chief market street.⁷²) Al-Mu'azzam's plan was to mark out the road clearly and to provide it with baths, cisterns, and guesthouses at each waystation. The notion had apparently been inspired by the pilgrimage he made in 611/1215 with three of his chief amirs, and he worked on it as occasion permitted for the duration of his life. It was not completed at the time of his death, though certain projects at Ma'an, Mu'ta, and Mecca itself had been carried out, and his successors never found the opportunity or inspiration to finish the task.⁷³

We need not question the sincerity of al-Mu'azzam's devotion to the *shari'a*. On his deathbed he even expressed the wish that, in accordance with the strict demands of the law, his body should be deposited in an unadorned grave.⁷⁴ Nevertheless he derived real political strength from his commitment to the *shari'a*, for it did much to ensure him the respect and loyalty of the local notables. Here too, as in his relations with his officials and his ordinary subjects, al-Mu'azzam maintained a close harmony between his personal character and his political interests.

6 The reign of al-Ashraf Musa: Damascus as a vassal state

The fall of al-Nasir Da'ud,
624/1227-626/1229

The death of al-Mu'azzam was at once an opportunity and an embarrassment for al-Kamil. Damascus was now in the hands of an inexperienced youth, al-Nasir Da'ud, to whose natural liabilities were added all those of his father—an exposed position between two princes far more powerful than he, and a complete lack of allies within the Ayyubid confederation except for al-Amjad of Baalbek. Thus for the first time since al-Kamil had inherited the sultanate a decade before, he could hope to assert his authority in south Syria. But the embarrassment was greater than the opportunity, for al-Kamil's compromising relationship with Frederick II had now lost its whole reason for being. Already the emperor's advance forces had disembarked in Acre, and the arrival of Frederick himself could be expected once the winter had passed.

At first al-Kamil seemed willing enough to accept the succession of his nephew in Damascus. On 18 Safar 625/28 January 1228 an ambassador from his court presented al-Nasir Da'ud with a robe of honor and the royal banners (*al-khil'a wa-l-sanajiq al-sultaniyya*), thus marking the sultan's formal recognition and confirmation of his accession to the throne. But shortly thereafter al-Kamil sought from al-Nasir surrender of the Transjordanian fortress of al-Shaubak, which he wanted for an arsenal and storehouse. The young prince would probably have been well advised to cede the place, since it lay in the extreme south of his possessions and guarded no military

road which he was ever likely to use. But he undoubtedly felt that this demand was only the opening gambit in a scheme to despoil him of all his possessions—or perhaps he merely let his pride get the better of his judgment; at any rate, he refused. Al-Kamil took this as a sign that al-Nasir Da'ud would be as proud and rebellious as his father. Nine years of bitter experience had taught the sultan that his authority would be respected in Syria only when enforced by diplomacy and force, and this one show of independence by al-Nasir was enough to convince him that he must undertake the conquest of Damascus without delay.¹

Such operations took time to prepare, however, and al-Kamil, who had inherited all his father's caution, made no overt moves for several months more. The new crusade, meantime, was gathering some momentum. When Frederick's advance forces had first arrived in Acre, they had not felt at liberty to move, partly because the emperor would insist on his personal direction of all military and diplomatic activities against the Muslims, but partly also because al-Mu'azzam was too able a soldier to meddle with carelessly. When he died, however, they could undertake some minor projects at least, since al-Nasir Da'ud was an unknown quantity. At some point during the winter of 625/1227-8, a detachment of Franks drawn from Acre, Beirut, and Tyre marched against Sidon. Since 588/1192 its revenues had been shared between the Franks and the Muslims, while its defenses had been razed since the German Crusade of 593/1197. The Franks occupied the city without resistance, expelled the qadi who oversaw the affairs of the Muslim community there, and began rebuilding the walls. The Ayyubids had no way to prevent this, for the nearby strongholds like Chastel-Neuf, Toron, and Beaufort had been dismantled during the Fifth Crusade and never restored. At about the same time the Franks dispatched a force to Caesarea to reconstruct its defenses, which had also been razed during the Fifth Crusade when al-Mu'azzam had taken the city by storm.²

The only Muslim response to this Frankish activity occurred in Rabi' I 625/February-March 1228, when al-'Aziz 'Uthman of

Banyas ambushed a detachment of Franks near Tyre, killing or capturing seventy cavalry.³ Otherwise the winter passed peaceably.

The new crusade was in fact the least of al-Nasir's troubles. At some time (probably summer) during 625/1228 his uncle al-'Aziz 'Uthman of Banyas had formed a conspiracy with one of al-Amjad Bahramshah's sons and some members of the Baalbek garrison to seize that town for himself—a move which would have given him control of a large tract of the richest land in Syria, the entire Biqa' and the headwaters of the Jordan. It had been agreed among the conspirators that al-'Aziz would approach Baalbek just before dawn, the postern gate would be opened for him, and he could enter the town before anyone was aware of his presence. On receiving word that all was in readiness, al-'Aziz set off from Banyas at a forced pace in order to cover the forty-odd miles to Baalbek in one night; but he arrived too late, just after sunrise. Not to be deterred by this mischance, he camped before the city to try to take it by force. But al-Amjad sent immediately to al-Nasir Da'ud, who was quite properly astonished at the news, for al-Amjad had been not only the hereditary master of Baalbek for forty-five years but also the faithful vassal of his father. He ordered al-'Aziz to break off his siege at once. The latter obeyed, but he harbored against his young suzerain a deep resentment for depriving him of his prize.⁴ Al-Nasir was facing on a small scale the problem which had plagued the sultans, how to extract submission and obedience from vassals whom one was not in a position to coerce and over whom one enjoyed no natural familial authority.

In Ramadan 625/August 1228 al-Kamil at last led the Egyptian army into Palestine, making his camp at Tall al-'Ajul near Gaza. His ostensible motive was to confront the Emperor Frederick II, whose arrival in Acre was expected at any time. But al-Kamil had more on his mind than repelling the crusaders; once established at Tall al-'Ajul, he sent military governors to seize al-Nasir Da'ud's chief possessions in Palestine—Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron. Then he moved his camp to Nablus and took up residence in the former palace of al-Mu'azzam

there. Al-Nasir was dealt a further blow when al-'Aziz 'Uthman and his personal regiment arrived from Banyas to join the sultan. Clearly al-Kamil intended to suppress his troublesome vassal in Damascus as soon as possible. Moreover the presence in his camp of the dispossessed heir of Hama, al-Muzaffar Mahmud (to whom al-Kamil promised the recovery of his principality), plainly signaled that the sultan's ambitions included imposing his authority on all the Syrian principalities south of Aleppo. But on 4 Shawwal 625/7 September 1228 the Emperor Frederick II at last arrived in Acre; until he was somehow disposed of, al-Nasir Da'ud was safe.⁵

As soon as al-Nasir had learned of al-Kamil's impending advance into Syria, he had decided to seek the support of his uncle al-Ashraf Musa, the only prince in the empire whose forces were something of a match for al-Kamil's. In so doing he went against the urgent advice of his closest advisor, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Mu'azzami,⁶ who had counseled him to try to mollify al-Kamil in some way. But believing that his only hope lay in outside assistance, al-Nasir sent one of his father's most trusted amirs, a distant relative of the Ayyubids named 'Imad al-Din b. Musak, and the chief of the chancery (*katib al-insha'*), Fakhr al-Qudat Nasr Allah b. Buraqa, to Sinjar, where al-Ashraf was then residing. Al-Ashraf responded readily to his nephew's entreaties, but came with only a personal escort, leaving the bulk of his armies in the East. He had more than sufficient reason, for Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah had recently returned from his wars against the Mongols in Iran and was again threatening Armenia, while the Rum Seljukid 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh was showing a disquieting interest in eastern Anatolia. But there is still room to suspect al-Ashraf's motives; since he could not have thought of opposing al-Kamil without a larger army than that of Damascus at his command, it seems at least possible that he was planning from the beginning to exploit al-Nasir Da'ud's evident weakness to his own advantage.⁷

Al-Ashraf arrived in Damascus in the last week of Ramadan/August and was greeted by al-Nasir with a splendid reception,

in which the two princes went out of their way to display deference and honor to one another. Al-Nasir's reborn confidence was further strengthened when al-Mujahid Shirkuh came to join his suzerain al-Ashraf with the army of Homs. Al-Ashraf now proposed that he try to negotiate a settlement with al-Kamil and sent as his representative to the sultan Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich, a leading amir of Aleppo who had recently joined his entourage. Sayf al-Din expressed al-Ashraf's hope that al-Nasir would be permitted to retain Damascus, but he was also at pains to point out that al-Ashraf had not come to Damascus to rebel against al-Kamil, but rather to support the *jihad* against the crusaders. In reply al-Kamil refused to guarantee al-Nasir's possessions, but stressed that he too had entered Syria with the sole purpose of protecting it from the Franks, whose activities up till now had gone unopposed. With the opportune arrival of his brother al-Ashraf, however, it no longer seemed necessary for him to remain in Palestine. The meeting concluded, al-Kamil at once broke camp in Nablus and withdrew to his original position at Tall al-'Ajul, as if he were preparing to return to Egypt. But the sultan did not dismiss Sayf al-Din without suggesting that he might be amenable to further discussion about Damascus.⁸

On being informed of this al-Ashraf hastened to Tall al-'Ajul to meet with al-Kamil—in order to prevent him from abandoning Syria to the enemy, according to Ibn al-Athir, but more probably to explore the sultan's hints about Damascus. Al-Ashraf travelled to the sultan's camp with al-Mujahid Shirkuh, while al-Nasir Da'ud, who had accompanied his allies to Nablus, remained there on al-Ashraf's advice to await the outcome of the talks. Al-Ashraf arrived at Tall al-'Ajul on the Feast of Sacrifice, 10 Dhu-l-Hijja 625/10 November 1228.⁹

Although we have no details, the negotiations at Tall al-'Ajul went on for at least two months. Not only did the future of the Ayyubid empire have to be decided, but al-Kamil was also deeply involved in his negotiations with Frederick II on the emotion-laden issue of Palestine. Frederick appeared to be in the weaker position: his army was never really large

enough to reconquer Palestine, and he was at this time an excommunicate, so bitterly at odds with a hostile Papacy that he could not command the loyalty of many elements in the local Frankish forces, even though his infant son Conrad was the nominal king of Jerusalem. Moreover his possessions in Italy and Sicily were under severe military and political pressure from the Pope.¹⁰ Al-Kamil, on the other hand, was constrained both by his past promises and his future hopes. He could not wriggle free of his commitment, made during al-Mu'azzam's lifetime, to surrender Jerusalem to the emperor; to refuse now would mean war, and al-Kamil could not have forgotten the terrible sufferings imposed by the Fifth Crusade. In addition al-Kamil now had an unusual opportunity to assert his authority throughout the empire, but this chance was very likely to disappear in the turmoil of a new crusade or if he lost too much time in reaching a settlement with Frederick. Therefore he had to make a peace which would involve no grave strategic liabilities, which would be at least marginally acceptable to his subjects, and which, most of all, would get Frederick II and his army out of Palestine as quickly as possible so that he would be free to strike at Damascus.

It does not seem that al-Ashraf or any other Ayyubid prince knew the extent of the concessions which al-Kamil was prepared to make, for the negotiations at Acre, conducted by the amir Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh and the emperor, were carried on in an atmosphere of the greatest secrecy.¹¹ However there is only a brief remark in Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi to suggest that al-Ashraf was in any way upset or surprised by what he learned. He did not prove difficult to pacify, in any event, and apparently he and al-Kamil were henceforth in accord as to the talks with Frederick II.¹²

The terms eventually agreed upon by the two Ayyubids at Tall al-'Ajul were most comprehensive and had a profound significance for the empire's political structure. Al-Ashraf was to have Damascus and all its dependencies down to 'Aqabat al-Fiq (near the southern tip of Lake Tiberias)—a group of territories comprising south Lebanon and Mt. Hermon, the Anti-Lebanon,

the Hauran, the Jabal al-Duruz, and Galilee. Al-Kamil would gain the direct control of the rest of Palestine and Transjordan, while al-Nasir Da'ud was to be compensated with al-Ashraf's territories in Diyar Mudar, including the cities of Harran, Edessa, Raqqa, Ra's al-'Ayn, and some lesser towns. Among the minor princes, al-Aziz 'Uthman would be rewarded with the cession of Baalbek. Hama, Barin, and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man would be restored to al-Muzaffar Mahmud, but he would be required to surrender Salamiyya to al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs.¹³

By this treaty al-Kamil gained almost everything he could possibly have hoped for. Al-Ashraf's huge domains in the east would be halved, and although he was gaining Damascus, he would no longer control the large and geographically contiguous realm which had provided such an imposing power base since al-'Adil's death. The divided realms of Damascus and Armenia would be strategically untenable and hence a far lesser threat to al-Kamil's supremacy within the Ayyubid confederation. Moreover by substituting in Hama his own client, al-Muzaffar Mahmud, for al-Ashraf's, al-Nasir Kilich Arslan, al-Kamil could expect to weaken considerably his brother's position in north Syria. Past events had shown that al-Kamil did not have the prestige to exact effective obedience to himself as sultan, nor did he have the resources to do it by military force. The political significance of the treaty of Tall al-'Ajul is that he had accomplished by astute and far-seeing diplomacy what he could never have attained in any other way. If its terms were carried out, he would no longer have to come to terms with two powerful Syro-Jaziran principalities, but rather could dominate a larger number of smaller states. The whole arrangement was so much to al-Kamil's advantage that it is astounding al-Ashraf could have been persuaded to accept it. Possibly Damascus seemed so prestigious a prize that he simply failed to weigh the cost. Or perhaps, since al-Ashraf was clearly no fool, we should follow the hint given by Ibn Wasil, who says that when al-Ashraf came to Damascus in the summer of 625/1228, he was completely beguiled by the beautiful gardens of the Ghuta, its lush greenery and flowing waters, and the fragrance

of its fruit trees. Al-Ashraf's lands east of the Euphrates were harsh and largely barren, a mixture of mountain and semidesert steppe. Moreover their location had involved him in almost incessant warfare for some twenty years. Now approaching fifty, he may well have been ready to retire from his labors. Damascus had often been an arena of strife since the death of Saladin, to be sure, but only when its prince was at odds with the ruler of Egypt. If al-Ashraf maintained good relations with al-Kamil and did not contest his authority, there was every prospect that Damascus would provide a peaceable and tranquil place for him to conclude his career.

While the conference in Tall al-'Ajul was still in progress, an Aleppan contingent arrived in the Jordan valley to reinforce the small body of troops at al-Ashraf's disposal. Sometime afterwards, but before the middle of Rabi' I 626/February 1229, the agreement was at last settled on. Word of it leaked out to al-Nasir Da'ud, still waiting patiently at Nablus. Finally realizing that he had been betrayed by his uncle, he broke camp and made a precipitate dash for Damascus, but before he could get very far, al-Ashraf overtook him at a place called Qasr Ibn Mu'in al-Din in the Jordan valley near Tiberias. With al-Nasir was a large entourage, including his uncle al-Salih Isma'il of Bosra, his cousin al-Mughith Mahmud of the Bilad al-Shaqif, and the amirs Karim al-Din al-Khilati and 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad. Al-Ashraf was almost alone.¹⁴

Claiming that he had done his utmost to save Damascus for his nephew, al-Ashraf tried to persuade al-Nasir to accept the settlement of Tall al-'Ajul. He pointed out that al-Kamil was not only far more powerful than any other prince, but also was the supreme authority of the empire—"wa-anta ta'lamu annahu sultanu l-bayti l-ayyubiyi wa-kabiruhum"; he could not and should not be opposed. Moreover al-Nasir was being honorably treated, for he was to receive a large new principality, suitable to his status, in exchange for Damascus. If the young prince was swayed by these arguments, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg (originally a proponent of appeasement) brought him back to an attitude of defiance by insisting that he should concede

nothing whatever and proclaiming that his troops were equal to the challenge being thrust upon them. At this point al-Nasir abruptly rose and made for Damascus, with the frustrated al-Ashraf unable to hinder him. But al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mughith Mahmud did not follow; seeing perfectly well which way the wind was blowing, they took their men to join al-Ashraf. This was all the more disastrous for al-Nasir because he had already been deserted by one of his most powerful amirs, 'Izz al-Din Aydemir al-Mu'azzami, the lord of Jinin and second only to 'Izz al-Din Aybeg in rank and influence. For some reason which our sources do not report, while al-Nasir was residing in Nablus, he had ordered the amir to be beaten and disgraced. In retaliation Aydemir had fled to al-Kamil, taking with him a number of his old comrades-in-arms (*khushdashiyya*), and was rewarded by a gift of 20,000 *dinars*, an *iqta'* in the upper Egyptian town of Qus, and the properties of the late *wazir* Safi al-Din ibn Shukr.¹⁵

Once back in his capital al-Nasir Da'ud undertook what must have seemed by now the discouraging business of finding allies. Hoping to reestablish al-Mu'azzam's alliance with the Khwarizmians, he sent his trusted counselor and tutor Shams al-Din al-Khusraushahi to try to induce Jalal al-Din to undertake a new campaign against Akhlat. Jalal al-Din might ordinarily have been eager to oblige, but he was at this time facing a serious new challenge from the Georgians. By the time he was free to act, it was too late. Another possible source of support evaporated when al-Nasir Kilich Arslan of Hama, leading his army to Damascus to join his protector al-Ashraf in the city's defense, suddenly learned the true state of affairs and beat a hasty retreat to his capital. Abandoned by every major vassal save 'Izz al-Din Aybeg and without a single ally, al-Nasir Da'ud was determined to defend his father's heritage. Although the young prince may have been deficient in cunning and astuteness, he never lacked for courage.¹⁶

Although al-Ashraf had only a small force at his disposal, he decided to begin operations against Damascus without waiting for al-Kamil to come to his support. In Rabi' II 626/March 1229

he led his troops before the walls; with him, besides his personal entourage, were the Aleppan contingent in the Jordan valley, al-Mujahid's army of Homs, and the troops of al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mughith Mahmud. Of siege engines, sappers and miners, etc., we read nothing. Al-Ashraf clearly could not have hoped to take Damascus with such forces, but perhaps he wanted at least to pen up al-Nasir Da'ud. And despite his inadequate forces al-Ashraf did score a minor success at the outset when his troops managed to cut off the two streams which supplied the walled city with its water. But a counter-attack by the garrison, energetically supported by local volunteers, succeeded in driving off al-Ashraf's men and restoring the city's water. Thereafter the siege seems to have settled into a standoff, with neither side capable of mounting an effective action, although the suburbs of Qasr Hajjaj and Shaghur were put to the torch during the fighting. Al-Kamil continued to delay, but eventually, in response to much pleading, he did send two contingents of 1000 regular cavalry each, the first under the command of his *ustadh al-dar* Fakhr al-Din 'Uthman and the second under the pretender to Hama, al-Muzaffar Mahmud. It seems plausible that these forces would have arrived late in Rabi' II/March or early Jumada I/April.¹⁷

Al-Kamil had some reason for procrastinating, to be sure, for the negotiations with Frederick II had proved difficult and prolonged. But by 15 Rabi' I 626/11 February 1229 a preliminary draft had been agreed on by the negotiators, and a week later, the final version was signed by Frederick and al-Kamil. The treaty thus sworn to by the two sovereigns on 22 Rabi' I/18 February 1229 astounded and infuriated both Islam and Christendom.¹⁸

Unfortunately the exact terms are not certain, since the fragments and summaries contained in western sources do not quite square with the Muslim accounts. According to Ibn Wasil, the Franks were to get control of the city of Jerusalem, together with the villages along the route from Acre to the Holy City. The defenses of Jerusalem, which had been razed by al-Mu'azzam during the Fifth Crusade, were not to be rebuilt.

Moreover all the villages in the district of Jerusalem were to remain in Muslim hands, under the authority of a Muslim governor (*wali*). Within the city the Haram al-Sharif and its great shrines were also to remain in Muslim hands, with a Muslim garrison and their Islamic devices left intact, although the Franks would have the right to enter this area and pray. On the other hand the Muslims residing in Jerusalem were compelled by the terms of the treaty to depart. In addition al-Kamil surrendered the ruined fortress of Toron as a symbol of his personal friendship for the emperor.¹⁹ The Muslim sources name no other places which were to be surrendered; however in 601/1204 the Franks had obtained control of Nazareth, and at the beginning of Frederick's crusade they had occupied Sidon, and the treaty confirmed these possessions.

Al-Kamil had been scrupulous in preserving Muslim religious rights in Jerusalem, and he had ceded no more than was necessary to induce Frederick II to break off his crusade. The sultan could and did point out that the cession of Jerusalem was militarily meaningless—it was strategically untenable by itself and could be recovered without effort when the truce lapsed a decade hence—and that the emperor had insisted on it only in order to reinforce his authority among his own people.²⁰ But it was no good: for half a century the skillful propaganda of Nur al-Din and Saladin had insisted on the sanctity of Jerusalem and had made its liberation the only appropriate goal of a true Muslim sovereign. Its capture in 583/1187 had been Saladin's crown of glory and furnished the fundamental legitimation of his regime and his dynasty. Public outcry over its surrender was so enormous that al-Nasir Da'ud took the opportunity to rally his subjects by displaying before them all the iniquity of their assailants and thus identifying his own cause with that of Islam itself. He directed Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, not only a powerful and popular preacher but a good friend of his father's, to deliver a sermon in the Umayyad Mosque on the merits of the Holy City and its present disgrace. The effect was devastating; everyone in the enormous throng who heard it was reduced to violent sobbing and tears.²¹

But such psychological weapons could no longer influence the course of events. Al-Kamil remained in Tall al-'Ajul for a time after concluding the treaty, probably to wait until Frederick visited Jerusalem a month later (in mid-Rabi' II/March) to oversee the implementation of the treaty. But it also appears that he was trying to pressure al-Ashraf into changing the terms of their own agreement. Al-Kamil suggested that he himself should be given the lands in Diyar Mudar which had previously been set aside for al-Nasir Da'ud, that al-Nasir Da'ud could be compensated well enough from the lands which al-Kamil was to receive in Palestine and Transjordan. Doubtless al-Ashraf did not want his brother as a neighbor in the Jazira; he would constitute a force which al-Ashraf could not hope to control (as he might have al-Nasir) and this in a region which had been peculiarly his own for nearly twenty years. Nevertheless he had to accept if he wished to obtain Damascus, and finally, at the beginning of Jumada II 626/late April 1229, al-Kamil led the Egyptian army north to Damascus. On 10 Jumada II/6 May he made camp near the Masjid al-Qadam south of the city.²²

The sultan's arrival put al-Nasir in an almost impossible situation, and the very next day he sent two of the leading Damascene *faqihs*, Jamal al-Din al-Hasiri (al-Mu'azzam's old mentor in Hanafi *fiqh*) and Shams al-Din ibn al-Shirazi, to al-Kamil's camp to discuss the possibility of terms. The response to this initiative was obviously encouraging, for on the following day (12 Jumada II/8 May) 'Izz al-Din Aybeg went out to begin serious negotiations with al-Kamil's representative 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh. But it quickly became apparent that talks would be fruitless at this stage and they were soon broken off.²³

Al-Nasir's stubborn resistance could not prevent the noose from being drawn ever more tightly. On 17 Jumada II/13 May the suburb adjacent to the Bab Tuma was burned to the ground as the result of heavy fighting. A week later most of the Ghuta villagers who had streamed into Damascus at the beginning of the siege had to be expelled because provisions were extremely short. By 9 Rajab/13 June the besiegers controlled all the terri-

tory around the city up to its very walls, so that the defenders were left without any possibility of manoeuvre.²⁴

It must have been obvious to al-Nasir by this time that there was no hope, but he fought on doggedly nonetheless. Every day his army and the armed populace launched sorties into the enemy lines, but they could never win any significant successes. The energetic support which al-Nasir received from the populace of Damascus is one of the most striking features of this siege. According to Ibn Wasil, it proceeded "from their intense devotion to him and to al-Mu'azzam, in the desire that the government should not pass from the latter's sons."²⁵ The basis of this devotion lay not only in the equitable and moderate rule which al-Mu'azzam seems to have provided, but even more in the feeling of the Damascenes that he was peculiarly their prince. One can hardly doubt that they were aware—as he certainly had been—that the continuance of his regime in Damascus depended largely on them. The loyalty of the people of Damascus to al-Mu'azzam had not been merely a sentimental attachment to an attractive personality; it also expressed a strong local patriotism which resented being swallowed up as a province in a vast empire. In a time and place which knew few specifically urban political institutions and nothing of the city as an autonomous political entity, the independence of the local prince could often become the clearest embodiment of such a patriotism. Al-Nasir Da'ud, perhaps less gifted than his father and surely far less fortunate, nevertheless tried to follow in his path and thus inherited much of his aura. But the most energetic local militias could no longer prevail against the kind of large, well-trained professional regiments that al-Ashraf and al-Kamil employed in this campaign, and the siege of 626/1229 is the last certain evidence we have of them in Ayyubid Damascus.

Al-Nasir did have to face two instances of disloyalty—he was deserted by a small detachment of his forces at some point well along in the siege, and he threw Fakhr al-Qudat ibn Buraqa and his own cousin al-Mukarram into prison, suspecting them (with some reason) of conspiring with al-Ashraf. However neither

incident proved terribly serious; his real problem was a lack of money. Having trusted al-Ashraf, he had neglected to transfer his treasury from al-Karak to Damascus. As the siege wore on and his local treasury was exhausted, he found it necessary to melt his gold and silver vessels down for coinage and to sell the jewellery and fine raiment of his women. However we nowhere read that he resorted to a forced loan on the merchants of the city.²⁶

While the siege of Damascus was still underway, al-Kamil decided to dispatch a force against the fortress of al-Karak, where al-Nasir Da'ud's mother was then residing. She seems to have been one of those strong-willed ladies so common among the Ayyubids, and when al-Kamil's forces appeared beneath the walls, commanded by two former amirs of al-Mu'azzam, she ordered a sortie against them by the townspeople (*ahl al-Karak*). Al-Kamil's forces, perhaps surprised by this show of resistance, were driven off in confusion, while the two commanders were captured. She threw them into a dungeon in the fortress, and there they remained until they died.²⁷

By 19 Rajab/14 June al-Nasir Da'ud could see that all resources and all hope were exhausted; surrender could no longer be postponed. He slipped out of the citadel one night and with a small escort made his way to al-Kamil's camp, presumably in order to sound out what sort of peace terms he would be able to obtain. He was received courteously but ordered to return to the citadel, and two days later Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh went to escort him to the sultan. The final terms of surrender were now agreed upon: al-Nasir would receive all of Transjordan except al-Shaubak, the Jordan valley between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea, Nablus, and the districts around Jerusalem. Al-Kamil was to retain the rest of Muslim Palestine, including Tiberias, Hebron, Gaza, and Ascalon. 'Izz al-Din Aybeg was confirmed in his *iqta'* of Salkhad. Al-Nasir returned to Damascus and at the beginning of Sha'ban 626/25 June 1229 opened the gates of Damascus to the Egyptian army. Al-Kamil named provisional governors to oversee affairs until he finished with the rest of his business in Syria.²⁸

As soon as he had established himself in Damascus, al-Kamil sent a part of his army on to Hama, placing this division under the command of al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs and the amir Fakhr al-Din 'Uthman. Although al-Muzaffar Mahmud was intended to be the chief beneficiary of this expedition, he was not one of the major commanders. Perhaps al-Kamil wanted it clearly understood that al-Nasir Kilich Arslan would surrender to one of the sultan's personal deputies, so that al-Muzaffar's dependent and subordinate status would remain perfectly obvious to all.

The siege of Hama began on 2 Ramadan 626/25 July 1229, and although Kilich Arslan was provisioned for a long struggle and was energetically supported by his amirs, he quickly decided that resistance would be futile. At the end of Ramadan/August, he surrendered the citadel of Hama to al-Kamil's deputies. He was given Barin as his *iqta'*, and (as agreed at Tall al-'Ajul) Salamiyya was turned over to al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs. As a result of this minor campaign, at which he himself was not even present, al-Kamil had accomplished the difficult feat of putting the princes both of Hama and of Homs in his debt at the same time.²⁹

Al-'Aziz 'Uthman of Banyas was less fortunate than other members of the coalition, for once al-Ashraf had control of Damascus, he refused to agree to cede Baalbek to his younger brother. Al-Kamil apparently thought it best not to oppose him in this. It was probably after the fall of Hama that al-Ashraf named his brother al-Salih Isma'il to command an expedition against Baalbek. But al-Amjad Bahramshah, who was guiltless of any offense against his assailants, stubbornly refused to yield the patrimony which he had ruled for almost fifty years. Though the besiegers were equipped with siege engines, it needed ten months to wear down al-Amjad's determination. At last, seeing that his attackers would not go away, he decided to seek terms. Using a wealthy Damascene merchant and qadi, Safi al-Din Ibrahim b. Marzuq, as his intermediary, he was able to extract a reasonably honorable settlement. Al-Amjad was assigned a new *iqta'* consisting of several villages near Damascus (the most

important of these being the mountain town of Zabadani, located on the main road between the Ghuta and the Bika'). With Baalbek in his possession at last, al-Ashraf named an unidentified governor there, while al-Amjad retired to his residence in Damascus. There in the same year of 627/1230 he was murdered by one of his own *ghulams* in a dispute which had arisen over a stolen inkwell.³⁰

Al-Ashraf in Damascus, 626/1229-635/1237

In spite of its beginning, al-Ashraf's regime in Damascus flowed almost undisturbed for the next eight years. His incessant wars in the East never involved the central lands of the empire. This calm at the center, to be sure, was chiefly due to the superb policy of al-Kamil, whose cleverly contrived alliance with al-Ashraf managed to endure a host of strains during the decade, since it appeared for some time that both princes had the same interests. Al-Ashraf himself never seriously doubted this until the very last months of his reign, when the empire inexorably slipped into a new round of strife among the princes. But in the intervening years, Damascus and its people knew a welcome respite of peace, of freedom from war and rumors of war.

Most of al-Ashraf's career in the Jazira and Armenia had been devoted to war and conquest, and like many soldiers he proved to be a rather simpler and cruder person than his predecessors in Damascus. Though he was a devout Muslim, he had none of al-Mu'azzam's intellectual force, nor did he share his brother's broad tolerance. It was al-Ashraf's constant policy to rid his capital of rationalist philosophizing in its *madrasas* and of "extremist" Sufis in its popular life. He deposed the great Shafi'i theologian and logician Sayf al-Din al-Amidi from his professorship in the Madrasa 'Aziziyya, an office to which al-Mu'azzam had appointed him in 617/1220. Al-Mu'azzam of course had been an ardent Hanafi and had, in addition, found Sayf al-Din an abrasive person. Nevertheless both he and his

son had always shown him great deference and included him in their *majalis* when these were to deal with legal and theological questions. As for Sayf al-Din, at least his public opinion of al-Mu'azzam is evidenced by his dedication to this prince of his treatise *Ihkam al-Hukkam fi Usul al-Ahkam*. But in 629/1232 al-Ashraf stripped him of his professorship and put him under house arrest until his death shortly thereafter. Ibn Wasil connects this action to Sayf al-Din's ties with the Artukid lord of Amida, al-Mas'ud, but this was almost certainly only a pretext. According to Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi, Sayf al-Din lost his post because of his attachment to the rational sciences.³¹

Al-Ashraf also turned on such "extremist" Sufi movements as the Qalandariyya and a local offshoot of the Rifa'iyya. The Qalandariyya were an eastern Iranian order which had just been introduced in Damascus in 616/1219 by *shaykh* Jamal al-Din al-Sawi, the first real systematizer of the group's doctrine and rule of conduct. Jamal al-Din himself left Damascus for Egypt after 620/1223, but he left behind him numerous disciples, many of them Persian (if we may judge by their names). These established a *zawiya* as local headquarters for their order in the Bab al-Saghir cemetery south of the city. Jamal al-Din and his disciples were left undisturbed for several years, but al-Ashraf would not tolerate them and expelled them from his domains together with the related Haydari *faqirs* who lived in a *zawiya* Mahallat al-'Auniyya west of the walled town. The immediate cause of his decision is not specified; perhaps the mendicant ways and peculiar dress of the Qalandaris and their Haydari cousins caused him to associate them with a third group, the Haririyya.³²

This group had formed around one 'Ali ibn Abi-l-Hasan al-Hariri, who—as his name indicates—had been a silk-worker in Damascus, where he had migrated from his birthplace of Busr in the Hauran. Attracted to the Sufi way, he at first followed the path of the profoundly revered Türkmen saint Shaykh Arslan (alternative form, Raslan), who had died in Damascus in 540/1145-46. But he soon became attracted to the kind of extravagant behavior characteristic of the Rifa'iyya.

Building a *zawiya* on the southern Sharaf, al-Hariri quickly gained many followers, including a number of young men from respectable families. He was bitterly censured by many leading scholars of Damascus—‘Izz al-Din ‘Abd al-Salam al-Sulami, Taqi al-Din ibn al-Salah, and Abu ‘Amir ibn al-Hajib are mentioned in this regard—and some even issued *fatwas* calling for his execution. Such pressures could be formidable indeed, as had been proven in the case of the unfortunate al-Suhrawardi a few decades before; nevertheless they were generally ignored in this case until al-Ashraf took power. He did not accede to demands to kill the heretic, but he did imprison him for several years in 628/1231.³³

Al-Ashraf’s crackdown on such Sufi groups remained effective for many years after his death—indeed almost to the end of the Ayyubid domination. Al-Hariri was released by al-Salih Isma‘il, apparently late in the 630s, but he was not permitted to reside in Damascus (though he did visit often) and eventually he died, well over ninety, in his native village of Busr. The Haydaris were not allowed to return until 655/1257. The fate of the regular Qalandaris is unknown, but we have no record of them in Damascus during the later Ayyubid period.

The religious and cultural tone al-Ashraf set is perhaps best exemplified in one of his major architectural projects, the Jami‘ al-Tawba, which was built between 629/1231 and 632/1234-35. In the suburb of al-‘Uqayba was a place called the Khan al-Zanjili (or Ibn al-Zinjari), notoriously given over to debauchery, drinking, and prostitution. Urged by his associates to do something about the place, al-Ashraf, spending a great deal of money and care, had it razed and rebuilt as a congregational mosque.³⁴ The decision to close down the original *khan* indicates the sort of moral strictness and probity which the new ruler wished to uphold, and replacing it with a congregational mosque shows his predilection for the most conservative forms of religious expression.

This is not to say that al-Ashraf was uninterested in learning or that he opposed all aspects of contemporary popular faith. But his patronage extended only to the narrowest form of

scholarship, the study of *hadith*. He sponsored two *dar al-hadith*: the first, situated near the east gate of the citadel, was established for the benefit of the leading Shafi'i jurist and traditionist in Damascus, Taqi al-Din ibn al-Salah;³⁵ the other, established almost simultaneously in the Hanbali suburb of al-Salihiyya, was intended for a leading shaykh of that community, Jamal al-Din ibn Surur. When this man died before the structure could be completed, the professorship was assigned to a grandson of the great Abu 'Umar ibn Qudama, who had been the chief of the Hanbalis of al-Salihiyya for half a century until his death in 607/1210. (In respect and sympathy for the Hanbalis al-Ashraf did maintain the attitude and policy of his brother al-Mu'azzam.)³⁶

It is plain, however, that al-Ashraf's public support of religion was most strongly engaged in the areas of *salat* and communal worship, for no fewer than seven out of the fourteen construction projects which he is known to have sponsored were mosques of one or another kind. The Umayyad Mosque of course received some attention; its various *maqsuras* were repaired, and more important, the marble panelling on the *qibla* wall was replaced. But al-Ashraf also devoted himself to founding new congregational mosques (*jawami'*) in the environs of the city, though not within the walled town proper. One example was that built in al-'Uqayba. In 630-31/ 1233-34, al-Ashraf ordered an old funeral mosque south of the walled city, the Masjid al-Jarrah, to be converted into a *jami'*—i.e., a place for public worship. And he established yet a third *jami'* in a locale some four kilometers southeast of the walled town called Bayt al-Abar.³⁷

Taken together these three new congregational mosques have a social significance beyond the public display of al-Ashraf's piety. If it is noted that al-'Adil's *wazir* Ibn Shukr had sponsored the construction of new congregational mosques in the Ghuta villages of Harasta and al-Mizza and that the center of the Hanbali community of al-Salihiyya was the new congregational mosque which they had built there at the turn of the century, a significant pattern emerges. Ideally a congregational

mosque, a *jami'*, was built to serve a single, coherent, substantial community of Muslims; conversely, each such community would have but one congregational mosque.³⁸ The proliferation of *jawami'* during this period thus suggests the growing importance of the suburban settlements (and may imply an overall demographic expansion as well). It undoubtedly shows that these settlements were becoming increasingly conscious of themselves as distinct communities with a social and religious identity of their own.

Al-Ashraf's repairs to three *masjids* (oratories rather than congregational mosques) might appear merely to reemphasize his concern for narrow orthodoxy. But two—the Masjid al-Qasab in the northern suburb of Satra and the Masjid Abi-l-Darda' in the citadel—where shrines rather than places for the *salat*. The Masjid al-Qasab contained the heads of several early Muslim martyrs who had revolted against Mu'awiya and had been put to death there, while the latter had a cenotaph of the Companion Abu-l-Darda', one of the earliest qadis of Damascus, a well-known Koran specialist and traditionist, and an early forebear of Sufism. Both these restorations of ancient sacred places suggest that al-Ashraf's piety deviated somewhat from strict traditionism and that he shared at least some of the popular beliefs of his times.

This emerges most clearly in an elaborate anecdote told by Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi in regard to the Dar al-Hadith al-Ashrafiyya intramuros, which turns out to have been not merely a locale for the study of *hadith*, but also a sort of reliquary shrine:

I was at al-Ashraf's residence in Akhlāt when Nizam al-Din ibn Abi-l-Hadid came to him bearing the Prophet's sandal. I informed al-Ashraf of his arrival, and he said, "Let him enter." When Nizam al-Din came in with the sandal, al-Ashraf arose at once and stepped down from the *iwan* [where he had been sitting]. He took the sandal, kissed it, touched it to his eyes, and wept. Then he gave Nizam al-Din a robe of honor, bestowed upon him a gift of money, and appointed a stipend for him. "You shall be a member of our entourage," he said, "for we will thus gain blessing."

I myself left Akhlāt [after that], but Nizam al-Din remained

with al-Ashraf. [Later], I heard that al-Ashraf had said, "This man Nizam al-Din goes about from one place to another and will not stay with us, but I should very much like to have a piece of the sandal to keep with me." But after spending the night in reflection, he thought better of the idea. When he had taken Damascus, he told me, "I had decided to cut off a piece of it, but then I thought: suppose someone else comes along after me and does the same—it may go on like that until the sandal has been completely destroyed. So I left it alone, saying that if something is given up for God's sake, he will replace it with something else as good. Then Nizam al-Din stayed with me again for some months, and it chanced that he died and left the sandal to me in his will, so that I obtained it undamaged."

When al-Ashraf conquered Damascus, he purchased the house of [the amir Sarim al-Din] Kiymaz al-Najmi, made it into a *dar hadith*, and placed the sandal there.³⁹

A later version of the story adds that al-Ashraf had tried unsuccessfully to buy the sandal from Nizam al-Din, with the intention of placing it in a shrine (*makan*), so that it would become an object of pilgrimage (*ziyara*).⁴⁰

The connection between the sandal and its eventual repository is worth exploring briefly. Since the sandal was associated with none of the already existing sacred places in Damascus, al-Ashraf might well have wanted to construct a new edifice to house it, and the nature of the relic—a physical remembrance of the Prophet—doubtless suggested that the most appropriate structure would be one devoted to the study of the Prophet's own words and deeds. The location of this *dar al-hadith* is likewise significant, for it stood in the shadow of the city's royal residence, the citadel, so that al-Ashraf would be close to the object of his veneration and to the *baraka* which it carried.

If al-Ashraf was a pious man, at least so far as his public conduct reveals, he nevertheless loved the things of this world. Far more than his father and brother he spent lavishly on his pleasures, with little regard for the state of his treasury. He is said once to have been so stricken by a musician that he offered him the city of Akhlat as a reward. (Doubtless the city's tax revenues only are meant, not actual possession and government.) The musician took the prince at his word, and it cost al-Ashraf's governor in Armenia an enormous sum of money to

buy off the claimant.⁴¹

Al-Ashraf's extravagance—perhaps a reaction to his long years of warfare and isolation in the Jazira—found architectural expression as well. In the citadel, he razed the old princely residence (the so-called Dar al-Masarra erected by Nur al-Din) and built it anew. He built in addition at least two glittering palaces outside the city to serve as summer and recreational residences. According to Ibn Wasil, they were places whose beauty and charm were unprecedented in any land, places such that “they captivated the viewer's reason and dazzled his inmost being.”⁴²

One cannot say that al-Ashraf was really a popular ruler, as al-Mu'azzam had been, nor could he draw on the reserves of popular sentiment available to al-Nasir Da'ud for many years after he had been exiled. Nevertheless, as with his three predecessors, we can discern few overt signs of popular discontent or turmoil. Al-Ashraf, his position protected by his alliance with al-Kamil, could afford to spend his revenues freely with little concern for the morrow. And these expenditures doubtless brought a certain measure of prosperity to the mercantile and artisanal classes—more than enough, surely, to offset any lingering doubts about his right to rule or any distaste for the strict and puritanical tone of his public administration.

Al-Ashraf and the East, 626/1229-633/1236

With the conquest of Hama and Baalbek, the entire character of events in the Ayyubid empire underwent another abrupt and profound change. So long as al-Mu'azzam had been alive, Damascus had been the focal point of imperial politics, but now that he was gone and Damascus had fallen to al-Ashraf, there was another period of internal stability. As always in such times the frontiers became the crucial zone, and as in the reign of al-'Adil the most troubled of these was the Jazira and Armenia. Since al-Ashraf had retained major possessions

in this area—al-Khabur, Nisibin, Sinjar in Diyar Rabi'a, and the Lake Van district in Armenia—he was deeply involved there. But while in his father's lifetime and the earlier years of al-Kamil's reign he had played the leading role east of the Euphrates, henceforth he would be confined to a subordinate part. He in fact participated in every major campaign in the Jazira, but almost always in obedience to al-Kamil's commands and in pursuit of his policies. One reason for this was that when al-Ashraf had surrendered his strategic territories in Diyar Mudar, he weakened, indeed destroyed, the whole complex patron-client structure by which he had dominated the other principalities of north Syria and the Jazira. But beyond this, he had (perhaps unwittingly) let himself become al-Kamil's client, for it was to him that he owed his conquest of Damascus and Baalbek. As long as al-Kamil respected his rights, he would be obligated to show him a certain obeisance. Al-Kamil had good reason to be pleased, for there was now not a single prince in Syria who was not in some way tied directly to him. When the sultan had come to power, there had been two other great principalities over which he had little influence and no control; he had now eliminated one and al-Ashraf's had lost much of its power and autonomy. If al-Kamil had been unable to impose the unity and central direction characteristic of al-'Adil's regime, at least his suzerainty was everywhere effective, and there was no one prince capable of opposing him.⁴³

The east was propelled back into the center of Ayyubid attention by the sudden reappearance in eastern Anatolia of Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah. He had not been entirely absent during the crusade of Frederick II or the siege of Damascus, to be sure. In 625/1228 he had returned from his successful (or so it seemed at the time) wars against the Mongols in Iran, which had culminated in an important victory at Isfahan. Almost at once he launched a terribly destructive raid into the region around Akhlat, thus revenging himself for a humiliating expedition which al-Ashraf's vicegerent in Akhlat, the *Hajib* Husam al-Din 'Ali, had led into Azerbaijan the year before at the instigation of the Seljukid princess who had become Jalal

al-Din's wife when he had first conquered the region. So terrible was the slaughter and pillage caused by Jalal al-Din's troops that large numbers of refugees from Armenia and Diyar Bakr fled to north Syria. Some had gotten as far as Manbij before it was learned that Jalal al-Din had been forced by the onset of winter to retreat back to Azerbaijan.⁴⁴

But it was the following year, 626/1229, that the Khwarizmians became the dominant fact of life for the Ayyubids. Things began ominously when al-Ashraf, probably during the early weeks of the siege of Damascus, suddenly ordered the arrest (and later the execution) of the *Hajib* 'Ali. This act shocked and mystified most contemporaries, for the *Hajib* was reputed to be a brilliant and courageous soldier and a loyal, honest, and competent administrator, a man who had done al-Ashraf the great service of staving off Jalal al-Din's repeated incursions. It was a task at which few others had succeeded.

Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, normally the worst-informed of men about affairs in the East, gives us our only substantial information about the *Hajib's* downfall:

When al-Ashraf came to Damascus and made the agreement with his brother al-Kamil to exchange the Eastern Territories [for Damascus], the *Hajib* heard of this and wrote to al-Ashraf, telling him: "By God, do not do this thing, for it is not in your interest, for several reasons. First, you crossed the Euphrates only in order to aid your nephew al-Nasir, and if you take Damascus from him, what honor will still attach to you among pines? And if it is a question of water and gardens and fine prospects, why then Sinjar is more salutary than Damascus and is more centrally situated. Second, the Khwarizmian [Jalal al-Din] was an ally of al-Mu'azzam and will not abandon his son. He is close by, and if he takes Akhlāt he will conquer the whole region (*jami'a l-biladi*). Third, you are today the Prince of the East, and the rulers of Mosul and Rum are in your service, but you will become like an amir or a vassal. Today you command 10,000 cavalry, while Damascus will not support more than 400 (*sic*)."
 . . . The letter fell into al-Kamil's hands . . . and he ordered his secretary to write a letter to 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Ashrafi (who was the *Hajib's* enemy) in Akhlāt, commanding him to murder the *Hajib*. [Al-Kamil] then sent the letter to al-Ashraf and said, "Place your signature (*'alam*) upon it," and he did so.⁴⁵

Even in this account al-Ashraf's motivation remains suspiciously vague; why should he have agreed to al-Kamil's order without dispute or further persuasion? But if we can accept the passage as substantially authentic, it would show that al-Kamil saw the *Hajib* as a serious obstacle to his ambitions in the East and in the empire as a whole, for the sultan's aim of breaking up and partially incorporating the great regional principalities could not be achieved if a man as powerful as al-Ashraf became fully aware of the issues at stake. Al-Kamil must have known that the *Hajib* 'Ali could not easily be replaced, but probably he did not object to that. After all he had little to lose from the incursions of Jalal al-Din, at least for the time being, while al-Ashraf stood to lose a great deal. And if al-Ashraf were weakened, al-Kamil was thereby strengthened.

At the beginning of Shawwal 626/late August 1229 Jalal al-Din again appeared before the walls of Akhlat, mounting against them twelve great mangonels. Soon after he had begun the siege, the Seljukid lord of Erzerum, Rukn al-Din Jihan Shah, a cousin of 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh who had been for some years a client of al-Ashraf, decided that the future in eastern Anatolia lay with the Khwarizmshah and offered him his submission. Jihan Shah did not personally participate in the siege of Akhlat but did furnish a quantity of siege equipment. Defending the city were the *Hajib* 'Ali's murderer and successor, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Ashrafi, and two brothers of al-Ashraf, al-Mu'izz Mujir al-Din Ya'qub and al-Amjad Taqi al-Din 'Abbas.

Again Jalal al-Din found Akhlat a difficult target, and the siege wore on into the winter. But the Khwarizmshah was not to be denied this time, in spite of the heavy snows and bitter cold, and as the long winter was coming to an end, on 28 Jumada I 627/14 April 1230, his troops stormed the city. One of the towers was treacherously surrendered by its commandant, according to a prearranged plan. The Khwarizmians burst into the city, looting uncontrollably and slaughtering those inhabitants who had survived the hideous sufferings of the ten-month siege. The remnants of the garrison fled to the

citadel, but this last redoubt could not long survive and surrendered on terms shortly afterwards. The two Ayyubid princes were taken captive, along with al-Ashraf's Georgian wife, but the unfortunate 'Izz al-Din al-Ashrafi was handed over to a *mamluk* of the murdered *Hajib* 'Ali, who killed him in revenge for his master.⁴⁶

Jalal al-Din was now in a position not only to occupy the rest of Armenia, but also to move against the Anatolian plateau and the Jazira. That this was precisely his intention cannot be in doubt, for one of his official letters (*fath-nameh*) announcing the fall of Akhlāt declares: "By this auspicious action a clime of this splendour has been added to the realms acquired and inherited by us (may God increase their extent!), as sooner or later the realms of Syria and Rum will likewise fall into the hands of the servants of our house (may God perpetuate it and grant it victory!)." The situation was the more serious because Gökbori of Irbil and Rukn al-Din Maudud of Amida and Hisn Kayfa were still in alliance with Jalal al-Din. The Ayyubid domination in the Jazira seemed on the verge of toppling. The peculiar thing is that 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh seemed far more urgently concerned than either al-Ashraf or al-Kamil about the consequences of the loss of Akhlāt, and it was he who took the initiative in patching up his long-standing quarrel with the Ayyubids. He sent an almost constant stream of envoys to al-Kamil (now in Raqqa organizing his new territories) and al-Ashraf. The latter also was in Raqqa, having come there upon learning of the fall of Akhlāt. At length an alliance was formed, apparently after some hesitation on the part of the Ayyubids. Al-Kamil appointed al-Ashraf to lead the Ayyubid armies and then took the astonishing step of returning to Egypt with the 7,000 cavalry whom he had brought to Raqqa.⁴⁷

Al-Ashraf was now left with the task of forming an army to take to Anatolia, since he had brought only 700 troopers with him from Damascus. He was able to obtain contingents from Aleppo (commanded by the Hakkari Kurdish amir 'Izz al-Din 'Umar b. Mujalli), Homs (led by the heir apparent al-Mansur Ibrahim), Hama, Diyar Mudar (under the command of

al-Kamil's newly appointed vicegerent there, the eunuch Shams al-Din Sawab al-'Adili), and Mosul. When he was joined by his brothers al-'Aziz 'Uthman of Banyas and al-Muzaffar Ghazi of Mayyafariqin, his forces totaled some 5,000 regular cavalry, well disciplined and superbly equipped. After mustering his army at Harran, he marched up the Euphrates valley to Sivas, where he joined 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh and his army of 20,000 cavalry.⁴⁸

When Jalal al-Din learned of the coalition, he set out from Akhlat to try to strike at the Seljukid forces before their junction with al-Ashraf could be effected. But at Kharput (modern Elazig) he was stricken with a sudden illness, and although after a few days he forced himself to proceed, he had lost his opportunity. Turning north at Kharput he headed for Erzinjan, from which he could continue his march westwards to Sivas. Near Erzinjan he happened upon a large force of soldiers from that city—perhaps as many as 6,000 men—who were going to meet Kayqubadh at Sivas. Catching them completely off guard, Jalal al-Din cut them to pieces in a surprise attack on 25 Ramadan 627/7 August 1230. But two days later, at a village in the environs of Erzinjan named Yasi-chimen, he encountered the allies' main army. In an opening skirmish on 27 Ramadan/9 August Jalal al-Din's vanguard was roughly handled by the Bedouin irregulars of the Ayyubid-Seljukid forces, but this hardly counted as a decisive encounter. The next morning the Khwarizmians charged up the hill on which the allies had stationed their troops, but something occurred which confused the attackers—a harsh wind which blew dirt in their faces, a heavy fog in which they lost contact with one another, or perhaps the withdrawal of Jalal ad-Din, still seriously ill, from the battlefield. At any rate the Khwarizmians began to retreat and break up. As their retreat degenerated into panic, the Ayyubid and Seljukid cavalry stormed upon them and turned the battle into a disastrous rout. Jalal al-Din himself fled all the way to Khoy, halting in Akhlat just long enough to withdraw its garrison.⁴⁹

Proceeding east from Erzinjan, al-Ashraf first seized Er-

zerum, which had been abandoned by Jihan Shah in the wake of the disaster, and turned it over to the lieutenants of Kayqubadh. He then journeyed south to Akhlat, which he found in a state of ruin. While al-Ashraf was there trying to reestablish his government, Jalal al-Din initiated a series of embassies to him to try to reach a peace. It was finally agreed that the treaty should be made on the basis of the *status quo ante* and that Jalal al-Din would release the prisoners whom he had taken at Akhlat. It was really a self-enforcing agreement, since at this point each prince was in actual possession of the lands he had held before the outbreak of the war.⁵⁰

Despite this decisive victory in which he had played so great a part, al-Ashraf's position in the Jazira was now much weaker than before. In Erzerum he no longer had to deal with a petty client-state but with the powerful Seljukid sultan of Rum, while the terrible vulnerability of his Eastern possessions to an outside invader had been starkly revealed. This time he had been able to recover Armenia, but that had been largely due to the presence of a friendly power in Anatolia. Essentially his new capital of Damascus was too far away for him adequately to protect Armenia. But perhaps his mind was not filled with such grim thoughts as he proceeded south to Sinjar to examine its affairs and then, at the beginning of Jumada I 628/ March 1231, returned to Damascus.

Yasi-chimen must rank as one of the most disastrous defeats ever suffered by any prince, for Jalal al-Din's army had been shattered there, and before he could begin the task of reassembling it, a new wave of Mongols was upon him. He had no means of resistance and fled first to the Mughan Steppe west of the Caspian Sea and then back through Armenia to Diyar Bakr. The Mongols caught up with him near Amida in the winter of 628/1231 and massacred a large part of his army. He himself managed to get away, but as he was resting in an obscure village near Mayyafariqin, he was set upon by a party of Kurdish peasants and murdered. Thus was the sordid end of this astounding adventurer. He was one of the greatest menaces the Ayyubids ever had to face, and he had proved himself a

tyrannical and unprincipled ruler. Even so, he was the only Muslim prince so far who had defeated a major Mongol force in the open field, and this explains Ibn Wasil's ambivalent judgment: "This man, with all we have recounted about his tyranny and blood-thirstiness, possessed vigor, determination, boldness, and high resolve. He was a barrier between us and the Tatars, and by his ruin they were established in Iraq, Rum, and the Jazira and were enabled to penetrate into Syria."⁵¹

Soon after returning to Damascus, al-Ashraf left for Egypt to attend his brother's court. They may have wanted to consult on the Mongol incursion into Diyar Bakr, but if so the two princes were not inclined to act hastily, and al-Ashraf appears to have spent his time mostly in promenades and riding. Perhaps al-Kamil had invited his brother to Cairo simply to nurture his ties to his suzerain and to prevent him from sinking roots at Damascus.⁵²

Sometime during al-Ashraf's sojourn in Egypt, however, the two princes decided to mount an expedition against the new prince of Amida and Hisn Kayfa, al-Mas'ud. The ostensible cause was al-Mas'ud's tyranny and misrule, and in particular his predilection for the daughters of his subjects. But this was only a pretext of the most commonplace kind; al-Kamil's real motives were certainly quite different. Al-Mas'ud's predecessor Rukn al-Din Maudud had allied himself to Jalal al-Din, and although he had in fact caused the Ayyubids no harm in the Khwarizmian war, the simple fact of his alliance with a hostile foreign power hinted at extremely dangerous possibilities—in the event of a Rum Seljukid or Mongol invasion, for example. It was of the highest strategic importance for the Ayyubids to gain direct control of Amida, a vast fortress which stood astride the main roads leading from Mayyafariqin into Diyar Rabi'a and Diyar Mudar. Its possession would in effect seal Ayyubid control of Diyar Bakr and the upper Tigris valley and would leave only Mardin still in the hands of a non-Ayyubid prince.⁵³

On 8 Jumada II 629/1 April 1232 al-Ashraf and al-Kamil led the combined armies of Egypt and Damascus out of Cairo.

Ahead of him al-Kamil sent his eldest son, al-Salih Ayyub, to act as his vicegerent in Diyar Mudar. This prince had filled the same post in Egypt during the campaign of 626/1229 against Damascus. At that time he had been the sultan's heir apparent, but his father had been informed that al-Salih was a tyrannical governor and—perhaps more disturbing—that he had used his position to purchase exceptionally large numbers of Turkish *mamluks*. These things had led al-Kamil to depose al-Salih Ayyub as heir apparent and to name in his place his younger son, al-Adil Abu Bakr. Henceforth al-Salih Ayyub would be heir only to al-Kamil's lands in the East, and even there the sultan saw to it that he should be closely supervised by the experienced and trustworthy Shams al-Din Sawab.⁵⁴

While al-Ashraf was leading the joint expeditionary force directly to Damascus, al-Kamil went to al-Karak with a small escort in order to marry his daughter 'Ashura Khatun to his nephew al-Nasir Da'ud as part of a general reconciliation. After a splendid round of festivities the contract was concluded on 20 Sha'ban/11 June, and al-Kamil, in the company of al-Nasir Da'ud and al-Muzaffar Mahmud of Hama, now moved north to Damascus. There al-Ashraf had already been joined by his three most important vassals, al-Salih Isma'il of Bosra, al-'Aziz 'Uthman of Banyas, and al-Mughith Mahmud of the Bilad al-Shaqif. As they marched north towards Diyar Bakr, the Ayyubid forces were swelled by regiments from al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs, al-Hafiz Arslanshah of Qal'at Ja'bar, al-Muzaffar Ghazi of Mayyafariqin, and al-Salih Ayyub. Of all the major Syrian princes, only al-'Aziz Muhammad of Aleppo, who had just reached his majority and was now trying to assert his authority within his own principality, did not participate.⁵⁵

Al-Kamil's armies drew up before Amida on 20 Dhu-l-Hijja 629/5 October 1232, and al-Mas'ud quickly decided that it was hopeless to try to fend off such a massive force. By 1 Muharram 630/18 October 1232 he had surrendered Amida to al-Kamil. His second major possession of Hisn Kayfa, lying downstream on the Tigris some seventy miles to the east, still remained unconquered, however. Al-Kamil sent al-Ashraf and

al-Muzaffar Ghazi, who took al-Mas'ud with them under heavy guard, to obtain its surrender. But its garrison proved rather more stubborn than their master and gave up only in Safar 630/November 1232. These important new conquests were assigned in their entirety to al-Salih Ayyub (who remained under Shams al-Din Sawab's tutelage, of course), although they would have been of immense benefit to al-Ashraf in consolidating his scattered and isolated Eastern lands.⁵⁶

An indirect result of the expedition to Amida was a change in the distribution of some of the minor appanages or princely *iqta's* in the principality of Damascus. Al-Mughith Mahmud died before Hisn Kayfa in Muharram 630/October 1232 and his *iqta'* in the Bilad al-Shaqif apparently reverted to al-Ashraf's direct control; at any rate we do not read of an heir or a newly appointed *muqta'*. Not long after the return of the Ayyubid armies to Syria, al-'Aziz 'Uthman also died, on 10 Ramadan 630/20 June 1233, and was interred in the tomb of his elder brother al-Mu'azzam; he was at first succeeded in Banyas by his eldest son, al-Zahir Ghazi, who died almost at once, and al-Kamil (*not* al-Ashraf) confirmed al-Zahir's infant brother al-Sa'id Hasan in his domains. It would be interesting to know why al-Kamil and not al-Ashraf confirmed the succession in this case, for Banyas had traditionally lain entirely within the authority of the prince of Damascus. It suggests that Banyas had become, in the years since al-Mu'azzam's death, a sort of quasi-principality, a client-state such as Baalbek had been in the time of al-Amjad Bahramshah, and was no longer an *iqta'* which al-Ashraf had the right to concede or take away.⁵⁷

The campaign of 629-30/1232 had confirmed al-Kamil's grip on the Jazira, but only a few months later, in the spring and summer of 630/1233, al-Ashraf's tenuous holdings in Armenia were swept away, when 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh sent his troops to occupy Akhlat (and presumably the other Ayyubid possessions around Lake Van as well). This event was certainly a proper occasion for a punitive expedition or a full-scale attempt to recover the lost lands, but al-Kamil made it the pretext for

an invasion of the heartlands of the Rum Seljukid empire.⁵⁸ The Ayyubid empire had by now almost reached its natural limits (only Mardin and a stretch of the Tigris valley north of Mosul were still not under its direct control), and it is hard to fathom why al-Kamil thought he could traverse the Taurus and successfully occupy the Anatolian plateau. Nor is it remotely clear why he should have wanted to. Possibly he felt that the Rum Seljukids, who were now rising to the apogee of their power and whose ambitions in north Syria and Diyar Bakr had never been long suppressed, would soon be ready to attack his northern possessions if he did not strike first. Possibly too it was a case of unbridled ambition, for during the past five years al-Kamil had not suffered a single setback in his attempts to confirm his own authority and expand the borders of his empire. Finally he may just possibly have had more sinister motives.

In the spring of 631/1234 al-Kamil and al-Nasir Da'ud led their combined forces from Egypt to Damascus. After being joined there by al-Ashraf and al-Salih Isma'il, they proceeded to Salamiyya. Here they spent the month of Ramadan/June, being joined by al-Mujahid Shirkuh and al-Muzaffar Mahmud. Proceeding northwards, al-Kamil sought and received al-'Aziz Muhammad's permission to encamp at Manbij, where he was joined by the army of Aleppo under the command of al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, one of the last living sons of Saladin. The prince of Aleppo also furnished a great quantity of weapons and supplies to the expedition, but he himself did not participate in it. 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh had informed al-'Aziz that he could send men and material to his suzerain al-Kamil, but it would not go unpunished if he himself joined the Ayyubid forces. Al-Kamil understood al-'Aziz's sensitive situation and was quite willing to accept the arrangement: Aleppo had become markedly disassociated from the Ayyubid system as a whole. Its concerns were focused northwards, on Cilician Armenia and Anatolia, rather than southwards on Cairo. In Tall Bashir, the final staging point for the campaign, the Ayyubid princes of north Syria and the Jazira joined the campaign

with their troops, bringing the total number of princes to sixteen. No figures are given on the size of the army, but by analogy with previous campaigns it could not have numbered less than 10,000 heavy cavalry.⁵⁹

In the summer of 631/1234 the Ayyubid armies advanced along the Euphrates to the Gök Su (Ar., Nahr al-Azraq); from there al-Kamil probably intended to penetrate through the Taurus to Malatya. But as his army advanced up the river valley into the narrow passes, they discovered that Kayqubadh's men had barricaded the way with a wall of wood and stones. The Seljukid troops held their makeshift fortifications stubbornly and it proved impossible for the Ayyubids to break through. Frustrated, al-Kamil retreated to Bahasna.⁶⁰

He might have had greater success had it not been for a rumor which al-Mujahid Shirkuh had passed on to al-Ashraf and which had inevitably spread from them to several other princes on the expedition, though apparently not to the rank-and-file. (Al-Mujahid's source is not identified, and the chroniclers may thus be hinting that he had concocted it for his own ends.) Al-Kamil, it was said, intended after his conquest of Anatolia to break it up into appanages for the Syrian princes in exchange for the territories they now held, so that he would become the sole master of Egypt and Syria. The rumor was taken quite seriously among those who heard it—not only because of its intrinsic credibility, perhaps, but also because the history of the dynasty showed that both Saladin and al-'Adil had attained their grasp on the supreme authority by expelling the major princes of the region in favor of their own sons, whose loyalty and subservience they could count on. In view of al-Kamil's rise, it may have seemed altogether likely that he hoped to repeat this process. And in al-Ashraf's case his suspicions were surely heightened by a personal slight recently dealt him by the sultan; he had asked al-Kamil to restore Raqqa to his control as a place where he could store forage for his animals when he crossed the Euphrates to visit his lands in Diyar Rabi'a, but he had been rebuffed with the remark that he was apparently not content with the throne of the Umayyads.

Feeling these fears and resentments, al-Ashraf and al-Mujahid had simply refused to press the attack against the Seljukid defenses along the Gök Su; there was no outright treason on their part, but their lassitude had doomed the Ayyubid assault.⁶¹

From his camp at Bahasna, al-Kamil (apparently unaware of the discontent among his vassals) dispatched a force to raze Hisn Mansur, one of the southernmost Seljukid strongholds, but any action of greater significance might have proved impossible had not the Artukid lord of Kharput entered the sultan's camp to offer his submission, probably in the hope of protecting his tiny principality against Seljukid expansionism. He suggested that the Ayyubid armies could gain a less difficult entry into Anatolia by way of his city. Following up this new opportunity, al-Kamil moved his base camp to Suwayda', and from there he sent ahead a detachment of 2500 cavalry under the command of al-Muzaffar Mahmud of Hama and Shams al-Din Sawab to secure the route. He himself was to follow soon with the rest of the army.

The Ayyubid advance force arrived in the vicinity of Kharput in some disorder, with its baggage lagging behind, and found itself unexpectedly facing a Seljukid army of 12,000 cavalry. A day-long battle, though fiercely contested, ended in the rout of the Ayyubids. They tried to flee into the town of Kharput, but it was almost immediately overrun by the victorious Seljukids. The scattered remnants of the Ayyubid force crowded into the citadel, along with a large number of townspeople. According to Ibn Wasil, there were 12,000 persons locked within—a very large figure, admittedly, but not out of the question in view of the massive size of the fortress at Kharput. At this point, 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh brought up his main army, along with nineteen mangonels, and laid siege to the fortress. Al-Muzaffar of Hama, who was leading the defense, expelled half the people in the citadel, but the shortage of food and water was still so critical that after a siege of only twenty-four days he was compelled to seek terms. On 25 Dhu-l-Qa'da 631/22 August 1234 the citadel of Kharput was surrendered to 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh. The defenders'

lives were spared, and indeed al-Muzaffar received gifts and a robe of honor from the hands of the conqueror. But al-Kamil's hopes for the conquest of Seljukid Anatolia were extinguished. He had no choice but to disband his forces and return to Egypt, and at the beginning of 632/October 1234 he broke camp at Suwayda'.⁶²

Al-Kamil's foolish adventure very nearly turned into a catastrophe the following spring, when Kayqubadh swept into Diyar Mudar, exploiting the general disorganization which would naturally have followed so huge and futile an effort and perhaps also relying on the chilliness which the Syrian Ayyubids now felt towards their Egyptian suzerain. 'Ala' al-Din overran Edessa, Harran, and Raqqa, placing his own governors in all three towns; this was not a punitive raid but a permanent conquest. After a vain attempt on Amida, in Dhu-l-Hijja 632/August 1235, his armies retired to Anatolia, leaving him the master of a region which the Ayyubids had ruled since the time of Saladin.⁶³

But just as expansion north of the Taurus was difficult and unnatural for a Syro-Egyptian monarchy, so the Seljukids of Anatolia were unable to maintain their conquests in the Jazira. In early 633/autumn 1235 al-Kamil led a coalition consisting of al-Ashraf, al-Mujahid of Homs, and al-Muzaffar of Hama back across the Euphrates. Edessa was his first target, and upon its fall he ordered the destruction of its citadel. Harran too was taken without undue difficulty. (Raqqa is not mentioned in the accounts of this campaign, but obviously no Seljukid garrison could maintain itself there if Harran and Edessa were in Ayyubid hands.) According to Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi, after the fall of Harran al-Kamil marched against Dunaysir in reprisal against the Artukid prince of Mardin, who had assisted Seljukid forces during the preceding year. But in the course of the fighting there, the Ayyubid chiefs received word from Mosul of a new Mongol incursion into the Jazira. This time the Mongols penetrated as far as Sinjar. Al-Kamil had no desire to risk a conflict with the Mongols and quickly retreated across the Euphrates. He spent the remainder of the year in Damascus before return-

ing to Egypt the following spring.⁶⁴

The origins of the Third Civil War, 633/1236-635/1238

Superficially the two years of war against the Rum Seljuks had been no worse than a waste of energy; if the Ayyubids had gained nothing from their efforts, they had at least lost very little. But it was during these campaigns that flaws first became visible in the unity which al-Kamil had imposed since the civil wars with al-Mu'azzam and al-Nasir Da'ud. Autonomous princes still held most of the Syrian and Jaziran territories, but al-Kamil's diplomacy, which surpassed even his father's in utilizing chance occurrences to attain well-defined long-term goals, had seen to it that no one of any significance would be disloyal or recalcitrant. He had thus accomplished a feat which had been the downfall of al-Afdal: he had imposed respect and obedience on a group of proud and powerful local lords who at the outset of his reign had owed him nothing, and in regard to whom he had at best the doubtful authority of an older brother. But the suspicion and ill-will created by his venture into Anatolia had gravely compromised his authority, which rested not on a preponderance of force or any other objective, quantifiable entity, but on a fragile basis of gratitude and moral dependence.

At first the seriousness of this was not apparent, and the one obvious rift was soon healed. Supposing al-Nasir Da'ud to have been among the conspirators, the sultan had forced him to divorce the daughter whom he had so recently married, thus dissolving the new accord between the two men. Al-Nasir had returned to al-Karak fearful that al-Kamil now intended to snatch his few remaining lands, and he therefore resolved to journey personally to Iraq to seek the caliph's protection. He suffered many humiliations and disappointments before obtaining a private audience with al-Mustansir, but at last his

efforts were rewarded with the award of robes of honor and the title (a very unusual one) "*al-wali al-muhajir*"—i.e., "the friend and emigrant." The title raised no claim to sovereignty or independence, since al-Mustansir had no desire to raise up a claimant against al-Kamil, but it did indicate that al-Nasir Da'ud was to be considered the caliph's direct client. In addition to this symbol of favor and moral support, the caliph sent an ambassador to accompany al-Nasir back to Damascus (where al-Kamil was then residing) in order to intercede with the sultan on his new client's behalf. Al-Nasir and the envoy entered Damascus in Shawwal 633/July 1236; al-Mustansir's initiative was graciously accepted, and al-Nasir returned to al-Karak with his fears about the future of his lands laid to rest.⁶⁵

But al-Kamil's rapprochement with his newphew did nothing to alter the deeper malaise. The latent crisis was brought to a head by the events following the sudden death of al-'Aziz Muhammad of Aleppo in Rabi' I 634/November 1236 at the age of twenty-three. For the second time since Saladin's death Aleppo was in the hands of a child, for al-'Aziz's oldest son, al-Nasir Salah al-Din Yusuf, was only seven. A regency council was formed, consisting of two amirs, Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini and 'Izz al-Din 'Umar b. Mujalli, the *wazir* Jamal al-Din al-Akram b. al-Qifti, and a eunuch of the Dowager Sultan Dayfa Khatun named Jamal al-Daula Iqbal al-Khatuni. Jamal al-Daula seems simply to have been the spokesman for the young prince's grandmother, Dayfa Khatun, who was the real ruler of Aleppo during the coming years. She passed on all the regency council's decisions, and her signature (*'alama*) was affixed to all documents.⁶⁶

Once the city's internal affairs were settled, the new rulers of Aleppo sent an embassy to al-Kamil to seek confirmation for al-Nasir Yusuf as al-'Aziz Muhammad's successor. Al-Kamil swore to protect the child's rights, but fell short in offering the proper honors to the Aleppan envoys. Worse than that, he presumed to interfere in Aleppan affairs by advising the appointment of al-Salih Ahmad of 'Ayntab, al-'Aziz's older brother, as commander-in-chief of the army and chief regent

for the new prince. He then sent a robe of honor to al-Nasir Yusuf, but the amirs of the city received similar honors, while a separate envoy was dispatched to al-Salih Ahmad in 'Ayntab to bestow a robe of honor on him. These acts were not only grave insults, they were also hardly veiled threats to the autonomy of Aleppo. They symbolized al-Kamil's attitude that the nature and extent of the new prince's rights were dependent on his will. They said, in a sense, that al-Nasir Yusuf was only one among many leading Aleppans and that the sultan had the right to deal directly with all of them. The Aleppans could not tolerate this; they decided that al-Nasir Yusuf alone should receive a robe of honor. The special envoy to al-Salih Ahmad was intercepted and turned back without attaining his object.⁶⁷

Al-Ashraf had also come to feel a deep resentment towards his brother, for he finally saw that he had been used to further al-Kamil's own ambitions and projects. And for all the aid which he had given his brother, he had derived no personal benefit—no portion of the new conquests in Diyar Bakr, no serious effort to recover the Lake Van region from the Rum Seljukids. Even in the wars against Jalal al-Din, which might well have endangered the Ayyubid domination in Syria and the Jazira, al-Kamil had provided no assistance of any kind. And there were other things to indicate the subservient position in which al-Kamil had placed him. When the sultan had taken possession of Diyar Mudar in 626/1229, he had also confiscated al-Ashraf's personal estates in that region. Finally al-Kamil's numerous and lengthy visits to Damascus, always in the company of a large retinue, had been a considerable burden on al-Ashraf's treasury. In view of these things (as well as the rumors which had arisen during the abortive Anatolian campaign), al-Ashraf decided to write to his sister Dayfa Khatun (for he was probably aware of the insults recently suffered by Aleppo) and propose a coalition of the Syrian princes aimed at preventing any further territorial or political encroachments by al-Kamil.⁶⁸ With this move al-Ashraf drew Aleppo back into the mainstream of Ayyubid politics, from which it had isolated itself since al-'Adil had achieved undisputed control of the

sultanate in 598/1201.

The ruling circles in Aleppo were most willing to join such a coalition, as was al-Ashraf's old client al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs, but al-Muzaffar Mahmud of Hama was too conscious of his debt to al-Kamil. In the face of this recalcitrance, which jeopardized the whole scheme, al-Mujahid made a personal journey to Hama to persuade al-Muzaffar that it was altogether in his interest to join the new alliance. If he did not, he was told, the other Syrian princes would drive him from his principality. Reluctantly al-Muzaffar went to Damascus to declare his adherence to the coalition.

The allies, realizing they needed greater resources to oppose al-Kamil (who controlled not only Egypt but the chief cities of the Jazira as well), sent ambassadors to 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh. But when the Syrian envoys (who included al-Ashraf's Chief Qadi Shams al-Din al-Khuwayi and Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim) arrived at the Rum Seljukid court, they discovered that 'Ala' al-Din had died (on 4 Shawwal 634/31 May 1237) and been succeeded by his son Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusrau II. In spite of some troubles which had attended his succession, the new sultan had all the imperial ambitions of his father and did not hesitate to enter the alliance. It seems reasonable to surmise that he was offered at least two key fortresses in Diyar Bakr, Amida and Hisn Kayfa.⁶⁹

Al-Nasir Da'ud was now the only Syrian prince who had not joined the alliance against al-Kamil. Al-Ashraf, who had no sons, promised to make him his heir apparent, which would have enabled al-Nasir to recover the bulk of his father's dominions, and at first he seemed receptive. But al-Kamil quickly reminded al-Nasir of his unfortunate experience with al-Ashraf's promises in the past and told him he could have all the military assistance necessary to regain his lost principality. After consulting with his mother, al-Nasir decided that al-Kamil was the more promising ally and journeyed to Egypt to meet with him. Al-Kamil bestowed upon him a robe of honor and the royal standards and then had him ride in state through the streets of Cairo to the citadel, thereby publicly proclaiming his high

status in the eyes of the sultan. To confirm the esteem in which he held al-Nasir, al-Kamil permitted him to renew his marriage tie with 'Ashura Khatun.⁷⁰ These brilliant ceremonies were surely meant as a clear signal to al-Ashraf that the sultan no longer deemed him the legitimate prince of Damascus and intended to replace him as soon as an opportunity arose.

In spite of al-Nasir Da'ud's defection, the Syrian princes could still muster enough troops to prevent al-Kamil from marching against them, for he preferred not to fight unless he had an overwhelming preponderance of force. Thus when they sent an embassy to Egypt to state their terms, which could be summed up in the demand that the sultan "should never again leave Egypt nor mount an expedition into Syria," he showed himself disposed to accept them, in return for a promise that they would not attack him or any of his possessions.⁷¹ This agreement, which momentarily checked the development of the crisis, would suggest that the purpose of the Syrian coalition was not to depose al-Kamil, but to ensure that the Syrian principalities remained autonomous, hereditary states and did not become clients whose policies and governments were manipulated by Cairo for its own ends.

How long the situation would have remained so delicately poised we cannot know, for at this critical juncture al-Ashraf fell gravely ill. He first took to his bed in Rajab 634/March 1237, and though he was attended by the best physicians, his condition steadily worsened. At last, on Thursday, 4 Muharram 635/28 August 1237, at the age of fifty-six, he died. As his successor he named his brother al-Salih Isma'il, who had had long experience of government in Syria as the *muqta'* of Bosra and who had occasionally served as al-Ashraf's vicerent in Damascus. The succession almost became the object of a serious internal feud, for just before he died, al-Ashraf became suspicious that al-Salih Isma'il was all too eager to have him dead. He thought of naming al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs to replace him, but at the last minute, he was talked out of this by his close friend and advisor Safi al-Din b. Marzuq, who deemed al-Mujahid tyrannical and unscrupulous. Before

al-Ashraf could make up his mind what to do, he had passed away.⁷²

Al-Salih Isma'il lost no time in confirming his grip on the throne. Without waiting for a confirmation of his title by al-Kamil (which he knew he could not obtain), he rode in solemn procession through Damascus, accompanied by the royal banners. Al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs rode at his side, while 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad carried the *ghashiya* before him.⁷³ To ensure his control in Diyar Rabi'a al-Salih sent his son al-Mansur Mahmud to take charge of al-Ashraf's eastern possessions—Sinjar, Nisibin, and al-Khabur.

He attempted also to reconfirm the Syrian coalition formed by al-Ashraf's initiative, but although al-Mujahid and Dayfa Khatun wished to continue the arrangement, al-Muzaffar of Hama saw this as his opportunity to escape an alliance which offered him many dangers but no benefits. Suddenly claiming that Salamiyya was rightfully his and that al-Mujahid was refusing to return it to him, he sent to al-Kamil to profess his subjection to him, excusing his recent behavior on the grounds of duress. The junta of Aleppo tried desperately to arbitrate the dispute between Homs and Hama, since it threatened not only the integrity of the alliance but the future of every prince in Syria. But in spite of the best efforts of Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim, which continued until the beginning of Jumada I 635/mid-December 1237, nothing could be accomplished.⁷⁴

Almost as frightening was a new development in the east. After the death of Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah, some 12,000 of his soldiers had remained in the region of Diyar Bakr and eastern Anatolia. They had first found service with 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh, but when Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusrau came to power in 634/1237, he arrested some of their chiefs and forced them to flee to the Jazira. Here al-Salih Ayyub was at last wielding unrestricted power, for his advisor and supervisor Shams al-Din Sawab had died in 632/1235. He saw in these semibarbarous warriors a chance to increase his strength many times over at relatively little cost, and he was able to obtain his father al-Kamil's permission to enroll them in his service and

distribute to them extensive *iqta's* in Diyar Mudar.⁷⁵ Clearly if al-Salih Ayyub were ever to attack any of his neighbors, there would be little hope of stopping him.

Now that al-Ashraf was dead and the Syrian alliance was breaking apart, it was obvious that al-Kamil would soon attack Damascus. Al-Salih Isma'il feverishly set about preparing to defend his new capital. Al-Mujahid of Homs and 'Izz al-Din Aybeg, feeling their own possessions to be seriously threatened, departed Damascus, but al-Mujahid did send a detachment under his son al-Mansur Ibrahim's command. He recognized full well that Damascus could not stand alone against the armies of Egypt and that if Damascus fell, Homs would not long survive it. From Aleppo too a contingent arrived; the fact that it was commanded by six amirs would suggest that it was a substantial force. Al-Salih Isma'il knew that he would need more than these and sent Najm al-Din Khalil al-Masmudi to the court of Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusrau II in search of aid, but this effort seems to have been without result. Al-Salih also concentrated on matters closer to home—auxiliary defense works were erected in and around the city, and he imprisoned certain persons whom he suspected of supporting al-Kamil in the citadel of Bosra, where they remained for many years.⁷⁶

Although it was Rabi' I 635/late October 1237 before al-Kamil and al-Nasir Da'ud were ready to leave Cairo, al-Kamil felt that the present circumstances were too favorable to permit him to postpone his campaign until the following spring. As the two princes proceeded northwards through Palestine, it occurred to al-Nasir Da'ud that the important fortress of 'Ajlun was still held by one of al-Ashraf's governors. In return for an unspecified sum of money, he persuaded the governor to surrender that castle to him. Although al-Kamil had not sanctioned this action, he did not hesitate to confirm al-Nasir in his new possession. No further incident marked their progress, and on 20 Rabi' I/10 November the Egyptian army began to draw up its lines before Damascus. The sultan's camp was near al-Qadam, some two and a half miles south of the walls; al-Nasir Da'ud was stationed at Mizza, two miles west of the

walled city; and al-Kamil's brothers Taqi al-Din 'Abbas and Mujir al-Din Ya'qub (veterans of the siege of Akhlat in 626/1229-627/1230) were located at Qabun, a village two and a half miles to the north. Mangonels were set up to bombard the walls, and every gate except the two flanking the citadel (the Bab al-Nasr and the Bab al-Faraj) was blockaded. Finally al-Kamil diverted the River Barada and cut off all other streams flowing into the city.⁷⁷

Soon after the siege began, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg brought his troops from Salkhad to assist in the defense, but he had great difficulty penetrating into Damascus. A few days later al-Kamil launched his first assault against the walls, but it was stopped in the Midan al-Hasa southwest of the walls by a force of infantry (*rajjala*). (This term may refer to a militia recruited from the townspeople, but the matter is not as clear-cut here as in 626/1229.) Al-Salih Isma'il again sent to al-Mujahid in Homs pleading for help, but the latter still refused to come personally. He did send a small force of 200 men, but they were surprised and overwhelmed as they were threading their way through the gardens in the Ghuta. Fifty prisoners from this detachment were brought before al-Kamil, who treated them like traitors rather than captured soldiers, for he had them hanged on the spot. The few survivors of al-Mujahid's relief force managed to get into the city, but most were wounded.

After that the siege settled down to a constant round of skirmishing in the suburbs outside the city. A great many homes, warehouses, and other property were destroyed, some undoubtedly as an ordinary by-product of the fighting, but much was the result of deliberate malice, for we read that al-Salih Isma'il's men would often break into the abandoned houses of their personal enemies, loot them, and then put them to the torch. There was a particularly fierce battle on the night of 26 Rabi' II/16 December, as the result of which a centuries-old paper mill and the recent *madrasa* of 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad were consumed. Again, however, the defenders were able to drive off the attacking force.⁷⁸

On 1 Jumada I/20 December a full-scale attempt to storm the city was made from two sides. Al-Nasir Da'ud sent his forces against the sector stretching from al-'Uqayba to the Bab al-Faradis, while the amir Rukn al-Din al-Hayjawi assaulted the Bab Tuma. By nightfall the attackers had driven the Damascenes back against the gates, and as the fighting went on into the night it seemed that they were on the verge of breaking into the city. But at this point al-Kamil sent Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh to al-Nasir Da'ud, directing him to break off the attack and pull back to Birza, some three miles northwest of the walls. The reasons for this act are unexplained. Possibly al-Kamil did not want Damascus to be taken by storm, with its pillage and destruction, for the ruin of the empire's second city would ill become the sultan. Or perhaps al-Kamil did not want al-Nasir to have the honor of taking the city by his own efforts, lest he become, in his own eyes and in those of others, too prestigious and too independent of the sultan's guidance. However that may be, the next morning al-Salih Isma'il sent out a force of engineers (*hajjarun, zarraqun*) and irregulars (*harafisha*) to demolish and burn the suburbs of 'Uqayba, Qasr Hajjaj, Shaghur, Bab Tuma, and Bab al-Salama. His motive, presumably, was to clear the walls of any structures which could obscure the approach of attackers or hinder the fire and sorties of the defenders.⁷⁹

It was now obvious that al-Kamil was determined to take Damascus, for neither the winter cold, the stubbornness of the defense, nor his rather severe losses had forced him to break off the siege. Moreover the townspeople had become very fearful, as a result of the last general attack, that the city might fall by storm, with all the destruction of life and property which that would entail. The siege had already driven prices very high, though it had been going on for no more than six weeks, and this too beat down public morale. In view of all this al-Salih Isma'il decided sometime in early Jumada I/late December to ask al-Kamil for terms. As his intermediary, he called on Muhyi al-Din Abu'l-Muzaffar Yusuf ibn al-Jauzi, the *wazir* of the Caliph al-Mustansir, who had been sent by his

sovereign to try to resolve the Ayyubid civil war. Possibly it was he who had persuaded al-Salih that further resistance would be vain. A settlement was achieved with no great difficulty, since al-Kamil seems to have accepted the terms al-Salih proposed without argument. Al-Salih was to retain his old *iqta'* of Bosra and the Sawad and to receive in addition Baalbek and the Biqa'. It was a very generous settlement under the circumstances, for al-Salih would govern two important towns, one of which commanded a principal northern approach to Damascus, as well as two of the finest agricultural districts of Syria. On 19 Jumada I 635/7 January 1238, al-Kamil and al-Nasir Da'ud entered Damascus in triumph.⁸⁰

The conquering sultan scrupulously stationed his entire army outside the city of Damascus and would permit none of them to enter the gates, thereby saving the townspeople innumerable petty vexations. The Aleppan contingent which had participated in the defense was honorably treated, being given three days' time to depart for Aleppo, but otherwise al-Kamil was in no mood to forgive the Syrian princes. Either during the siege or soon after his entry into the city, he issued to al-Muzaffar Mahmud a diploma (Ar., *manshur*, *tauqi'*) investing him with Salamiyya and giving him the authority to seize it by force. And once in Damascus he dispatched a sizeable force from his own armies under the command of al-Nasir Da'ud against Homs; al-Muzaffar of Hama was to join forces with him. According to al-Makin, al-Mujahid was able to save himself the rigors of a siege only by his entreaties to the amir Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich, who was now the commander-in-chief of al-Kamil's armies outside Damascus and by sending his son al-Salih Nur al-Din to plead his case before the sultan.⁸¹ Still following al-Makin, al-Kamil finally consented to accept an indemnity of 2,000,000 *dirhams* from the prince of Homs. Reaching beyond the confines of Syria, al-Kamil also ordered his son al-Salih Ayyub to seize the territories in Diyar Rabi'a which were governed by al-Mansur Mahmud.⁸²

But at the beginning of Rajab/late February, before al-Kamil could proceed any further with the subjugation of Syria, he fell

ill of dysentery, and three weeks later, on Tuesday evening, 21 Rajab 635/9 March 1238, he died. There was no one with him at the time, and his body was not discovered until the next morning.⁸³

7 The Third Civil War, 635/1238-643/1245

The Reign of al-Jawad Yunus, 635-636/1238

At the time of his death al-Kamil had come very close to recreating the unified empire of his father and Saladin. His success would have been even more remarkable than theirs, for Saladin had raised his state out of the ruins of the Zangid and Fatimid empires, and al-'Adil had only dealt with weak successor principalities. But by the end of the Fifth Crusade, when he could at last survey his dominions and the true status of his authority, al-Kamil found himself facing two large Ayyubid states, each ruled by an intelligent and vigorous prince. Only by great cunning and greater patience had he at last attained a position where he could impose his authority throughout the empire and where a coalition able to resist him could no longer be created.

Nevertheless even if al-Kamil had lived long enough to realize his goal, there is good evidence to suggest that the constitutional structure of the reunified empire would not have represented any real advance over that of his father and uncle. It too would have been a confederation of regional principalities, over which al-Kamil could expect to exercise considerable control in his lifetime, but which would have no principle of unity beyond the force of his own personality. The very fact that he named two heirs apparent, al-'Adil Abu Bakr for Egypt and al-Salih Ayyub for the Jazira, is enough to confirm that he had given no real thought to the problem of organizing his empire so that it would not fly apart on his death. Nor is

there any evidence to suggest a policy of general institutional centralization, at least to a degree surpassing that followed by the princes of Aleppo and Damascus. Rather he seemed content to work within the political concepts which he had inherited from Saladin and al-'Adil—collective sovereignty within the family, confederation rather than a centralized monarchy, unity through diplomacy and personal bonds rather than through formal institutions.

In fact al-Kamil's nascent state was to prove even less stable than that of his two great predecessors, for they had died after their regimes had become firmly established, so that there was at least some prospect for an orderly succession. But al-Kamil died at a time when tensions were at their highest, and fear, jealousy, and confusion pervaded the air. It was almost inevitable that his unexpected death would provoke a new epoch of civil strife, in which all the princes of the dynasty would try to establish for themselves a suitable place in a new political hierarchy. The new situation was all the more difficult for Damascus, because at this point it had no clearly defined political status. It was not a provincial capital controlled by Cairo, for al-Kamil had solemnly and publicly promised it to al-Nasir Da'ud, who in any case had the strongest claim to it. On the other hand it was not truly an autonomous principality either, since al-Kamil had procrastinated over installing al-Nasir in power after the conquest of the city and had died without doing anything about it. Until the status of Damascus was definitively resolved, there could be no peace for it or for the empire.

The inherent confusion of the times was immensely intensified by the actions of the great amirs of al-Kamil's army. On the morrow of his death they formed themselves into a junta to elect his successors in Egypt and Damascus. Included in this conclave were the brothers Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh and 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich and his brother 'Imad al-Din, Rukn al-Din al-Hayjawi,¹ and—somewhat surprisingly—the commandant of the Ashrafiyya regiment, so recently engaged in the defense of Damascus, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg

al-Asmar al-Ashrafi.² They began their meetings on Thursday, 22 Rajab 635/10 March 1238 in the citadel. It was at once decided to honor the designation of al-'Adil as ruler of Egypt and sultan of the Ayyubid empire, since he had been for many years al-Kamil's heir apparent in Cairo and was in effective control of its government. But Damascus presented them with more interesting possibilities. Although al-Nasir Da'ud had been promised this city in Cairo, the sultan had never actually surrendered the administration to him after its conquest. Indeed he had made every effort to keep his protégé occupied with affairs outside Damascus, and one might well have believed that the sultan did not want to fulfill his solemn engagements in this matter. This situation gave the junta the opportunity, if not the right, to elect whomever they pleased to the throne of Damascus.³

The first day of discussion produced no decision. At the beginning sentiment had leaned towards al-Nasir Da'ud, whose claim was obvious and indisputable, but 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, recalling some personal slights which he had suffered from al-Nasir in Cairo, would not have him. Instead he proposed al-Jawad Yunus, a prince of monumental insignificance. The son of one of al-'Adil's lesser offspring, Shams al-Din Maudud, al-Jawad first appears towards the end of al-Mu'azzam's reign, when he abruptly fled Egypt, apparently because he was somehow involved in a conspiracy against al-Kamil. Al-Mu'azzam received him warmly and assigned him the important town of Gaza in *iqta'*. But a little later al-Kamil invited him to return to Egypt, where he was restored to his old *iqta'* in the Buhayra province. We next catch sight of him when al-Kamil had him carry the *ghashiya* for al-Nasir Da'ud in the latter's splendid investiture ceremony in Cairo in 634/1237. It was not a very interesting or auspicious background for a would-be prince of Damascus.⁴

The night after this first meeting Rukn al-Din al-Hayjawi and 'Izz al-Din al-Asmar slipped out of the citadel and went to al-Nasir Da'ud. They informed him that he could ensure his succession only by massive gifts to the Ashrafiyya regiment,

to gain their willingness to fight on his behalf. The populace was already devoted to him, and his opponents were all in the citadel where it would be easy to trap them. But confident that his rights would be respected, al-Nasir did nothing. By the next day the junta had begun to lean toward al-Jawad. Ostensibly, at least, they believed that he would be more willing to govern Damascus merely as a vicegerent of al-'Adil II, while at the same time having that authority with the soldiers and populace which only an Ayyubid prince could enjoy. The junta's legitimism is worth noting: although it had taken upon itself to dispose of the succession, its members still looked to the established house and not to anyone of themselves. It would be naive, of course, to suppose that these men were solely concerned with protecting the rights of al-'Adil and his dynasty. There are clear hints that they believed they could dominate al-Jawad much more effectively than they could al-Nasir, and since they doubtless thought that they would retain if not increase their influence with the new sultan in Cairo (who was only eighteen), they were probably hoping to run the empire to suit themselves.

Only Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh objected to al-Jawad Yunus. Al-Jawad was a prince, too, he pointed out, and would not long resist the temptation to take power in his own name. The ideal choice would be an amir from the royal household (*al-khuddam*) of al-Kamil and al-'Adil II—someone who could easily be deposed and who would not have the prestige to make himself an autonomous ruler. Al-Jawad, on learning of Fakhr al-Din's opinions, tried to buy his support with an offer of 10,000 *dinars* and an *iqta'* of 150 cavalry. Fakhr al-Din was adamant, but his opposition was not enough to override the other amirs, and al-Jawad was elevated to the governorship of Damascus, with the troops of the city being required to swear allegiance to him as the lawful representative of al-'Adil II.⁵

The decision made, Rukn al-Din al-Hayjawi went to inform al-Nasir Da'ud. The prince was surely dumbfounded, but he made no protest and at once mounted his horse to depart the city. The street from his palace to the Bab al-Faraj led directly

to the east wall of the citadel before turning north towards the city gate. As al-Nasir rode through Damascus, a vast throng of people crowded the streets to shout encouragement, for they supposed that he intended to force his way into the citadel and demand his rights. When he turned north towards the Bab al-Faraj, they realized that he was leaving Damascus and massed around the gate, screaming, "No! No! No!," but to no avail. Enraged at the cynical violation of their sentiments and of the rights of the scion of al-Mu'azzam 'Isa, the mob turned to riot. The oligarchs in the citadel were prepared for this eventuality; the *wali* of Damascus, Baha' al-Din Malikshu, led his forces into the crowd with maces flying, and it was quickly dispersed.⁶

As for al-Nasir, he first withdrew only to his palace in Qabun, a Ghuta village about three miles north of Damascus. He remained there in a fog of indecision for a few days, until he learned that the junta had decided to arrest him. He at once fled to the old Umayyad palace of Umm Hakim in the Marj al-Suffar, but the amir 'Imad al-Din ibn Musak (an old associate of al-Mu'azzam who had joined al-Ashraf's entourage in 626/1229) secretly sent a message that 'Izz al-Din al-Asmar was on his way to capture him. That night al-Nasir fled again, this time not stopping until he had reached the castle of 'Ajlun in the northernmost reaches of his own principality. There he waited, seeking for an early opportunity to recover Damascus.⁷

As ruler of Damascus, al-Jawad Yunus soon proved incompetent, cowardly, and tyrannical. He began his regime by distributing enormous largesses to all the important amirs and notables of the city. It is said that he exhausted the treasuries in distributing 700,000 *dinars* and 5,000 robes of honor, and at the same time he was conceding villages in the environs of Damascus with an exceedingly free hand. Once al-Jawad appeared to be well-established in Damascus, Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh led the bulk of the Egyptian army back to Cairo, but some troops did remain to support al-Jawad's government — the Ashrafiyya, commanded by 'Izz al-Din al-Asmar, and an Egyptian contingent under the command of 'Imad al-Din ibn

al-Shaykh and 'Imad al-Din b. Kilich. In addition al-Jawad presumably had a small personal guard, raised and equipped on the basis of his old *iqta'* in Egypt, which had come with him on the campaign of 635/1238.⁸

Al-Jawad's capacity to defend his new possessions was put to the test almost at once. In 'Ajlun al-Nasir Da'ud had already assembled a small force. Even with the departure of most of the Egyptian army he did not have the resources to attack Damascus directly, but the rest of al-Jawad's territories were quite exposed, and al-Nasir was determined to exploit his opportunity. He began his offensive with a sudden sweep down the southern coast of Palestine and succeeded in occupying without resistance the important fortress of Gaza, whose garrison he added to his own meager forces. His position thus strengthened, al-Nasir wrote to the sultan al-'Adil to explain his conduct. These lands, he asserted, were part of those promised to him by al-Kamil in restoration of his father's patrimony; his occupation of them was thus not a violation of the sultan's prerogatives but merely the fulfillment of his own rights. He hoped, moreover, to receive the sultan's permission to occupy Damascus, in which he sincerely intended to conduct himself as his deputy and vicegerent. To these overtures al-'Adil returned no positive response, but he was perhaps not entirely negative, since a considerable correspondence was exchanged between the two men.⁹

For al-Jawad this unexpected raid by al-Nasir did not represent an immediate threat to his hegemony in Damascus, but he could not afford to delay his response, lest the prince of al-Karak succeed in gathering a strong enough army to challenge him directly. He led his entire army down to Palestine, fixing his camp at Jinin in order to intercept any northward thrust by his rival. Al-Nasir responded by marching north to Sabastiyya, some ten miles from Jinin, at the head of 700 cavalry. Much of his army was still in al-Karak, and his advisors had counseled him to avoid a clash until he could muster those men, but he would not listen. His natural eagerness to recover Damascus from his hated rival was much increased by an ingenious ruse

of al-Jawad. He had the leaders of the Ashrafiyya corps write to al-Nasir, telling of their discontent and promising to desert al-Jawad on the battlefield. Al-Nasir was so taken in by this that he made no precautions to guard his camp against the Damascenes. Al-Jawad's men were thus able to slip up to al-Nasir's camp undetected and even to surround that prince's own pavilion. Al-Nasir noticed them just in time to flee, and he reached al-Karak accompanied only by a tiny escort and with all his baggage abandoned in Sabastiyya. Al-Jawad could now occupy at his ease all of al-Nasir's possessions west of the Jordan—Nablus, the district of Jerusalem, and the Jordan valley. For al-Nasir the affair appeared to be an irretrievable disaster, for al-Jawad, the foundation stone of an independent principality.¹⁰

Two unforeseen events moderated the consequences of Sabastiyya. Al-'Adil II was not at all well disposed to having so powerful a governor in Damascus, and he ordered his "lieutenant" al-Jawad to withdraw at once from Palestine and to restore all al-Nasir Da'ud's lost territories. And after the conclusion of the battle, the remaining Egyptian contingents were taken back to Egypt by 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh. Nevertheless the moral impact of Sabastiyya had been profound, and al-Jawad now felt sufficient self-confidence to try resurrecting the moribund principality of Damascus. Even before his victory over al-Nasir he had put out some tentative feelers to the other Syrian princes to see how much support he might have in the face of a challenge by al-'Adil II. A proffered alliance with Aleppo was refused by Dayfa Khatun, who wanted no part of a new conflict between Damascus and Cairo. But al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs was more willing, and after al-Jawad's return from Palestine he came to Damascus to seal a renewed alliance between the two cities. (Al-Mujahid's motives may have included a desire to reconstruct a Syrian coalition capable of resisting Egyptian domination, but he also had a more concrete reason for wanting an alliance with Damascus: he was still locked in his dispute with al-Muzaffar of Hama over the possession of Salamiyya.) Al-Jawad now took the grave step,

almost tantamount to rebellion, of placing his own name in the *khutba* immediately after that of al-'Adil, thus signaling that he was ruling in Damascus by virtue of his own authority and not merely as delegate of the sultan.¹¹

In spite of these pretensions and his minor diplomatic success, al-Jawad's position soon suffered a serious blow. Soon after his return to Damascus he was abandoned by 'Izz al-Din al-Asmar and the Ashrafiyya. The nature of the dispute is unfortunately not reported. Of all the amirs who had raised him to power, only 'Imad al-Din ibn Kilich still remained in his service; al-Jawad no longer had the troops to maintain himself as prince of Damascus in the face of any outside challenge.¹²

Such a challenge was in fact beginning to develop, for al-'Adil was infuriated by the way things had been going in Damascus; if al-Jawad succeeded in establishing an autonomous regime there, he too would have to contend with all the dangers and frustrations which had bedeviled his predecessors in the sultanate. Summoning Fakhr al-Din and 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, he dealt them a severe tongue-lashing for having made al-Jawad Yunus governor of Damascus. 'Imad al-Din took upon himself the entire responsibility for the results of this act and stated that he would go personally to Damascus to restore the sultan's direct authority there. He left Cairo sometime in Rabi' I 636/October-November 1238 in the company of only a small escort, for he did not want al-Jawad to think that he was immediately threatened by a full-scale campaign. Fakhr al-Din had deep misgivings about his brother's mission; he pointed out to 'Imad al-Din that although al-Jawad owed everything to him, now that he had become a *sultan*, he would not easily consent to becoming again a simple *amir*.¹³

When he learned of 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh's approach, al-Jawad realized that he could save his regime only by extraordinary measures. Thus he conceived the notion of inviting his cousin al-Salih Ayyub, at that time the leading prince in the Jazira, to undertake an exchange of territories; al-Salih would receive Damascus, while al-Jawad would be given Sinjar and the Euphrates towns of Raqqa and 'Ana. Perhaps al-Jawad

thought that the threat to place the bitter and ambitious al-Salih Ayyub in such close proximity to Egypt would induce al-'Adil to leave him unchallenged in Damascus. And if the sultan were still determined to expel him, then at least he would have new possessions to which he could retire. Al-Jawad's envoy, the *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque, Kamal al-Din b. Talha, met with al-Salih in Hisn Kayfa and found him extremely receptive to this proposal. He was indeed so eager to accept that he offered al-Jawad the town of Haditha in addition to the three originally requested.¹⁴

When 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh arrived in Damascus, he was given a splendid reception by his former protégé, who went so far as to house him in one of the palaces in the citadel (the Dar al-Masarra, built by Nur al-Din). In reality, however, all was not so harmonious, for 'Imad al-Din made it clear that henceforth he himself would be the sultan's vicegerent in Damascus and that al-Jawad must relinquish the city and return to Egypt. If he did as he was told, he would be awarded a superb *iqta'* — al-Shaubak, Alexandria, and a portion of the Buhayra province. Otherwise he must expect to be expelled from Damascus by force. At this point al-Jawad threatened to surrender Damascus to al-Salih Ayyub, but 'Imad al-Din would not back down. Nor was al-Mujahid Shirkuh, still residing in Damascus, able to sway him from his course. Al-Mujahid had no desire whatever to see al-Salih Ayyub installed in Damascus, for he knew that this would gravely jeopardize his independence in Homs. Perhaps hoping to strengthen al-Jawad's position sufficiently for him to break off his agreement with al-Salih, al-Mujahid conspired with him to assassinate 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh. The arrangements made, he quietly left Damascus to return to his own capital of Homs.¹⁵

On 26 Jumada I 636/4 January 1239 al-Jawad invited 'Imad al-Din to join him for a ride outside the city. As the amir emerged from his residence, he was approached by a suppliant bearing a petition. When he extended his hand to take the paper, his accoster drove a dagger into his side, and another figure materialized out of nowhere and stabbed the helpless

'Imad al-Din in the back. Al-Jawad acted properly horrified at the news and even had the presumption to preside over the murdered man's funeral rites in the Umayyad Mosque. He then reverted to character by confiscating all the wealth which 'Imad al-Din had brought with him; he even tried to enlist the latter's *mamluks* in his own service, but they would have nothing to do with him.¹⁶

At the beginning of Jumada II 636/mid-January 1239 al-Salih Ayyub at last approached Damascus, bringing with him a detachment of the army of Mosul, which he had obtained from Badr al-Din Lu'lu' before departing. As he crossed the Euphrates, he sent word to al-Muzaffar Mahmud of Hama, requesting his company on the remainder of his journey to Damascus. Al-Muzaffar was delighted to accept. He was perhaps hoping for al-Salih's support in recovering Salamiyya from al-Mujahid of Homs, but more important, he desperately needed the patronage of a powerful prince in order to protect himself against Aleppan expansionism. (Aleppo had seized Ma'arrat al-Nu'man in 635/1238 after the death of al-Kamil, and then had laid siege to Hama itself for some months in order to compel al-Muzaffar's acquiescence in his loss.) As al-Salih approached Hama, al-Muzaffar went out to join him with a contingent of his army, and the two princes immediately proceeded to Damascus. Al-Jawad, meantime, had excised al-'Adil's name from the *khutba* and *sikka* immediately after 'Imad al-Din's death and substituted the name of al-Salih Ayyub, thus demonstrating the true significance of the territorial exchange. He greeted al-Salih's entry into Damascus with splendid ceremony; to symbolize the transfer of power and his own subservient status, al-Jawad marched before him carrying the *ghashiya*. Later in the procession al-Muzaffar took up the *ghashiya*, thereby signaling his submission also to al-Salih Ayyub. Finally al-Jawad removed his residence from the citadel to a neighboring palace called the Dar al-Sa'ada, which had once housed the princes of Baalbek but now served as a residence for the lesser Ayyubid princes who maintained no regular palace in Damascus.¹⁷

But having committed himself to the surrender of Damascus, al-Jawad almost at once regretted it. He noted that al-Salih had brought only a small force, one which his own army could probably overpower. He secretly invited the military chiefs of Damascus to his residence to obtain from them an oath of loyalty, but al-Muzaffar, residing in the citadel with al-Salih, somehow got wind of the scheme. He slipped down to the Dar al-Sa'ada and roundly berated al-Jawad for his foolish plots, at the same time promising that he would personally guarantee al-Salih Ayyub's promises to him. With this incident the last obstacle to al-Salih's possession of Damascus was removed, and al-Jawad prepared to leave for his new capital of Sinjar.¹⁸

He was not permitted to depart in peace. The populace of Damascus crowded around the Bab al-Nasr hooting and jeering at a man whom they had come to fear and despise and who no longer had any power over them. We are very sketchily informed about al-Jawad's relations with his subjects, but their general tenor is probably well enough communicated in the two anecdotes which have come down to us. He gave a personal servant of his wife's, a man named Nasih al-Din, full authority to extort funds from the city's notables (*al-nas*) by any means he found appropriate. Nasih al-Din proved reasonably adept at this, obtaining for his master the sum of 600,000 *dirhams* during the ten months of al-Jawad's regime. The roots of this odious policy, made doubly hateful to the townspeople by being entrusted to a harem servant rather than the regular fiscal officials, undoubtedly lay in his having squandered his treasury at the time of his accession. His desperate search for funds appears even more clearly in his treatment of Safi al-Din Ibrahim b. Marzuq, a man who had extended many loans to the princes of Damascus and who was in general one of the wealthiest and most respected merchants of the day. We have already noted his activities in arranging the surrender of Baalbek in 627/1230 and his advice to the dying al-Ashraf to give the succession to al-Salih Isma'il rather than to al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs. This latter bit of counsel proved his undoing, for al-Mujahid was able to convince the

money-starved al-Jawad to arrest Safi al-Din (with whom he had heretofore been on friendly terms) and confiscate all his property. By this means al-Jawad netted no less than 400,000 *dinars*. The unfortunate Safi al-Din was then turned over to al-Mujahid, who threw him into prison in Homs, where he remained until al-Mansur Ibrahim came to the throne of that city three years later.¹⁹

Al-Salih Ayyub in Syria, 636/1239-637/1240

Al-Salih Ayyub had taken a daring gamble when he had decided to come to Damascus, for his Jaziran lands were now exposed to the ambitions of Aleppo and the Rum Seljukids, two powers which had entered into a close alliance soon after al-Kamil's demise. He thus left most of his army in the East and brought only a small entourage with him to Damascus. However, he could expect to inherit whatever army al-Jawad had had in Damascus, since it had no personal attachments to that prince. He had not even brought with him a *wazir* to direct the administration of his new capital, but was instead content to appoint a local figure (one Jamal al-Din b. Jarir) to this post after his arrival. Ibn Jarir was descended of a very modest family of Raqqa and had spent his earlier years there, but he eventually rose to become al-Ashraf Musa's *wazir* in Damascus. But Ibn Jarir died hardly a month after the new prince had taken power; he was replaced by a certain Safi al-Din b. Muhajir, a man of whom almost nothing is known, although his father Taj al-Din was to play a minor role in the events of the following years.²⁰

Al-Salih's *wazirs*, though nominally the chiefs of his administration, were obscure men, but he had brought with him from the Jazira several figures of much greater fame and importance, many of whom were his long-time associates. Three had particular significance: his *ustadh al-dar* Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali al-Hadhbani; his *katib al-insha'* Baha' al-Din Zuhayr;

and his *nazir al-jaysh*, Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh.

We would like to know more than we do of Husam al-Din's early career. He began as an amir of Hama, where his family was part of the Kurdish military elite. Both his father and cousin were high-ranking, influential people, and Husam al-Din himself was commandant of the Salamiyya citadel on behalf of al-Muzaffar Mahmud when that prince had been awarded the town in 620/1223. We next see him in autumn 625/1228, accompanying al-Muzaffar on al-Kamil's great expedition to Syria; at this point an obscure but serious dispute arose between Husam al-Din and his sovereign and he had to abandon his service. He then attached himself to the service of al-Salih Ayyub, at that time al-Kamil's vicegerent in Egypt and his heir apparent to the sultanate. Husam al-Din rose quickly in his new master's service, becoming one of his closest advisors and obtaining the high office of *ustadh al-dar*. Thus matters stood early in 636/1239, when al-Salih called him to Damascus from Hisn Kayfa, where he had been acting as the *atabeg* for his prince's young son al-Mu'azzam Turanshah.²¹

Baha' al-Din Zuhayr was of the purest Arab descent; born in Mecca, he traced his ancestry back to the famous Umayyad politician Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra. While al-Salih was still heir apparent in Egypt, he had entered his service as a *katib*, soon became one of his closest confidants, and remained intensely loyal to him for the rest of his life. One might note also that Baha' al-Din was the finest Arabic poet of his day, perhaps the finest for many generations.

Baha' al-Din was a close friend of Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh, who had been born in Asyut in 592/1196. He entered the Egyptian bureaucracy in the important town of Qus and rose through a number of different offices in the provincial administration until he too joined al-Salih's service. Like Baha' al-Din, he followed his new master to the Jazira, when he was exiled in 629/1232, and by the time al-Salih returned to Syria, he had risen to the vital post of *nazir al-jaysh*.²²

Al-Salih Ayyub's first months in Damascus were spent in a flurry of diplomatic activity which showed that he did not

intend to remain merely prince of Damascus. To secure his position in south Syria, he made an alliance with his uncle al-Salih Isma'il, who came to Damascus to swear allegiance and then returned to Baalbek. Al-Salih Ayyub now wrote to Dayfa Khatun in Aleppo, seeking her support for an offensive against Egypt. But as usual Aleppo proved reluctant to become embroiled in the feuds of the other Ayyubid princes when her own interests were not clearly and immediately at stake. For a short time it looked as if he would gain the adherence of al-Nasir Da'ud, who offered to ally himself to al-Salih if the latter would invest him, *in advance* of any expedition to Egypt, with the lands of his father al-Mu'azzam. Al-Salih was generally favorable, but insisted on occupying Egypt first, so no agreement could be reached.²³

Finding that an expedition against Egypt was not immediately practicable, al-Salih began to be rather more amenable to al-Muzaffar Muhmud's incessant urgings that he should attack Homs in order to rid himself of the troublesome al-Mujahid Shirkuh. In Sha'ban 636/March 1239 he led his army north from Damascus to the pass called Thaniyyat al-'Uqab, the first major stopping-point on the desert road to Homs. As his vicegerent in Damascus he named Nasir al-Din al-Qaymari, a leader of a Kurdish unit (the Qaymariyya) which would become a most important political force in Syria during the next decade. With al-Salih went Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, Baha' al-Din Zuhayr, and Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh.

But at Thaniyyat al-'Uqab he halted, for there he was met by envoys representing his father's old amirs in Egypt, who were intensely unhappy with the state of affairs in that country under al-'Adil II. Whatever their original hopes of dominating this young man, they were soon disabused of them, for al-'Adil much preferred his own courtiers and personal favorites. Doubtless the new men were inexperienced and incompetent, but the real basis for the older men's bitterness was of course that they had been shunted aside. They sent to al-Salih Ayyub, obviously the region's rising power, and offered him their assistance in the conquest of Egypt. At first al-Salih hesitated,

for he had already committed himself to a campaign against Homs, but eventually the lure of Egypt won him over. With Egypt in his control, Homs would surely be easy prey.

On 14 Ramadan 636/20 April 1239 he ordered Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali to lead an advance force to Jinin in Palestine. By the time Husam al-Din had reached Lake Tiberias, at the end of Ramadan/April, he learned that seventeen of the leading Egyptian amirs had deserted al-'Adil, along with the sizeable forces which they commanded, and had gone to await al-Salih at Gaza. When al-Salih was informed of this, he recalled Husam al-Din's advance force back to Khirbat al-Lusus and then marched at the head of his full army to meet him. Al-Salih's forces are said to have numbered 6,000 regular cavalry; if that figure is correct, this was surely the largest army ever fielded by an Ayyubid prince of Damascus. In addition to al-Salih's oldest son, al-Mughith 'Umar, there were four other princes of the blood in his army: Mujir al-Din Ya'qub and Taqi al-Din 'Abbas, both driven into exile from Egypt by al-'Adil II for having allegedly conspired against him; and two sons of the late al-Amjad Bahramshah of Baalbek, al-Sa'id and al-Muzaffar Taqi al-Din, who had probably inherited their father's *iqta's* in the district of Damascus. Several amirs of al-Mu'azzam's were also present, but the most important and prestigious of these, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad, was conspicuously absent. Al-Salih's army looked as if it would soon receive even further reinforcements, for the Egyptian amirs had now left Gaza and were encamped in the Jordan valley; Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali was directed to go and escort them to the main camp at Khirbat al-Lusus.²⁴

The possibilities for a successful expedition were somewhat enhanced by al-Nasir Da'ud's decision to go to Egypt to try making an alliance with al-'Adil against al-Salih Ayyub. If the alliance were successfully concluded, of course, al-Salih's difficulties would be considerably increased, but in the meantime al-Nasir's absence meant that al-Salih's passage through Palestine would be unimpeded. After passing the 'Id al-Fitr in Khirbat al-Lusus, al-Salih's army proceeded to Nablus, where

the prince lodged himself in the old palace of al-Mu'azzam. Here they remained for the next three months, until the end of Dhu-l-Hijja 636/early August 1239. In view of the obvious advantages of a rapid advance, such a long delay is altogether astounding. A partial explanation may lay in the fact that during his sojourn at Nablus, al-Salih was establishing his administration in territories which had heretofore belonged to al-Nasir Da'ud. Among other things he was attempting to bind the Egyptian amirs to his cause by distributing extensive *iqta's* to them in Palestine. But at the same time there had been an air of indecision and vacillation about this campaign from the outset. Al-Salih Ayyub, though a man of iron will and intense ambition, did not possess great personal courage. Perhaps as he drew closer to the Egyptian border he became fearful that he was walking into a trap and that his new Egyptian troops would not fight their old comrades but would instead turn against him.²⁵

Finally at the end of 636/August 1239 al-Salih began to prepare for the final stage of the campaign. He first ordered an advance force of Egyptian and Damascene troops to encamp at Gaza and begin gathering provisions for the march across Sinai. He also began pressuring al-Salih Isma'il of Baalbek, one of his two Syrian clients, to join him at Nablus. Isma'il promised to come as quickly as he could equip his forces, but for the moment, he could only send his son al-Mansur Mahmud with a small contingent.

Then just as al-Salih Ayyub was ready to commence his march on Egypt, the Caliph al-Mustansir intervened to try to prevent a new outbreak of civil war. His envoy was again Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Jauzi, who was on this occasion accompanied by his son. Muhyi al-Din remained with al-Salih Ayyub, while his son journeyed back and forth between Nablus and Cairo, conveying proposals and counterproposals. At length Muhyi al-Din was able to induce the contending parties to agree to a restoration of the *status quo ante*: Egypt and southern Palestine would go to al-'Adil II; the Jordan valley, Judaea, and Samaria would be restored to al-Nasir Da'ud (who was

still in Cairo); and Damascus, the Hauran, and Galilee would remain under al-Salih Ayyub's control. With the principles of an accord at last agreed to, Muhyi al-Din and Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh (whom al-Salih had named as his personal representative) went to Egypt for the formal ratification of the treaty.²⁶

It is possible that this agreement might have stabilized the situation for a brief period, though al-Salih Ayyub's ambitions would probably not have allowed it to endure for very long. But at this point the political structure of Syria was profoundly altered by a totally unexpected series of events, which culminated in al-Salih Isma'il's seizure of Damascus. This brilliant coup d'état was the result of a complex conspiracy between al-Salih Isma'il of Baalbek and al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs, with 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad participating in a minor role. Al-Salih Isma'il's motives for this rash adventure are not mentioned in the sources; we can only postulate his desire to recover the power and influence which he had so briefly enjoyed after the death of al-Ashraf. Al-Mujahid's reasons, on the other hand, are not in doubt: as long as al-Salih Ayyub was the ruler of Damascus, Homs would be in danger of attack. The terms of the agreement between al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mujahid are uncertain. We are told that they intended to divide al-Salih Ayyub's possessions between them, with al-Salih Isma'il taking Damascus; this may have meant that he was to take control of all south Syria, while al-Mujahid would attempt to seize Diyar Mudar, but we cannot be sure. While the groundwork for the conspiracy was being laid, al-Salih Isma'il wrote to al-'Adil II in Cairo to inform him of his intentions; once in control of Damascus, he said, he would act only as the sultan's vicegerent, making the *khutba* and *sikka* in his name exclusively.²⁷

It was part of al-Salih Isma'il's carefully laid scheme to create as much support as possible for himself before he moved openly. Along with his son al-Mansur Mahmud he sent a number of secret agents, chief among them the amir Nasir al-Din Isma'il b. Yaghmur, to recruit adherents to his cause among

al-Salih Ayyub's troops. At the same time he had sympathizers in Damascus, led by one Najm al-Din b. Salam, working to undermine the loyalty of Ayyub's officials and garrison there. Many of Ayyub's loyal supporters were quite aware of what was going on, but when one reported his suspicions, Ayyub retorted that if he lost his horsewhip in the desert, his uncle would not dare to retrieve it. Thereafter no one said anything further for fear of al-Salih Ayyub's wrath.²⁸

But eventually he began to grow suspicious of al-Salih Isma'il's extraordinary procrastination in joining him, so he sent to Baalbek a special envoy, the noted physician Sa'd al-Din al-Dimashqi, to find out what his vassal was doing. Sa'd al-Din secretly brought with him a coop of carrier pigeons so that he could keep his sovereign informed on a daily basis. It was immediately obvious that al-Salih's feverish preparations had nothing to do with Nablus, but were aimed at the conquest of Damascus, and Sa'd al-Din wrote up the appropriate reports to send to Nablus. Unfortunately al-Salih Isma'il's *wazir*, Amin al-Daula al-Samiri, discovered Sa'd al-Din's pigeons and substituted other birds, so that his careful reports never reached their destination. Worse still, the original pigeons were used to send forged messages that al-Salih Isma'il would soon be on his way to Nablus.²⁹

When everything was in readiness in Baalbek, al-Salih Isma'il requested that al-Mansur Mahmud be permitted to return to Baalbek to conduct its affairs while Isma'il was absent on campaign in Egypt. Al-Salih Ayyub naively acceded to this request, and for some unknown reason he decided at the same time to send his own son al-Mughith 'Umar back to Damascus. It seems that he was accompanied only by a personal escort; certainly he took no large number of troops with him.³⁰

Damascus had been left almost undefended, and the conspirators' chances were unexpectedly improved even further by a strange incident in Hama. Al-Muzaffar Mahmud had learned of what was being plotted in Baalbek and Homs and was preparing to send a detachment to strengthen the skeleton garrison stationed in Damascus, when rumors suddenly started

circulating through Hama that the prince intended to surrender his city to the Franks. These rumors were undoubtedly connected with the arrival in early Safar 637/September 1239 of a new crusade led by Theobald of Champagne. They may also, of course, have been deliberately and maliciously spread by provocateurs. Many of the leading notables and army officers of Hama believed them and fled precipitously to Homs to seek refuge with al-Mujahid Shirkuh. This prince exploited his opportunity to the full by throwing the confused refugees into prison, and he even went so far as to torture several of the leading persons among them. By virtue of this incredible misfortune, al-Muzaffar's capacity to intervene in Damascus (or in any situation at all for years to come) was destroyed.³¹

With al-Salih Ayyub still encamped at Nablus and no possibility of interference from Hama, the circumstances now seemed wholly propitious for a strike against Damascus. Late in Safar 637/September 1239 al-Salih Isma'il set out from Baalbek with a mixed force of infantry and cavalry and marched down the Bika' to Majdal 'Anjar, a point at the mouth of the major pass leading through the Anti-Lebanon to Damascus. From here he sent a message to al-Salih Ayyub that he would soon join him in Nablus, but at dawn the next morning he turned east towards Damascus. By nightfall al-Salih Isma'il's forces were in the hills just east of Damascus. Meantime, al-Mujahid Shirkuh had taken the desert route. At daybreak 27 Safar/28 September the combined forces of Homs and Baalbek stormed Damascus at the Bab al-Faradis. Some of al-Salih Isma'il's men clambered up onto the roof of the Khan of Ibn al-Muqaddam (a structure adjacent to the wall which had almost proved the city's undoing in 597/1201), from which they climbed onto the walls, ran down behind the Bab al-Faradis, and broke it open before the rest of the attackers. In all this they were aided by their fellow conspirators within the city, and within the hour all resistance had ceased. Al-Mughith 'Umar and a few of the garrison were indeed still holding out in the citadel, but they were helpless there. Al-Salih Isma'il opened his second reign in Damascus by announcing that henceforth the *khutba* and

sikka would be made in the name of al-'Adil II and that he considered himself no more than the sultan's *na'ib* and *ghulam*.³²

The next morning, 28 Safar/29 September, al-Salih and al-Mujahid laid siege to the citadel. Though it was defended by a tiny garrison, it resisted stubbornly for three days. Only when al-Mughith saw that no help would arrive from his father in time to save the citadel did he decide to ask for terms. He was granted safe-conduct, but no sooner had al-Salih Isma'il entered the citadel than he seized and imprisoned the young prince in one of the great towers. He was too useful a hostage to release merely because of a promise.³³

The superbly executed manoeuvre of al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mujahid Shirkuh threw the affairs of the empire into an extraordinary muddle. There were now three distinct, yet interrelated, conflicts being waged among the Ayyubid princes. Three men claimed the throne of Damascus: al-Salih Isma'il, al-Salih Ayyub, and al-Nasir Da'ud. Isma'il held the strongest position in this struggle by virtue of possession, but it seems doubtful that he would have had the power to retain the city in the face of a determined counteroffensive by al-Salih Ayyub. Ayyub had by far the greatest financial and manpower resources; not only did he have a sizeable army at Nablus, but he could also call on the Khwarizmians and his troops stationed in the Jazira. On the other hand he was now completely isolated from his old power base east of the Euphrates, and his capacity to act depended entirely on the loyalty of his army at Nablus. Al-Nasir Da'ud, with the poorest dominions and the smallest army, certainly appeared the weakest contender. Only a unique combination of circumstances, skillfully exploited, could have returned Damascus to him.

A second conflict was that between al-'Adil II and al-Salih Ayyub for the sultanate, a struggle which was particularly envenomed by al-Salih's hatred and envy of his younger brother. In such rivalries the princes of Damascus had always somehow been involved, but this time al-Salih Ayyub was a central figure in the conflict over both Damascus and the sultanate.

Finally there was a long-smoldering affair between Homs and Hama over Salamiyya; though it had begun only as a political manoeuvre, both princes had come to take it very seriously indeed, to the point that they consistently aligned themselves on opposite sides of the greater struggles of these years. Until all three of these conflicts had been resolved, there could be no peace in the Ayyubid empire.

As soon as al-Salih Ayyub learned of his uncle's attack on his capital, he ordered his *ustadh al-dar*, Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, to lead a detachment to its relief. But by the time the amir had reached Kiswa, a day's march south of Damascus, he learned that he was already too late and returned to Baysan to inform al-Salih Ayyub, who was following him with the bulk of the army. As-Salih Ayyub pressed on, hoping to arrive before the citadel had fallen, but at Qasr Mu'in al-Din the news arrived that it too was taken. Al-Salih's army, for all its imposing size, had been somewhat makeshift and was held together chiefly by the hope of future rewards and glory. Now that their leader's cause no longer appeared so auspicious, they had little interest in remaining with him. Moreover al-Salih Isma'il's agents had done their work well, with fair promises of rank and land for all those who deserted. The four minor Ayyubid princes were the first to seek al-Salih Ayyub's permission to return to Damascus, where, they pointed out, their families were residing unprotected. They were followed by almost all the leaders of the army, including even the Egyptian amirs who had so recently joined him. At last he was left with a tiny personal entourage of some seventy *mamluks*, in addition to a few of his most loyal retainers: Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, Baha' al-Din Zuhayr, and the *amir-jandar* Zayn al-Din.³⁴

Al-Salih Ayyub and his little band now had to decide what to do. Some argued that he should ensconce himself in the cave-fortress of Tyron in Lebanon until he could gather an army capable of taking the field against al-Salih Isma'il, while others thought he should return to Diyar Mudar, where he had plenty of soldiers as well as powerful fortresses. But he rejected both

these counsels as almost certain to lead to his own capture and decided instead to return to Nablus and seek asylum with his cousin al-Nasir Da'ud. At sunrise the next day al-Salih's party began its journey; in the Jordan valley they were very nearly overwhelmed by a band of Yazidi Bedouin led by one of al-Salih Isma'il's *mamluk* amirs, but after a sharp fight the marauders were beaten off.³⁵

As soon as he reached Nablus, al-Salih Ayyub sent to al-Nasir Da'ud in al-Karak seeking asylum. Al-Nasir had just returned from Cairo in anger and frustration, for al-'Adil had supported or at least condoned al-Salih Isma'il's takeover in Damascus instead of recognizing al-Nasir as the rightful ruler of that city. (With al-Nasir had come the amir Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich, who had become discouraged with the youthful sultan's attitude towards him and decided to try his fortunes with another master; as his *iqta'* he was conceded the vital fortress of 'Ajlun.) Al-Nasir was delighted to learn of Ayyub's presence in Nablus, seeing therein a superb opportunity to gain a new if not altogether willing ally in his struggle to regain Damascus. He sent a detachment of 300 cavalry under 'Imad al-Din b. Musak (who had come to join his service at some point after his flight from Damascus two years before) and Zahir al-Din Sungur al-Halabi.³⁶ They informed al-Salih that their sovereign had accepted his plea for refuge and even did him the honor of installing him in al-Mu'azzam's old palace in Nablus. But a few days later the refugees were told that Theobald of Champagne's crusaders had launched a raid along the coast, and al-Salih's companions accompanied the force which al-Nasir sent out to repel it, leaving their master almost alone in Nablus. At this point the crusader raid was revealed as a ruse to isolate the prince from his followers; al-Salih was seized and sent off to al-Karak, seated on a mule, with little food or drink until he reached his destination. With him were only his favorite concubine, Shajar al-Durr, and a *mamluk* amir named Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Salihi.³⁷

Once he reached al-Karak, however, he was treated with honor and courtesy. Al-Nasir justified his cousin's confinement

by protesting that he only meant to protect him from the nefarious designs of al-Salih Isma'il and al-'Adil II. The members of al-Salih's entourage were permitted to remain with their master if they so desired, and while most did stay, the *amir-jandar* Zayn al-Din and Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali asked leave to return to Damascus. When they arrived, they found themselves sharing the fate of those who had previously put their trust in al-Salih Isma'il; they were thrown into prison, where four of the Egyptian amirs had already died as a result of their harsh treatment.³⁸

Al-'Adil was of course delighted to learn of his brother's capture and at once requested that al-Nasir turn the prisoner over to him, in return for which he would pay an indemnity of 100,000 *dinars*. But al-Nasir was not interested, for he knew that to do so would only strengthen the men who had once again deprived him of Damascus—al-'Adil himself, al-Salih Isma'il, and al-Mujahid Shirkuh.³⁹

While al-Nasir was waiting for an opportunity to make use of his valuable captive, he saw a chance to reinforce his possessions west of the Jordan. On 14 Rabi' II 637/13 November 1239 a large crusader force under Count Henry of Bar had been cut to pieces near Gaza by an advance force al-'Adil II had sent out to guard Egypt's frontiers. Although the Franks' numerical losses had not been crippling, they were so demoralized that they could not act for several months. Since the expiration some months earlier of the truce between al-Kamil and Frederick II, the Christians of Jerusalem had been feverishly trying to restore that city's fortifications, but as yet its only protection was a small garrison in the Tower of David, the one element of the city's defenses which al-Mu'azzam had left standing in 616/1219. It was thus an easy matter for al-Nasir Da'ud to occupy the city; the garrison in the Tower of David were compelled to surrender on safe-conduct on 9 Jumada I 637/7 December 1239, after a siege of twenty-one days.⁴⁰

Soon after this victory there was a new attempt to create a general peace in the Ayyubid empire by Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Jauzi and Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh, who had been caught flat-

footed in Cairo by the astounding sequence of events in Syria. Sometime in Jumada I/December the two men arrived in Damascus, where Muhyi al-Din, as the Caliph's envoy, received especially deferential treatment from the new prince. But these well-meant efforts were all in vain, because while al-Salih Isma'il and al-'Adil II were perfectly willing to respect each other's rights, al-Nasir Da'ud would not accept any terms which did not ensure him the immediate restoration of Damascus.⁴¹

Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh quickly saw that Muhyi al-Din's diplomacy would accomplish nothing towards the release of al-Salih Ayyub and decided to go on alone to the friendly city of Hama. There he confirmed the ties between al-Salih Ayyub and al-Muzaffar Mahmud. He then went on to Harran, where he conferred with Husam al-Din Berke-Khan, the chief of al-Salih's Khwarizmian mercenaries, trying to persuade him to come to the aid of his imprisoned sovereign. To this end Jamal al-Din produced a letter from al-Nasir Da'ud, which stated in substance that he had acted only to preserve al-Salih from his enemies and that he intended to release him as soon as circumstances permitted and to assist him in reestablishing his power; in the meantime al-Nasir called on the Khwarizmians to unleash an attack against Homs and Aleppo. His mission completed, Jamal al-Din returned to reside in Hama until al-Salih was released.⁴²

By the spring of 637/1240 the pressure on al-Nasir to release his prisoner had begun to mount. Al-Muzaffar of Hama sent his Chief Qadi Shihab al-Din ibn Abi al-Damm to al-Salih Isma'il, al-Nasir Da'ud, and al-'Adil II; his ostensible purpose was to announce that henceforth al-Muzaffar would make the *khutba* in the name of al-'Adil II, dropping that of al-Salih Ayyub altogether. Shihab al-Din's real purpose was to advise al-Nasir to release Ayyub and support him in the conquest of Egypt. Three of al-Nasir's most influential amirs, 'Imad al-Din b. Musak, Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich, and Zahir al-Din Sungur al-Halabi, counselled him likewise. Thus on 27 Ramadan 637/21 April 1240, after a captivity of seven months, al-Salih Ayyub was released from al-Karak and sent to meet

with al-Nasir Da'ud in Nablus. There al-Nasir ordered the *khutba* to be pronounced in the name of his former prisoner, thus symbolizing his recognition of him as sultan of the Ayyubid empire. The two princes then proceeded to the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, and there, in the most sacred place in Palestine, they swore an oath of alliance. The terms of this alliance (and hence of al-Salih Ayyub's release from captivity) are differently reported in the various sources; but if one follows a middle path, it would seem that al-Salih Ayyub was to receive Egypt and the sultanate, while al-Nasir Da'ud was to be invested with Damascus (together with its usual dependencies) and the Jazira.⁴³

This was an enormous price for al-Nasir to demand for al-Salih's release, and one cannot help wondering if he thought it would really be honored once al-Salih was in a position to fulfill his promises. Perhaps he felt that a man of al-Salih's intense ambition would try to absorb the entire empire, once he controlled the great financial and military resources of Egypt, and that this eventuality could be prevented only if he himself was almost equally powerful.

From Jerusalem the two princes led their small army to Gaza. If it came to a real fight, they could not hope to defeat al-'Adil, since the army of al-Karak was obviously no match for that of Egypt. But they confidently assumed that as they approached Egypt, many of al-Adil's leading amirs would desert him. In fact, however, al-'Adil led his forces to Bilbays with no evidence of dissension or disloyalty. More than that, he also obtained the support of his Syrian allies, for while he was encamped at Bilbays, al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mansur Ibrahim of Homs (who had succeeded his father al-Mujahid Shirkuh in Rajab 637/February 1240) led their combined armies to al-Fawwar in the Sawad. When al-Nasir and al-Salih Ayyub saw that they were held between two armies, each of which was much larger than theirs, they retreated in despair to Nablus. Here al-Nasir advised that they return to al-Karak, but al-Salih thought (or so he later claimed) that this was a trap, that al-Nasir would simply imprison him again and make

a rapprochement with Isma'il and al-'Adil. Instead he journeyed to a shrine south of Nablus to plead for divine assistance. While he was there, a messenger came to give him the astounding news that on 8 Dhu-l-Qa'da/31 May al-'Adil II had been seized by his troops and put under close guard. Al-Salih Ayyub was invited to come at once and assume the sultanate and the throne of Egypt.⁴⁴

It had become obvious to al-'Adil's chief amirs, who consisted mostly of his father's commanders and the leaders of the Ashrafiyya corps, that he had to be deposed; they could no longer stomach his hedonism and his favoritism towards his own courtiers. However there was a division as to who should succeed him. The Ashrafiyya would have preferred al-Salih Isma'il, a Syrian prince whom they had known for many years, but al-Kamil's men played the part of legitimists and insisted on al-Salih Ayyub, the oldest son and original heir of their master. The Ashrafiyya, much the smaller group, eventually had to go along with the latter choice.⁴⁵ It should be noted that there was never any question of electing someone other than an Ayyubid prince; even when the military claimed the right to dispose of the throne, it did not claim the supreme authority for itself.

Al-Salih Ayyub and al-Nasir Da'ud hurried from Nablus to Bilbays and from there to Cairo. On 24 Dhu-l-Qa'da 637/16 June 1240 al-Salih made a triumphal entry into the great citadel of Saladin to become the head of the Ayyubid empire.⁴⁶ If it had been predicted at the time of al-Kamil's death that al-Salih Ayyub would eventually become sultan, few would have deemed this unlikely, but no one could possibly have foreseen the incredible sequence of events which led to this final triumph, for every step had made it seem less and less likely. Even when he finally ascended the throne, it must have seemed that he could never reunify the empire, for no Ayyubid sultan had ever faced such openly hostile principalities at the outset of his reign. In Damascus ruled the man who had almost wrecked his career, a man whose energy and cleverness were not open to doubt, and he was solidly supported by the able

new prince of Homs. Aleppo was as intensely jealous of its independence as ever, and any threat to it was bound to draw a quick and hostile response. On the other hand al-Salih Ayyub had an important ally in Hama, and he still ruled most of the Jazira as well as Egypt. If he used effectively the resources available to him, he might yet override his opposition.

The second reign of al-Salih Isma'il:

637/1240–643/1245

Now that he had attained the supreme authority in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, at least in name, al-Salih Ayyub had no intention of honoring his extravagant commitments to al-Nasir Da'ud. On the contrary he was quite eager to be rid of his erstwhile ally, who was a nuisance in any event and might possibly prove a threat. Even on the road from Nablus to Cairo, al-Salih had heard disturbing rumors about his cousin—that he intended to seize the sultanate for himself and even that he had tried to convince some of al-Salih's *mamluks* to murder their master. On the other hand after the two princes had reached Cairo, al-Nasir had requested the cession of al-Shaubak, possession of which would complete his control of Transjordan. This was refused; nor would the new sultan provide any of the troops he had promised to al-Nasir for the reconquest of Damascus. Al-Salih declared openly that all his commitments to the prince of al-Karak were invalid, having been extorted from him under duress. Disheartened by this new disappointment and learning that al-Salih planned to arrest him, al-Nasir asked leave to return to his own lands. At the end of 637/July 1240 he left Egypt for the last time.⁴⁷

As soon as al-Nasir had reached al-Karak, he sent to al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mansur Ibrahim, seeking to form a new Syrian coalition against the ambitions of Ayyub. If he could not recover his father's principality, he was at least determined to retain the little he had. Al-Salih Isma'il accepted with

alacrity; he was himself desperately searching for allies, for he knew that he would be his nephew Ayyub's chief target. On 4 Muharram 638/26 July 1240, he proposed to Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim, then returning to Aleppo from an embassy in Cairo, that Aleppo should join him in an alliance against al-Salih Ayyub. But Dayfa Khatun rejected the invitation out of hand. Aleppo traditionally tried to keep clear of disputes between Egypt and Damascus; moreover, Kamal al-Din's embassy had obtained from Ayyub a formal commitment to respect the independence of Dayfa Khatun's government, and this doubtless appeared a better guarantee of her position than an alliance with Damascus.⁴⁸

There was now only one considerable power left to whom al-Salih Isma'il could turn, the Franks of Acre. Ordinarily they were too weak to do any more than defend themselves, but the presence of Theobald of Champagne's crusade made them well worth consideration. Despite the extraordinary ineffectiveness of this crusade so far, Theobald still led perhaps 5,000 heavy cavalry in addition to his infantry forces, and this would be an invaluable addition to al-Salih Isma'il's meager resources. Therefore early in 638/late summer 1240 he proposed to Theobald a defensive alliance against Egypt. In return for Frankish support al-Salih Isma'il would turn over all his possessions in Galilee and south Lebanon. Although all this region's major castles—Safad, Tyron, Beaufort, Chastel-Neuf, and Toron—had been at least partially dismantled for many years, they could quickly be restored and would provide a solid basis for Frankish control. Tiberias was probably included in Isma'il's offer, and he must also have confirmed the cession of Sidon made in the treaty with Frederick II. Finally, it seems likely that Jerusalem (excluding the Haram area) was returned to the Franks, presumably with the consent of al-Nasir Da'ud.⁴⁹

It was certainly one of the most humiliating offers which any Ayyubid prince had yet been forced to make to the Franks, and Theobald, though not a wise or energetic leader, recognized at once its great strategic benefits and accepted it without dispute. Al-Salih Isma'il's own subjects, on the other hand,

were shocked. He was denounced in scathing terms from the pulpit of the Umayyad Mosque by the new *khatib* there, 'Izz al-Din 'Abd al-Salam al-Sulami, one of the greatest Shafi'i doctors of his age. He was joined by the equally noted Maliki grammarian Jamal al-Din Abu 'Amr ibn al-Hajib. In retaliation al-Salih Isma'il arrested them both and ordered them to leave his lands at once; the two men made their way to Egypt, where al-Sulami soon became qadi of Fustat.⁵⁰

Such opposition was not surprising when it came from pietist circles deeply imbued with the duty and sanctity of *jihad*; less expected was the recalcitrance of the commandant of Beaufort. He was an old retainer of al-Salih Isma'il, having begun as the master of his kitchen, but when he refused to surrender his castle to the Frankish lord of Sidon, Isma'il ordered him to return to Damascus, where he had him summarily executed. However the second-in-command, a man named Shihab al-Din Ahmad al-Shaqifi al-Mu'tamid, proved equally stubborn. He wrote to al-Nasir Da'ud for assistance and received back royal banners to signify that the castle was now under al-Nasir's protection. But he was too far away and too concerned himself about the Franks and Egypt to do anything further. When Isma'il saw that the garrison of Beaufort would not surrender the castle of its own accord, he was forced to besiege it with the army of Damascus. Its defenders finally surrendered it to him, saying that they were at least giving it to a Muslim prince, and he could do with it what he liked.⁵¹

If we can accept as authentic a story reported by Ibn Shaddad, this was not the worst of al-Salih's embarrassments. The Templars were given the ruined fortress of Safad by Theobald, and they decided to restore it by using some of the Muslims then prisoner in Acre. The prisoners assigned to the project numbered about 1,000 men, while they were guarded by less than 200 Templars. It occurred to the Muslims that they could easily overpower their captors, but unless they were provided with a secure refuge afterwards, their revolt would obviously come to no good end. Thus they sent secretly to Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich in 'Ajlun about their scheme, and he in turn

informed his suzerain al-Nasir, advising that a force he sent to occupy Safad and drive off any attempted Frankish counter-attack. But al-Nasir, now allied to al-Salih Isma'il, did not want to involve himself in any affair which might jeopardize al-Salih's Frankish alliance, so he sent this delicate correspondence on to Isma'il in Damascus. He in turn conveyed it to the Templars, who acted with their customary vigor: they seized the prisoners at Safad, dragged them back to Acre, and slaughtered them to a man.⁵²

In spite of the angry reaction of al-Salih Isma'il's subjects to his treaty with Theobald, the time was a propitious one for an alliance against the ruler of Egypt, for al-Salih Ayyub was deeply immersed in internal troubles. Almost as soon as he had taken control of Cairo, he began to hear rumors that the Ashrafiyya were conspiring to depose him and install his hated uncle al-Salih Isma'il on the throne of Egypt. He at once shut himself up in the Cairo citadel and refused to go out for fear they would try to assassinate him. Early in 638/late summer 1240 he began making mass arrests among not only the Ashrafiyya but also the chief amirs of al-Kamil—i.e., the very men who had elevated him to the sultanate. To replace them he began purchasing large numbers of Kipchak slaves (now more available than ever before because of the Mongol invasions in Central Asia), and these formed the elite guard of his army.⁵³

Under such circumstances Ayyub had no way to counter militarily the Franco-Damascene alliance, although he did send a force to Gaza to keep watch on a combined army which Theobald and al-Salih Isma'il had posted south of Jaffa. But he still could use diplomacy, and this he did with superb skill, by exploiting a serious division in the Frankish camp between the local barons and the Templars on the one hand and the Hospitallers and the newcomers from Europe on the other. The treaty with al-Salih Isma'il was generally regarded as a victory for the Templar party, and as a consequence the Hospitallers were intensely jealous. They set about arguing to Theobald that he should break the alliance with Damascus—

especially now that he had occupied all the areas ceded to him by it—and make a new treaty with al-Salih Ayyub of Egypt, from whom he could undoubtedly extract concessions in southern Palestine as well as the freedom of those taken prisoner at Gaza the year before. Theobald at length yielded to their urgings and found al-Salih Ayyub very willing to strike a bargain. The sultan ceded Ascalon and the district (but not the town) of Gaza, neither of which he really controlled anyhow, and in addition agreed to release the captives of Gaza, the represented the victory of his deposed brother al-‘Adil II. Al-Salih Isma‘il’s treaty with the Franks was thus broken almost before it had taken effect; his territorial concessions and public humiliation were totally in vain. Theobald of Champagne departed almost at once after concluding the alliance with al-Salih Ayyub, leaving Acre early in Rabi‘ I 638/late September 1240 with all his troops.⁵⁴

About the time that Theobald of Champagne was embarking for France, an unexpected new danger, not only for al-Salih Isma‘il but for all the Syrian princes, emerged in the north. The Khwarizmians whom al-Salih Ayyub had installed in Diyar Mudar some four years before suddenly swept across the Euphrates into north Syria. The cause of this massive raid is not stated; it may have been purposeless marauding, inspired by this people’s essential rootlessness, or it may have had some connection with the mission of Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh to Harran the year before. The invaders numbered roughly 12,000 horsemen, and an Aleppan force of 1500 regular cavalry (all who were available at that moment) led against them by al-Mu‘azzam Turanshah was cut to pieces (14 Rabi‘ II/2 November). It was fortunate for Dayfa Khatun, who had so brusquely rejected the overtures of al-Salih Isma‘il three months earlier, that al-Mansur Ibrahim of Homs had assembled a contingent of 1000 troopers, made up of units from Damascus and Homs, in order to counter yet another wave of Crusaders just arrived in Acre under Richard earl of Cornwall. When al-Mansur learned of the Aleppan disaster, he decided that the Khwarizmians were the greater threat and at once led his forces to

Aleppo, entering the city on 23 Rabi' II/11 November, only two days after Manbij had been put to the torch by the Khwarizmians. It was by now late in the year, and the invaders retreated back across the Euphrates unopposed, but it was obvious that they might renew their raids the following spring. In Jumada II 638/December 1240-January 1241, therefore, Dayfa Khatun sent Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim to Damascus to seek more assistance. Al-Salih Isma'il agreed to send a second contingent, knowing that unless the Khwarizmians were rapidly defeated, the Syrian princes would be crushed in a vice between them and the army of Egypt. According to Ibn Bibi, Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusrau also ordered his governor in Malatya to lead an expeditionary force of 3000 troops drawn from the Seljukid border fortresses to the aid of Aleppo.⁵⁵

In Rajab 638/January 1241 the Khwarizmians again struck across the Euphrates. Al-Mansur Ibrahim, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the allied forces, followed in their wake. The invaders proceeded southwards at first, pillaging Sarmin, Kafartab, and Shayzar, and then began withdrawing eastward toward the Euphrates. Al-Mansur caught up with them at Raqqa on 5 Sha'ban/19 February, but his forces were worsted in an all-day fight and could not prevent the Khwarizmians from crossing the river. The Khwarizmians now retreated to their center at Harran to regroup their forces, while al-Mansur crossed the Euphrates further north at al-Bira. On 21 Ramadan/5 April he finally drew the Khwarizmians into a pitched battle near Edessa and gave them a terrible beating. They fled headlong back to Harran, gathered their families, and moved south to take refuge in 'Ana, a caliphal possession on the Euphrates. During the next year the Khwarizmians were successively in the service of the caliphate, Badr al-Din Lu'lu' of Mosul, and al-Muzaffar Ghazi of Mayyafariqin, and they served their new masters no better than they had the Rum Seljukids or al-Salih Ayyub.

After the battle at Edessa all Diyar Mudar was open to the Aleppan forces, and in short order they had seized every major town in the region. (Qarqisiyya and al-Khabur, however, were

annexed by al-Mansur as part of his own principality of Homs.) Finally, al-Mansur's forces joined a Rum Seljukid army and together they overwhelmed the great fortress of Amida. In one brief campaign al-Salih Ayyub's vast Jaziran possessions were all but wiped out; only Hisn Kayfa was still his.⁵⁶

This campaign seems to have brought a temporary end to hostilities between the rulers of Damascus and Egypt. Al-Salih Ayyub was doubtless too deeply involved with reconstructing his army in Egypt to intervene in Syria, and it was plainly to Isma'il's interest not to arouse his powerful neighbor. This does not mean that all was calm in the Ayyubid empire—far from it. The Khwarizmians continued to be a disruptive element in the Jazira, necessitating new punitive expeditions by Aleppo in Safar 639/July-August 1241 and again in Safar 640/August 1242. (In the second of these, al-Mansur Ibrahim was again the Aleppan commander, gaining a clear-cut but not yet decisive victory over his opponents.) In Palestine there were intermittent clashes between the Franks and al-Nasir Da'ud, who now bore the onerous burden of defending the holy places. This fighting culminated in a Templar raid on Nablus on 4 Jumada I 640/30 October 1242; during a savage three-day sack of the city, at least 1,000 of its inhabitants were killed and many women and children were carried off to the slave markets of Acre. The raiders retreated before the advance of al-Nasir Da'ud from al-Karak, but he was not strong enough to launch a reprisal by himself, nor did his pleas to al-Salih Ayyub find any response. This last fact is one of the most significant aspects of the tragic affair, for it demonstrates the sultan's aloofness from the affairs of the empire at this time.⁵⁷

All that we know of al-Salih Isma'il during these years has to do with the fate of his nephew al-Jawad Yunus. Al-Jawad had successively been expelled from Sinjar by Badr al-Din of Mosul, attached to the Khwarizmians in their raid of 638/1240-41, in the service of al-Nasir Da'ud, and finally a refugee among the Franks of Acre. After he participated in the raid on Nablus, al-Salih Isma'il finally decided to get rid of this

dangerous adventurer once and for all. He sent the trusted amir Nasir al-Din b. Yaghmur to try to beguile him into returning to Damascus, but this ploy very nearly backfired, for (at least according to rumor) the two men made an agreement between themselves to depose al-Salih. Somehow al-Salih got wind of this scheme and threw both of them into prison. Nasir al-Din, formerly a valued retainer, was reasonably treated, but al-Jawad died in mysterious circumstances in Shawwal 641/March 1244. A contemporary rumor said he had been strangled.⁵⁸

Sometime during 641/1243 a new exchange of correspondence occurred between Ayyub and Isma'il, apparently on Ayyub's initiative; it concerned the establishment of peace between the rulers of Cairo and Damascus, and indeed among all the princes of the empire. The time was well chosen, since there had been no open hostilities between them since late 638/mid-1241. A political settlement was attained quite readily; it was based on a recognition of the *status quo*, with three significant changes. First, al-Salih Ayyub was to be recognized as "*sahib al-khutba wa-l-sikka*"—i.e., as sultan—throughout the empire, and especially in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, where this honor had so far been denied him. Second, Ayyub's associates who had been imprisoned in Damascus since Isma'il had occupied the city were to be released and their property restored. In this connection the sultan was especially concerned for his son and heir apparent al-Mughith 'Umar. Finally, the rulers of Damascus and Egypt agreed to divide between themselves the possessions of al-Nasir Da'ud, thus ridding themselves of a man who was a nuisance and a threat to both.⁵⁹

The burden of these conditions lay upon al-Salih Isma'il, and he set out at once to honor them. Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, imprisoned at Baalbek under the harshest conditions, was released and brought to Damascus, where he was awarded a robe of honor by al-Salih Isma'il and instructed to lead the other associates of Ayyub back to Egypt. Al-Mughith was released from confinement and allowed the liberty of the city, but he was not permitted to depart until such time as the final oaths sealing the peace had been sworn.⁶⁰

In the meantime al-Salih Ayyub had sent the *khatib* Asil al-Din al-Is'irdi to Damascus and Homs in order to pronounce the first *khutba* in those cities in his name as head of the Ayyubid empire. This was an exceptionally formal arrangement for carrying out this symbolic change, but undoubtedly al-Salih Ayyub wanted to underline and draw attention to his new dignity. The coinage too was altered in accordance with the treaty provisions. Since the fall of al-'Adil II al-Salih Isma'il had been minting *dirhams* exclusively in the name of the caliph and himself, thus giving himself the dignity of an independent monarch. Henceforth he would mint coins carrying Ayyub's name on the obverse, and his name and the caliph's on the reverse. Eight dirhams survive to show that Isma'il did in fact carry out this part of the agreement.⁶¹

Finally ambassadors of the three Syrian principalities met together in Cairo to swear allegiance to al-Salih Ayyub as sultan on behalf of their respective sovereigns and to hear in return his oath to respect the rights of the Syrian princes. But no sooner was the peace concluded than it collapsed. Of this event we have two accounts which at first appear contradictory, but which in fact may merely be presenting different aspects of the affair. According to Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi, the peace was wrecked by the *wazir* Amin al-Daula al-Samiri, who persuaded al-Salih Isma'il not to permit al-Mughith 'Umar to return to his father in Egypt. We are told nothing of the *wazir's* motives, but these may be clarified by Ibn Wasil's very different account, which is based on conversations with Jalal al-Din al-Khilati. Jalal al-Din had been al-Salih Isma'il's chief negotiator, and he was in Cairo when the new peace broke down. He says that just before the final oaths were to be sworn, he received a letter from his master which contained a second letter, addressed from al-Salih Ayyub to the Khwarizmians. In it al-Salih urged them to invade Syria at once and declared that he had pretended to make a peace treaty with his uncle only in order to gain the release of his son before he himself attacked the Syrians. Jalal al-Din al-Khilati presented the incriminating document to Ayyub's *wazir*, Mu'in al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, who

stood speechless, unable to invent any explanation at all for it. If both accounts—Ibn Wasil's and Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī's—are authentic, then Amin al-Daula's conduct is easily explained. The only hope of making al-Salīḥ Ayyūb adhere to his promises was to keep al-Mughith in Damascus, where he might at least be a useful hostage. At any rate the young prince was again locked up in the citadel of Damascus, and his father's name was stricken immediately from the *khutba* and *sikka*.⁶²

Once again al-Salīḥ Isma'īl had to try to construct a Syrian coalition. After the preliminary agreement with Ayyūb had been reached, he had been so eager to occupy his portion of al-Nasir Da'ūd's lands that he had immediately sent a force to besiege 'Ajlun. The siege against this castle had now dragged on for some time without success, and Isma'īl decided to recall his army and try to patch up his relations with al-Nasir. Aleppo and Homs had likewise broken ties with Ayyūb, and a new Syrian alliance thus came into being. But although Aleppo had now become quite a large state, perhaps second only to Egypt, the allies did not think they could stand alone against the combined power of Egypt and the Khwarizmians, so late in 641/winter-spring 1244 they turned again to the Franks of Acre. This time they certainly did surrender Jerusalem, so recently reconquered for Islam by al-Nasir Da'ūd, granting to the Christians even the right to install their cult in the Haram al-Sharif—a concession which al-Kamil had scrupulously avoided. In addition they promised that if they were able to effect the conquest of Egypt with Frankish support, they would concede to them a portion of that land also.⁶³

Once the treaty was concluded, Isma'īl sent an advance force to Gaza to block the road from Egypt into Palestine, while al-Nasir Da'ūd established his army near Jerusalem in order to be able to respond quickly to an Egyptian advance. Al-Mansur Ibrahim meantime proceeded to Acre to make precise plans for the conduct of the upcoming war. But at the beginning of 642/early summer 1244 the Khwarizmians again crossed the Euphrates; they swept south into Palestine in two large bodies, one penetrating the Biqa' and the other passing through the

Ghuta. A force of 10,000 cavalry, they included not only Khwarizmians properly speaking—i.e., troops who had originally come with Jalal al-Din—but also a new Kurdish group, the Qaymariyya. Learning of their approach, Isma'il hastily recalled his army from Gaza, not to oppose the invaders but to prevent its annihilation by them, while al-Nasir Da'ud hurriedly retreated to the relative security of al-Karak. The Khwarizmians looted and murdered without opposition on their progress south, but they did not pause to attack any major towns. Then on 3 Safar 642/11 July 1244 they arrived before Jerusalem, in Frankish hands only a few months and still without defenses. The Khwarizmians ravaged the city proper at will, but the garrison in the Tower of David put up a sturdy resistance until 17 Rabi' I/23 August, when it surrendered on safe-conduct. The Khwarizmians destroyed all Christian shrines and monuments in the city, then moved on to Gaza. There they stopped at last and sent to inform al-Salih Ayyub of their arrival.⁶⁴

The sultan now sent a large army to join the Khwarizmians, putting it under the command of the same Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Salihi who had shared his captivity in al-Karak. A second and smaller force, under Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, was posted at Nablus. Meantime al-Mansur Ibrahim, who had twice defeated the Khwarizmians in the East, led the combined armies of Homs and Damascus to Acre where the Franks were fielding an army of 1500 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, probably the largest force raised by the local barons since the fatal summer of 583/1187. In addition al-Nasir had sent troops under the command of Zahir al-Din Sungur al-Halabi. On 13 Jumada I 642/17 October 1244 the opposing armies met at a village in the district of Ascalon named La Forbie (Ar., Harbaya). Al-Mansur, who knew his enemy well, wanted to stand on the defensive for the opening phase of the battle, but he was overruled by his Frankish colleagues, eager to attack at once and be done with the Khwarizmanian menace. The battle was a catastrophe for the Franco-Syrian army. The capacity of the Franks to mount a serious campaign was destroyed forever, so serious were their

losses, and a number of ranking Syrian amirs were taken prisoner. Al-Mansur managed to escape with a few followers to Damascus, but he received a chilly welcome from al-Salih Isma'il, who understood all too well the significance of the disaster.⁶⁵

No barrier now stood between al-Salih Ayyub and a direct assault on Damascus. And a note of personal vengeance was added to his political ambition by the death of his son al-Mughith 'Umar on 22 Rabi I 642/29 August 1244. The sultan was convinced that al-Salih Isma'il and Amin al-Daula al-Samiri had murdered him. But contemporary writers were dubious of this charge, and *a priori* it seems unlikely that al-Salih Isma'il would do something which was bound to convert an already bitter political struggle into a personal vendetta.

Ayyub began his offensive by ordering Rukn al-Din Baybars and Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali to converge with their forces on Ascalon, but the new fortifications of the place were too strong to be carried by a quick assault. The Egyptian army therefore proceeded to Nablus and encamped there to await further instructions. The Samarian and Judaeian hills had been mostly controlled by al-Nasir Da'ud, but he no longer had the wherewithal to hold them, and Ayyub was able to place his governors throughout the entire region without further fighting. Of al-Nasir's once considerable principality, there remained nothing except al-Karak itself, the Balqa', and the castle of 'Ajlun. Indeed, 'Ajlun was really controlled by its resident *muqta'*, Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich rather than by the prince.⁶⁶

In Cairo the sultan appointed his *wazir*, Mu'in al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, to lead the siege of Damascus. He was given full authority to act for the sultan, being granted even such privileges as the use of the royal pavilion (*al-dihliz al-sultani*) and the right to sit at the head of the table and be served by the staff of the royal household. Mu'in al-Din proceeded first to Gaza to join forces with the Khwarizmians and then advanced to Bay-san in the Jordan valley. Here he halted momentarily, probably to organize the administration of the districts around Lake Tiberias. Finally his forces closed on Damascus. Soon after

their arrival, they were joined by a contingent from Aleppo, for after the battle of La Forbie, the ruling clique in Aleppo felt that the only way to secure their own lands from attack by al-Salih Ayyub lay in at least short term cooperation with him.⁶⁷

Damascus, then, was besieged by forces from the two largest Ayyubid states, Egypt and Aleppo, as well as by the Khwarizmian mercenaries, and although Isma'il had al-Mansur and the army of Homs among his defending garrison, it was obvious that the opposing forces were too large to be beaten off. He therefore sent his *wazir*, Amin al-Daula al-Samiri, to Baghdad, apparently even before the siege opened, to try to obtain the intervention of al-Musta'sim, but the response from that quarter was of no practical use. In the meantime Mu'in al-Din's army had kept up severe pressure on Damascus. The city was daily bombarded with mangonels, while the Khwarizmians were employed as raiders to prevent food from entering Damascus. The city suffered serious damage as a result of the fighting: the eastern minaret of the Umayyad Mosque caught fire and was destroyed, and the attackers burnt the suburb of Qasr Hajjaj to the ground in one of their forays. Nor was all the destruction caused by the attacking army. On 9 Muharram 643/6 June 1245 al-Salih Isma'il sent a demolition crew (*zarraqun*) to burn the palace of al-'Adil, which apparently lay against the city's north wall, and in the resulting conflagration the entire quarters of 'Uqayba and al-Rumman were destroyed.⁶⁸

Sometime in Rabi' II 643/September 1243 al-Mansur Ibrahim slipped out of the city to confer with the Khwarizmian chief Berke-Khan; he had not forgiven al-Salih Isma'il's poor reception after La Forbie, and now that money and provisions were low in the beleaguered city, he was thinking of betraying Damascus to the Khwarizmians. But remembering the atrocities visited by these mercenaries upon their victims, he soon thought better of it, and nothing came of his clandestine meeting. Soon afterwards, however, Amin al-Daula went to the headquarters of Mu'in al-Din for a brief parley, probably to sound out terms. Negotiations apparently continued for the

next several days, and the following settlement was agreed upon: al-Salih Isma'il and al-Mansur Ibrahim would receive safe-conduct and security for their personal possessions; al-Mansur would retain his principality of Homs without loss; and al-Salih Isma'il would be allowed to retain the possessions awarded him by al-Kamil in 635/1238—Baalbek, Bosra, and the Sawad. Once these terms were sworn to, the two defending princes slipped away from Damascus during the night and rode quickly to their own lands. On 9 Jumada I 643/2 October 1245 after a siege of more than four months, Mu'in al-Din ibn al-Shaykh entered the city of Damascus. Just after the departure of Isma'il and al-Mansur, an urgent letter arrived from the sultan instructing Mu'in al-Din that he must under no circumstances allow al-Salih Isma'il to escape, that he must be brought in chains to Cairo. The sultan was furious when he learned of what had happened, but for the moment nothing could be done.⁶⁹

The regime of al-Salih Isma'il in Damascus

In his relations with his nephew Ayyub, Isma'il proved wily and energetic, if seldom successful, but his behavior towards his own subjects was altogether reprehensible. This is surprising, in light of his previous experience in government. He was well known to the notables and populace of Damascus, first as al-Ashraf Musa's usual vicegerent and then as prince in his own name for the months between al-Ashraf's death and the conquest by al-Kamil. He seems at this time to have had a good reputation both as a devout man, of orthodox creed and much devoted to the study of the Koran, and as a just and equitable governor. When he seized the city in 637/1239 the Damascenes were probably well disposed to him both on the basis of his past behavior and his strong local identification.⁷⁰

When Isma'il returned from Baalbek, however, he brought with him a new *wazir* and counsellor, Amin al-Daula al-Samiri,

a life-long resident of Baalbek whose uncle had been a *wazir* to al-Amjad Bahramshah. His entire family was of the Samaritan religion, although Amin al-Daula himself had converted to Islam in his youth. When al-Salih Isma'il reentered Damascus, he placed the entire conduct of internal affairs in Amin al-Daula's hands, including appointments to the chief religious and juridical offices, probably so that he could devote himself more singlemindedly to the hard task of staying in power.⁷¹ Thus although Amin al-Daula had a real influence on his sovereign's relations with other states, his political impact was most directly felt by the people of Damascus.

Amin al-Daula's regime included two especially oppressive elements: a network of spies and the systematic extortion of money from the well-to-do. The former aspect is well illustrated by an anecdote in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi. He relates that when he returned from Jerusalem soon after the release of al-Salih Ayyub from al-Karak, he spoke of this event with the young professor of the Madrasa Shibliyya. This professor was also a secret agent for Amin al-Daula, and when he reported his conversation with Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi to his employer, he deliberately misrepresented it in such a way that Sibṭ was made to seem largely responsible for al-Salih Ayyub's release. The unfortunate Sibṭ was immediately exiled from Damascus with no further hearing and was able to return only several years later.⁷² Al-Salih Isma'il had of course attained power partly through subversion among the notables of Damascus and was undoubtedly fearful, as successful conspirators are, that the same thing would happen to him unless he took elaborate precautions against it.

Throughout his reign, Isma'il must have faced an unceasing and desperate need for money, for al-Jawad Yunus had bequeathed him an exhausted treasury, and he himself was perpetually engaged in war or in preparations for war. His chief instrument for raising the necessary funds, which could not be fully supplied through the regular taxes, was the chief qadi of Damascus, Rafi' al-Din 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Jili, who had been a minor *faqih* of no particular distinction before he became

acquainted with Amin al-Daula. Rafi' al-Din was appointed to his high office a few months after Damascus had fallen to Isma'il, when al-Mu'azzam's old appointee, Shams al-Din al-Khuwayi, at last died. As chief qadi, Rafi' al-Din had a much broader and more direct contact with the urban populace than did the *wazir* or the regular fiscal officials. Through the systematic use of fraudulent testimony directed against the great merchants of Damascus, he was able to extract enormous sums from them. He later claimed that he had raised in this way the sum of 1,000,000 *dinars* for the treasury. (Al-Salih Isma'il retorted that his efforts had raised no more than 1,000,000 *dirhams*, but that was still a considerable sum of money.)⁷³

Rafi' al-Din at last became so bitterly hated that Amin al-Daula advised al-Salih to depose him, for the people had begun to blame their sufferings on the prince. At the end of 641/mid-1244 Rafi' al-Din was stripped of all his offices and honors, which included not only the qadiship but also the professorships of three of the most prestigious madrasas in the city—the 'Adiliyya Kubra, the Shamiyya, and the 'Adhrawiyya. He was then sent under guard to an isolated place in Mt. Lebanon, where two notaries witnessed the sale of all his property to Amin al-Daula. Then one of the local Christian mountaineers threw him off a high cliff to his death. With his ruin came that of many of his associates, whose careers are unfortunately not transmitted to us. The purge was supervised by the new chief qadi, Muhyi al-Din b. Zaki al-Din al-Qurashi, a noted Shafi'i scholar and the scion of an ancient family which had already given many qadis to Damascus.⁷⁴

As in the case of al-Mu'azzam 'Isa, there was a real unity between al-Salih Isma'il's conduct of foreign policy and his dealings with his subjects. However with al-Mu'azzam the bond was organic, proceeding from his integration into the life of Damascus, so that he became the symbol of its independence and prosperity, while with al-Salih Isma'il the unity was rather a parallel, the consequence of a given personality operating on two different problems. Al-Salih Isma'il never identified himself with the people and culture of Damascus; the city was for

him merely the seat of his regime. He was chiefly concerned to protect his own power and autonomy, and the interests of Damascus were quite incidental to that end. There was nothing inherently reprehensible about al-Salih's attitude—it was indeed far more common and broadly accepted than al-Mu'azzam's. But in securing his throne against outside attack or internal subversion, he displayed a low cunning rather than true intelligence, and instead of honest realism, an opportunism and expediency which were blind to long-term consequences. For the independence of Damascus, such a character was a thin defense against the imperious ambition and vengefulness of al-Salih Ayyub.

8 Damascus as an Egyptian province, 643/1245-648/1250

With its conquest by the armies of al-Salih Ayyub, Damascus lost its status as the capital of an autonomous principality and became merely the seat of a provincial governorship. From the death of Saladin until this time, it had been assumed without question that Damascus would be ruled by a prince of the blood (though of course he might be a political dependent of the sultan) and that this prince would have the right to designate his own successor. The city's turbulent history had more than once subverted this principle, to be sure, but it was still held to be valid even in the case of a prince who owed his throne to conquest. But al-Salih Ayyub, deeply alienated from his family and made cynical and embittered by circumstances, was suspicious of anyone whose political authority did not in some way derive from him. Given the concept of collective sovereignty embodied in the very fabric of the Ayyubid empire, autonomous authority naturally tended to cling to any Ayyubid prince ruling a major town with a political tradition and history of its own. Moreover Damascus was the one principality which had been and might continue to be a serious threat to al-Salih's security in Egypt, and it was a threat which he was no longer willing to tolerate. On the other hand, having established himself as master of Damascus, he displayed no overt hostility towards the other Syrian principalities, at least at the outset. The policies which he was to institute in Damascus during the next five years should be seen in the first instance as symptomatic of his desire for security against any new coups d'état or hostile coalitions. It would certainly be rash to conclude that

they formed part of a consciously conceived general plan for the systematic restructuring of the Ayyubid political order.

Once ensconced in Damascus, Mu'in al-Din ibn al-Shaykh began making the administrative changes necessary to accommodate the city's new political status. No prince of the blood had accompanied him on his expedition, and none was given any part in the government. He himself acted as al-Salih's vicerent, and he divided the local administration between two other figures: as *wali al-qal'a* he appointed the eunuch Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir and to the lesser post of *wali al-madina* he named one Jamal al-Din Harun, of whom nothing further is known. In addition Mu'in al-Din replaced the Chief Qadi Muhyi al-Din b. Zaki al-Din with one of his deputies, Sadr al-Din b. Sani al-Daula.¹ It does not seem to have been an issue of malfeasance—at least the sources hint at nothing of the sort—and Mu'in al-Din was probably simply eliminating all trace of al-Salih Isma'il's appointees in the upper levels of the administration.²

Soon after the conquest of Damascus, al-Salih Ayyub ordered Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, who was still in Nablus, to proceed to Damascus and assume the governorship. Not long after his arrival Mu'in al-Din suddenly died (22 Ramadan 643/10 February 1246), and the executive power in the city was conferred jointly on Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir and Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, although only the former seems to have carried the title of viceroy (*na'ib al-saltana*). The transfer of authority was managed without difficulty, and al-Salih Ayyub's regime in Damascus seemed already securely established.³

The Khwarizmian soldiers encamped around Damascus, however, were becoming dangerously restless. When al-Salih Ayyub had invited them to invade Syria in 642/1244, he had made lavish promises of Egyptian *iqta's* in reward for their services. But when they had reached Gaza, he had forbidden them to enter Egypt at all, for he well knew what unreliable adventurers they were. After Mu'in al-Din entered Damascus, he had distributed to them numerous *iqta's*, both in the immediate area and in Palestine, but these were not commensurate

with their own estimate of what they deserved.⁴

At length the frustrated Khwarizmians launched a fearfully destructive raid into Darayya, an important village some five miles south of Damascus. Then they began seeking allies for a rebellion against al-Salih Ayyub. It was not difficult to obtain the adherence of the three most important independent rulers remaining in south Syria—al-Salih Isma'il of Baalbek, al-Nasir Da'ud of al-Karak, and 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Mu'azzami of Sal-khad—for these all realized that they were doomed to lose the little they still held unless Ayyub could be driven out of Syria. But none of them could have fielded more than a few hundred troops, and the Khwarizmian chiefs therefore wrote to the commander of the Egyptian forces stationed at Gaza, Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Salihi, their commander-in-chief at La Forbie. Rumor has it that he did agree to join the conspiracy, but the fact of the matter is not clear. Certainly it is hard to think what he might have gained, for his status in a Khwarizmian-dominated regime could hardly have been higher or more secure than that which he already enjoyed as an officer of al-Salih Ayyub.⁵

The rebels quickly began massing for an assault on Damascus, but Ayyub's only response was to recall Rukn al-Din Baybars to Cairo, where he was at once imprisoned as a traitor and left to die. Even when al-Nasir Da'ud had his lieutenants reoccupy his former possessions in Palestine—Jerusalem, Nablus, the Ghaur, and Bayt Jibril—the sultan's governors made no attempt to defend them. Towards the end of winter (probably early Dhu-l-Qa'da 643/late March 1246) the Khwarizmians at last invested Damascus. The blockade was so strict that no supplies could enter the city, and since provisions were undoubtedly meager anyhow at that time of year, prices in the city rapidly rose to astronomical heights. The harshness of the situation can be illustrated by the case of a man whose house, worth 10,000 *dirhams*, could only be sold for 1500 *dirhams*, enough to buy precisely one sack of wheat. Nor were the city's two governors provided with a large enough garrison to defend the city adequately. To make up the shortage of regular troops

they had recourse to auxiliary forces (*rajjala*, *muqatila*). Presumably these were drawn from the local populace—the armed villagers from the Ghuta who have already appeared in these pages as volunteers against the crusaders and the normally somnolent *ahdath*—but this is not explicitly stated. The first weeks of the siege were conducted exclusively by the Khwarizmians and ‘Izz al-Din of Salkhad, but on 23 Dhu-l-Qa‘da/11 April the attackers were joined by al-Salih Isma‘il, and the position of the defenders deteriorated to the point that the Damascenes were feeding on carrion and dogs. There is even one report of cannibalism among the inmates of a prison who fell in desperation on a dead comrade.⁶

Damascus was saved only by a new and unexpected alliance between al-Mansur Ibrahim of Homs and al-Nasir Yusuf of Aleppo. Although a passage in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi implies that this resulted from an initiative taken by al-Salih Ayyub, we have no substantive knowledge of the steps leading to the formation of the alliance.⁷ However the interests of the two parties are clear enough. Both Homs and Aleppo had been identified for some years with the struggle against the Khwarizmian marauders, and Aleppo had been directly threatened by them at one point. Neither could afford to permit the Khwarizmians to become the dominant force in Syria, as they surely would if Damascus fell, and thus they resurrected their old alliance of 638-640/1240-1242. On the other hand to fight the Khwarizmians at this point was to strengthen the grip of al-Salih Ayyub on south Syria. This prospect probably presented no particular difficulty for al-Nasir Yusuf, since he had achieved a *rapprochement* with Cairo after the battle of La Forbie, but al-Mansur of Homs must have found it a bitter pill to swallow. However if al-Salih did initiate the negotiations between Homs and Aleppo, there is a second passage in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi (again rather cryptic) which suggests the possibility that al-Mansur was induced to participate by a promise that he would receive Damascus if he was successful.⁸

By the beginning of the new year (644) the allied forces were already congregating at Homs. The army of Aleppo was

led by the amir Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini, who had become the most influential figure in Aleppo following the death of Dayfa Khatun in 640/1242, while al-Mansur commanded a force composed predominantly of Türkmén and Bedouin mercenaries. Once the army had assembled, al-Mansur was made the commander-in-chief because of his experience in dealing with this enemy. When the Khwarizmians learned of the forces gathering against them, they at once broke off their siege and marched north to meet them. On Friday, 1 Muharram 644/18 May 1246, the Khwarizmians and their allies confronted al-Mansur at an obscure place called al-Qasab beside the Lake of Homs. They were dealt a shattering defeat, one which ended for all time their role as a power in Syrian political life. The severed head of their chief Berke Khan was presented to Shams al-Din Lu'lu', who brought it back to Aleppo to be suspended in triumph from the gate of the citadel.⁹

The defeated Khwarizmians scattered in all directions, while 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad scurried back to the relative safety of his castle in the Jabal al-Duruz. Al-Salih Isma'il fled to Aleppo with a small party of Khwarizmians, knowing full well that Baalbek would provide no haven this time against the wrath to come. Reaching Aleppo, he sought asylum from al-Nasir Yusuf. Al-Nasir was not yet seventeen, so perhaps he did not realize the political implications of granting Isma'il's plea. When al-Salih Ayyub learned that his bitter rival was in Aleppo, he sent Baha' al-Din Zuhayr to that city to obtain his extradition, but al-Nasir would not violate his pledge, although he had placed Isma'il under close surveillance. This incident created a sudden chill in the hitherto improving relations between Aleppo and Cairo and marked a turn towards a renewal of conflict between what were now the empire's two major political centers. For the time being, however, the incident passed without consequence.¹⁰

In the meantime al-Mansur Ibrahim led the army of Homs against Baalbek, apparently on his own initiative. It was defended by al-Salih Isma'il's eldest son, al-Mansur Mahmud, and several other members of his family were sheltered there

as well. Ibrahim overran the outer town with ease, but the citadel must have appeared too formidable for the forces at his disposal, for he returned to Homs without attempting it. At this point al-Salih Ayyub invited al-Mansur to Egypt, possibly pursuant to an agreement (admittedly hypothetical) to turn Damascus over to him.¹¹ Al-Mansur did not hesitate to accept, but by the time he reached Damascus he was already gravely ill, and he died in the Ghuta village of Nayrab on 11 Safar 644/28 June 1246. He was succeeded in Homs by his son al-Ashraf Musa, a youth only seventeen years of age.¹²

Homs was not one of the larger principalities, and its location normally made it a client of one of its more powerful neighbors. But a sequence of weak rulers in Damascus after the death of al-Ashraf, together with the vigorous policy followed by al-Mujahid Shirkuh in his later years and then by his son al-Mansur Ibrahim, had combined to give Homs an extremely influential role in imperial affairs since the sultanate of al-Kamil. With al-Mansur's demise, however, Homs fell back into its accustomed passivity; it would not emerge again as a political force until the last days of the Ayyubid empire.

The Khwarizmian defeat at al-Qasab allowed al-Salih Ayyub to complete the subjugation of south Syria. In view of his autocratic temperament, he might well have taken this step in any event, but it is important to realize that he was driven to it at this time by a specific set of circumstances. The events of the year following his seizure of Damascus had demonstrated all too forcibly that even the smaller political entities south of Homs could not be left in the control of autonomous rulers. Ayyub was to devote the rest of his life to placing this region under governors who were formally responsible to him and would do his bidding.

In a sense the process had begun already, for on 29 Jumada I 643/22 October 1245, shortly after the fall of Damascus, the amir Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich had arrived in the camp of the *wazir* Mu'in al-Din ibn al-Shaykh to surrender his *iqta'* of 'Ajlun. We can surmise that ill-health was his reason for giving up his exposed *iqta'*, for he lived in seclusion in Damascus

until his death some months later. Nevertheless it is curious that he did not turn 'Ajlun over to his own suzerain al-Nasir Da'ud, whom he had heretofore served ably and loyally, and who could hardly afford to lose one of his last important possessions.¹³

After al-Salih Ayyub's acquisition of 'Ajlun, nothing more happened along these lines until Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali led the troops of Damascus against Baalbek. On 22 Rabi' II 644/6 September 1246 he obtained the surrender of its garrison. The members of al-Salih Isma'il's family residing there were brought to Damascus, and from there they were sent on to captivity in Egypt, along with Isma'il's old collaborators Amin al-Daula al-Samiri and Nasir al-Din b. Yaghmur.¹⁴

While Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali was bringing the Biqa' under Ayyub's control, Ayyub dispatched another army from Egypt, this one under the command of Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, to restore Palestine to his dominion. This campaign would almost certainly have occurred sometime, but it was apparently provoked at this point by an unexpected strengthening of al-Nasir Da'ud's position. A band of Khwarizmians who had escaped the debacle at al-Qasab, had made their way to the Balqa', where al-Nasir at once enrolled them in his tiny army. His lands now stood hopelessly exposed to al-Salih Ayyub's ambitions, and perhaps he hoped that the Khwarizmians would add to his defense. But in fact his action only increased the likelihood of an attack, since the sultan could not allow any substantial independent force to dominate Transjordan and the Palestinian uplands, if only because it would pose a threat to his communications with Damascus.

In late summer Fakhr al-Din led his army into Palestine, occupying without resistance the towns of Nablus, Jerusalem, and Bayt Jibril. Then, moving across the Jordan, he met al-Nasir and his Khwarizmians at al-Salt on 17 Rabi' II 644/1 September 1246. The Egyptians swept their opponents from the field and put al-Salt to the torch. After pausing to install a governor for the Balqa', Fakhr al-Din moved south against al-Karak, where al-Nasir had taken refuge with his remaining

forces. He sacked the lower town and then invested the great fortress itself. Although he had not the means to take it, al-Nasir was not strong enough to drive him away, and in the end a settlement was reached whereby al-Nasir would retain al-Karak and nothing else, while the Khwarizmians in his service would be handed over to Fakhr al-Din. This done, the latter promptly registered them in his own forces.¹⁵

Having settled the situation in Palestine and Transjordan, Fakhr al-Din turned north and marched on Bosra, the last place still held (if only nominally) by al-Salih Isma'il. The resistance, led by one Shihab al-Din Ghazi, proved quite stubborn, and as the siege wore on, Fakhr al-Din fell seriously ill and had to be taken back to Egypt in a sedan chair. His lieutenants continued the struggle, however, and Bosra at last surrendered in Rajab 644/November-December 1246.¹⁶

As a result of these campaigns only three autonomous towns remained in south Syria: al-Karak, ruled by al-Nasir Da'ud; Salkhad, held by 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Mu'azzami; and Banyas, in the hands of al-Sa'id Hasan b. al-'Aziz 'Uthman. All these places were powerful fortresses, of course, but they were also isolated one from another and thus constituted not the slightest threat to al-Salih Ayyub's regime in the area. Nevertheless he was eager to bring them under his direct authority, if he could do so without undue effort.

A more immediate task, however, was an administrative reorganization and tour of inspection in Syria, which he had not seen since coming to the throne of Egypt some seven years before. Soon after Husam al-Din overcame Baalbek, he was recalled to Cairo to act as the sultan's vicegerent while Ayyub went to Syria. Husam al-Din's replacements in Damascus were the *khazindar*¹⁷ Mujahid al-Din Ibrahim (who was to be *wali al-madina*) and Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh (who was to be the *wazir*). In many instances a *wazir* merely supervised the administration, but Ibn Matruh was to share the executive power with Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir, who continued to function as *wali al-qal'a*. To buttress Ibn Matruh's authority, he was given an *iqta'* of seventy horsemen, a sizeable, if not enormous,

grant by Ayyubid standards, and a very unusual kind of benefice for an official of bureaucratic background to receive.¹⁸

Early in the spring of 644/1247 al-Salih Ayyub set out for Syria, arriving in Damascus on 29 Dhu-l-Qa'da/7 April.¹⁹ As an act of public charity, he bestowed the sum of 40,000 *dirhams* on the *madrasas* and other religious institutions of the city. In view of the enormous damage which Damascus had sustained during recent years, it was hardly a munificent sum.²⁰ Undoubtedly more important from his point of view was the strengthening of his diplomatic position by the arrival at his court of al-Ashraf Musa of Homs and al-Mansur Muhammad II of Hama. Both princes were very young (the latter being but twelve), and both had acceded to their thrones only in the past year. Too weak and exposed to keep their principalities without the patronage of a more powerful neighbor, they had wisely turned to al-Salih Ayyub, who was not only the strongest of the Ayyubid princes but also the one least committed to the tradition of collective sovereignty.

These matters settled, the sultan left Damascus, journeying first to Baalbek, where he noted the deplorable condition of the walls. He ordered these restored and strengthened, and in addition he made a gift of 20,000 *dirhams* to the local religious foundations. Then he retraced his steps southward to the Hauran, stopping in Bosra to make a like donation. But the real goal of this part of his journey was Salkhad. His agents had been sent ahead to negotiate its surrender with 'Izz al-Din, and when the sultan arrived, 'Izz al-Din came down voluntarily from the fortress to meet him, and the two men rode together back to Damascus. As compensation for Salkhad, 'Izz al-Din had been promised a number of places on the Khabur River, among them Qarqisiyya, al-Khabur (modern Hassaka), and Majdal. Once in Damascus, al-Salih kept his end of the bargain by giving 'Izz al-Din the diploma for these. But at this point a serious embarrassment arose. All these places lay within the territories al-Salih Ayyub had received from his father, and undoubtedly he still considered them his, but in the wars between the Khwarizmians and Aleppo al-Nasir

Yusuf had annexed al-Salih's lands in Diyar Mudar. Before al-Salih's investiture of 'Izz al-Din could be implemented, then, he had to obtain al-Nasir's consent. The prince of Aleppo flatly refused; he would not give up lands which he had won by his own sword. (Nor, probably, did he want to give substance to any future claims by al-Salih Ayyub that Diyar Mudar was still truly his or that as sultan he had a right to grant lands within the territories of the lesser princes.) Relations between Cairo and Aleppo, already cool, must have become quite frigid, but for the moment al-Salih could do nothing about it.

It is difficult to be certain what happened next. Apparently the sultan suddenly decided to force 'Izz al-Din to return with him to Cairo; there he was thrown into prison where he died shortly afterwards. Al-Salih had had a dream that his throne would be seized by a Turk named 'Izz al-Din Aybeg, and he wished to take no chances with the former lord of Salkhad.²¹

Al-Sa'id Hasan of Banyas also decided at about this time to turn his *iqta'* over to al-Salih, for motives which are not explained, but he was more fortunate than 'Izz al-Din Aybeg. On 17 Dhu-l-Hijja 644/25 April 1247 the sultan's officials occupied Banyas, and in return al-Sa'id was granted an *iqta'* in Egypt of 150 cavalry, which was probably nearly equal to the regiment he had been able to support at Banyas. In addition he received an indemnity of 100,000 *dirhams* and 500 pieces of fine linen (*qumash*).²²

By the time al-Salih Ayyub returned to Egypt in the spring of 645/1247, he was absolute master of Syria south of the Lake of Homs, with the minor and now irrelevant exception of al-Karak. Moreover the young princes of Homs and Hama clearly looked to him rather than to Aleppo. However Aleppo had lost none of its traditional independence, as al-Nasir Yusuf's recent attitude had clearly shown, and it was now a far larger and more powerful state than it had ever been in Ayyubid times. But since Aleppo posed no threat at this time to al-Salih's control of the rest of Syria, he saw no need to try to impose his authority there.

There was, however, one obvious weakness in his position—

the Frankish states, which controlled not only the entire Syrian littoral from Ascalon to Valania but also held a number of strongpoints in Galilee and south Lebanon. With his Muslim opponents gone, al-Salih was free to undertake at least a limited offensive against the Christians. In this he would be departing rather sharply from the policy of his Ayyubid predecessors, who had almost universally gone to great pains not to stir up hostilities with the Franks, lest they induce a new crusade in response. Of course this conciliatory policy had not prevented four expeditions from Europe since Saladin's death, and perhaps al-Salih (who maintained good relations with Frederick II) had learned that Louis IX of France was taking preliminary steps towards a new crusade. In any event he had nothing to lose by trying to drive the Franks out of their inland possessions at least.

In the late spring of 645/1247 he sent a new army under the command of Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh into Palestine. He moved first against the Frankish possessions in eastern Galilee, which had been most recently obtained and were most weakly held. Tiberias fell on 10 Safar 645/16 June 1247, and Mt. Tabor and Kaukab soon thereafter. The great Templar fortress of Safad probably seemed beyond the reach of a short campaign, and Fakhr al-Din now marched down to Ascalon. Here resistance was stubborn, and an Egyptian flotilla sent by al-Salih to aid in the siege was broken up and scattered by a sudden storm. But the attack was determined, and on 22 Jumada II/24 October Fakhr al-Din's men burst through a breach in the walls and killed or captured the entire garrison. After the battle Ascalon was razed and left deserted.²³ The first Muslim offensive against the Franks since the summer of 585/1189 thus ended with substantial, if not glittering, success.

Instead of returning to Egypt after this campaign, Fakhr al-Din proceeded to Damascus in order to keep watch on a worrisome development in the north. During the sultan's sojourn in Syria the previous winter, al-Ashraf Musa of Homs had been moved to surrender to him the important stronghold of Salamiyya, perhaps to underline the patron-client relation-

ship between him and al-Salih Ayyub. But the ruling clique of Aleppo was profoundly disturbed by this act, for Egyptian armies had often used Salamiyya as a staging-ground on northern campaigns; it was the last important point on the military road before one entered Aleppan territory. If al-Salih Ayyub held this place, he would be able to move his armies up to the boundaries of Aleppo without hindrance. Such a threat was intolerable, and al-Nasir Yusuf, under the guidance of his closest advisor, Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini, decided to annex Homs.²⁴ Again circumstances were conspiring against the old "Ayyubid" order of things and leading, if not to the unification of the empire under one head, at least to a bipolar structure dominated by the highly centralized monarchies of Cairo and Aleppo.

The most obvious way to block al-Nasir's plans would have been for Fakhr al-Din to lead his troops to Homs, thereby serving notice of al-Salih's commitment to maintain the *status quo*, but Fakhr al-Din could not move without the sultan's authorization. As in the Khwarizmian crisis, however, al-Salih proved unwilling to act during the earlier phases of the situation, and Fakhr al-Din remained motionless in Damascus for the rest of 645. At the beginning of 646/May 1248, the army of Aleppo at last set out against Homs, under the joint command of Shams al-Din Lu'lu' and the remarkably persistent al-Salih Isma'il. The defenders of Homs resisted stubbornly, and the siege wore on for two months with no apparent progress by the besiegers. In the meantime al-Ashraf Musa and his *wazir* Mukhlis al-Din Ibrahim b. Qirnas were sending frantic pleas for immediate assistance to Fakhr al-Din in Damascus and al-Salih Ayyub in Egypt.²⁵

The sultan had every intention of coming to his beleaguered client's rescue. In the winter of 645/1248 he had sent his elite regiment, the Royal Guard (*al-halqa al-sultaniyya*), to the frontier post of al-Salhiyya, while he himself proceeded to his residence at Ashmun Tannah. At the beginning of the new year, al-Salih ordered Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali to surrender his vicegerency in Cairo to Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur (here

encountered for the first time) and proceed to al-Salihiyya to take command of the *halqa*. The sultan had intended to lead his forces personally into Syria, but as he was preparing to leave Ashmun Tannah, he was stricken with a serious infection. His doctors knew at once that he would never recover, but they did not tell him so at the time. He remained in Ashmun Tannah, hoping that he would soon recover sufficiently to march into Syria, but near the end of Rabi' II 646/mid-August 1248, he received the news that Homs had been compelled to surrender. Aleppo's terms had not been ungenerous: al-Ashraf Musa was permitted to retain Palmyra and al-Rahba, and in exchange for Homs he was to be given Tall Bashir. The latter was hopelessly isolated from his other possessions, of course, and the terms of surrender thus completely neutralized him as a potentially independent political force. Al-Salih Ayyub was shocked by the news, since he had expected Homs to hold out indefinitely. After consulting with Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, he decided to proceed to Damascus as planned and from there to stage a counterattack to regain Homs. Because of his extreme illness, the sultan had to be carried in a sedan chair.²⁶

When the Egyptian army reached Damascus, al-Salih remained behind in the citadel, while Fakhr al-Din and Husam al-Din led the army north to invest Homs. They took with them the royal pavilion (*al-dihliz al-sultani*) to symbolize the presence of the sultan, though on this campaign no one seems to have been given plenary powers to act for him, as Mu'in al-Din ibn al-Shaykh had been three years earlier. The siege did not begin until winter had already set in, and because it was hard to maintain an army in the field at that season, a large number of heavy mangonels were dragged from Damascus to Homs by peasants impressed into service, in the hope of concluding the struggle as quickly as possible. In mid-Ramadan 646/late December 1248 al-Nasir Yusuf countered by bringing the Aleppan army down to Kafartab, some three days' march from Homs, in order to be in a position to relieve the garrison in that city if need be.

The Egyptian siege continued unbroken throughout the

winter, probably into Dhu-l-Hijja 646/March 1249, and it was clear that if it were much further prolonged Homs would fall. But at this point a special envoy of the caliph, Najm al-Din al-Badhira'i, arrived from Baghdad to try to restore peace. He proposed that al-Salih Ayyub should recall his armies and confirm Homs in the possession of al-Nasir Yusuf. To the obvious astonishment of many contemporary observers, the sultan accepted. But, as Ibn Wasil points out, the sultan's illness had intensified during the winter, and—more important—reports from Cyprus made it clear that Louis IX's immense armada would soon be leaving Cyprus for a fresh assault on Damietta.²⁷ It is thus quite clear that even in the absence of al-Badhira'i's embassy al-Salih would soon have had to break off the siege of Homs.

Before departing Damascus, however, the sultan received a second embassy, this one from al-Nasir Da'ud of al-Karak. It was composed of his son al-Amjad Hasan and a Persian *faqih* named Shams al-Din al-Khusraushahi, al-Nasir's tutor, spiritual counselor, and closest associate since his youth. The two envoys offered, on al-Nasir's behalf, to surrender al-Karak to the sultan, on condition that he grant him in return al-Shaubak and a benefice (*khubz*) in Egypt. Al-Salih was quite amenable to this unexpected offer, and when he left Damascus for Cairo on 4 Muharram 647/19 April 1249, he instructed Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali to proceed to al-Karak in order to arrange specific terms with al-Nasir Da'ud. But Husam ad-Din, fearful for some reason that the latter might abruptly change his mind and imprison him, sought to be excused from the assignment. The sultan then turned to Taj al-Din b. Muhajir, but on reaching al-Karak, he discovered that al-Nasir had decided to renege on his offer: he had become aware of al-Salih's grave illness and of the impending crusade. Perhaps he hoped that the near future would bring some restoration of his fortunes.

During the year following al-Salih Ayyub's departure from Damascus, the evolution of the Ayyubid empire flowed from events in Egypt, so to deal with the final developments of al-Salih's administration in Syria, it will be necessary to depart

from a chronological narrative for a time.

Not long after the Sultan had returned to Egypt, al-Nasir Da'ud was again overwhelmed with a sense of hopelessness and world-weariness and decided to go to Aleppo to seek the protection of al-Nasir Yusuf. How long he intended to remain away from al-Karak we do not know. Clearly, however, he did not intend to abandon the place, for behind him he left a younger son as vicegerent—al-Mu'azzam 'Isa, the child of a Turkish concubine whom al-Nasir particularly adored. But two of his older sons, al-Amjad Hasan and al-Zahir Shadhi, children of a granddaughter of the great al-'Adil, bitterly resented the preference shown to this son of a concubine. With their mother's connivance, they seized the young vicegerent and took control of al-Karak; then al-Amjad Hasan went personally to al-Salih Ayyub's camp at al-Mansura to repeat his father's old offer—with the crucial exception that he asked compensatory lands for himself and his brother, but not for al-Nasir himself. The sultan at once accepted, and dispatched the eunuch Badr al-Din al-Sawabi to act as his governor in al-Karak. By 18 Jumada II 647/28 September 1249, Transjordan had passed into Egyptian hands. When the army of al-Karak arrived in Egypt, under the command of two brothers of al-Nasir Da'ud, it was stationed on the west bank of the Nile, opposite al-Mansura, in order to guard against any Frankish attempt to advance upriver from that side.²⁸ In this pathetic manner the last faint trace of the great power and influence once wielded by al-Mu'azzam 'Isa passed from the stage.

The Egyptian occupation of Transjordan had a broader significance than that, however, for it meant that al-Salih Ayyub had at last expunged every vestige of autonomous authority from south Syria. Except for the few areas in Frankish hands (the coastal strip north of Jaffa and a few strongpoints in Galilee and south Lebanon) everything south of Baalbek was ruled by governors directly responsible to the sultan. The administrative subdivisions of this area are not entirely clear from the sources, but apparently we do not yet have that division into three or four relatively large and autonomous provinces

(*mamalik* or *niyabat*), each containing a number of smaller districts, which would characterize the Mamluk period.²⁹ Rather we must think in terms of three or four broad regions, each of them organized according to different principles. Palestine was apparently highly fragmented, with each major town (Nablus, Jerusalem, Gaza, and Bayt Jibril) having an autonomous governor directly responsible to Cairo. Transjordan was generally governed from al-Karak, although the governor of the Balqa' may possibly have been tied directly to Cairo. Damascus seems to have been the center of a considerable province, comprising the Hauran (in the broader sense of the term), Mt. Hermon and the Anti-Lebanon, and perhaps also the Biqa'. (But the Biqa' may also have been an autonomous district governed from Baalbek.) None of these areas had any political or constitutional existence in its own right; under al-Salih Ayyub they were simply administrative groupings which could be established or altered at his behest.

Within the administration of Damascus itself al-Salih had instituted some significant changes during his recent sojourn there. At first glance these appear to be merely personnel changes, but these conceal an important structural modification. For some reason the sultan had become intensely displeased with his *wazir* in Damascus, Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh, and had ordered him to return with him to Cairo. Ibn Matruh's crime was presumably some sort of personal slight or administrative shortcoming rather than a political offense, for although he was henceforth frozen out of al-Salih's entourage, he was not further punished. The commandant of the citadel, Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir, was also removed from office at this time, but since this officer would continue to play a significant political role in the months ahead, he was probably being rotated to another position. As his new vicegerent (*na'ib al-saltana*) in Damascus, al-Salih sent for Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur al-Yaruqi, presently holding the same position in Cairo. As *wazir* in Damascus he named al-Qadi al-As'ad Sharaf al-Din al-Fa'izi, but he does not seem to have inherited the broad executive authority which had belonged to his predecessor.

Mujahid al-Din Ibrahim remained in Damascus, but he was now promoted to *wali al-qal'a*.³⁰

These changes brought into being for the first time an administrative structure in Damascus which approximates that adopted by the Mamluks: a viceroy (*na'ib al-saltana*) with overall executive authority for the city of Damascus and the districts attached to it; an independent commandant of the citadel (*wali al-qal'a*) directly responsible to the sultan rather than to the viceroy; finally a *wazir*, who directed the local administration but was not empowered to govern *per se*. The office of *wali al-madina* certainly retained its importance in the city's daily life, but since we hear of no further appointments to this position by al-Salih Ayyub, its holder must no longer have enjoyed the broad political influence often visible in earlier times. In the Mamluk administration the *wali al-madina* was appointed by the *na'ib as-saltana* instead of the sultan, and it may well be that this reform was included in al-Salih's changes of 646-7/1249.³¹ It was a simple and logical scheme, well in accord with the highly militarized government Ayyub had created. It also satisfied his desire to keep power from concentrating in the hands of any one man besides himself. On the other hand, one must stress that it was the result not of systematic planning but of trial and error.

In addition to his systematic elimination of independent power centers in south Syria, al-Salih Ayyub also introduced another—better known—critical innovation into the Ayyubid political structure. This was his large-scale purchase of *mamluks*, whom he used almost exclusively in forming his personal regiments.³² These innovations represented his reponse to the empire's fundamental constitutional question—i.e., how could the sultan assert his authority within a confederation of autonomous principalities? In a sense, of course, he tried to solve this problem by changing its terms, by eliminating the lesser political units in the empire. Nevertheless the changes he introduced did not proceed from a conscious attempt to make Ayyubid politics conform to a preconceived ideology of centralized authority flowing from the person of the sultan alone.

Rather they were shaped by his personality and the actual circumstances facing him.

The role of al-Salih Ayyub's personal character must not be slighted—his domineering temperament, his deep-seated suspicion (admittedly well-founded) of his relatives' intentions towards him, and his sense of alienation from them, all produced a complete lack of moral compulsion to respect their established rights and interests. When a crisis arose between him and any of the others, he did not shrink from the total subjugation of his opponent. And when he felt unsure of the fidelity of his free-born soldiers, he surrounded himself with *mamluks*. But granted his basic disposition to autocracy, he took concrete steps towards it only in response to particular incidents; in general so long as the *status quo* did not threaten him, he was willing to accept it.

If al-Salih's innovations had come about accidentally, so to speak, they nevertheless fixed the parameters of the region's future political development. The bitter civil wars between al-Salih Ayyub and the other princes dissolved the family solidarity which had so characterized the Ayyubids. With the loosening of familial ties, the validity of the concept of collective sovereignty—several regional rulers within the bounds of a common empire—was inevitably weakened as well. The Ayyubid principalities looked more than ever like so many rival kingdoms, united only by their common name. Moreover al-Salih Ayyub's victory over his relatives meant the elimination of alternate centers of political power outside of Cairo. When all visible authority in south and central Syria was gathered into his hands, the concept of collective sovereignty was bound to wither away. This was especially true among those who were to become his political heirs—his *mamluk* guards. As we have noted, the relationship of a *mamluk* to his *ustadh* was ideally one of intense loyalty and devotion, and by all reports this ideal was realized with al-Salih Ayyub.³³ Men thus educated to see authority embodied in a single person would not easily revive a dormant, even moribund, concept that it could be shared among many. One might almost say that autoc-

racy was inherent in the system of *mamluk* education. However that may be, the institutions al-Salih Ayyub created for the attainment of specific goals would, in the following generation, become the framework for a new ideology of political authority. Insofar as any individual was responsible for the change from an era of local principalities to an era of centralized autocracy, that man was al-Salih Ayyub.

The foundations for al-Salih's new order had hardly been completed, however, when everything was again thrown into confusion. On 4 June 1249 Louis IX's flotilla had cast anchor off Damietta, and two days later that vital city was in his hands. For the rest of the summer nothing of great significance occurred, but the sultan's illness was becoming increasingly serious. On 15 Sha'ban 647/21 November 1249 he at last expired. The moment was critical, for the annual floods had subsided and the crusader army was on the verge of setting out from Damietta down the road to al-Mansura. The whole thing must have seemed terribly reminiscent of the situation at the death of al-'Adil. But then, at least, al-'Adil's heir apparent had been in the field at the head of the Egyptian army and had been able to assume the sultanate at once, whereas al-Salih's only surviving son was residing on the upper Tigris as the governor of Hisn Kayfa.³⁴

The course of events in Egypt at this point is so well known that it need only be summarized. The sultan's widow, Shajar al-Durr, knowing what a disaster her husband's death might cause if it became generally known, informed no one save the commander-in-chief of the army, Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, and a tiny number of others. She and Fakhr al-Din continued to issue forged decrees in the name of the late sultan, while a special embassy was dispatched to Hisn Kayfa to call al-Mu'azzam Turanshah to the throne as quickly as possible. This party arrived there early in Ramadan 647/December 1249, and a few days later (11 Ramadan/18 December) Turanshah had already departed for Egypt with a small band of fifty companions. They took a little-frequented road south through Diyar Rabi'a to 'Ana on the Euphrates, fearing interception by al-Nasir Yusuf

or Badr al-Din Lu'lu' of Mosul. From 'Ana they turned westwards to cross the Syrian desert, and on 28 Ramadan 647/4 January 1250 Turanshah arrived in the village of Qusayr in the Ghuta, where the vicegerent Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur had erected the royal pavilion. The next day Turanshah made his ceremonial entry into Damascus and was officially proclaimed sultan.

In order to ensure his position beyond question among the notables and troops of the city, he distributed enormous largesses; when he had exhausted the 300,000 *dinars* in the citadel's treasury, he sent to al-Karak to obtain even more. Turanshah remained in Damascus for some three weeks, only departing the city on 17 Shawwal/23 January. He left Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur behind him as his vicegerent, but took with him the *wazir* Sharaf al-Din al-Fa'izi as a new member of his entourage and administration.³⁵

When Turanshah finally reached al-Mansura on 19 Dhu-l-Qa'da/23 February, he found that Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh had been killed two weeks earlier, when the crusaders had at last crossed the Nile and launched a brilliant but eventually disastrous charge into the Egyptian camp. But he was still in time to preside over a superb victory against the crusaders, consummated by the capture of Louis IX himself on 3 Muharram 648/6 April 1250. Such a triumph should have been enough to establish Turanshah's regime on the most solid foundations, all the more as he had begun his reign with the full support of the great amirs. But he fell into the same trap as al-Afdal and al-'Adil II when he tried to supplant his father's men with the courtiers and officers who had come with him from the East, and he put himself into even greater danger when he began threatening the former group personally. He had soon alienated every powerful figure around him, not only the leaders of al-Salih's two elite *mamluk* corps, the Bahriyya and the Jamdariyya, but also the great Kurdish lords, still as much (or more) in evidence as they had ever been—Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, Sayf al-Din al-Qaymari, 'Izz al-Din al-Qaymari, *et al.* On Monday evening, 28 Muharram 648/2 May 1250, as

Turanshah was seated at a banquet in his pavilion, a band of the Bahriyya guards (500 of them, according to Joinville) burst in with drawn swords and began to slash at him. He first fled to a high wooden tower outside his pavilion near the river, but his assailants set it aflame and he was forced down. He ran down to the river and stood in the shallow water, pleading for his life, but everyone simply stood by gazing at him impassively. At last a then obscure officer named Faris al-Din Aktay jumped into the river and cut him down. His body was left untended beside the burnt tower for three days before receiving burial.³⁶

The conspirators were now faced with a difficult constitutional question. They had mounted their *coup d'état* entirely on their own behalf and not even nominally in favor of some Ayyubid pretender to the throne. And in fact there was no clear legitimate heir in Egypt who could have been raised to the sultanate. It was finally decided to make the *khutba* and *sikka* in the name of Shajar al-Durr, as the widow of al-Salih Ayyub and obviously an individual of considerable competence. For the first time in Islam, a woman was to rule in her own name (though there was nothing new in a woman's having great influence or even being the power behind the throne). To command the armies—and perhaps also because as a woman Shajar al-Durr had legal need of a guardian—an *atabeg* was named as well. This office was first offered to Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, who refused it, probably because he realized that even though he was the oldest and most prestigious member of al-Salih Ayyub's entourage, he could not, as a Kurd, command the allegiance of the turbulent *mamluk* corps. Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir likewise turned down the post. At last the assembled amirs settled on a middle-ranking officer of the Bahriyya, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Turkumani, a man of no great accomplishment heretofore, and perhaps chosen because he seemed weak enough to be managed by his peers.³⁷

Such an arrangement was inherently unstable and was surely meant to be only a stopgap solution until a permanent formula could be worked out. On the other hand one salient feature of this interim government—the effective monopoly of power

held by the army, specifically by its *mamluk* units—was destined to remain a fundamental element in any system of government that might emerge from the immediate confusion. In spite of the vestige of continuity that Shajar al-Durr (and later a young child, al-Ashraf Musa) represented, the events of 28 Muharram/2 May mark definitively the Mamluk seizure of power and the end of Ayyubid rule in Egypt. It is difficult to determine why the army's leaders chose this point in time to sever the web of loyalties which had hitherto bound them so completely to the house of Ayyub and to assume power. The sequence of events leading up to Turanshah's assassination does not answer the question, a solution must be based on the particular role and status of al-Salih Ayyub's *mamluks*. In this respect at least two hypotheses suggest themselves.

Al-Salih Ayyub's heavy reliance on his personally recruited *mamluks* had seriously weakened the balance of power between the various elements composing the Ayyubid army in Egypt. He thus violated an old maxim of Muslim statecraft never to become dependent on any one ethnic group in the army, but always to recruit from several groups which could be balanced one against another, with each needing the sultan's protection to preserve its position in the state.³⁸ In view of al-Salih's ability to command the fidelity of his *mamluks*, their predominance in the military did not threaten him personally, but the same thing would not be true for his successors.

Moreover al-Salih's *mamluks* seem to have been far more isolated from other elements of the army than those of his Ayyubid predecessors: they were trained as a separate unit and housed in new barracks in the palace complex of Roda. Their loyalties were thus closely focused on their master and comrades. When al-Salih Ayyub died, he was replaced by a man whom they hardly knew and who also tried to eject them from their favored positions; even though the new sultan was the son of their *ustadh*, he could have no real claim on their fidelity. Moreover the character of al-Salih's wars with his relatives could not have encouraged any sentiments of loyalty to the Ayyubid dynasty as a whole among his *mamluks*. When he

disappeared, the only focus of loyalty left to them was themselves; the dynasty meant far less to them than their own sense of comradeship.

Whatever the ultimate causes of the political revolution in Egypt, it had an immediate and profound influence on south Syria and led directly to the disruption of that region's administrative dependence on Cairo. The first effects were felt in Transjordan, which was abruptly and unexpectedly turned back into an independent principality. When Turanshah had arrived in Egypt, he had discovered there a potential rival for his throne, a son of al-'Adil II named al-Mughith Fakhr al-Din 'Umar. He was in fact being held prisoner in the Cairo citadel, but even that was not sufficiently sure for Turanshah's peace of mind, so the young prince was exiled to al-Shaubak. But when the governor of Transjordan, Badr al-Din al-Sawabi, learned of Turanshah's assassination, he took advantage of al-Mughith's presence to make himself independent of the new regime in Cairo. Al-Mughith was released from his prison and brought secretly to al-Karak, where on 13 Rabi' II 648/15 June 1250 he was proclaimed as prince of al-Karak. Badr al-Din retained all the real powers of government, of course, but there was nevertheless once again an autonomous Ayyubid principality in south Syria, and al-Salih Ayyub's carefully assembled structure of provincial government was broken.³⁹

Far greater significance attached to events in Damascus. After the Egyptian army had returned in triumph from al-Mansura to Cairo (9 Safar/13 May), the *khatib* Asil al-Din al-Is'irdi was sent to Damascus to receive its garrison's oath of allegiance to the new regime in Cairo. However Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur, still faithful to the house of al-Salih Ayyub, would have nothing to do with the new government, and his officers followed him in this. On the other hand Jamal al-Din did not proclaim himself an independent ruler, and it is impossible to guess what his plans were for the immediate future. But a Kurdish unit under his command, the Qaymariyya, became suspicious that he was in league with al-Salih Ayyub's Turkish *mamluks* to do away with them, so the two commanders, Nasir

al-Din al-Qaymari and Diya'al-Din al-Qaymari, wrote to al-Nasir Yusuf in Aleppo and invited him to occupy the vacant throne of Damascus.⁴⁰ In return for their support they sought larger *iqta's* than they now possessed.

There is no evidence that al-Nasir had entertained any ambitions concerning Damascus until now, but once he received this invitation he moved very quickly. By 7 Rabi' II 648/9 July 1250 he was already encamped at Darayya, and at dawn the next morning his troops stormed the walls of Damascus. Nasir al-Din al-Qaymari had been put in charge of the Bab Saghir (on the south side of the city), and as the Aleppans neared the walls he opened the portals before them. Most of the garrison surrendered without further resistance, but Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur fled to the citadel to join Mujahid al-Din Ibrahim. Shortly thereafter, however, perhaps even on the same day, the citadel too surrendered. The victorious al-Nasir knew better than to trust al-Salih Ayyub's old *mamluks*, and these were all arrested and imprisoned in various outlying castles, while their *iqta's* were given over to the Qaymariyya. Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur was likewise put under arrest for a brief time, but then he was released and even awarded a robe of honor. In the whole affair no one had lost his life.⁴¹

The Cairo government, caught entirely by surprise, could only have saved Damascus by sending a strong force there at once, before al-Nasir had time to stabilize his position. Something of the sort had in fact been attempted, but only half-heartedly. On 12 Rabi' II/14 July, less than a week after first learning of al-Nasir's departure from Aleppo, Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali took command of a relief force. But three days later, before he had even departed, news reached Cairo that al-Nasir already stood before the walls of Damascus. Husam al-Din hesitated, and on 20 Rabi' II/22 July it was learned that Damascus had fallen. The Egyptian junta at once gave up all thought of trying to retrieve the city, fearing that a similar coup might be aimed against them in Cairo. They set about rounding up all those who could be suspected of disaffection, including many high civil and religious officials, as well as the Kurdish

amirs Sayf al-Din al-Qaymari and 'Izz al-Din al-Qaymari, whose kinsmen were responsible for al-Nasir's seizure of Damascus.⁴² But none of this had any effect on the situation in Syria, and al-Nasir Yusuf was permitted to consolidate his power undisturbed.

After a hiatus of five years an Ayyubid prince was again sovereign in Damascus, but the revolution unleashed in Syria by Turanshah's murder went much further than that. With what seemed the petty exceptions of al-Mansur Muhammad II of Hama and al-Mughith 'Umar of al-Karak, all Muslim Syria was united under a single monarch. As in the time of Nur al-Din there was now a unified Syrian kingdom facing a hostile but profoundly troubled Egypt, and al-Nasir Yusuf had a real advantage over his great predecessor, for the Frankish states were immeasurably weaker than those of Nur al-Din's day. The times seemed ripe for a rapid reconquest of Egypt from the usurpers and for the restoration of the Ayyubid empire to its former grandeur.

9 Al-Nasir Yusuf: Restoration and Ruin (648/1250-658/1260)

The invasion of Egypt, 648/1250-1251

Al-Nasir's conquest of Damascus had assured his domination in Syria, but it had not completed it, for there still remained a number of towns and fortresses which al-Salih Ayyub's appointees held. With Turanshah's assassination, these places had become in effect independent baronies, and al-Nasir's first task was to bring them under his control. He had no difficulties in the beginning, when he obtained the surrender of 'Ajlun by means of handsome gifts to its commanders and Salamiyya and Salkhad likewise fell into his hands without a struggle. The smooth progress of his policy was interrupted only by al-Mughith 'Umar. At the end of Jumada I 648/August 1250 al-Mughith was asked to surrender al-Karak and al-Shaubak, but he responded that he would have no place to go if he gave up these fortresses. He proposed instead that he should be recognized as al-Nasir's governor in Transjordan, promising to conduct himself strictly in accord with al-Nasir's will and not as the chief of an autonomous entity. This sort of arrangement was familiar to al-Nasir from north Syria, where it had worked without a hitch since the death of Saladin. Not wanting to tie up his army in a siege of the forbidding castle of al-Karak, he accepted al-Mughith's offer without further dispute. In Jumada II/September al-Nasir obtained Baalbek by conceding its Salahi governor a number of villages in Diyar Mudar. Finally there was Banyas. It had been surrendered to al-Salih Ayyub in 644/1247 by its hereditary lord, al-Sa'id Hasan, in return for

lands in Egypt. But when Turanshah had entered that country, he had exiled al-Sa'id to Syria, probably for the simple reason that he feared anyone who might become a rival claimant to the throne of Egypt. Al-Sa'id made his way back to Banyas, where he was able to persuade al-Salih Ayyub's lieutenants (who were in fact *mamluks* of his own father al-'Aziz 'Uthman) to restore the place to him. But when al-Nasir Yusuf occupied Damascus, al-Sa'id (for reasons unknown to us) fled to Egypt. Al-Nasir undoubtedly intended for Banyas to be governed in his name, but for the time being he took no steps to replace al-Sa'id's men by lieutenants of his own choosing.¹

By the autumn of 648/1250, then, al-Nasir Yusuf had gained control of an impressive empire, comprising Syria and most of Diyar Mudar. On the northeast his dominions were generally bounded by the Khabur River, although he did not always control the towns lining its course. His neighbors on this side—Badr al-Din Lu'lu' of Mosul, the Artukid al-Sa'id I-Ghazi of Mardin, and the Ayyubids al-Kamil Muhammad of Mayyafariqin and al-Auhad 'Abd Allah of Hisn Kayfa—caused him some difficulties because of their incessant mutual rivalries, but posed no threat whatever to his hegemony over Diyar Mudar.² The northern boundaries of al-Nasir's states are harder to draw because the Mongol invasion of Anatolia in 641/1243 had thrown this region's political structure into confusion. It is certain, however, that his control reached as far as the Euphrates crossing of al-Bira and the fortress of 'Ayntab. As for the towns guarding the routes from Syria up onto the Anatolian plateau (e.g., Samosata, Ra'ban, and Mar'ash), they were probably now held by the Rum Seljukids. But whereas this fact would once have implied a dangerous weakness on al-Nasir's northern flank, the Rum Seljukids, reduced to the status of Mongol clients, no longer constituted a threat in their own right. On the northwest al-Nasir's possessions marched with Cilician Armenia and the Principality of Antioch; again, there was a possibility (many times realized in the history of Ayyubid Aleppo) of his becoming embroiled in their quarrels, but neither was by itself a source of serious concern. In Syria proper the only

major city he did not control directly was Hama, but after Turanshah's death its prince had no one save him to turn to. It is true that his authority did not extend to the Jabal Ansariyya, at least those parts of it held by the Assassins, but he maintained the same good relations with the Assassins that his grandfather and father had. The Syrian littoral presented a very real problem, for the militarily insignificant Frankish states might still act as a magnet for European crusaders, but it was only on his southern border (marked by Gaza) that al-Nasir faced an obvious and immediate foreign threat. The new Mamluk government of Egypt, though still on insecure foundations, was nevertheless both powerful and hostile.

In the mere extent of his dominions al-Nasir was a more imposing prince than any of his immediate neighbors, and the number of troops which he could field was commensurate. We have no figures for the overall size of his armies, but isolated data permit at least a plausible estimate. According to Ibn Shaddad, Harran was expected to support 1000 regular cavalry in al-Nasir's time (ca. 640/1242), and Saruj 300. The city of Edessa had revenues slightly exceeding those of Saruj; it is thus reasonable to assume that it too was supposed to support at least 300 troopers. This would yield a fairly reliable minimum of 1600 men to be fielded from the revenues of Diyar Mudar. If the revenues of the other towns and fortresses of that region are added in, the actual total must have equalled no less than 2000. As for Syria, we know that in the time of al-Mu'azzam 'Isa Damascus maintained a superbly equipped and trained force of 3000 regular cavalry. In view of its revenues and strategic imperatives Aleppo must have had an army of roughly the same size. Al-Mansur Ibrahim's expeditionary force of 638/1240, which defeated the first Khwarizmian invasion of Syria, numbered 1000 cavalry. This was a joint force, drawn from both Damascus and Homs, but if we assume that al-Mansur would not have taken Homs's entire regular army, this figure may well approximate the army of Homs at that time. We can thus estimate the total regular cavalry under al-Nasir's direct control in 648/1250 at some 9000 men. This was

undoubtedly smaller than the Egyptian army, but it would still have represented a far larger force than any Syrian prince had previously had at his disposal in Ayyubid times. (The numerical strength of al-Nasir's army was of course somewhat dissipated by the necessity of scattering it among a large number of towns and fortresses; however, given sufficient notice, he could still have assembled a powerful expeditionary force.)³

In addition to its size and its army al-Nasir's empire could draw on another source of strength—a remarkably high degree of administrative centralization. Syria was now almost divested of the complex structure of autonomous appanages and hereditary *iqta's* which had characterized it during the Ayyubid period. Henceforth it would be governed largely by men whose tenure and authority were dependent on the will of the sultan in Damascus. In north Syria al-Zahir Ghazi and al-'Aziz Muhammad had devoted their reigns to eliminating the entrenched power of the hereditary military families established there by Nur al-Din and Saladin. By the reign of al-Nasir Yusuf only the possessions of the heirs of Nasih ad-Din Khumartigin (located in the inaccessible Jabal Ansariyya) were still intact. Nor had these two princes ever allowed themselves to grant subappanages to lesser members of the family. The prince of Aleppo, in contrast to his colleague in Damascus, was not embarrassed by the presence of ambitious, scheming relatives in such sensitive places as Salkhad, Bosra, Baalbek, Banyas, and al-Karak. This is not to say that many important towns and fortresses in north Syria had not been governed by princes of the blood—indeed, al-Nasir left Aleppo itself in the care of his aged grandfather al-Mu'azzam Turanshah—but these men were governors or viceroys, serving at the pleasure of the prince of Aleppo. This structure of provincial government which al-Nasir inherited he retained as far as possible. Likewise he took advantage of al-Salih Ayyub's reforms in south Syria and worked to prevent the reemergence of an appanage system there.⁴ Thus al-Nasir Yusuf was in a far stronger position than his predecessors in Damascus to contend with Egypt. They had been forced to rely on fragile coalitions of mutually

autonomous princes, and they had never been able to enlist all the Syrian Ayyubids in a common cause for more than a brief moment. Save for Hama and Transjordan, al-Nasir's direct authority extended unbroken from the Khabur to Sinai.

In this light the character of his central administration in Damascus takes on more than routine significance. So far as we can tell from the sources, it seems to have contained no significant departures from the ordinary (i.e., pre-al-Salih Ayyub) patterns of Ayyubid Syria. It was based on a simple tripartite structure of palace-military establishment, civil bureaucracy, and religious bureaucracy. The religious bureaucracy seems to have had little influence on policy during these years, though at least one important statesman (Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim) had originally come from its ranks. On the other hand though al-Nasir was dogged by war and the threat of war throughout his reign, his regime was not unduly dominated by the military. In policymaking the chiefs of the civil bureaucracy as well as of the army had an effective voice. And in the administrative structure *per se*, although it had been fairly common under the Ayyubids (and especially under Saladin) for a military officer to be charged with overseeing the *diwans*, al-Nasir apparently did not adopt this practice; the civilian bureau chiefs were responsible directly to him.

Each of the three basic elements of the government—military, bureaucratic, and religious—had a distinct regional character. When al-Nasir occupied Damascus, he did not interfere with the religious offices there; as a result these remained in the hands of the local notables. Sadr al-Din ibn Sani al-Daula remained chief qadi throughout al-Nasir's reign. As to the military, although the sultan's commander-in-chief and closest advisor, Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini, had come with him from Aleppo and although at the beginning his elite troops were also Aleppan, it is also true that he tried to incorporate the troops and amirs of Damascus into his forces on an equal basis. Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur and Mujahid al-Din Ibrahim continued to rank among the senior officers, while the Qaymari amirs would eventually become the most influential figures in his kingdom.

For a time there was even a strong Egyptian element in the army. The civil bureaucracy was another matter altogether; it was from the beginning to the end of his reign predominantly Aleppan, composed of those who had formed the ruling circles in his natal city. It is hardly odd that al-Nasir brought key members of his entourage with him, for al-Salih Ayyub and even Saladin had done the same; this fact simply underlines the point that the civil bureaucracy in Ayyubid times, though recruited from the indigenous population, was more closely attached to the person of the prince than to the locales which it administered.

The ease with which al-Nasir had occupied Damascus and south Syria, the size of his armies, the unitary character of his empire, all suggested that he would be equal to the difficult and ambitious project which he was now contemplating, the conquest of Egypt. It was a campaign which the honor of his house almost compelled him to undertake, nor could he afford to permit a hostile regime to consolidate its authority on his southern flank. But al-Nasir possessed a far from adventurous personality, and he was not at all eager to embark on a project which could easily cost him everything he had gained in recent months. Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini strongly urged him to do it though, and in the end he agreed. If the Ayyubids were ever to be reinstated in Egypt, it was important to strike quickly, while al-Nasir's personal prestige was at its height. Moreover there was clear evidence of dissension and political instability in Cairo and even some signs of sympathy for al-Nasir and the Ayyubid house.

This had been noticed as early as Muharram 648/April 1250, when Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim had been dispatched by al-Nasir on an embassy to Turanshah. By the time Kamal al-Din reached al-Mansura, however, Turanshah was already dead and power in the hands of the Bahriyya. Nevertheless he took the opportunity to sound out the feelings of several leading amirs about his own master. He discovered not only a considerable sympathy for the legitimist cause, perforce represented by the prince of Aleppo, but even many offers of support should

he make an attempt on Egypt. When Kamal al-Din returned to Syria, he duly passed on these findings to al-Nasir.⁵

The political changes which occurred in Cairo immediately after al-Nasir's seizure of Damascus demonstrated clearly that the new regime in Egypt was still very uncertain of itself. On learning of the fall of Damascus, the military chiefs in Cairo decided that the situation no longer permitted a woman to hold the supreme authority, and on 29 Rabi' II 648/31 July 1250 the *atabeg* 'Izz al-Din Aybeg was elevated to the sultanate. Taking the title of al-Malik al-Mu'izz, he rode in solemn ceremony through the streets of Cairo to the citadel to take up his residence there. Less than a week later, however (5 Jumada I/5 August), it was agreed that he should step down, for it was apparent that enough legitimist sentiment existed in influential circles to make it expedient to have an Ayyubid on the throne. The candidate selected for this dubious honor was an obscure six-year-old prince named al-Ashraf Musa, a grandson of al-Kamil. Aybeg lost none of his real power, of course, and he retained both his royal title and the office of *atabeg*. Nevertheless that it was felt necessary to seat an Ayyubid prince on the throne implied in itself that al-Nasir Yusuf would find numerous adherents if he entered Cairo.⁶

Towards the end of Jumada I/August al-Nasir directed an advance force to proceed to Gaza and secure his line of march; he himself was to follow later with the bulk of the army. Aybeg had already posted a strong contingent there under the command of Rukn al-Din Khass-Turk al-Kabir, one of the leading figures in the Egyptian junta. This force was to parry any sudden thrusts by al-Nasir, but as soon as they learned of the Syrians' approach, they panicked and fled back to al-Salihiyya, on the other side of the Sinai. At this point the leaders of the Egyptian advance force (including not only Rukn al-Din Khass-Turk but also Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir) unexpectedly threw off their allegiance to Aybeg and al-Ashraf and declared their support for al-Mughith 'Umar of al-Karak as ruler of Egypt. The significance of this act is not entirely clear; it may have represented a disgruntled faction's reaction against the growing

power of Aybeg, and perhaps it can also be seen as an attempt at a more serious Ayyubid restoration, one which would enthrone a mature, though admittedly weak, prince. Certainly al-Mughith, as the son of al-Kamil's designated successor al-'Adil II, had a better claim to the sultanate than al-Ashraf Musa. But whatever motivated the revolt of Khass-Turk and Rashid al-Kabir, it came to nothing: Aybeg and his followers stood firm, and the ringleaders were forced to seek asylum with al-Mughith, who seems heretofore to have had no connection with the plot whatever.⁷

The moment was propitious for al-Nasir's projected invasion, but he suddenly fell desperately ill. Although he eventually began a slow recovery, his preparations for the expedition were wrecked. On 5 Rajab 648/3 October 1250 Faris al-Din Aktay, the commandant of the Bahriyya and Jamdariyya regiments, led a force of 2000 cavalry to Gaza, where the advance units sent a month before by al-Nasir were still stationed. He fell on them without warning and drove them in headlong flight back to Damascus. Having achieved his goal, Aktay did not pursue them, but instead returned in triumph to Cairo, where he arrived on 4 Sha'ban/1 November.⁸

Only by the end of that month was al-Nasir sufficiently recovered to resume preparations for the Egyptian campaign. The army which he assembled in Damascus was perhaps the largest fielded by any Syrian prince since the death of Nur al-Din. It included the army of Aleppo—not only its two royal *mamluk* regiments (the 'Aziziyya, recruited by al-'Aziz Muhammad, and the newer and apparently less important Nasiriyya, formed by the present prince), but also troops commanded by al-Mu'azzam Turanshah and Nusrat al-Din, the last living sons of Saladin. Al-Ashraf Musa, now lord of Tall Bashir, was present with his regiment, and al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama, though not personally on hand, was represented by a contingent. Finally there was the army of Damascus, consisting of that part of al-Salih Ayyub's garrison which had transferred its allegiance to the new regime. By mid-Ramadan 648/December 1250 all was in readiness, and al-Nasir led his army out of

Damascus.⁹

The Egyptian army was almost certainly much larger than al-Nasir's, and the Syrians' chief hope lay in their own morale and in the dissension and disloyalty which lay just beneath the surface in the Egyptian camp. But all was not well among the Syrians either. The elite 'Aziziyya and Nasiriyya corps strongly resented the commander-in-chief, Shams al-Din Lu'lu', whom many thought indifferent to their status and interests. But Ibn Wasil identifies a second, more disturbing element of weakness — *jinsiyya*, the feeling of racial solidarity which the 'Aziziyya and Nasiriyya *mamluks* entertained towards their Egyptian counterparts. The *mamluks* in both armies were recruited from the same ethnic stock, the Kipchak Turks dwelling east and north of the Caspian Sea, and in both armies they were numerous enough to be aware of themselves as a distinct and powerful group. Faced with opponents who shared their language and culture, and who were even led by a man of their own race, the Syrian *mamluks* not surprisingly felt closer to them than to the other groups — Kurds, Türkmen, and freeborn Turks — in their own army.¹⁰

But these potential sources of disloyalty were not easily discernable to outsiders, and on the same day that al-Nasir pitched camp at Gaza (2 Shawwal 648/28 December 1250), al-Mu'izz Aybeg was arresting all persons in Cairo who could be suspected of pro-Ayyubid sympathies. Only on 9 Shawwal 648/4 January 1251, however, did he finally send his army to al-Salihiyya to block the Ayyubid advance. Some three weeks later Aybeg released two sons of al-Salih Isma'il from captivity and bestowed robes of honor on them, undoubtedly intending to shake the loyalty of al-Salih (who was with the Syrian forces) towards al-Nasir, but he obtained no results from this maneuver. On 1 Dhu-l-Qa'da/25 January Aybeg attempted an even subtler ploy by announcing with great fanfare a nonexistent alliance with al-Mughith 'Umar of al-Karak, but this likewise came to nothing. At last on 3 Dhu-l-Qa'da/27 January Aybeg departed Cairo at the head of his remaining troops and marched to al-Salihiyya.¹¹

Two days later al-Nasir brought the Syrian army to the village of Kura', in the vicinity of the old Tulunid military outpost of 'Abbasa, some thirty-five miles southwest of al-Salihiyya.¹² To meet its advance Aybeg was compelled to move his camp to the village of Samut. At dawn 10 Dhu-l-Qa'da 648/3 February 1251 the two armies began to form their orders of battle. We know nothing of the troop dispositions except that Shams al-Din Lu'lu' had his master al-Nasir placed well to the rear of the Syrian army, where he was protected by a small personal guard drawn from the 'Aziziyya and Nasiriyya corps. In midmorning the Syrian cavalry suddenly swooped down on the Egyptian lines and almost at once drove them headlong from the field. Many fled to Cairo and some even to upper Egypt. The main body of the Syrian forces pursued them closely and before long they too were out of sight.

When he saw what was happening, Aybeg withdrew to one side in the company of his commander-in-chief, Faris al-Din Aktay, and a small guard of no more than 300 men. They were intending to make their way to al-Shaubak, where they hoped to find a temporary refuge, but as they rode away they noticed at a distance the banners of al-Nasir Yusuf with only a small party of men clustered beneath them. On an impulse Aybeg and his men charged. Al-Nasir fled in panic, and when his guard, made up of the half-loyal 'Aziziyya, saw their sovereign desert the field, they abruptly joined forces with Aybeg. Those who remained loyal to al-Nasir were killed or captured. Nor did the peculiar tale end here. Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini, unaware of what had happened, was returning to find his master when he spotted Aybeg and his men. Underestimating the number of Aybeg's companions, he ignored the warnings of his fellows and plunged ahead to the attack. His little entourage was overwhelmed, and he and another senior officer, Diya' al-Din al-Qaymari, were captured.¹³

This event, far more than al-Nasir's precipitate and cowardly retreat, turned certain victory into a disastrous defeat. If Shams al-Din had been able to regroup his forces, he could very probably have pressed on to Cairo while the Egyptian army was still

scattered and the local army in confusion. But now almost every prince and high-ranking commander had been captured: al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, Nusrat al-Din, al-Salih Isma'il, and al-Ashraf Musa of Tall Bashir. The princes were treated with proper respect by their captors, but Shams al-Din was brought before al-Mu'izz Aybeg, who lacked magnanimity but not insight. He ordered him executed on the spot, and even the remonstrances of Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali, who thought the prisoner too noble and too valuable a hostage to suffer such a fate, could not delay his demise. Immediately thereafter Diya' al-Din al-Qaymari was also summarily beheaded.¹⁴

The main bodies of the two armies had no knowledge of all this, of course, and as the routed Egyptians were scattering down the Nile valley, the victorious Syrians regrouped at 'Abbasa under the temporary leadership of Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur. In anticipation of al-Nasir Yusuf's imminent arrival, the royal pavillion was erected, and all imagined that he would soon lead them in triumph to Cairo. But the next day they learned the full extent of the disaster. There was dissension at first as to the proper course of action; some even wanted to advance on Cairo, believing that they could still take it without a fight, since the truth was still not known there and since Aybeg's effective army was now miniscule. But lacking a leader of sufficient standing, they eventually decided to make their way back to Damascus, and with that action disappeared the last faint hope that the Syrians might yet gain the decision. Al-Mu'izz Aybeg stood as the absolute victor in what was assuredly the strangest battle in the history of the Ayyubids.¹⁵

It was some time before accurate information reached Cairo. On Friday, the day after the battle, al-Nasir's occupation of the city had seemed so certain that his name was pronounced in the *khutba* in the citadel and in the mosque of 'Amr ibn al-'As. But the next day (12 Dhu-l-Qa'da/5 February 1251) Aybeg made a triumphal return to his capital, accompanied by his newly acquired 'Aziziyya and Nasiriyya guards. He was not slow to settle accounts. Two days later he ordered the hanging of Nasir al-Din b. Yaghmur and Amin al-Daula al-Samiri (al-Salih Isma'il's

onetime *ustadh al-dar* and *wazir* respectively). During the hours when it was generally believed that Aybeg had been defeated, they had emerged from prison and boasted loudly of the power they would enjoy under the new regime. He was on the verge of ordering the execution of Sayf al-Din al-Qaymari as well, since he was a kinsman of the Qaymari amirs in al-Nasir's forces, but at the last moment he relented and commuted the sentence to exile in Syria. Most of the Ayyubid princes captured at Kura' were imprisoned but otherwise unharmed. But on the night of 27 Dhu-l-Qa'da 648/20 February 1251, al-Salih Isma'il was led by torchlight from his cell in the citadel to the Qarafa Cemetery, and there he was strangled.¹⁶

Al-Nasir Yusuf had not suffered serious manpower losses at Kura', and during the weeks following the battle most of his troops slowly filtered back to Damascus to rejoin him. Nevertheless this campaign proved a fatal blow to his hopes of leading an Ayyubid restoration in Egypt. In the first place there would never again be so fortunate a conjunction of circumstances. Egypt remained politically troubled until the end of the decade, but al-Nasir Yusuf's personal conduct at Kura' had cost him the great prestige which he had heretofore enjoyed. To legitimist circles in Egypt al-Nasir had seemed an ideal choice to restore Ayyubid rule there. As the great-grandson of Saladin, whose very name he shared, his right to the throne of Egypt was indisputable. Moreover until now his reign had been a succession of triumphs: the occupation of Diyar Mudar in 638/1241, the annihilation of the Khwarizmians at al-Qasab in 644/1246, the conquest of Homs in 646/1248, and finally the seizure of Damascus in 648/1250. But when the chain of successes was broken at Kura', men must have begun to reflect that al-Nasir's had been a borrowed glory. His victories in the East and against the Khwarizmians were owed to the superb generalship of al-Mansur Ibrahim of Homs while Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini had been the guiding spirit behind the occupation of Homs and the expedition against Egypt. In any event after Kura' Egypt showed little interest in an Ayyubid restoration, which was now reduced to an empty sentiment.

The death of Shams al-Din had far more direct effects on al-Nasir's future. It was now clear to all that this prince had crippling flaws in his character—indecision and a lack of personal courage—which had hitherto been largely compensated for by the energy of his chief advisor. With Shams al-Din gone, nothing ever really worked out well for al-Nasir again. He won some minor military and diplomatic successes, to be sure, but a decisive victory always lay just beyond his grasp.

Years of frustration,
648/1251-657/1259

The first consequence of the debacle at Kura' was a weakening of al-Nasir's control in Syria. Shortly after his return to Damascus his vassal al-Mughith sent a force under the command of Rukn al-Din Khass-Turk, now in his service, to occupy the vital town of Nablus. This al-Nasir could not permit, and he in turn dispatched a unit to snatch it back. But neither could he afford to alienate his vassal in Transjordan, which led him to concede several places to al-Mughith that had once formed a part of al-Nasir Da'ud's principality: the Balqa', the Ghaur, Bayt Jibril, and possibly Hebron.¹⁷

Undoubtedly of greater concern to al-Nasir was the likelihood of an Egyptian counteroffensive. His position in this respect was further complicated by the presence in Acre of the remnants of Louis IX's shattered crusade. This force was far too small—never more than 1400 men-at-arms—to undertake any serious campaigns on its own, but it did represent an important potential reinforcement for either al-Nasir or the Mamluks. The minimum diplomatic goal for both Damascus and Cairo was to ensure that the other side did not form an effective alliance with Louis, and ideally each wished to obtain the use of Louis's forces. Louis had two main goals: to obtain the release of Frankish prisoners being held in Egypt (a key point in his peace treaty with the Mamluk amirs) and to restore the de-

fenses, and as far as possible the territories, of the frail Kingdom of Jerusalem. Refortifying the coastal cities required no reference to the Muslim political situation, but extending the kingdom's territorial possessions necessarily embroiled him in diplomatic negotiations with the two Muslim powers. And since he had left Egypt in humiliation, with only his leading men, he had no way to pressure the Mamluk amirs into releasing the Frankish prisoners save by exploiting the hostility between Cairo and Damascus.

Al-Nasir had initiated diplomatic contacts with Louis when he proposed an alliance against the Mamluk usurpers prior to his Egyptian expedition. As an inducement he had offered to restore the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Louis's response was honest but astute. He informed the sultan that he could not conclude such an alliance until he saw whether the Egyptians intended to honor their treaty with him and release his prisoners. If they did not, he would readily join forces with him. With this offer in hand Louis was now able to demand that Cairo immediately release his prisoners. The Mamluks temporized by asking for alliance against al-Nasir Yusuf, but Louis's envoy refused to consider that until all the captive knights were sent to Acre. At this point, sometime in Rajab 648/October 1250, the Egyptians acquiesced and freed some 800 of their Christian prisoners (including as many as 200 knights). But when the prisoners arrived in Acre, Louis told the Egyptian envoys accompanying them that he would not consider an alliance against Damascus save on the most stringent terms: the bodies of those killed at the battle of Gaza in 637/1239, all Christian children held captive in Egypt and forced to renounce their faith, and—most important—the remission of the huge debt (200,000 *livres tournois*) which Louis still owed as ransom for his release from Damietta. The Mamluks could not accede easily to these proposals and did not respond seriously to them for more than a year. In the meantime al-Nasir had undertaken his disastrous invasion, while Louis moved his forces south to Caesarea to begin refortifying that city.

It was only in Muharram 650/late March 1252 that the Mam-

luks finally informed Louis that they would accept his terms. All prisoners would be released, the balance of the king's debt forgiven, and as recompense for his expected support against Damascus the Kingdom of Jerusalem would be restored in its entirety. A joint campaign against al-Nasir was to be launched in May, with Louis moving his forces south to Jaffa and the Mamluks occupying Gaza. But for once al-Nasir moved decisively: as soon as he knew of the alliance, he sent a large advance force under the command of his *ustadh al-dar* Sayf al-Din Baktut with orders to station itself at Tall al-'Ajul, near Gaza, in order to prevent the junction of the Frankish and Egyptian armies. Meantime he himself brought the rest of his army down to 'Amta in the Ghaur. Louis kept his part of the bargain anyhow and advanced to Jaffa, while al-Mu'izz Aybeg assembled his armies in al-Salihiyya and dispatched an advance force of 1000 cavalry to Gaza under the command of Faris al-Din Ak-tay. But nothing else happened. The Egyptians scrupulously honored the other points in the treaty with Louis, Louis set about refortifying Jaffa, but otherwise the three armies glowered at one another for almost a year and did not move. In fact neither the Mamluks nor al-Nasir Yusuf were eager to begin a war that promised to benefit the Franks far more than either of them, so when the Caliph al-Musta'sim offered to mediate between Cairo and Damascus, through the experienced Najm al-Din al-Badhira'i, both sides were willing to accept the offer. A settlement was not easy to attain, but after several months of difficult negotiations, in early Safar 651/April 1253, a peace was finally signed. It contained the following provisions. The Mamluks would retain all Egypt and in addition be ceded Palestine as far north as (but not including) Nablus—i.e., Judaea and the Muslim portion of the coast. Al-Nasir was confirmed as ruler of everything else in Muslim Syria, and the Ayyubid princes still imprisoned in Cairo—al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, Nusrat al-Din, and al-Ashraf Musa of Tall Bashir—would be permitted to return to Damascus. With this treaty the contest for supremacy between Ayyubids and Mamluks sputtered to its indecisive close.¹⁸ The Mamluks had certainly gained the most:

in addition to the small territorial increment represented by southern Palestine, their legitimacy had been implicitly recognized, both by the caliph and by al-Nasir Yusuf. Al-Nasir, on the other hand, found his position somewhat weakened: his kingdom had been truncated slightly and the Mamluks were more firmly ensconced than ever. As for Louis IX, the peace treaty had not referred to him at all, and that fact in itself spelled the end to his hopes of recovering some portion of Palestine for the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

In principle Louis was now at war both with Cairo and Damascus, but in fact Damascus was his only active enemy for the duration of his stay in the Holy Land. Soon after concluding the accord with the Mamluks, al-Nasir recalled his troops from Gaza. Either on his orders or on their own initiative they returned by way of the coast road, exploiting whatever opportunities they found for raiding or skirmishing. On St. John the Evangelist's Day, they passed by Louis's camp outside Jaffa and succeeded in drawing his crossbowmen into a sharp but inconclusive fight. They then moved up the coast to Acre and fought a second brief skirmish there, in an apparently unsuccessful attempt to raid the city's outlying gardens. Then learning that Sidon was almost undefended, they hurried north to try their fortunes there.¹⁹

Sidon had apparently fallen into Muslim hands for a brief period during Louis's campaign in Egypt, and Ibn Shaddad even reports that the *mutawalli* of Sidon, one Sa'd al-Din b. Nizar, sent a detachment against the fortress of Tyron at about this time and seized it from the Franks. But the treaty with the Mamluk amirs called for a restoration of the territorial *status quo ante*, and this presumably required the reversion of both places to the Franks.²⁰ In any event when al-Nasir's troops arrived before this city, it was only partly walled and its garrison, hopelessly outnumbered, fled with a few townspeople to the little Castle-by-the-Sea. The Muslims had a free hand to do as they wished, and they pillaged unmolested, massacring (according to Joinville) some 2000 defenseless townspeople. But they made no effort to take the castle or hold the town and soon

retreated to Damascus.²¹

Louis was deeply saddened by the news from Sidon and determined that as soon as he had finished his work at Jaffa, he would begin the refortification of Sidon. On 29 June 1253 he decamped with his army and set off for the north. As he progressed he mooted the possibilities of an attack into Muslim territory, perhaps thinking to avenge the raid on Sidon or to anchor a bit more securely the Frankish possessions in Galilee and south Lebanon. Finally, while the army was encamped at Tyre, it was decided that a joint force (made up of Templars, Hospitallers, local barons, and the king's troops) should try to capture Banyas, while the king himself should proceed directly to Sidon and begin work there. Banyas was now under al-Nasir's direct control; its titular lord, al-Sa'id Hasan, had attempted to retake possession of the place in Ramadan 649/November-December 1251, but he had been captured by al-Nasir's troops before he could reach it and packed off to imprisonment in the Euphrates fortress of al-Bira. Al-Nasir made no special effort to defend Banyas against the new attack, in spite of its strategic value, and the Franks were able to overrun the town itself almost without resistance. But the defenders still held the great castle of al-Subayba overlooking the town and—more importantly—the hillside between the two points. As a result the Frankish position rapidly became untenable and the attackers were forced to withdraw on the same day. This incident marks the end of the fighting between al-Nasir Yusuf and Louis IX, although Louis remained at Sidon several months longer in order to complete its refortification. By winter it was obvious that the king would soon have to return to France. Back in Acre at the beginning of Lent 1254, he arranged a truce with al-Nasir in obscure circumstances. Its provisions were of the simplest: it was to date from 1 Muharram 652/21 February 1254 and to last for two years, six months, and forty days; it apparently recognized the territorial *status quo*, save that the revenues of Tiberias (under Muslim administration) and Sidon (under Frankish control) would be shared on a half-and-half basis. On 4 Rabi' I 652/24 April 1254 Louis embarked at Acre;

for the rest of the decade al-Nasir and the Franks would leave each other in peace.²²

The end of the petty skirmishing with Louis IX did not signal the beginning of a period of tranquillity for al-Nasir, however. Even before he had signed the truce with the Franks, Syrian politics was abruptly and profoundly affected by the turbulence of Mamluk Egypt. There had been for some time a growing tension between al-Mu'izz Aybeg and his elite Bahriyya and Jamdariyya corps, together with their commandant Faris al-Din Aktay. Aware that they were the foundation of Aybeg's regime, these two regiments were making increased demands for special privileges and new *iqta's*. Moreover Aybeg was becoming fearful (quite possibly on good grounds) that they were plotting his overthrow. In response he began a policy of favoring the two Syrian regiments which had defected to him at Kura' in the hope of gaining new adherents in case of a clash with the Bahriyya and Jamdariyya. Having secured his position, al-Mu'izz now felt free to strike at the man whom he suspected of being the chief conspirator. On 10 Dhu-l-Qa'da 651/1 January 1254 Faris al-Din Aktay was invited to the Cairo citadel to consult with the sultan on some urgent matter. As the amir entered the palace, he was stabbed to death by a gang of Aybeg's personal *mamluks*, led by one Sayf al-Din Kutuz. As soon as the other Bahriyya got wind of what was happening, many of them gathered under their ranking officer, Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Bunduqdari, and fled to Syria, hoping to find refuge with al-Nasir Yusuf. Those who remained were thrown into prison, while their properties were pillaged by the now dominant 'Aziziyya. Aybeg, meantime, took the occasion to confirm his power as sole ruler of Egypt. The Ayyubid al-Ashraf Musa was deposed from the sultanate, while his former regent rode in ceremony through Cairo, surrounded by the royal banners and preceded by the *ghashiya*.²³

In the meantime Baybars and the other Bahriyya refugees had made their way to Gaza; there they halted and requested permission to enter al-Nasir's service. He leapt at the opportunity; personally conducting his army down to 'Amta in the

Ghaur, he sent a contingent on to Gaza to greet the Bahriyya. All this of course convinced Aybeg that al-Nasir was planning a second invasion of Egypt, and he brought his forces out to 'Abbasa to meet it. But in fact nothing of the sort occurred, for al-Nasir was far from eager to risk his reconstructed army in another Egyptian expedition. The Bahriyya felt very differently, however; to them al-Nasir was the instrument by which they could recover their former power in Egypt, and they urged him repeatedly to strike quickly. But in vain—he was not even moved by the news that a revolt in upper Egypt, led by 'Izz al-Din al-Afram, had at least temporarily brought that region under Bahriyya control.²⁴

Though he had no intention of taking the offensive, al-Nasir was quite aware that enlisting the Bahriyya might lead to renewed war with Egypt and began to search for ways to strengthen his diplomatic position. Sometime during 652/1254 he dispatched Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim to Badr al-Din Lu'lu' of Mosul and the Artukid al-Sa'id Il-Ghazi of Mardin with the aim, first, of patching up a persistent quarrel between these two princes over the possession of Nisibin and, second, of obtaining commitments to support him in the event of war with the Mamluks.²⁵

In 653/1255, however, al-Nasir suddenly found himself receiving more efficacious help than his new alliance could ever have provided. As in 651/1253 it evolved out of disaffection between Aybeg and his troops. This time it was the 'Aziziyya who were beginning to feel ill-disposed towards their master. The causes of this are unknown to us, but they were serious enough to drive this corps, so recently the mainstay of Aybeg's regime, into correspondence with al-Nasir Yusuf. They proposed to kill Aybeg and call al-Nasir to the throne of Egypt, in return for which they would of course receive suitable rewards. This arrangement, which promised a peaceful and unopposed entry into Cairo, was agreeable even to the weak nerves of the sultan of Damascus. It was Aybeg's custom to go riding every Tuesday through the Egyptian camp at 'Abbasa, surrounded by an escort drawn from the 'Aziziyya, and the conspirators

planned to exploit this habit. But in mid-Ramadan/October rumors flew through the camp that Aybeg had discovered all, and those involved in the scheme (most of the regiment) fled in panic to Syria.²⁶

The possibility of open conflict between Egypt and Syria was again averted by caliphal intervention. Yet a second time al-Musta'sim's envoy Najm al-Din al-Badhira'i was able to arrange a workable treaty between the two sides. Al-Nasir was clearly in the stronger position this time, however, and the new settlement reflected this reality by restoring all Palestine, as far south as al-'Arish, to al-Nasir. He at last obtained the means to reward the Bahriyya in a suitable manner and carved up Palestine among them in *iqta'*. Unfortunately we have but a fragment of more precise data: an obscure amir named Kütük was made governor of Jerusalem, and Rukn al-Din Baybars was granted a very large assignment of 120 horsemen, based on Nablus and Jinin.²⁷

For more than a year after these events an unaccustomed calm settled over al-Nasir's affairs. The only episode of significance occurred in Shawwal 654/October-November 1256, when al-Nasir dispatched Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim and his son Jamal al-Din to Baghdad with the mission of seeking formal caliphal investiture of their sovereign with the title of *al-sultan*. What motivated al-Nasir to make this request is not stated, but obviously it was connected with his rivalry with al-Mu'izz Aybeg. The only Ayyubid ruler even to have obtained this title from the caliph was al-Salih Ayyub, and perhaps al-Nasir thought that by gaining it for himself, he would give legal sanction to his claim to be the sole legitimate successor of that monarch. In any future negotiations or conflicts with the Mamluks, this point of prestige might have its uses. However this may be, al-Nasir's two envoys arrived in Baghdad on 22 Dhu-l-Qa'da 654/11 December 1256 and spent the next four months trying to persuade al-Musta'sim to grant their master's request. Unfortunately for them Aybeg had sent his own representative to the Abbasid court precisely to ensure that al-Nasir should not gain any such propaganda victory. This put al-Musta'sim in a

quandary. Hülegü Khan had led a huge Mongol army into Iran the previous year and already had accomplished the immense feat of rooting the Assassins out of their mountain strongholds and utterly destroying that sect as a political force. It was obvious that the Abbasid caliphate was Hülegü's next major objective; if he was to be resisted, al-Musta'sim would need all the allies he could find—in particular al-Nasir Yusuf and al-Mu'izz Aybeg, who were by far the most powerful kings still remaining in the central Islamic lands. To yield to either would certainly cost him an ally, and so as always when faced with a decision of substance, al-Musta'sim procrastinated. At length his *wazir*, Mu'ayyad al-Din ibn al-'Alqami,²⁸ called Jamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim and presented him with a fine dagger, saying that it was a token that al-Nasir would be given the honors he sought at a later and more convenient time, but not now. With this humiliating gift in hand, the Syrian ambassadors departed for Damascus on 1 Rabi' II 655/18 April 1257.²⁹

But they had not left Baghdad before the fragile equilibrium between Damascus and Cairo was broken by the eruption of a new period of turmoil within the ruling clique in Cairo. This time it proceeded from the personal estrangement (rapidly metamorphosing into intense hatred) between Aybeg and his wife Shajar al-Durr. Wanting a wife more in keeping with his new status than a former slave-girl and perhaps also thinking to establish an alliance with al-Nasir's eastern neighbor, Aybeg had married a woman from the ruling house of Mosul. Shajar al-Durr was not only jealous of her husband's new bride, but she also feared that he intended to murder her. She thus moved to form a conspiracy to do away with him before he could strike. But the high officials and notables showed little interest; Safi al-Din ibn Marzuq, now residing in Egypt, was promised the vizierate, but he would have nothing to do with the scheme and even advised strongly against it. Finally she succeeded in enlisting a group of al-Salih Ayyub's old household servants, who undoubtedly still felt obligated to defend his widow's honor. On 23 Rabi' I 655/10 April 1257, as Aybeg was in his bath in the citadel, two of the conspirators entered

the chamber and stabbed him to death. But a week later, before a new regime could be formed, the slain man's own *mamluks* revolted and took power into their own hands. The actual murderers were crucified at the citadel gate, while Shajar al-Durr was handed over to the mother of Aybeg's oldest son and beaten to death by her. A new government was not officially formed until 26 Rabi' II/13 May, when Aybeg's amirs raised his eldest son, al-Mansur 'Ali, then fifteen years of age, to the throne of Egypt. As his *atabeg* they named Faris al-Din Aktay al-Musta'rib,³⁰ while Sayf al-Din Kutuz was also given an influential post.³¹

Almost at once there were rumors of yet a third conspiracy, this one in some way connected with al-Nasir Yusuf. The *wazir*, Sharaf al-Din al-Fa'izi, who had served three sultans, had continued in office with the new government, but a few days after al-Mansur 'Ali's enthronement, two highly placed figures testified that they had overheard the *wazir* saying, "Royal power (*mamlaka*) is not appropriate for youth . . . al-Malik al-Nasir, the lord of Syria, alone is fit for it." The whole thing seems suspiciously trumped up—al-Fa'izi was not a powerful man in his own right, nor do we read that anyone else was implicated with him. But whatever the truth in the charges against him, he was summarily dragged from his residence in the citadel and strangled.³²

All this turbulence provided al-Nasir Yusuf an excellent opportunity to intervene, had he so desired, and certainly the Bahriyya were still as eager as ever to follow him back to Egypt. But he would not act, and a marked chilliness began to appear between him and the Bahriyya. They were frustrated by his passivity and timidity and perhaps also jealous of his esteem for the 'Aziziyya. For his part al-Nasir was beginning to suspect that the powerful Bahriyya, arrogant soldiers of fortune rather than loyal servants of their sovereign, were bent on deposing him and usurping royal authority for themselves, just as they had once done in Egypt. Possibly, too, they were too great a financial burden for the treasury of Damascus: at one point al-Nasir offered their commandant Baybars his full

stipend (*mustahaqq*), but declared that the other members of the corps would have to be content with only a part of theirs.

At length, sometime in Ramadan 655/September-October 1257, Rukn al-Din Baybars either asked permission to leave Damascus or was expelled from the city. With him he took the other Bahriyya in Damascus and together they moved down to Jerusalem. They asked its governor Kütük, a Bahri like themselves, to join them, but when he would not betray his allegiance to al-Nasir, they deposed him. More than that, they had the *khutba* in Jerusalem pronounced in the name of al-Mughith 'Umar of al-Karak, who had willy-nilly become a major pole of attraction for dissidents from the Cairo or Damascus regimes. As when Khass-Turk and Rashid al-Kabir deserted seven years before, al-Mughith apparently had no foreknowledge of Bahriyya intentions.

After occupying Jerusalem and plundering its stores, Baybars led his men on to Gaza, where they repeated the process. Early in Shawwal 655/late October 1257 al-Nasir realized that he would have to take decisive action. He brought his army down to Nablus, where the Bahriyya had advanced to meet him. At the first shock of battle the Damascene cavalry broke and fled, but as their opponents followed in pursuit, the Damascenes abruptly turned and drove them from the field—a classic *al-karr wa-l-farr* exercise.³³ The Bahriyya fled across the Jordan and did not reform until they reached the Balqa'. From there they proceeded down the eastern shore of the Dead Sea until they reached Zughar on its southern tip; from there they sent their submission to al-Mughith in al-Karak.³⁴

Al-Mughith was delighted to gain the services of this powerful force, doubtless seeing in it the instrument of his independence from Damascus. To ensure its fidelity he began distributing among the Bahriyya all the enormous wealth which al-Salih Ayyub had placed in al-Karak eight years earlier. His new troops at once began urging their favorite project, an invasion of Egypt, and for some unfathomable reason both al-Mughith and his advisor Badr al-Din al-Sawabi were amenable to the notion. Why anyone thought that such an expedition could

succeed is a mystery: there is no evidence that any faction in Egypt was prepared to support the invaders, while the force finally assembled by al-Mughith was hardly overwhelming — 700 cavalry, of whom 300 are termed *muqatila* (presumably Bedouin warriors).

There could be no hope of surprise, for when the Cairo government had learned of the Bahriyya's departure from Damascus, they had assumed that it signaled a new assault on Egypt by al-Nasir. Accordingly by the beginning of Shawwal 655/mid-October 1257 a large contingent had been posted at 'Abbasa as an advance guard. Nevertheless al-Mughith's miniscule army moved swiftly across Palestine and had already passed al-'Arish before the Egyptians learned of its approach. The latter hurriedly transferred their camp to the more strategically located al-Salihiyya, and there in the predawn of 15 Dhu-l-Qa'da/24 November the lines were drawn up for battle. Fighting began while it was still dark, and al-Mughith's men battled so fiercely that some of the Egyptian units deserted the field. But as the sun rose and al-Mughith's forces could see how overwhelmingly outnumbered they were, they fled in panic back into the Sinai.³⁵

In spite of this setback al-Mughith and Baybars were not discouraged. Their actual losses had been slight, and it was no great trouble to assemble a second army at the beginning of the next year (656/1258). This new force numbered 1500 regular cavalry, more than twice the size of the first. In addition to the Bahriyya and al-Mughith's own regiment, it included a large number of adventurers attracted by the prospect of booty and power in Egypt. Most were deserters from the Egyptian army — old amirs of al-Salih Ayyub who saw their influence and status fading under a regime now based on the *mamluks* of al-Mu'izz Aybeg, and unprincipled soldiers of fortune (e.g., the sons of the Khwarizmian chief Berke-Khan and one of the Qaymariyya amirs).

The internal weakness of the Mamluk army was indicated not only by the number of desertions from its ranks, but also by the correspondence which a number of amirs who had remained in the Egyptian camp kept up with their counterparts

in al-Mughith's army. But al-Mughith's force was rent by intense feuding which sometimes broke into open violence—just as one might expect of so heterogeneous an army, united chiefly by the hope of plunder. The battle finally occurred in Rabi' I 656/March 1258. As before it was fought at al-Salihiyya, but this time al-Mughith had to face the full might of the Egyptian army, led by Faris al-Din al-Musta'rib and Sayf al-Din Kutuz. Oddly enough neither side suffered from desertions, and this fact sealed the outcome of the battle. Baybar's contingent held at first, but when the units under al-Mughith and Badr al-Din al-Sawabi broke, he resisted no longer. The entire baggage of the invaders was seized, and many were captured. Those prisoners who had deserted from the Mamluk army were executed on the spot under the eye of Kutuz—a warning to any future traitors.³⁶

The coming of the Mongols, 656/1258-658/1260

To the modern student the continual turbulence of the middle years of al-Nasir's reign can seem no more than petty and tiresome quarreling; it is easy to forget that these events often embodied problems of high importance. The four years Louis IX spent in Palestine, in the end so sterile, represent the last serious attempt by Latin Europe—indeed by the local barons as well—to reconstruct the Frankish states in the Orient. The continuing rivalry of al-Nasir with the Mamluks showed that Ayyubid hopes for the dynasty's restoration in Egypt had been definitively checked. Even the adventures of the Bahriyya, in themselves so much picaresque derring-do, point to a persistent political problem of the Ayyubid period after al-Kamil's death—the disruption caused to established institutions by free-floating bands of mercenaries. The political chiefs of Syria and Egypt can hardly be blamed for engrossing themselves in local affairs, and yet it seems astonishing that they could have

remained so oblivious to, so unconcerned with, the approaching armies of Hülegü. The Mongols had long been a disturbing presence lurking on the margins of the Ayyubid world; they were fast becoming an immediate threat to its very existence.

Although the Mongols had penetrated the empire as early as 628/1231 in pursuit of the fugitive Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, it was only in 642/1244, following the collapse of Seljukid arms at Köse Dagh the year before, that they had properly begun to attack Ayyubid territory. Early in the year Mongol forces had raided as far south as Haylan, a village on the River Quwayq hardly eight miles north of Aleppo.³⁷ And near the end of the same year a Mongol army had marched down from Lake Van to lay siege to Mayyafariqin. The prince of that city, al-Muzaffar Ghazi, had fled beforehand with most of his family and retainers, ostensibly to recruit assistance from the caliph or Egypt, but more probably (as it would seem from his rather confused itinerary) simply in the hope of dodging the Mongol army. As it happened his panic was needless; if the Mongols ever did lay siege to his capital (a point which is uncertain from the sources), they were somehow induced to break it off in short order and retreat back into Anatolia.³⁸ Although the events of 642/1244 seemed to presage a bitter future for the Jazira and north Syria, they turned out to be isolated incidents, of a kind that would not recur for eight years. Although the Mongols controlled eastern Anatolia, they clearly had not yet made the Ayyubid empire a target for subjugation.

Nevertheless the very closeness of the Mongol presence was sufficient encouragement for the neighboring Ayyubid princes to seek a *modus vivendi* with them. Nor did it require any profound insight into the Mongols' diplomatic conceptions to realize that from their point of view the only acceptable arrangement was voluntary submission and the acceptance of vassaldom to the *Qa'an*. It was undoubtedly this line of thought which led al-Nasir Yusuf (under the guidance of Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini) to dispatch an embassy to Karakorum in 648/1250, very shortly after his occupation of Damascus. When the Ayyubid envoys, headed by Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi,³⁹

reached the Mongol capital, they found the imperial throne occupied by a newly elected *Qa'an*, Möngke. He acceded to their petition of submission readily enough, and late in 649/1251 Zayn al-Din returned to Damascus with the imperial insignia (*tamgha* and *nishan*),⁴⁰ symbolizing that al-Nasir and his kingdom were now under Mongol protection. But even as al-Nasir's ambassadors had stood before Möngke, he was already deciding on a reassertion of Mongol authority in Iran and Anatolia and the conquest of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.⁴¹

Al-Nasir's efforts to forestall Mongol attack were not limited to this embassy to Karakorum. In addition he was careful to send annual gifts to the general Bayju, the conqueror of the Rum Seljukids in 641/1243 and now the Mongol governor for Azerbaijan and Armenia. This initiative had only limited success, however; in Rabi' I 650/May-June 1252 Bayju suddenly appeared before Mayyafariqin and, while setting siege to the city with his main army, dispatched raiding parties that penetrated as far south as Saruj and Ra's al-'Ayn. Al-Kamil Muhammad, who had succeeded his father al-Muzaffar as prince of Mayyafariqin in 645/1247, had managed to get to Hisn Kayfa with his family before Bayju reached Mayyafariqin. From there he sent his younger brother al-Ashraf Musa to the Mongol prince Batu, the ruler of southern Russia and the Caucasus and as such Bayju's overlord, to seek his intervention. Batu agreed to order Bayju's withdrawal, but on the condition that al-Kamil should immediately thereafter go personally to Karakorum to present his submission to the *Qa'an*. Bayju was obedient to Batu's will, breaking off the siege immediately upon al-Ashraf's return, but—according to one source at least—he left behind him devastation and 20,000 dead. As to al-Kamil, he also fulfilled his pledge and set off for Möngke's court at the end of 650/February 1253. When he arrived, he found he was not alone; also paying their respects to the *Qa'an* were the heirs apparent of Mosul and Mardin and a scion of the royal house of Cilician Armenia. In principle, then, Möngke was already the overlord of every major ruler in Syria and the Jazira.⁴²

In fact, however, Möngke had no intention of contenting himself with merely nominal sovereignty. For more than a year before al-Kamil had even left Mayyafariqin, the *Qa'an* had been planning an immense campaign on two fronts designed to complete the conquest of China and the Islamic East. One of his brothers, Kubilai, was charged with the war in China, and another, Hülegü, was given command of the western offensive. Möngke's instructions to Hülegü (insofar as they are authentic and not merely a later justification for Hülegü's policy) were comprehensive: he was to establish Mongol authority from the Oxus to the Nile, mercilessly suppressing rebellious elements wherever they were found; the Assassins in Iran especially were to be extirpated and their castles thrown down; finally the caliph was to be required to submit or face destruction. To further the accomplishment of his task, Hülegü was to wield absolute political authority during his sojourn in Iran: he could make all decisions without referring them to the *Qa'an*, and all Mongol forces and governors already posted in the Near East were put under him. Nevertheless it seems clear that Möngke did not intend Iran to be a permanent, hereditary appanage for his brother. On the contrary Hülegü was instructed to return to Karakorum once his work was done (though admittedly Möngke had no easy way to compel him to do so). Unfortunately we have no comprehensive figures for the size of the army which Hülegü would lead. That it was immense, at least by the standards of Ayyubid Syria and Egypt, may be inferred from the size of the advance force — 12,000 men — which departed Karakorum in Jumada II 650/August 1252, under the command of Kitbugha, to begin the arduous task of reducing the Assassin castles of Kuhistan. The main force included 1,000 teams of Chinese specialists in siege warfare, as well as a special levy of one-fifth of the household troops belonging to each of the Mongol princes. Such an expedition, grandiose both in size and goals, could not be hastily assembled, and neither Möngke nor Hülegü was impatient to act; thus more than two years elapsed between the first serious preparations and Hülegü's departure, in Dhu-l-Hijja 651/February 1254, for Transoxiana.⁴³

Undoubtedly Damascus was well aware of Hülegü's intentions; al-Nasir Yusuf and his advisors could not have supposed that they would be exempt from his attentions. Moreover the Mongols' early incursions into Islam had been lightning-swift, while Hülegü's expedition was moving at a glacial pace—not until 1 Dhu-l-Hijja 653/1 January 1256 did he at last bring his army across the Oxus, some two years after leaving Mongolia.⁴⁴ There was plenty of opportunity, then, for al-Nasir to frame a viable policy, either of submission or defense, but he frittered it away. On the one hand he failed even to send appropriate gifts and high-ranking ambassadors to Hülegü in token of his good faith and in recognition of his own vassal status. On the other hand al-Nasir did not attempt to build a system of alliances, nor did he even cooperate effectively with those neighboring princes who wished to resist the Mongol invasion. The only item which might fall into this category was his marriage in 652/1254 with a daughter of the Rum Seljukid sultan 'Ala' al-Din Kayqubadh (d. 634/1237). But even this may have come about at the instigation of the other party, hopeful that strengthened relations with its strongest neighbor would help to preserve the scraps of independence that still remained to the Rum Seljukids.⁴⁵

Al-Nasir was not alone in his procrastination; during the whole ponderous advance of Hülegü's armies across Central Asia and into Iran and then during the Mongols' meticulous, year-long campaign against the Assassin strongholds, the Caliph al-Musta'sim had done nothing. But in Rabi' I 655/March-April 1257 Hülegü departed his base of operations at Qazwin for Hamadhan. By 9 Rabi' II/26 April he had advanced as far as Dinawar, and his descent into the plain of Iraq seemed imminent. At this point the caliph obtained an unwarranted reprieve; Hülegü remained at Dinawar for three months and then, for reasons altogether unexplained, withdrew to Hamadhan, where he remained for the rest of the summer without taking any overt action at all. In Ramadan/September, however, Hülegü was again ready to march and began his campaign against the caliph with an embassy demanding immediate surrender. This

set off an acrimonious diplomatic exchange between the two monarchs, in which, though each side's messages were replete with arrogance and dark threats, it soon became obvious that the caliph's position was extremely weak. It was undoubtedly this sequence of events which at last induced al-Musta'sim to accede to al-Nasir Yusuf's old but still-standing request for investiture with the office of *sultan*. Najm al-Din al-Badhira'i was sent to Damascus, taking with him the appropriate robes of honor and a diploma of investiture (*al-taqlid al-sharif bi-l-saltana*). Clearly al-Musta'sim's gesture was not intended to give al-Nasir the kind of protectorate over the caliphate which the Seljukid sultans had once enjoyed, but he surely did hope that this honor would encourage the Syrian ruler to see himself as the special defender of the caliphate, now beneath the shadow of the most terrible threat in its five centuries' existence.⁴⁶

Whatever moral obligations al-Nasir incurred, his resolve was in no wise stiffened. In Shawwal 655/October-November 1257 Hülegü set out a second time for Baghdad and this time he did not turn back. Utilizing his massive resources to the full, he planned an assault on three fronts: with his main force he would approach the Abbasid capital from the east; Bayju would bring the Mongol troops in eastern Anatolia down the west bank of the Tigris and encircle the city on that side; finally Kitbugha would attack from the south. Al-Musta'sim sent an urgent plea for help to Damascus and made the unusual request of specifying that he wished his old client al-Nasir Da'ud, long in obscurity, to command the Ayyubid expeditionary force. The sultan could not refuse to send aid to the caliph, of course, and he may well have been pleased with an opportunity to get rid of al-Nasir Da'ud, whose presence in Damascus he regarded as an embarrassing nuisance.⁴⁷ But in his typically dilatory fashion, he was still equipping his expeditionary force when word arrived that the Mongols had already invested Baghdad (an event which occurred during the period 11-15 Muharram 656/18-22 January 1258). Al-Nasir Da'ud was still eager to depart, though he must have known that this expedition would surely mean his own death, but the delays continued, and before the Ayyubid troops

were ready to set out, the terrible news arrived. Baghdad had surrendered to Hülegü on 4 Safar 656/10 February, its population had been subjected to systematic massacre, its great monuments had been razed, and—on 14 Safar/20 February—the Caliph al-Musta‘sim and all his family had been put to death.⁴⁸

Al-Nasir was doubtless appalled at this news, but he had little time to lose in lamentation, for his empire was obviously the next target. Faced with the inevitable choice between early submission and doomed armed resistance, he half-heartedly chose the former. Immediately on learning of the disaster at Baghdad, it would seem, he dispatched a party of envoys to that city. (The precise nature of their mission is unfortunately unstated.) When they arrived there, on 19 Rabi‘ I 656/26 March 1258, they found that Hülegü was already on the road back to Hamadhan. But he had left for them a letter which called on them to learn from the caliph’s example. Perhaps in consequence of this first mission, al-Nasir decided to send a more formal embassy later on the same year. As his personal representative he named his son and heir apparent, al-‘Aziz Muhammad. The other envoys were Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi (who seems to have been the chief negotiator), the *hajib* ‘Alam al-Din Qaysar al-Zahiri, and the amir Sayf al-Din Iljaki. The Syrian embassy, consisting of such high-ranking personages and bringing with it gifts of a splendor suitable for the Mongol prince, was courteously received. But Hülegü, already aggrieved by al-Nasir’s failure to send a proper embassy at the time of his original entry into Iran two years earlier, was further annoyed by the sultan’s unwillingness to appear before him personally in Maragha. Al-Nasir’s ambassadors apologized profusely, declaring that, as their sovereign’s lands bordered those of the Franks, he could not even for a short time leave them unattended. Hülegü pretended to accept this excuse, but in view of the influence enjoyed at his court by his wife Dokuz Khatun and the general Kitbugha, both of whom were devout Nestorian Christians—not to mention the current Mongol attempts to obtain an alliance with the Papacy—it seems unlikely that such a reason would have carried much weight with him. Moreover

there were disturbing rumors afloat among the Muslim delegation (and they were clearly not without substance) that Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi, who had earned considerable prestige with the Mongols during his mission to Karakorum in 648/1250, was now secretly urging Hülegü to launch a full-scale invasion of Syria. Whether or not the Mongol prince required such encouragement, Zayn al-Din's doings must at least have revealed the divisions and weakness of morale at al-Nasir Yusuf's court. Al-Nasir seems to have learned very little of all this; when his envoys at last returned to Damascus in Sha'ban 657/August 1259, he was informed that Hülegü had accepted his gifts and protestations of submission and was now well disposed towards him.⁴⁹

But even while this initiative towards appeasement was still in progress, al-Nasir once again displayed the fatal weakness in his character: his incapacity to define a consistent line of policy, his tendency to undertake a project halfheartedly and without the will to follow it out to its conclusion. In the face of the slow, unpredictable, but inexorable approach of the Mongols, he sat toying first with one, then with the other of the alternatives confronting him. Admittedly neither was palatable, neither had even a reasonable probability of ultimate success; but with the Mongols indecision was inevitably fatal. His character being what it was, al-Nasir could not resist the possibility of a useful alliance when it appeared in the person of al-Kamil Muhammad, prince of Mayyafariqin. When al-Kamil had returned from Karakorum early in 655/1257, he had to all appearances secured his position as a Mongol vassal, and later in the same year he had strengthened his hold in Diyar Bakr by snatching Amida from the hapless Rum Seljukids. But after the fall of Baghdad al-Kamil's relations with the Mongols chilled, and, knowing that Mayyafariqin and Amida lay on the main road from the Mongol camp in Azerbaijan to Syria, he decided to seek an alliance with al-Nasir Yusuf. Al-Nasir promised to send troops to aid al-Kamil in defending the vital (and superbly fortified) cities which he held. It would have been a useful, though admittedly hazardous, investment of his troops, but in fact, after al-Kamil had departed, al-Nasir reneged on his

promises. Ibn Wasil excuses the sultan on the grounds that his soldiers were so terrified by the fate of the Assassins and the caliphate and by the Mongols' fearsome reputation, that they refused to follow his orders to go to Diyar Bakr. This may be true, but it also seems clear that al-Nasir put forth little effort to persuade them to obey him.⁵⁰

It is one of the ironies of fate that at a time when the Mongol threat required all al-Nasir's attention, he should have been forcibly diverted from this task by the eruption of a new conflict with al-Mughith and the Bahriyya. The affair began, or perhaps one should say it was prefaced, by the entry of a new tribal group into Syrian political life. A large number of Kurds from the Shahrzur region had fled their ancestral homelands before the Mongol advance in late 655/1257 and early 656/1258. Among these refugees were 3000 mounted warriors, and the Qaymari amirs, who had become the most influential faction at the court of Damascus and who were undoubtedly eager to increase Kurdish representation in the army, strongly urged al-Nasir to recruit this powerful force. The need for more men was obvious, and he followed their advice. But the Shahrzuriyya proved fractious and rebellious from the outset and threatened to desert to al-Mughith unless they were given more generous *iqta's* and stipends. However when al-Nasir tried thus to appease them, they muttered even more threateningly. At length the Qaymari amirs suggested that al-Nasir depute one of themselves, Badr al-Din Huri al-Hadari al-Qaymari, to induce the Shahrzuriyya to return to obedience. Some days later al-Nasir learned that Badr al-Din had personally departed with all the Shahrzuriyya for al-Karak, where they planned to join the service of al-Mughith, claiming that al-Nasir showed no zeal for war against the Mongols, that indeed his principal advisors were afraid of them.⁵¹

Al-Nasir's leading vassal had now become altogether too powerful, but towards the middle of 656/1258 much graver difficulties began to develop. After returning from his second Egyptian expedition, al-Mughith had evinced some displeasure with the Bahriyya, but a thinly veiled threat from Baybars

induced him to receive them again into his good graces. Once having asserted their independence of al-Mughith, the Bahriyya were not likely to stop, and about midyear (probably after the Shahrhiriyya had deserted to al-Karak) they began mounting destructive raids throughout the Ghaur and the parts of the coast belonging to al-Nasir Yusuf. Again al-Mughith apparently did not instigate these acts, and one suspects that he was merely permitting the turbulent Bahriyya to indulge themselves. Obviously this exposed him to counterattack from al-Nasir, but he may well have felt that it was safer to take that chance than to try to control the Bahriyya, all the more as his new Shahrhiriyya troops would give him the resources to resist his suzerain's anger.

For a time al-Nasir did nothing about these provocations. But when at the end of the year, the Bahriyya turned to raiding in the vicinity of Damascus itself, he could no longer ignore them. He outfitted a force of 2000 regular cavalry under the command of two trusted amirs, Mujir al-Din b. Abi Zakari and Nur al-Din 'Ali b. Shuja' al-Din al-Akta'. This contingent proceeded to Gaza, where it was confronted by a much smaller Bahriyya force commanded by Baybars and containing only some 600 horse, of whom half were apparently Bedouin irregulars (*muqatila*). Al-Nasir's troops overran the two wings of Baybars' little force, but the center, only seventy men under his own command, held firm and then by a sudden counter-attack scattered its opponents. Both of the Damascene commanders were captured and imprisoned in al-Karak.⁵²

This bizarre and unexpected defeat converted the Bahriyya raids from a nuisance into a serious threat to al-Nasir's control of Palestine. The marauders now seized Gaza, then Hebron and Nablus, all in the name of their sovereign al-Mughith. Al-Nasir was on the verge of panic; he suspected all his amirs of treason, even those who had been with him the longest, and feared a general conspiracy to rob him of Damascus and hand it over to al-Mughith. The Qaymariyya leaders suggested that he require an oath of loyalty; anyone who refused to take it should be imprisoned and his property confiscated. But a faction among

the 'Aziziyya would not take the oath, declaring that their *iqta's* were not commensurate with their rank and services. This must have seemed a distressingly familiar complaint to al-Nasir, but he could take no chances at this juncture of alienating any part of his army. To the dissident amirs he granted the larger *iqta's* which they were demanding. With this gesture dissension within the army of Damascus at last died down, and al-Nasir was free to take the field against al-Mughith and the Bahriyya.⁵³

His capital was exposed to attack by the free-floating Bahriyya, and he began his campaign by establishing his camp within the Ghuta itself. He suffered a humiliating setback almost at the outset, when a daring raid led by Baybars penetrated his camp and cut the ropes of the sultan's tent. But although the populace of Damascus was panic-stricken by this event, it had no permanent significance, and the Bahriyya soon withdrew into Transjordan. At this point al-Nasir called on the assistance of his vassal al-Mansur II of Hama, and together the two princes set off in pursuit of their adversaries. Meanwhile the Bahriyya were joined in the Ghaur by al-Mughith and his troops from al-Karak, though these were no longer the considerable force they had been, for the Shahrzuriyya had abruptly and for no known reason abandoned al-Mughith and gone to reside at Gaza. Thus weakened, al-Mughith and the Bahriyya were dealt a sharp defeat at Jericho early in 657/1259 and were forced to flee to al-Karak for safety. After a brief halt in Jerusalem, al-Nasir crossed the Jordan and made camp at a place called Birkat Ziza, two days' march north of al-Karak. He had no intention of wasting his resources on a regular siege of that forbidding fortress and was content simply to pen al-Mughith up there until he was ready to come to terms.

Al-Nasir remained at Birkat Ziza for six months (probably until Rajab 657/July 1259). He refused to consider any settlement save the surrender to him of the entire Bahriyya regiment. Since this was the basis of what little power and influence al-Mughith had, he was at first unwilling to yield, but as time went on he began to waver. Baybars, sensing his change of attitude, persuaded some of the Bahriyya to flee with him to al-Nasir's

camp, where they were warmly welcomed by the sultan, who even restored to Baybars his old *iqta'* of Nablus and Jinin. Soon thereafter al-Mughith finally agreed to turn over the Bahriyya still in al-Karak to al-Nasir; from Birkat Ziza they were shipped off to imprisonment in the citadel of Aleppo. Meantime al-Nasir, al-Mansur II, and Baybars all returned to Damascus, remaining there until year's end. Whatever al-Nasir's failings as a statesman, he was not vindictive; not wishing to humiliate al-Mughith entirely, he confirmed him in the possession of Hebron, seized by the Bahriyya earlier in the year.⁵⁴

The sultan had at last restored order in his own house, but at considerable cost to his military machine, which had been rather badly disordered by the events of the preceding year. Nor was he given much time to consolidate the gains of his victory, for on 22 Ramadan 657/12 September 1259 Hülegü set out from Azerbaijan to begin his long-expected invasion of Syria. In the autumn of 656/1258 he had moved to secure the main highway between Azerbaijan and the Jazira by dispatching an expeditionary force under the command of his son Yoshmut against Mayyafariqin. But that city's prince, al-Kamil Muhammad, proved an astoundingly tough and resourceful opponent, and the siege dragged on throughout 657/1259 with no progress whatever. At some point during the year Hülegü instructed his client Badr al-Din Lu'lu' of Mosul, who had conscientiously cooperated with him during the campaigns against Irbil and the caliphate, to send assistance to Yoshmut.⁵⁵ Badr al-Din responded by equipping a force under the command of two of his sons, but even with this help Yoshmut was unable to take Mayyafariqin. In the face of this unusual failure of Mongol arms, Hülegü was forced to select a different route for his Syrian expedition; upon reaching Akhlat, he turned south into the mountainous Hakkari region and headed for Jazirat ibn 'Umar, which was in the friendly hands of a son of Badr al-Din Lu'lu'. From there he turned west and in a lightning campaign seized all the major towns of the Khabur valley and Diyar Mudar, subjecting many to pillage and massacre. By Dhu-l-Hijja 657/mid-November 1259 he held all al-Nasir Yusuf's possessions east of

the Euphrates. Moreover though Mayyafariqin still stood firm, al-Kamil's other major possession, Amida, was now besieged by Hülegü's vassal al-Salih Isma'il of Mosul⁵⁶ and would surrender by the end of the year. With no major strongpoint in Diyar Mudar unconquered and his lines of communication secure, Hülegü paused for a brief moment, gathering his forces for the final assault on the Ayyubid Empire.⁵⁷

Al-Nasir Yusuf was at last compelled to act by the news that Hülegü had departed Azerbaijan, which must have reached him about the middle of Shawwal/early October. Knowing that he no longer could muster the resources to meet the onslaught alone, he quickly dispatched Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim to Cairo to seek an alliance with his bitterest enemies, the Mamluks of Egypt.

Kamal al-Din had hardly arrived, however, when Egypt experienced a coup d'état, and for a time no serious negotiations could be undertaken. Al-Mansur 'Ali, the nominal ruler of Egypt, was still only seventeen, and he had not proved especially precocious in the arts of rule. The amir Sayf al-Din Kutuz was especially discontented, both because of his own ambition and because, as he later declared in justifying his actions, the government of Egypt could not be left in the hands of a boy in such times. Near the end of Dhu-l-Qa'da 657/mid-November 1259 the chiefs of al-Mansur's personal guard went on a hunting trip outside Cairo. Kutuz seized his chance and on 28 Dhu-l-Qa'da/16 November arrested al-Mansur together with his mother and younger brother, throwing them all into prison in Damietta. Al-Mansur's guard rushed back to Cairo to unseat the usurper, but he gained the support of the *atabeg* Faris al-Din al-Musta'rib and was too well ensconced to be challenged. The returning amirs were seized and imprisoned, and thereafter Kutuz faced no further challenges to his authority.⁵⁸

Kutuz could now attend to al-Nasir's plea for an alliance against the Mongols, and he sent Kamal al-Din back to Damascus with an affirmative response. But it was already very late in the game, for in Dhu-l-Hijja/November-December Hülegü sent his son Yoshmut (who had been recalled from Mayyafariqin for

the winter) across the Euphrates with a detachment of 8,000 men for a reconnaissance in force. The raiders captured Balis, a major crossing-point on the river, and then turned north to Manbij and Tall Bashir before at last returning to their base near Edessa. On receiving this news, al-Nasir consulted with his advisors and the city's notables as to the best course of action. They urged that he assemble his army outside the walls of Damascus both to reassure the citizens and to be in a position to move quickly against the invaders. As he established his camp in Birza (a village some three miles north of the walled city), he was joined by innumerable refugees from the north — Bedouin, Persians, Türkmen, Turks, and Kurds, many of them not only able but eager to undertake the *jihad* against the pagan Mongols. In addition he received a new contingent of regular cavalry when al-Muzaffar 'Ala' al-Din Yusuf, a son of the late Badr al-Din Lu'lu' and the new lord of Sinjar, arrived as a rebel against his Mongol overlords.⁵⁹

The preferred strategy among al-Nasir's advisors was to march north at once and intercept the Mongol advance in the open field, but a contrary current of opinion, represented by the *amir-hajib* Najm al-Din and Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi,⁶⁰ urged a course of the utmost caution. They pointed out that Hülegü's army was many times larger than al-Nasir's and that fear had so affected his soldiers that they would not dare to stand against the Mongols in open battle. Once again al-Nasir's innate indecisiveness emerged, and he found himself quite unable to frame any policy at all.⁶¹

Such behavior struck one faction among the sultan's own Nasiriyya corps as intolerable, and at the beginning of 658/1260 they plotted to do away with him. The plan was also aimed at the Kurdish Qaymari amirs, his closest and most influential advisors, and this would suggest that ethnic rivalry and jealousy were motivations quite as strong as any disgust with al-Nasir's actions. The possibility implied in our sources that Baybars and the Bahriyya were likewise implicated in the conspiracy can only reinforce such an interpretation. We are not certain just what the conspirators intended to do once they had deposed

al-Nasir. They later claimed that they had planned only to imprison him and replace him with his brother al-Zahir Ghazi (who may indeed have been connected with the scheme, if his later behavior is any guide). Nevertheless the dominant belief among contemporaries was that the Nasiriyya planned to murder the sultan and substitute one of their own in his place, for they had grown contemptuous of their master and had come to believe that they were better suited for the supreme authority.

It was al-Nasir's custom to spend certain nights with a few close companions in a garden pavillion not far from the city, and here, one evening early in the new year, a band of assailants burst in without warning. But al-Nasir managed to clamber over the walls of the garden before the conspirators could get to him and ran in terror all the way back to the citadel. On learning that their plot had been aborted, the Nasiriyya, the Bahriyya, Baybars, and al-Zahir Ghazi all fled the camp at Birza and headed for Palestine. The next morning Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur and the Qaymariyya entered the citadel and at length managed to persuade the sultan that the danger was over and that he should return to his camp to resume direct command of his troops.⁶²

In the meantime the fugitives reached Gaza, where they joined forces with the Shahrizuriyya Kurds, who had been quietly residing there for almost a year. Al-Zahir Ghazi, heretofore the most obscure of individuals, was proclaimed sultan by these heterogeneous forces, who probably numbered around 4,000 cavalry. But although he found himself at the head of a formidable body of men, he made no attempt to capitalize on his good fortune beyond demanding from his brother a richer *iqta'* and a more prominent place in affairs.⁶³

Constrained and frustrated by his exile from any major center of political power like Cairo or Damascus, Baybars was quick to exploit a chance to reenter the mainstream of events when Kutuz sent an Egyptian expeditionary force under Jamal al-Din al-Najibi to Syria to reinforce al-Nasir's shrunken and demoralized army. The Shahrizuriyya in Gaza thought it would be profitable to attack this group, but a warning from

Baybars enabled the Egyptians to return unharmed. With this useful service to his credit, Baybars sent one of his companions-in-arms, 'Ala' al-Din Taybars al-Waziri, to discuss with Kutuz the possibility of his return to Egypt. Kutuz was in fact eager to obtain the services of this brilliant (albeit unscrupulous) officer and offered him a superb *iqta'* as well as a high rank in the Egyptian army. Early in 658/1260 Baybars and a few close associates left Gaza to reenter the service of the Mamluk state.⁶⁴

Even as al-Nasir's army, corroded by dissension and racial enmities—and ultimately by a critical failure of leadership which left it with no focus of loyalty—was dissolving from within, the final catastrophe began to unfold. In the last days of 657/1259 Hülegü led his main army to the Euphrates. His first task was to reduce the fortress of al-Bira, which guarded the crossing. It was strongly fortified and put up a stiff resistance, but it was doomed by the overwhelming numbers of its besiegers and fell after no more than two or three weeks. Al-Bira had held a notable political prisoner, the former lord of Banyas, al-Sa'id Hasan; he was released by Hülegü and given a *firman* restoring his former possessions as soon as these should be conquered. Al-Sa'id was not slow to accept this gracious favor and henceforth attached himself enthusiastically to the Mongol cause in Syria.⁶⁵

With the conquest of al-Bira, the road to Aleppo stood open. The governor of that city, al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, hoped to interrupt the Mongols' advance before they could actually reach Aleppo itself. But one glimpse at the immense size of Hülegü's forces sent the Aleppans scurrying back to the apparent safety of their city's massive fortifications, and many were cut down by the Mongols as they fled. Hülegü now sent al-Mu'azzam a formal invitation to surrender, proposing fairly generous terms: the Mongols would appoint two governors, one for the city proper and one for the citadel, each with full executive authority in his sphere, and these two figures would be surety for the lives and property of the Aleppans while Hülegü led the rest of his troops south against al-Nasir in Damascus. Al-Mu'azzam, a courageous if not very gifted soldier, flatly refused, knowing

that Aleppo was the chief bastion of the empire.

The Mongol response was terrifyingly efficient. On 2 Safar 658/18 January 1260 they established their camp before the city and by the next morning had entirely ringed it with earthworks. Twenty great mangonels were pounding the sector of the Bab al-'Iraq alone, while sappers and miners had already been set to work. Resistance was bitter, but on 9 Safar/25 January, a bare week after their first appearance, the Mongols burst into the city through the Bab al-'Iraq. (According to a contemporary rumor, it was the *ra'is* of Aleppo, Safi al-Din—a brother-in-law of Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi—who threw open the gates to the assailants.) As the Mongols streamed into Aleppo, they began a campaign of slaughter and pillage that went on for six days, until the streets were choked with the slain, and a vast number of women and children were seized as slaves. The city's suffering was capped by humiliation, when Hetoum I, king of Cilician Armenia, set fire to the venerable Great Mosque. The citadel itself held out for another month, until 11 Rabi' I/25 February, but at last al-Mu'azzam, seeing that further resistance could gain nothing and perhaps fearful that the Mongols' sappers might permit it to be taken by storm, decided to seek terms. Contrary to his normal pattern, Hülegü not only granted the garrison safe-conduct but even kept his word, for he was deeply impressed by the courage and dignity of the venerable al-Mu'azzam. But in fact this rare act of magnanimity did al-Mu'azzam little good, for he died of old age (he was more than eighty) only a few days later. Ruined and half-deserted, Aleppo would not recover from the carnage for another century.⁶⁶

Having secured Aleppo, Hülegü sent a portion of his forces against the fortress of Harim, the chief strongpoint guarding the road between Aleppo and Antioch. The garrison resisted for a time before seeking terms. The general in charge (one Fakhr al-Din Saqi, probably a Muslim from Iran or Transoxiana) promised them their lives, but this pledge was rescinded by Hülegü, who had them all slaughtered. There were many other powerful castles in north Syria, of course, but the centralization of power in that region during the preceding decades meant that none

were in a position to put up serious resistance. In the Jabal Ansariyya, however, a region too isolated to concern the invaders for the moment, one of the last great hereditary lords, Muzaffar al-Din 'Uthman b. Nasir al-Din Mengüverish b. Khusmartigin, succeeded in exploiting the prevailing chaos to his own advantage; he carved out a small and effectively independent principality in the district by annexing a few castles near his hereditary seat of Saone. But beyond this, the fall of Harim put an end to the fighting in north Syria.⁶⁷

Indeed the war seemed almost over throughout the whole of Syria. The notables of Hama, whose sovereign al-Mansur II was at the time in al-Nasir Yusuf's camp at Birza, dispatched a delegation to Hülegü soon after the fall of Aleppo to beg security of life and property for the defenseless inhabitants of their city. Hülegü graciously acceded to their plea and sent back with them a Persian named Khusraushah to act as his vicegerent. The citadel of Hama was left in the hands of its Ayyubid commandant, but he was to be responsible to the new governor.⁶⁸

Homs, too, was voluntarily placed under Mongol authority, but in this case by its onetime prince, al-Ashraf Musa. He had quickly perceived that his sovereign's kingdom was doomed. An intelligent man, who moreover could have felt no excess of loyalty towards a sultan who had snatched from him his birth-right of Homs, he decided to make his own arrangements with the invincible Hülegü. To this end he sent one of his retainers (apparently even before the siege of Aleppo had opened) to offer his submission to the Mongol prince. Al-Ashraf's envoy did his work well, and his master was invited to present himself personally before Hülegü. Al-Ashraf reached Aleppo on the eve of the citadel's surrender and was received most honorably: not only was he restored to his old principality of Homs, but he was given the title of *na'ib al-mulk* for all of Syria. The precise significance of this honor is not clear, but it probably indicated a formal precedence over the other clients and appointees of the Mongols in the region.⁶⁹ The treatment meted out to al-Sa'id Hasan and al-Ashraf Musa (and later on to al-Nasir Yusuf

himself) leads one to think that Hülegü did not intend, at least for the short term, to eradicate the Ayyubid dynasty but to subjugate it, to make it into a client regime more or less on the model of the Rum Seljukids.

No more than Homs and Hama did Damascus resist the Mongols. News of the catastrophe at Aleppo reached al-Nasir's camp at Birza on 15 Safar 658/31 January 1260. The sultan was stunned, for he had been confident that Aleppo could hold out literally for years. His amirs urged him to proceed at once to Gaza, where he could join forces with Kutuz, and he was only too eager to follow their advice; he no longer had any stomach for facing Hülegü. He appointed a garrison for the citadel of Damascus, but nothing for the town proper, and as he and his men prepared to depart, the populace gathered on the walls to howl invectives at these leaders who were leaving them defenseless in the face of the most horrible threat in their history. Many of the Christians in Damascus left for Tyre, in the hope that this Frankish town might provide a place of refuge, for the Mongols had so far displayed a markedly pro-Christian policy in the Near East. The winter march of al-Nasir and his followers through Transjordan and Palestine was a nightmare—the rains were heavy, the winds bitter, the roads muddy ruts; many of the women of this pathetic caravan (one cannot justly term it an army) were kidnapped and raped by the local peasants, and banditry was endemic.⁷⁰

Despite his disorderly retreat, al-Nasir was not entirely bereft of a capacity for military planning. In Nablus, the main town on the road between Damascus and Gaza, he established a rear guard to hinder the Mongol advance, putting it under the command of Mujir al-Din b. Abi Zakari and Nur al-Din 'Ali b. Shuja' al-Din al-Akta'. (His choice of these two men seems not particularly auspicious when one remembers their failure to quash the Bahriyya rebellion of the preceding year.) Al-Nasir then proceeded on to Gaza, where he joined the motley collection of rebels assembled there—the Shahrzuriyya, the Nasiriyya, and his brother al-Zahir Ghazi. The sultan was able to reconcile al-Zahir to his authority by agreeing to assign him

Salkhad in *iqta'*. Under the present circumstances, of course, al-Zahir had no desire to take personal possession of his new acquisition and sent as his governor the *naqib al-'askar*, one Sa'd al-Din b. 'Umar Kilich.⁷¹ As a result of this settlement, which seems almost comically irrelevant to the realities of the time, al-Nasir again had at his disposal a substantial army; the question was whether he had also discovered the will to use it to some purpose.⁷²

Shortly after al-Nasir's departure from Nablus, a Mongol advance party under Kushlu Khan surprised the Ayyubid garrison in the olive groves outside the town. The defenders were destroyed almost instantly and both commanders were killed. Only a few wounded soldiers managed to escape and inform al-Nasir what had happened. Alarmed by the sudden, ghostlike approach of the Mongols so near his own camp, the sultan took his forces on to al-'Arish, hoping that this would be a securer place to await the arrival of reinforcements from Egypt. Once in al-'Arish, he sent to the Mamluk camp at al-Salihiyya to confirm his alliance with Kutuz, but this time he apparently expressed his willingness to become some sort of vassal, for when the Egyptian ruler returned his acceptance, he sent also two royal banners (*sanjaqs*), one for al-Nasir Yusuf and the other for al-Mansur II of Hama. Kutuz prudently did not yet wish to leave his base camp and called on the Syrians to retreat to al-Salihiyya to join him there. Al-Nasir obediently brought his troops as far as Qatya, about four days' march from al-Salihiyya. But there something snapped; he was assailed by doubt and indecision, and in the end could not make up his mind to do anything. To remain where he was meant certain capture by the Mongols, but to deliver himself to the Mamluks would likely mean his arrest and incarceration. At last he put his family under the care of al-Mansur II and assigned to him the command of his troops, with orders to proceed directly to Kutuz's camp, while he himself remained at Qatya. With him was a tiny escort consisting of his brother al-Zahir Ghazi and his son al-'Aziz Muhammad, a Qaymari amir named Shihab al-Din, and a son of the late al-Mujahid Shirkuh of Homs (al-Salih

Nur al-Din).⁷³

It is hard to know whether al-Nasir's fears about Kutuz were valid or not. The forces al-Mansur II led to the Egyptian camp were in general honorably received and maintained. On the other hand al-Nasir's close associates found a less gratifying welcome. Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur was temporarily imprisoned in the Cairo citadel, and all of al-Nasir's *mamluks* and officials were subjected to torture and extortion. Even his Seljukid wife was compelled to surrender all her valuables, a fate shared by all the women of the Qaymariyya amirs, who had been so closely tied to the ruined sultan.⁷⁴

While al-Nasir was engaged in his painful and humiliating retreat towards Egypt, the notables of Damascus were left to oversee their city's fate. In a way they were fortunate, for having been left absolutely without soldiers and provisions, they could not be tempted into trying to withstand a siege. Under the leadership of Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi, who had refused to follow al-Nasir when he left Damascus, they decided to send their submission to Hülegü, who was still engaged in the siege of the Aleppo citadel. Hülegü received the group of notables, headed by the Chief Qadi Sadr al-Din ibn Sani al-Daula, graciously, but with so important a city as Damascus, he could not merely dispatch a small group of officials to establish a Mongol administration. On the contrary it was vital to create a military presence in south Syria as soon as possible, and he therefore ordered his general Kitbugha to lead a sizeable detachment of soldiers there. With Kitbugha went three Persian officials who had been named by Hülegü to head the new administration, but it seems that Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi was to continue on as the chief native advisor to the Mongol regime.⁷⁵

On 17 Rabi' I 658/2 March 1260 Kitbugha made his triumphal entry into Damascus, accompanied by the Mongols' Syrian vassals—King Hetoum of Cilician Armenia, Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch and Tripoli, and al-Sa'id Hasan of Banyas. He remained there only a few days before leading his forces out of the city to complete the subjugation of the smaller towns and strongpoints in the region. As soon as the Mongols were out

of the city, the Ayyubid garrison posted in the citadel revolted against the new overlords. Al-Nasir's commanders there, the *wali*, Badr al-Din Muhammad b. Qalijar, and the *naqib al-qal'a*, Jamal al-Din al-Sayrafi,⁷⁶ had been sent clandestine instructions by their master, who was at this point still in Gaza, to take the first opportunity to rebel against Kitbugha. Al-Nasir undoubtedly hoped that with the attentions of the Mongol garrison thus occupied, he would be enabled to lead an army of reconquest back into Damascus. As it happened, of course, he did not return, and when Kitbugha came back to Damascus early in Rabi' II/mid-March he was able to invest the citadel unmolested. According to a story in Ibn Wasil, the Mongols at first had the notion of forcing the townspeople of Damascus to storm their own citadel, issuing this frightful command the night of 6 Rabi' II/20 March. But they quickly relented (no reason is given) and settled down to starve out the defenders. Soon, however, the Mongols saw that this would take too long, and on 12 Jumada I/25 April they began assembling a vast quantity of siege equipment. Twenty mangonels were constructed literally overnight, and walls, streets, and canals were stripped of their stone for ammunition. The citadel garrison stood up to the bombardment for two days, but quickly concluded that further resistance was useless, since al-Nasir Yusuf clearly was not going to return. On 15 Jumada I/28 April they obtained terms from Kitbugha. A more generous man than his master, he granted the entire garrison an amnesty. The citadel, however, was partially dismantled, its war supplies being destroyed and its upper works (Ar., *a'aliha*—i.e., the battlements, etc., but not the body of the walls and gates) razed, so that it would henceforth be useless as a point of resistance.⁷⁷

Probably while the siege against the citadel was still in progress, Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi sent to the governor of Baalbek, the *hajib* Shuja' al-Din Ibrahim, who still professed loyalty to al-Nasir Yusuf, and demanded that he surrender that town to the Mongols. Shuja' al-Din refused, declaring that he preferred martyrdom to collusion with the Mongols. Once Kitbugha had obtained surrender of the citadel, therefore, he led his forces

against Baalbek. The religious notables informed their governor that no religious merit attached to the defense of the town, since that would only lead to the destruction of its people. He submitted to this argument and sought terms from Kitbugha, who conceded to him a safe-conduct to Damascus for himself and his family. At this point, however, Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi took it upon himself to inform Hülegü of the rebellion of Badr al-Din b. Qalijar and Jamal al-Din al-Sayrafi and the refractoriness of Shuja' al-Din Ibrahim; he even went so far as to urge their execution. He obtained the response he wanted, but Kitbugha was furious at this by-passing of his authority. Although he recognized that Hülegü's order had to be obeyed, he told Zayn al-Din that he had no intention of carrying it out himself. Zayn al-Din would have to execute the three Ayyubid commanders with his own hands — and if he did not, he would summarily be put to death himself.⁷⁸

With Baalbek and Nablus taken, the Mongol occupation of Lebanon and Palestine was effectively completed (although, oddly enough, they seem never to have entered Jerusalem). In south Lebanon Tyron was reluctant to accept Mongol authority, but an infantry force led against it by one Shihab al-Din b. Buhtur⁷⁹ procured its submission after a short siege, and the place was then dismantled by the conquerors. In Sidon the Franks took advantage of the reigning confusion to snatch full administrative and fiscal control, but this gain was quickly dissipated when a rash attack by its lord Julian against a Mongol force in the hinterland precipitated a destructive Mongol raid on Sidon in retaliation (early Ramadan/mid-August). Otherwise the Franks were too weak and disunited to profit by the sudden collapse of Muslim power in Syria. By late summer of 658/1260, therefore, the Mongols had gained direct control of all of Muslim south Syria except for the Jabal al-Duruz and Transjordan. In Transjordan al-Mughith 'Umar had preserved his position by sending his submission to Kitbugha as soon as the latter had occupied Damascus.⁸⁰

The ease of the Mongol conquest of Syria is all the more remarkable when one remembers that they used only a fraction,

perhaps 10,000 men, of their original army. In the spring of 658/1260, while Hülegü was still in Aleppo, he had learned of the death of the *Qa'an* Möngke during the previous summer (11 August 1259). This event had led to a serious struggle between Hülegü's two brothers, Kubilai and Arikbuqa, for the succession, and although he himself was not a candidate for the supreme authority, he was obviously very much affected by the outcome of the conflict. Accordingly he withdrew from Aleppo with the bulk of his forces and returned to Tabriz to await further developments in the Far East; of his itinerary we know only that he reached Akhlat on 24 Jumada II 658/6 June 1260.⁸¹ Although Hülegü had been compelled to leave Syria with his work not quite completed—especially considering that a large Muslim army still existed intact in Egypt—he nevertheless had good reason to be pleased with the results of his campaign. In the Jazira the fall of Mayyafariqin on 23 Rabi' II 658/7 April 1260 meant that only Mardin and Hisn Kayfa were still independent of Mongol control. Mardin was already under siege and would surrender by the end of the year, while Hisn Kayfa was too isolated from the main routes of communication to be worth the effort of a serious attack. Within Syria itself only the Jabal Ansariyya and the Lebanon had not been subjugated or at least reduced to vassal status, and these areas, populated mostly by heretics and Christians, hardly constituted centers of resistance to the Mongols. Egypt alone was a source of concern, but in view of the ethnic and political rivalries which had plagued it over the preceding decade, it appeared no more formidable than many another Muslim kingdom which had foundered before the Mongol onslaught.⁸²

While the Mongols were swallowing up the last remaining fragments of his empire, al-Nasir Yusuf remained in a quandary at Qatya. Despairing of help and not knowing where he might find a secure refuge, he eventually led his little entourage into the Sinai desert (Ar., *Tih Bani Isra'il*). Making their way eastwards through the Negev, al-Nasir and his companions at length turned north and headed towards al-Karak. He received an invitation from al-Mughith 'Umar to join him in this castle,

but al-Nasir was afraid that this offer concealed a trap and refused. At last he wandered into the Balqa' and made camp at Birkat Ziza, the site of his victory over the Bahriyya only one year before. Here one of his retainers, the *tabardar* Husayn al-Kurdi,⁸³ urged him to surrender to Kitbugha. Since the Mongols would inevitably conquer Syria, just as they had every other land, al-Nasir's best hope was to put himself under their protection. When the *tabardar* even offered to go arrange the matter personally with the Mongol general, al-Nasir, long since sunk into total despair, gratefully accepted this proposal. On learning of his opportunity, Kitbugha did not delay an instant and marched south to confront his captive. He assured al-Nasir of his personal safety and promised him a generous reception in Tabriz by Hülegü. Nevertheless he took advantage of his prisoners to gain control of the few places which still remained outside Mongol authority. On the road back to Damascus Kitbugha instructed al-Nasir to enter 'Ajlun and persuade its governors to surrender it. Having thus obtained possession of the great fortress, Kitbugha had the walls razed, for the Mongols' control of a region did not rest on its strongpoints—on the contrary they saw these merely as invitations to rebellion and disorder. The nominal lord of Salkhad, al-Zahir Ghazi, was ordered to proceed there and supervise its dismantling. Kitbugha permitted al-Zahir to retain Salkhad, as his *iqta'*, but in fact a Mongol governor was put in charge of its administration. After completing the destruction of his newly won fortress, al-Zahir went on to Damascus, and from there the four princes—al-Nasir Yusuf, al-Zahir Ghazi, al-'Aziz Muhammad, and al-Salih Nur al-Din (the son of al-Mujahid Shirkuh)—were sent under guard to Hülegü's court in Tabriz.⁸⁴

Their reception, especially that of al-Nasir, was all that had been promised. He was given a generous stipend and even invited to seat himself on a throne beside the Mongol prince. Hülegü went so far as to promise his prisoner the return of all his former dominions once he had finished with Egypt. But the Ayyubid princes had not been long in Tabriz when at the end of Shawwal 658/October 1260 Hülegü learned of the disaster

at 'Ayn Jalut. There on 25 Ramadan/3 September his able and devoted general Kitbugha had been killed, his army annihilated, and the Mongol hegemony in Syria destroyed.⁸⁵ Hülegü was livid with rage; he haled al-Nasir (along with the other Ayyubid princes) before him and charged him with treason, because his army had been present on the Egyptian side. Al-Nasir protested that his loyalty was absolute and that he could not possibly have controlled the actions of his former subjects in Syria while he himself was held in Tabriz. Hülegü responded by striking him to the ground and then killing him with his sword. The other Syrian prisoners were then dragged outside the city and beheaded. Only one was spared, the young al-'Aziz Muhammad, because Dokuz Khatun, struck with his youth and fine bearing, had intervened personally on his behalf. He remained at Hülegü's court, treated with honor and respect, until his death at an unknown time and place.⁸⁶

With these pathetic events, the last hope of a revived Ayyubid kingdom in Syria was extinguished. In a way, therefore, our story is finished, but by way of epilogue we will recount the sequence of events by which Damascus was transformed into a province of the Mamluk empire, a status which it retained for more than 250 years.

Kitbugha had been in Damascus when he learned first that an extremely large army was advancing from Egypt into Palestine and then that an advance contingent which he had posted at Gaza under Kushlu Khan had been destroyed.⁸⁷ Realizing that this was the long-expected Muslim counteroffensive, he at once assembled all the forces he could muster, leaving Damascus entirely denuded of troops. This move left the city open to rebellion, but Kitbugha had no choice, for the forces at his disposal were much less than those of the Egyptians. He even recruited an auxiliary infantry from the townspeople of Damascus to supplement his inadequate regular cavalry. The city was thus devoid of any garrison when the first news arrived at 27 Ramadan/5 September of the great Muslim victory at 'Ayn Jalut. Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi was the acting governor at that time; knowing full well what his fate would be when the populace

learned of this event, he fled immediately to the north and is henceforth found as an official at the Mongol court.⁸⁸

For two days Damascus was torn by rioting and looting in a pogrom that the Muslims directed against the Christians and (to a lesser extent) the Jews of the city. The foundations for this explosion had been well laid, for the Christians of Damascus had taken full advantage of the first time in 600 years that one of their coreligionists had held power. At the time of Kitbugha's triumphal entry in Rabi' I/March, the Umayyad Mosque had been made into a church, in the presence of Hetoum of Armenian Cilicia and Bohemond of Antioch, and the holy precincts had been desecrated by wine and music. Now the Muslims could take their revenge. They began by burning to the ground the church of St. Mary (located in the northeast quarter between the Bab Tuma and the Bab al-Sharqi), and then they set off in a rampage of uncontrolled pillaging directed against Christians' private homes. Many churches were damaged and some Christians were murdered by the mob. On the next day it was the turn of the Jews: they suffered less, however, for although many of their shops were set afire, the great synagogue was left unharmed. Muslims who were known to have collaborated with the Mongols, whether local citizens or outsiders who had come in the conquerors' train, were put to death. The mob's behavior was unquestionably brutal, but one may find some excuse for it in the rumors which said that the Christians had intended similar acts against the Muslims in the event of a Mongol victory.⁸⁹

On 29 Ramadan/7 September the amir Jamal al-Din al-Muhammadi al-Salihi entered Damascus on behalf of Kutuz, and the troubles within the city at once began to subside. The next day Kutuz himself brought his victorious army to the nearby village of al-Hasura.⁹⁰ Here he passed the 'Id al-Fitr, and then on 2 Shawwal/10 September he entered Damascus and took up his residence in the citadel to begin the business of reorganizing the administration of Syria. Most of the Syrian amirs were confirmed in the *iqta's* which they had held under the Ayyubids, but those of Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur and the

Qaymariyya, whose actions a decade before had cost the Mamluks the control of Syria, were taken from them and redistributed to former *mamluks* of al-Salih Ayyub and al-Mu'izz Aybeg. In regard to the Ayyubid princes of Syria Kutuz's treatment was quite generous. It was only just that al-Mansur II of Hama, who had served with distinction at 'Ayn Jalut, should be confirmed in his principality, but it seems rather surprising that al-Mughith 'Umar should have been allowed to keep al-Karak, since he had submitted to the Mongols fairly early on, though he had never actively assisted them. Most striking, however, was Kutuz's behavior towards al-Ashraf Musa, who had been present at 'Ayn Jalut in Kitbugha's army. When he had seen that all was lost, he had fled to Palmyra and from there had sent to Kutuz seeking pardon. This was granted, and al-Ashraf was restored to all his old possessions without penalty. Only al-Sa'id Hasan of Banyas was punished, and by all the evidence he deserved it. He was captured at 'Ayn Jalut, and although Kutuz was at first disposed to clemency, when he learned that al-Sa'id's collaboration with the Mongols had gone so far that he had even become a Christian, he had him executed on the spot. Although Ayyubid princes were left in possession of the petty principalities of Transjordan, Homs, and Hama, the very circumstances of their survival made it clear that their continued existence depended entirely on the will of the Mamluk sultan. Since the Ayyubids no longer ruled Aleppo or Damascus, it was hardly possible for them to pose any threat to Mamluk hegemony in Syria. For these two cities Kutuz was careful to appoint governors with no hereditary ties to the places they governed. As his vicerent in Aleppo he did name a prince, but not one of the Ayyubid family — al-Muzaffar 'Ala' al-Din Yusuf, a son of Badr al-Din Lu'lu' and the nominal lord of Sinjar. In Damascus just before his departure for Cairo at the end of Sawwal/early October Kutuz named joint governors, 'Alam al-Din Sanjar al-Halabi and Mujir al-Din Khushtarin al-Kurdi. This was Kutuz's last important act of state, for on his return journey, at al-Salihiyya, he was murdered by a faction of his own officers. But the fundamental administrative reform which he had begun during his

brief residence in Syria—the incorporation of Aleppo and Damascus into a centralized Syro-Egyptian empire ruled from Cairo, and the reduction of the Ayyubids to a marginal and dependent political role—outlived him, and under the reign of his assassin and successor, Baybars, it was extended and consolidated as a basic structural principle of the state.⁹¹

From a dramatic point of view, the final collapse of the Ayyubid empire presents a pathetic and even contemptible spectacle, one which seems wholly inappropriate to the empire of Saladin. Moreover the obvious causes seem quite accidental, something external to the institutional evolution of the preceding seven decades—on the one hand there was the Mongol invasion; on the other, the personal weakness of al-Nasir Yusuf, his crippling failure of will whenever confronted by a serious crisis. But reflection suggests that the Ayyubid empire was likely soon to dissolve even without the Mongols and that al-Nasir's weakness affected the basic political structures of his state as well as the actual sequence of events.

Had it not been for the Mongol invasion, al-Nasir's regime might well have survived the immediate crisis caused by the Mamluk coup d'état in Egypt. But the foundation of the Ayyubid state was the army, and this institution was ridden by dissension and rebellion throughout al-Nasir's ten years in Damascus. Of the five units whose names are known to us—the *mamluk* 'Aziziyya, Nasiriyya, and Bahriyya, and the Kurdish Shahr-zuriyya and Qaymariyya—only the Qaymariyya never deserted or attempted to overthrow him. It is tempting to suppose that al-Nasir's problems with his army stemmed from its ethnic divisions. But although ethnic identity was a key element in the politics of these years, it was not always a matter of Turk against Kurd by any means. The real difficulty lay in the racial solidarity among the members of the two (or sometimes three) *mamluk* corps. This led them to think of themselves as a group apart, whose interests did not necessarily coincide with those of the throne. In al-Nasir's kingdom, as in Egypt after the death of al-Salih Ayyub, the *mamluk* regiments had become fully conscious of themselves as a political force independent of the

dynasty which they served. In a sense, then, even during al-Nasir's lifetime, Syria too was becoming a "mamluk" state, in which the titular dynasty held authority only on sufferance.

It is not easy to identify the causes of this change in the Syrian army's conception of its political role, since most contemporary observers seem hardly to have noticed it, but the evidence we have suggests at least three possibilities:

1) The proportion of *mamluks* in al-Nasir Yusuf's army seems to have been greater than had been the case under the earlier Syrian Ayyubids. Our sources clearly imply that the 'Aziziyya and Nasiriyya corps were largely *mamluk* in recruitment and in that regard differed from their counterparts of earlier decades. The earlier corps (as Ayalon has noted)⁹² had depended heavily on free-born troops—hereditary amirs, Kurdish and Türkmen soldiers of fortune; *mamluks* undeniably formed an important element, but were recruited in small enough numbers to be assimilated fairly easily. At any rate they did not form a distinct and self-conscious group within the army.

2) The Mamluks of Egypt had set a very vivid example when they took the supreme authority into their own hands. Once a corrupt dynasty had been deposed in one part of the Ayyubid empire, it must have seemed all the more viable a possibility for a discontented faction in other areas.

3) The turbulence of the 1250s had created a number of free-booting mercenary corps who owed no permanent allegiance to anyone and who operated quite outside the framework of stable fidelity to a given prince or dynasty—e.g., the *mamluk* Bahriyya or the refugee Kurdish Shahrizuriyya. Such groups demonstrated to their less erratic brethren the possibility that a military group's first allegiance might be to itself and that it could be the arbiter of a dynasty's fate.

All these things created a framework of attitudes in which an army coup d'état might be directed against the Ayyubid regime in Syria. But by themselves they would doubtless not have been adequate to set off such an event; so long as the sultan was a powerful and strong-willed person, the legitimacy of his rule would not be open to attack. It was simply that the

Ayyubid dynasty's right to the throne was no longer beyond question. Formerly if one prince of the blood was deposed for incompetence, another Ayyubid would take his place as a matter of course. But after the murder of Turanshah in 648/1250, it was at least equally likely that the conspirators would try to take power into their own hands. The sultan's personality was henceforth vital to the dynasty's continuance in authority. And in this regard al-Nasir Yusuf came perilously close to forfeiting the legitimacy not only of himself but of his family. He had a presumptive right to authority, derived from the great Saladin, al-'Adil, and al-Kamil, and from his own highly capable forebears in Aleppo, al-Zahir Ghazi and al-'Aziz Muhammad. But such an inherited right was easily lost, and it seems hardly less than a miracle that al-Nasir retained his throne until the bitter end. His capacity to rule, to command obedience from at least some of his servants, disappeared only with his final collapse in the face of the Mongol invasion. The Ayyubid empire died a violent but not an untimely death.

Appendix A

The Ayyubid concept of the sultanate

The meaning and nature of the sultanate constitutes one of the most vexing questions in medieval Islamic studies, and it is not the intent of this brief essay to discuss the issue as a whole. We shall rather confine ourselves to making some observations on the uses of the terms "*sultan*" and "*saltana*" among the Ayyubids. Throughout the preceding pages we have consistently referred to the head of the Ayyubid dynasty as the "sultan," as if he were the only member of the family at any given time to carry this title. But this is a serious distortion of reality and has only been employed for the sake of simplicity; at one time or another almost every regnant prince of the blood called himself by this name. On the other hand there were real distinctions of titulature among the various princes, but to understand these requires us to identify the three levels of usage current in Syria and Egypt during the first half of the thirteenth century. The first level pertained to the relationship of the Ayyubid sovereigns with the caliph, the second to the relationship between the chief of the dynasty and the other ruling princes of the Ayyubid house, and the third dealt with the relationship between the Ayyubid princes and their subjects.

We have seen that the caliphate exercised only sporadic political influence in the Ayyubid empire, normally in the form of attempts to mediate disputes between Damascus and Cairo. Otherwise the caliph and his policies were largely irrelevant to Ayyubid political life. This is reflected in the peculiar Ayyubid reticence in using the title "*al-sultan*" in the protocol of their coinage; not until 647/1249, a few months before al-Salih

Ayyub's death, did this epithet finally appear in the Ayyubid *sikka*.¹ Balog suggests that the reason the Ayyubids had not previously used the title in their coinage is that it had never been conferred on them by the caliph until 647/1249; when they did receive formal caliphal investiture as *sultan*, they at once began to inscribe this title on their coinage.²

Balog's interpretation is undeniably a plausible one. The right of coinage in medieval Islam was always considered the caliph's exclusive privilege, so that even when the regional princes usurped the power, they always inscribed the caliph's name in the place of honor on their coins. They thus observed the fiction that they were acting strictly as the caliph's deputy and subordinate. In matters of the coinage, at least, there was a clear tendency to avoid arrogating to oneself a title and rank the caliph had not actually conferred. Although al-'Adil I and al-Kamil had both received caliphal investiture for Syria and Egypt, neither was granted the title "*al-sultan*" and neither inserted it on his coinage.

However a passage in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī, if it is correctly dated, would make Balog's attractive hypothesis untenable. In two places Sibṭ states that in 643/1247, after the fall of Damascus to Mu'īn al-Dīn ibn al-Shaykh, his cousin 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jauzī arrived from Baghdad with the robes and trappings of the sultanate (*khila' al-saltana*) and the appropriate diploma (*manshur*) and bestowed them on al-Salih Ayyub in 'Abbasa.³ If this dating is correct, and if these terms carry their technical significance, then four years elapsed between al-Salih Ayyub's being recognized as *sultan* by the caliph and the time when he actually began to use his new title on his coinage.

The most obvious explanation of this behavior is that the Ayyubid sovereigns did not really care whether the caliph gave them this title or not. If they had wanted it, they would surely have petitioned for it more assiduously and made quicker use of it once they had it. But the title had little relevance to their political situation—they were not the masters of the Islamic world, and most especially they were not the protectors of the caliphate against its political and religious enemies. It took on

a special importance only in the course of al-Salih Ayyub's struggle to dominate the Ayyubid empire and subjugate his fellow princes. The title itself was not important, since the Ayyubid princes called themselves "*al-sultan*" rather freely, but gradually al-Salih Ayyub must have begun to see that to have the caliph confer this title on him formally would give him a real advantage in prestige over his rivals. He alone would truly be the "sultan"; he alone would have the right to govern in his own name throughout the empire; all the other princes would be no more than his deputies. But al-Salih Ayyub's centralization of the empire had been a rather *ad hoc* process, the result of his responses to specific challenges to his authority. Only at the very end of his reign did the implications of what he had done become clear to him, and only then did he think to proclaim publicly, through his coinage, that the sultanate was uniquely his prerogative. It was perhaps at this point that the ideological divide between the age of collective sovereignty and that of centralized monarchy was crossed.

In their relations among themselves, of course, the Ayyubids did not hesitate to adopt the title "*al-sultan*." It was claimed not only by the head of the dynasty but by a large number of other princes as well. On this level, legal considerations did not enter in; it was strictly a matter of political claims and status within the dynasty. Our evidence for this level of usage is found chiefly in the inscriptions, official acts asserting formal claims but not directly involving the caliph's prerogatives. Among the rulers of Damascus alone al-Mu'azzam 'Isa called himself *al-sultan* twenty-three times altogether in his epigraphy, not scrupling to use the title even before the death of his formidable father, while al-Ashraf Musa used it six times and al-Salih Isma'il eight.⁴ Even the princes of Banyas claimed it in a number of their inscriptions.⁵ The evidence of inscriptions is confirmed by the few chancery documents which survive: al-Kamil twice claims the rank of *al-sultan*, both times during the lifetime of his father al-'Adil.⁶ The only distinguishing mark of the head of the dynasty is that, in a very few examples, he used the title of *al-sultan al-a'zam* in his protocol. This was clearly meant to

indicate his superior rank and status, but it is important to note that it is a very rare usage. In the epigraphy of the major princes of the empire, there are no regular distinctions of protocol.

This widespread use of "*al-sultan*" clearly stems from the dominant political conception of the Ayyubid period, that sovereignty belonged to the dynasty as a whole and that any prince of a major town or region (though he might owe formal allegiance to the chief of the family) was an independent ruler in his own right, not merely someone else's deputy. Therefore many members of the dynasty simultaneously had the right to claim the title of *al-sultan*—not because it had been legally conferred upon them by some higher authority, but because they all shared to some extent the right to rule in their own names.

To be an Ayyubid prince did not necessarily mean that one was also a *sultan*. Every prince of the blood carried a title in *al-malik*; such titles implied nothing whatever as to political authority. Only those who actually ruled would call themselves *al-sultan*; and even among these princes, the title occurs commonly only in the epigraphy of the rulers of Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, and the Jazira. There is no inscription in which the prince of Hama claims this dignity and only one in which a prince of Homs uses it.⁷ Under what circumstances, then, did an Ayyubid prince adopt the title of *al-sultan*? In answering this question the usage of contemporary chroniclers is an important supplement to the obviously fragmentary evidence of the inscriptions. The narratives of these historians, because they are unofficial in nature, represent the way the rulers' status was perceived by at least their more educated subjects. In this light it is interesting to learn that the testimony of the chroniclers does not differ greatly from that of the inscriptions, but rather confirms it. In general the chroniclers call a *sultan* any Ayyubid prince who governed a major city or region as an effectively independent ruler. Hereditary right to the throne does not suffice in itself. Thus although al-Amjad of Baalbek had been confirmed by Saladin himself as prince of Baalbek, in hereditary succession to his father, and although he ruled there for

almost fifty years, he is never called *al-sultan* by the chroniclers, because Baalbek was a minor place and because he was so clearly a client of the princes of Damascus. The position of the rulers of Homs and Hama is ambiguous, and the uncertain usage of the chroniclers reflects this. As to the chief of the dynasty, he is very seldom given any distinctive identification; only a few examples can be found—e.g., *al-sultan al-kabir*, *al-sultan al-a'zam*, or (once) *sultan al-bayt al-Ayyubi*. For the chroniclers, too, the sultan was essentially *primus inter pares*, perhaps distinguished from his colleagues by his greater power and prestige, but not by the very nature of his authority.

Appendix B

Notes on the *iqta'* in Ayyubid Syria

No institution played a more critical role in the political structure of the Islamic world from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries than did the *iqta'*, nor is any more vital to our understanding of the ties which bound the ruling class to the rest of society during that time. But the truth is that we have developed only a very superficial comprehension of this institution, and almost all that we really know of it is contained in a profound, difficult, and all-too-brief article by Claude Cahen. He proposes a number of well-documented hypotheses as to the early history of the *iqta'*, all of which need to be tested by a systematic examination of each of the regions and periods in which this institution is found.¹ Our purpose here is simply to present some material which contemporary chroniclers furnish us on the *iqta'* in Ayyubid Syria and to try to reconstruct the basic principles of the *iqta'* system in use there.

In the sense most commonly used among modern scholars *iqta'* refers to the institution of temporary and revocable grants of revenue-producing properties made by a Muslim ruler to his military officers; from the income of these properties they were required to furnish a specified number of fully equipped and trained cavalymen upon the ruler's call-to-arms. Ordinarily, but not in all times and places, the *muqta'* was immune from further taxes or supervision by the central government, since he was expected to meet all the administrative expenses of his grant (as well as his military obligations) from its revenues.

This definition, however, is at once too narrow and too simple, for in reality the term "*iqta'*" refers to a group of institu-

tions. These are indeed related, for they are always revenue-producing properties whose income is set aside for the maintenance of a person in some way connected with the state or the ruling dynasty. But beyond that one must deal with each case on an *ad hoc* basis. In Ayyubid Syria one can find the term *iqta'* applied to the following range of situations: 1) the appanages distributed to the princes of the ruling family—these were normally hereditary and implied full powers of local government; 2) the governorships of the major towns, castles, or especially rich and strategic districts which were bestowed on the amirs; 3) villages and other properties whose revenues were assigned to the lesser amirs and some troopers, but the grant of which did not create governmental and administrative rights beyond the collection of rents and tax equivalents; 4) the stipends paid to the high civil and religious dignitaries of the regime—these were presumably drawn on a specific group of properties registered by the *diwan* officials, but do not seem to have conferred any administrative powers over them; 5) the pensions, also drawn from registered groups of properties, which were paid to certain members of the ruling family, including the women.² These five possibilities are meant only to define the range of situations which might be termed "*iqta'*" in Ayyubid Syria; they do not represent the formal administrative categories by which the Ayyubid regime operated.³

Our comments will be restricted to the second category of *iqta's*—those which had a predominantly military character and which usually conferred upon their holders powers of local government—because these constituted the basic element in Ayyubid provincial administration. Unfortunately we know very little about the procedures by which *iqta's* were allocated and registered in Ayyubid Syria, and nothing at all about how their holders met their governmental responsibilities or collected their revenues. On the other hand we do have information on questions which are hardly less significant for the history of Ayyubid society.

For the two decades following al-Kamil's death we have some data as to the size of the larger *iqta's* assigned in the region of

Damascus. In Syria the late Seljukid and Zangid practice was maintained of measuring an *iqta's* size by the service which its holder owed.⁴ Thus we learn the following: Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh was offered in 635/1238 (but did not accept) an *iqta'* of 150 horsemen (*faris*); Jamal al-Din ibn Matruh, as al-Salih Ayyub's *wazir* in Damascus, held an *iqta'* of 70 horsemen; al-Nasir Yusuf assigned to Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Bunduqdari the towns of Nablus and Jinin, on the basis of which he was expected to field 120 men; finally, Nasir al-Din al-Qaymari held from al-Nasir Yusuf an immense *iqta'* of 250 horsemen. The irregularity of these figures goes to confirm what one suspects from the silence of the texts, that the Ayyubid hierarchy of rank did not correspond in any simple way to the number of troops to be supported by an amir's *iqta'*. Thus we see nothing like the titles "amir of a hundred," "amir of forty," "amir of ten," which constituted the classic Mamluk rank system.⁵ It is even difficult to discern how the Ayyubids graded their officer corps. A close scrutiny of the inscriptions yields some distinctions—viz., *amir*, *amir kabir*, *amir isfahsalar*—and the extremely scanty evidence of the texts appears to confirm that these terms do refer to ranks and are not mere self-bestowed honorifics. Nevertheless, there is no apparent relationship between these titles and the *iqta'* system of Ayyubid Syria, which seems to have been organized in accord with the needs and circumstances of the moment. The assignments made to any particular amir reflected his status and influence rather than the definitions of a fixed system.

Cahen maintains that the Zangids and Ayyubids made a clear distinction between *wali* and *muqta'*. The *wali* had general governmental and fiscal powers in the district under his control; however, the revenues he collected were to be registered in the central *diwan*, while his personal income was drawn from precisely defined grants, which were not necessarily located entirely in his sphere of authority. The *muqta'*, however, was granted the free disposal of the revenues of his *iqta'*; he was required to furnish the requisite number of men-at-arms, but was otherwise constrained only by his sense of

justice and self-interest.⁶ Cahen may well be correct in a formal and legal sense, but as we have seen, especially in the chapters on Saladin, contemporary chroniclers, even men as well versed in the administrative system as 'Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani or Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad, seldom bothered to separate the two offices in a consistent or systematic way. To them *wali* and *muqta'* were commonly synonymous terms. Again Ayyubid administration seems to have been only loosely systematized, especially in Syria. On the other hand there is a clear and uniformly maintained distinction between *niyaba* and *iqta'*, with the former corresponding to Cahen's description of the office of *wali*.

Cahen and Elisséeff both state that Nur al-Din introduced hereditary tenure for his *muqta's*, hoping thereby to ensure the loyalty and devotion of his military lords, and Elisséeff places this important innovation in the year 558/1163.⁷ We have seen how powerful the hereditary amirs of north Syria were in early Ayyubid times, and the system had even taken root in south Syria and Palestine after the conquests of 583-4/1187-8. But in the north al-Zahir Ghazi and al-'Aziz Muhammad succeeded in breaking up most of the hereditary *iqta's*, and (for different reasons) the same thing happened in the south under the reign of al-'Adil. After the death of this sultan, Damascus suffered so many revolutions that there was no opportunity for a new group of hereditary *muqta's* to establish themselves. Indeed we do not even know if the princes of Damascus intended to assign *iqta's* in hereditary tenure.

We know very little about the ordinary life of even the greater amirs, and it is difficult to determine whether the *muqta's* resided in Damascus and other major towns or on the lands which had been assigned them. It is clear that some had to reside on their *iqta's*; the governors of the strategic Galilean and Lebanese fortresses and the governor of a town like Jerusalem could not live elsewhere. But it is also clear that all the more important amirs had townhouses in Damascus, and probably those who could preferred to reside there.⁸ Rural living had few attractions for the upper-class Muslim of medieval

times in any case; all significant political activity was concentrated in the major cities, so that those who wanted influence with the sovereign as well as material comfort were almost compelled to live in them. So far as we can discover, an amir normally went to live on his estates only if he had fallen out of favor with the prince.

In general there is no evidence of subinfeudation, of formally recognized multiple loyalties, or of any other institutions of this kind which made the social-political pattern of medieval Europe so rich and complex. A partial exception is provided by the princes of minor appanages like Banyas or Baalbek, however. Although themselves more or less closely tied to Damascus, they were able to grant *iqta's* to their own retainers. On the other hand they, too, held their lands from and owed fidelity to one superior only.

Finally it should be stressed that the institution of the *iqta'* did not establish a tie of personal fealty between man and man. There is no evidence of any kind to suggest that the sovereign and his *muqta'* formally undertook a body of mutual obligations to each other, nor did the latter swear a specific oath of fidelity to the prince on the occasion of his receiving an *iqta'*. It is of course true that when a new prince ascended the throne, he had his amirs and officials swear allegiance to him, but that is a different institution altogether. An *iqta'* was conceded through a decree (*manshur*) issued by the prince, in the same manner as any other office of state would be conceded. The *muqta'*, for all that he often appeared to be and behaved like a western feudatory, was in reality simply another official, a delegate of the prince with no legal status of his own. Among the Ayyubids of Syria, as among their Seljukid and Zangid predecessors, the *iqta'* was understood simply as an administrative mechanism aimed at ensuring an adequate financial basis for an effective military machine. In essence it was as impersonal as any other arrangement for provincial government and military administration might have been.

Appendix C

The *muta‘ammimin*: ‘*ulama*’ and bureaucracy

The educational reform fostered by Nizam al-Mulk is usually supposed to have bridged the gulf between the Sunni ‘*ulama*’ and the civil bureaucracy, which had often been Shiite, Sasanophile, and scandalously lax about religious matters.¹ It is certainly clear enough that in twelfth-century Syria (and later Egypt), under the aegis of Nur al-Din and Saladin, the two groups did come to share a common education in the religious sciences. Likewise the mutual hostility so obvious in Buyid times or in the heyday of the Abbasid caliphate is hardly visible under these new conditions; on those few occasions when it does appear, it seems more the result of confessional distaste (for many civil functionaries were still Christians or Jews or only recent converts to Islam) than of a rivalry between two value-systems and ways of life.² Moreover there are many examples of horizontal mobility, in which the same man or different members of the same family followed both scholarly-religious and bureaucratic careers. The most striking case is the astoundingly versatile Aulad al-Shaykh, who produced *sufis*, soldiers, and administrators. In addition one can cite the Banu al-Athir of Mosul, who in the same generation produced a powerful statesman and administrator (Majd al-Din, who was also a traditionist), the noted historian ‘Izz al-Din, and a second statesman (rather less successful than his older brother, as we have seen) and rhetorician in Diya’ al-Din. Among the Banu al-‘Ajami of Aleppo are found both *wazirs* and madrasa professors. Nur al-Din’s Chief Qadi Kamal al-Din ibn al-Shahrazuri was not only his highest legal official but also a trusted political

advisor and the overseer of his administration. Finally we may note that when 'Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani first arrived in Syria from the Abbasid *diwan* in Wasit, he was briefly appointed as professor at a new *madrasa* in Damascus before entering Nur al-Din's *diwan al-insha*'.³

But if such horizontal mobility was feasible and occasioned no special comment from contemporary sources, we must not be misled into thinking that the two groups, '*ulama*' and bureaucrats, became merged into one. They were separate and distinct career patterns, such that relatively few men were able to move back and forth between them. Moreover there was a very strong hereditary tendency in both groups; not only were sons trained to follow in their fathers' footsteps, but they were given highly preferential treatment in appointments and promotions. There are, for example, many cases where *madrasa* professorships were reserved for the descendants of the first incumbent and where mere boys nominally held professorships whose duties were filled by a deputy.⁴ In short '*ulama*' and bureaucracy remained largely separate in membership, though sharing a broadly similar set of values.

The normal pattern for a young man who wanted a bureaucratic career was to attach himself, upon completion of his *madrasa* studies, to the circle of some great figure in the administration. In this way he would acquire on-the-job administrative training, for which his *madrasa* education, devoted exclusively to *fiqh*, could give him no background at all. Only years of experience could make him conversant with the elaborate techniques and conventions of the bureaucracy. In general both this experience and the good fortune of having chosen the right patron were necessary for any real success in a bureaucratic career. The protégé system and the need for on-the-job training obstructed any sort of free transfer from a religious to a bureaucratic career. But there were barriers on the other side as well. The hereditary character of many *madrasa* professorships restricted severely the number of possible openings for an outsider. One's only hope was either to have gained the favor of the prince or to be named to a post by the

patron of a new foundation. But the prince filling vacancies in established *madrasas* and the patrons of new ones tended to prefer scholars of established eminence. A would-be bureaucrat whose career had gone sour could not easily move back into the religious establishment, even if he did have a *madrasa* education.

There are a few refinements which might be proposed to the scheme just presented, though we have not the space to study them here in any detail. Neither the civil bureaucracy nor the religious establishment was altogether homogeneous. The religious establishment contained administrative posts of great importance—the qadiships first of all, but also the *hisba* and the *wakalat bayt al-mal*.⁵ To hold a qadiship especially might give one an entree into the civil bureaucracy not otherwise easily obtained by a man who had followed a religious career. This is not surprising, perhaps, since a *qadi's* administrative responsibilities were often quite as heavy as his legal ones, and since he was commonly a very close collaborator of the ruler's. But within the religious establishment there was no barrier between the scholarly and the administrative path. All religious officials were recruited from among the learned, and many men simultaneously held qadiships and *madrasa* professorships.⁶

The civil bureaucracy, too, was internally divided, but here mobility from one section to the other was far more restricted. Very roughly one might view the bureaucracy as divided into a correspondence and a financial section. The former (the *Diwan al-Insha'*) involved training in the rhetoric of diplomatic correspondence, the technical vocabulary of decrees of all kinds, etc. But it was a relatively public office, the results of whose labors were widely disseminated, and it demanded a solid general education in law and grammar. Of the two sections it was probably the more open to newcomers and the easier to leave for a religious career. As to the financial *diwans*, however, their work was arcane and complex. It involved computations of remarkable complexity and innumerable elaborate registers.⁷ The degree of training and specialization needed

here clearly surpassed that of the *Diwan al-Insha'*, and most men who entered the bureaucracy were forced to choose between the correspondence and financial sections at the outset of their careers. Al-Qadi al-Fadil, who managed both tasks with consummate skill, was very much the exception. As if the intricacy of its procedures did not sufficiently isolate it, the financial section was closed off from the religious establishment by another fact—a great many of its employees were *dhimmis*, especially in Egypt but possibly to some extent in Syria as well. An outsider could not easily learn the techniques of the financial section, while many of its members were in effect barred from leaving by their religion. Even as converts (a numerous group), they could not gain the status or lengthy legal education to penetrate the ranks of the '*ulama*'.

When we speak of the *muta'ammimin*, then, it must be clear that it was not a homogeneous group in many respects. But by virtue of the religious education which most of its members shared, it did infuse a group of military oligarchies with a clear Sunni Muslim character and linked the machinery of state with the indigenous social and political structures.

Appendix D

The Ayyubid principalities and their rulers, 589/1193-658/1260

1. Egypt

- 589 al-‘Aziz ‘Uthman b. Salah al-Din (since 582)
- 595 al-Mansur Muhammad b. al-‘Aziz
- 596 al-‘Adil Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Najm al-Din Ayyub
al-Kamil Muhammad b. al-‘Adil (until 615 coruler
with al-‘Adil)
- 615 al-Kamil Muhammad (sole ruler)
- 635 al-‘Adil Abu Bakr II b. al-Kamil
- 637 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil
- 647 al-Mu‘azzam Turanshah b. al-Salih
- 648 Shajar al-Durr (*umm walad* of al-Salih Ayyub)
- 648 al-Mu‘izz Aybeg al-Turkumani (*mamluk* of al-Salih
Ayyub, husband of Shajar al-Durr)
al-Ashraf Musa b. al-Mas‘ud Yusuf b. al-Kamil (co-
ruler and titular senior colleague of al-Mu‘izz until
the end of 651)
- 655 al-Mansur ‘Ali b. al-Mu‘izz
- 657 al-Muzaffar Kutuz (*mamluk* of al-Mu‘izz)

2. Damascus

- 589 al-Afdal ‘Ali b. Salah al-Din (since 582?)
- 592 al-‘Adil Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Najm al-Din Ayyub
(as *na’ib* of al-‘Aziz of Egypt)
- 594 al-Mu‘azzam ‘Isa b. al-‘Adil (nominally autonomous,
but under the tutelage of al-‘Adil until 615)
- 615 al-Mu‘azzam ‘Isa (independent ruler)

- 624 al-Nasir Dawud b. al-Mu‘azzam
- 626 al-Ashraf Musa b. al-‘Adil
- 635 al-Salih Isma‘il b. al-‘Adil b. Ayyub
- 635 al-Jawad Yunus b. Shams al-Din Mawdud b. al-‘Adil
(as *na’ib* for al-‘Adil II of Egypt)
- 636 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil
- 637 al-Salih Isma‘il b. al-‘Adil b. Ayyub
- 643 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil (represented in Damas-
cus by a nonprincely lieutenant)
- 648 al-Nasir Yusuf b. al-‘Aziz Muhammad b. al-Zahir
Ghazi b. Salah al-Din
- 658 Mongol occupation

3. Aleppo

- 589 al-Zahir Ghazi b. Salah al-Din (since 582)
- 613 al-‘Aziz Muhammad b. al-Zahir
- 634 al-Nasir Yusuf b. al-‘Aziz Muhammad (until 640
under tutelage of his grandmother Dayfa Khatun
bint al-‘Adil; after 648 resident in Damascus)
- 648 al-Mu‘azzam Turanshah b. Salah al-Din (*na’ib* for
al-Nasir Yusuf)
- 658 Mongol occupation

4. Homs

- 589 al-Mujahid Shirkuh b. Nasir al-Din Muhammad
(since 581)
- 637 al-Mansur Ibrahim b. al-Mujahid
- 643 al-Ashraf Musa b. al-Mansur
- 646 al-Nasir Yusuf b. al-‘Aziz Muhammad (Homs an-
nexed to Aleppo)
- 658 al-Ashraf Musa b. al-Mansur (second reign)

662 Mamluk occupation

5. Hama

- 589 al-Mansur Muhammad b. Taqi al-Din 'Umar (since 587)
- 617 al-Nasir Kiliç-Arslan b. al-Mansur
- 626 al-Muzaffar Mahmud b. al-Mansur
- 642 al-Mansur Muhammad II b. al-Muzaffar (d. 683)

6. Diyar Mudar (*Edessa, Harran*)

- 589 al-'Adil Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Najm al-Din Ayyub (since 588)
- 592 al-Fa'iz Ibrahim b. al-'Adil (as *na'ib* for al-'Adil)
- 597 al-Ashraf Musa b. al-'Adil (until 615 under tutelage of al-'Adil)
- 615 al-Ashraf Musa (independent ruler)
- 626 al-Kamil Muhammad b. al-'Adil
- 635 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil
- 638 al-Nasir Yusuf b. al-'Aziz Muhammad of Aleppo
- 657 Mongol occupation

7. Diyar Bakr (*Mayyafariqin*)

- 589 al-'Adil Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Najm al-Din Ayyub (since 588)
- 592 al-Kamil Muhammad b. al-'Adil (under tutelage of al-'Adil)
- 596 al-Awhad Ayyub b. al-'Adil (under tutelage of al-'Adil)

- 607 al-Ashraf Musa b. al-'Adil (under tutelage of al-'Adil)
- 615 al-Ashraf Musa (independent ruler)
- 618 al-Muzaffar Ghazi b. al-'Adil
- 645 al-Kamil Muhammad b. al-Muzaffar
- 658 Mongol occupation

8. Diyar Bakr (*Amida and Hisn Kayfa*)

- 629 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil b. al-'Adil (as *na'ib* for al-Kamil until 635)
- 635 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil
- 636 al-Mu'azzam Turanshah b. al-Salih (as *na'ib* for al-Salih until 647)
- 638 Amida occupied by Rum Seljukids
- 647 al-Awhad (or al-Muwahhid) 'Abd Allah b. al-Mu'azzam (as *na'ib* for al-Mu'azzam until 648; d. 682)

9. Transjordan (*Karak*)

- 589 al-'Adil Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Najm al-Din Ayyub (since 584)
- 594 al-Mu'azzam 'Isa b. al-'Adil (under tutelage of al-'Adil until 615)
- 615 al-Mu'azzam 'Isa (independent ruler)
- 624 al-Nasir Dawud b. al-Mu'azzam
- 647 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil
- 648 al-Mu'azzam Turanshah b. al-Salih
- 648 al-Mughith 'Umar b. al-'Adil II
- 661 Mamluk occupation

(Karak was the center of a semiautonomous principality only under al-Nasir Dawud, after his loss of Damascus in 626, and al-Mughith 'Umar. It was otherwise part of a larger entity, normally Damascus.)

10. Baalbek

- 589 al-Amjad Bahramshah b. 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah
(since 578)
- 627 al-Ashraf Musa b. al-'Adil b. Ayyub
- 635 al-Salih Isma'il b. al-'Adil
- 644 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil (Henceforth Baalbek
loses autonomous status.)

11. Banyas

- 615 al-'Aziz 'Uthman b. al-'Adil
- 630 al-Zahir Ghazi b. al-'Aziz
- 630 al-Sa'id Hasan b. al-'Aziz
- 644 al-Salih Ayyub b. al-Kamil (dependency of Egypt)
- 648 al-Nasir Yusuf b. al-'Aziz Muhammad (dependency
of Damascus)
- 658 al-Sa'id Hasan b. al-'Aziz (second reign; d. 658)

12. Bosra

- 589 al-Zafir Khidr b. Salah al-Din (*muqta'* of al-Afdal in
Damascus)
- 592 Iqta' resumed, fully incorporated into principality of
Damascus)
- 615 al-Salih Isma'il b. al-'Adil b. Ayyub
- 644 al-Salih Ayyub (Henceforth Bosra loses autonomous
status.)

Certain other places—Salkhad, Tall Bashir, Samosata, Qal'at Ja'bar, 'Ayntab—served as the residences of Ayyubid princes at one time or another. But the first two of these performed

such a role only briefly, while the other three were held by a single prince each.


| | |
|----------------------|---|
| <i>Salkhad</i> | al-Afdal 'Ali b. Salah al-Din (592-598) |
| <i>Samosata</i> | al-Afdal 'Ali (596-622) |
| <i>'Ayntab</i> | al-Salih Ahmad b. al-Zahir Ghazi b. Salah al-Din (d. 650) |
| <i>Qal'at Ja'bar</i> | al-Hafiz Arslanshah b. al-'Adil b. Ayyub (d. 639) |
| <i>Tall Bashir</i> | al-Ashraf Musa b. al-Mansur b. al-Mujahid Shirkuh (646-658) |

Appendix E


Genealogical Tables of the House of Ayyub

The following five tables contain only those persons who have had some role, however slight, in the preceding narrative. They make no attempt to include every descendant of Shadhi ibn Marwan, and are thus not comparable to Zambaur's tables. Nor are they based on his; rather, I have compiled them directly from the sources—chronicles, biographical dictionaries, and inscriptions. I have of course systematically compared my results with his, and I have referred as well to the more restricted but still useful data in Bosworth's *Islamic Dynasties* and in Gaston Wiet, *Les Biographies du Manhal Safi*, *MIE*, 19 (1932), p. 64. Nevertheless, my presentation differs from Zambaur's at several points, and I believe it is more reliable even if less complete. I should say that there is still room for a precise and exhaustive survey of the Ayyubid family on the model of Alderson's *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). Such a study might clarify much that remains obscure about the internal evolution and patterns of behavior of this remarkable clan.


I. THE HEIRS OF SHADHI IBN MARWAN




II. THE HOUSE OF SALADIN




III. THE HOUSE OF AL-'ADIL



IV. THE HOUSE OF SHAHANSHAH



V. THE HOUSE OF SHIRKUH



Sources and Bibliography

A. Description of the Sources

Although a full description of the sources used to establish my narrative seems unnecessary, since that task has been accomplished by Cahen, Gottschalk, and Elisséeff in their works on related subjects, it may still be useful for me to spell out the criteria which have governed my use of these materials. The basic principle is simple: the foundation for Ayyubid political history is provided by the Arabic narrative sources—chronicles and biographical dictionaries—and to these every other category of source is basically ancillary.

But this is hardly to say that epigraphy, numismatics, and diplomatic evidence are not important or that they have not been used in this study. Even in the rather barren format of the *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*, the form in which Ayyubid inscriptions are chiefly available, the epigraphy of the period throws much light on titulature, the relations between the various princes of the Ayyubid house, provincial governorships, changes in sovereignty over disputed territories, dates, etc. When the inscriptions can be examined through the masterful studies of van Berchem, Wiet, Sauvaget, and their modern successors, of course, their value is all the greater. But Arabic inscriptions seldom give any direct information on events, public proclamations, etc.; by themselves they would permit only a crude and static outline of Ayyubid political history.

Much the same judgment must be made of the numismatic

evidence, at least in its present state. Ehrenkreutz has made several valuable but brief studies of the gold coinage of Egypt under the Ayyubids, and Balog has done the same for Ayyubid silver, both Syrian and Egyptian. (The latter has promised us a comprehensive survey of Ayyubid coinage, which should be invaluable when it appears.) Likewise, some new studies by Dr. Michael Bates on Ayyubid silver are now in progress and promise to be of high importance. Finally, the possibilities of computer analysis have emerged in an interesting, though admittedly uncritical, study of Ayyubid coinage by Jeanette Wakin. In general, however, Ayyubid numismatics is still an infant and can only throw light on a few isolated episodes.

Ayyubid chanceries were immensely productive by all reports; certainly they produced the three chief exponents of the official Arabic epistolary style—al-Qadi al-Fadil, ‘Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani, and Diya’ al-Din ibn al-Athir. But only five original documents remain, and these are exceptional in that they are grants of privilege and protection made to the monastery of St. Catherine’s on Mt. Sinai. Otherwise there exist only citations in the chronicles or those documents reproduced (often with the names and dates omitted) in formularies and administrative handbooks. Moreover the overwhelming bulk of what we do have comes from the pen of al-Qadi al-Fadil or ‘Imad ad-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani and thus pertains to the reign of Saladin. There are the correspondence and decrees composed by Diya’ al-Din ibn al-Athir (558/1163-637/1239), of which copies exist in at least three manuscripts, but since most of his extant letters come from his years in the Jazira and the Zangid court of Mosul, they throw very little light on affairs in the central Ayyubid principalities. In general Ayyubid chancery documents are invaluable for the study of institutions (or would be, if they had been adequately studied), but only occasionally do they illuminate the course of events.

It is, then, the Arabic narrative sources to which we must turn if we hope to reconstruct not only the events, but also the dynamics, of Ayyubid history. We are very fortunate to have at least substantial citations, and in most cases the entire work,

of fifteen contemporary or near-contemporary historians of the Ayyubids after Saladin. These are by no means of equal importance; indeed the great bulk of what we know about the period comes from two great works: the *Mir'at al-zaman fi ta'rikh al-a'yan* of the Damascene Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī (d. 654/1256), and the *Mufarrij al-kurub fi akhbar bani ayyub* of the Qaḍī Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Wāsil (604/1208-697/1298).

The *Mir'at al-zaman* claims to be a universal chronicle, and in fact down to the death of Saladin it does display a broad scope and a considerable range of sources. But for the thirteenth century it is really little more than a local chronicle of Damascus; it derives its undeniable importance for Ayyubid history as a whole from the central role of that city in the affairs of the age. Moreover, it shows no very sophisticated idea of history; Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī recounts events both great and trivial without any real attempt to distinguish between them, while his organization is often haphazard and confusing. On the other hand he was closely associated with many in power, including al-Mu'azzam 'Isa, al-Nasir Da'ud, and al-Salih Ayyub, and often cites them as authority for his statements. Moreover his motley selection of events gives us a far more intimate view of life and politics in Ayyubid Damascus than we could otherwise attain. He was already an adult when he settled in Damascus around 600/1204; he was for many years a preacher (*wa'iz*) on the staff of the Umayyad Mosque—a position which gave him ample opportunity to observe the great and small of Damascus; he seems to have collected the materials for his chronicle (partly in the form of a diary) over some decades; and he never had time to produce a finished version—all of this lends unusual credence to his testimony, at least when it is a question of Damascene affairs.

Ibn Wāsil's *Mufarrij al-kurub* is another matter altogether. It is distinguished by its breadth and evenness of coverage, by its attempt (remarkably successful) to present the history of the Ayyubid dynasty as a whole in all its complexity and confusion. Although it adheres to a standard annalistic presentation on the whole (albeit with some remarkably interesting digressions), it

gives an outstandingly clear and coherent survey. No less a virtue is its author's fairmindedness and evenhandedness: he makes no attempt to blacken the name of any prince of the dynasty, nor does he have (except for Saladin) any outstanding heroes. His faults proceed from his virtues. He tends to oversimplify complex events so as to maintain clarity and smoothness, and his generosity towards his protagonists proceeds from his desire to portray the house of Ayyub as a kind of ideal Muslim dynasty. He tends to mask (or overlook) the greed, perfidy, and occasional cruelty which were a part of its internecine quarreling. But these criticisms can be made on the basis of data given by Ibn Wasil himself; were the *Mufarrij al-kurub* all that remained to tell the Ayyubids' story, it would be enough.

If Ibn Wasil is an easier source to use than Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi and more generally reliable, he does present another kind of problem. For most of his thirteenth-century material, Sibṭ relies either on his own experience or on witnesses he had interviewed. Ibn Wasil, on the other hand, makes heavy use of other contemporary historians: 'Izz al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr, Kamāl al-Dīn ibn al-'Adīm, Ibn Khallikān, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahīr, Abu Shama. It is only with the death of al-'Adīl I (615/1218) that he begins to introduce a substantial amount of original information, and probably only with the death of al-Kāmil (635/1238) that the bulk of his work is drawn from eye-witnesses. (Oddly enough, though he knew Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi, he seems never to have used the *Mir'at al-zaman*.) Still, he does not reproduce his sources uncritically, but always compares all accounts known to him; even for the earlier years he gives valuable additions and rectifications to the materials he cites. His use of Kamāl al-Dīn's huge biographical dictionary of Aleppo (*Bughyat al-talab fi ta'rikh Halab*) is a fortunate accident for modern scholarship, since so much of this work is otherwise lost; Ibn Wasil's résumé of its data is at many points more complete than that given by Kamāl al-Dīn in his own short chronicle, the *Zubdat al-halab min ta'rikh Halab*.

The other chronicles and biographical dictionaries need not

detain us so long. If Kamal al-Din's *Bughya* had survived intact, it would certainly have been a source of sovereign importance. But at least two-thirds are missing, while the nine volumes that do survive go no further than the letter *sin*. As a result, we have not one account of any prince of the Ayyubid house of Aleppo, and very few of the dynasty's other great princes are represented. By scouring the pages, one can find a few entries for officials and soldiers of the period, and many more for scholars, but the amount of data these biographies actually yield is distinctly disappointing. There is some consolation in the same author's *Zubda*, which is available in an excellent edition. But the *Zubda* extends only to 641/1243, thus omitting the period when the author was personally at the center of affairs in Aleppo and Syria. Moreover, like so many works of Muslim historiography, the *Zubda* is heavily indebted to Ibn al-Athir, but uses him far less critically than does Ibn Wasil.

The *al-Kamil fi-l-ta'rikh* of 'Izz al-Din ibn al-Athir of Mosul (555/1160-630/1233) was deservedly one of the most influential works of Islamic historiography. Its merits are too well known to detain us here; it will suffice to point out that it is by far our best source for events in the Jazira in the first half of the Ayyubid period. On the other hand Ibn al-Athir is often tendentious; if he saw the significance of events better than any other historian of his age, he was not above distorting his data to suit the interpretation he wished to place upon it. Likewise he has relatively little to contribute concerning affairs in Damascus and Egypt.

The other Arabic sources are far less significant though they are often useful for short periods or specific incidents. They can be grouped into three categories: those surviving only in citations in later compilers; those closely dependent on Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi; and those which apparently incorporate independent traditions.

The first category includes one writer of first importance, 'Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani, who is our best single source for the turbulent decade from the death of Saladin until his own passing in 597/1201. He is preserved chiefly in the famous

Kitab al-raudatayn fi akhbar al-daulatayn of Abu Shama, but also (for the most part only indirectly) in Ibn Wasil's *Mufarrij al-kurub*. Of distinctly less importance, though fascinating to read, are 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (557/1162-629/1232) and Sa'd al-Din ibn Hamawiya Juwayni (592/1196-674/1276); these are best known through citations in al-Dhahabi's *Ta'rikh al-islam*, which have now been extracted and published by Prof. Cahen.

Three other writers base their work largely on Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi, but add enough information on specific points to be worth consulting. Of these Abu Shama (d. 665/1268), in his *Dhayl al-raudatayn*, is easily the most important, especially for al-Kamil's siege of Damascus in 635/1238 and the Mongol occupation of that city in 658/1260. This group also includes al-Jazari (658/1260-739/1338), who is a major historian for the early Mamluk period but not for the Ayyubids, and an obscure figure called Ibn al-Khazraji, the extant portion of whose work goes under the title of *Ta'rikh daulat al-akrad wa-l-atrak*.

The last group of minor chroniclers, those preserving an independent tradition, number half a dozen, but only three call for any special comment. The *al-Ta'rikh al-mansuri* of Ibn Nazif al-Hamawi (d. 640/1242) is a handbook of universal history and apparently represents a résumé of the same author's totally lost *al-Kashf wa-l-bayan fi hawadith al-zaman*. It is of no interest till the time of Saladin, when it begins to present a fuller account. Generally haphazard and confused, it nevertheless throws light on certain things—the relations between al-Kamil and Frederick II, for example, or the defeat of Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah at the hands of the Ayyubids and Rum Seljukids.

'Izz al-Din ibn Shaddad al-Halabi (613/1217-684/1285) wrote a long political geography of Syria based on his experience as an administrator for the Ayyubid al-Nasir Yusuf II and the Mamluk Baybars. Only four sections of the work are extant—those pertaining to Damascus, Aleppo, south Syria, and the Jazira—but they are an invaluable source for the second quarter of the thirteenth century and for the history of the minor towns and strongholds of Ayyubid Syria, which would other-

wise be hopelessly obscure.

Finally we may mention the chronicle of the Copt al-Makin ibn al-'Amid (602/1205-672/1273), which becomes relatively full and detailed after the death of al-Kamil. But he does not inspire confidence; when his accounts can be compared to others, they too often prove to be misleading or erroneous. At times he seems simply to have been misinformed, but at others he has clearly falsified his materials for partisan purposes. It is not a question of a pro-Christian, anti-Muslim slant, but rather of favoritism towards specific individuals, most notably al-Kamil and al-Salih Ayyub.

The history of thirteenth-century Syria of course drew the attention of many historians besides the indigenous Muslim Arab chroniclers; one must have recourse to works in Persian, Armenian, Syriac, Latin, and Old French as well. As far as my technical competence will permit, I have tried to consult these "foreign" traditions. But they are essentially outside the scope of this discussion, for though they throw light on the relations between the Ayyubids and the states surrounding them, they seldom help one comprehend the internal evolution of the empire.

In short the political history of the Ayyubids rests on a careful study of Ibn Wasil and Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi. While other sources, whether archaeological, documentary, or narrative, cannot be neglected, they only strengthen, they do not lay, the foundation.

B. List of Works Consulted

1. *Abbreviations. Journals, Encyclopedias, Reference and Collective Works.* (*Note: starred items below are collective works whose individual chapters or articles are not cited in this bibliography, but are referred to at appropriate places in the notes.)

AAS

Annales archéologiques de Syrie

AESC

Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations

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| | |
|------------------------|---|
| <i>ANSMN</i> | <i>American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i> |
| <i>Arabica</i> | |
| <i>BEO</i> | <i>Bulletin d'études orientales</i> |
| <i>BFLUS</i> | <i>Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg</i> |
| <i>BIE</i> | <i>Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte</i> |
| <i>BIFAO</i> | <i>Bulletin de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire</i> |
| <i>BSOAS</i> | <i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London</i> |
| <i>Byz.</i> | <i>Byzantion</i> |
| <i>CAJ</i> | <i>Central Asiatic Journal</i> |
| <i>CHI*</i> | <i>Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 5. Ed. by J. A. Boyle. London and New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968.</i> |
| <i>Dozy, Suppl.</i> | <i>Dozy, R. P. A. Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes. 2 Vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1881</i> |
| <i>EI¹*</i> | <i>Encyclopaedia of Islam. 4 Vols. and Supplement. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-38</i> |
| <i>EI²*</i> | <i>Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition. 3 Vols., in progress. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954-</i> |
| <i>GAL</i> | <i>Brockelmann, Carl. Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur. 2nd ed. 2 Vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943- 49. Supplement. 3 Vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1937-42.</i> |
| <i>HJAS</i> | <i>Harvard Journal of Asian Studies</i> |
| <i>IC</i> | <i>Islamic Culture</i> |
| <i>IJMES</i> | <i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i> |
| <i>JA</i> | <i>Journal asiatique</i> |
| <i>Islam</i> | <i>Der Islam</i> |
| <i>JAOS</i> | <i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i> |
| <i>JESHO</i> | <i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i> |
| <i>JRAS</i> | <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i> |
| <i>JSS</i> | <i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i> |
| <i>Lane, Lexicon</i> | <i>Lane, E. W. An Arabic-English Lexicon. 8 Vols. London: Williams and Norgate, 1863-93</i> |
| <i>MIE</i> | <i>Mémoires de l'Institut d'Égypte</i> |
| <i>MIFAO</i> | <i>Mémoires de l'Institut français d'archéologie orien- tale du Caire</i> |
| <i>MMAF</i> | <i>Mémoires de la Mission archéologique française au Caire</i> |
| <i>MNDPV</i> | <i>Mitteilungen und Nachrichten des Deutschen Paläs- tina-Vereins</i> |

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|-------------------|--|
| <i>Orientalia</i> | |
| <i>REI</i> | <i>Revue des études islamiques</i> |
| <i>RH</i> | <i>Revue historique</i> |
| <i>RHR</i> | <i>Revue de l'histoire des religions: annales de la Musée Guimet</i> |
| <i>ROL</i> | <i>Revue de l'Orient latin</i> |
| <i>RSO</i> | <i>Rivista degli studi orientali</i> |
| <i>SEI*</i> | <i>Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> . Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961 |
| <i>SI</i> | <i>Studia Islamica</i> |
| <i>SM</i> | <i>Studi medievali</i> |
| <i>Syria</i> | |
| <i>WZKM</i> | <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</i> |
| <i>ZPDV</i> | <i>Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästinavereins</i> |

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Notes

Introduction

1. Much the same conclusion has been reached by Ayalon, "Yasa," C1, 132, n. 1.

2. Ehrenkreutz, "Dinar," 183; *idem.*, *Saladin*, 97-99, 186, 235.

3. Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion: the Selchükids," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 164-165. The two major studies of the political structures of these city-states are Ashtor, "Adm. urbaine," and Cahen, "Mouvements populaires."

4. The most penetrating and detailed discussion is that of Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, especially chs. 3 and 4.

5. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities*, 45 ff., 130 ff.

6. The problems here and in the following paragraphs are discussed in detail in my forthcoming study, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," scheduled to appear in *SI*, vols. 45-46 (1977).

7. These figures are drawn from the following studies:

1) Gibb, "Armies," 77-79.

2) Ayalon, "Structure," I, 222-223.

3) Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 104. (The number of regular troopers is estimated from the number of amirs of each grade assigned to Damascus.) On the *halqa*, see Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 88-89; Ayalon, "Structure," II, 448-456.

8. Ayalon, "Structure," II, 472-475; *idem.*, "Wafidiyya," 98-99.

9. The Arabic equivalent of "prince" is "*malik*" (pl. *muluk*). Among the Ayyubids *malik* was a title of descent, not of sovereignty; all male descendants of the ruling house received it, whether or not they were appanaged. But in this book, I use the term "princes" only in reference to autonomous rulers. There is also an Arabic equivalent for "principality," of course: *mamlaka* (pl., *mamalik*). But in contemporary Ayyubid sources this term almost always means "kingship, sovereignty," and only occasionally carries a geographical significance. Our use of the word "principality" thus represents in some degree a modern concept imposed on the different language of our sources.

10. See Appendix A, "The Ayyubid Sultanate." Usually, but not always, the sultan held one of the principalities as his own, of which he was the direct ruler—ordinarily Egypt, occasionally Damascus. The exceptions to this rule are al-'Adil and (after 582/1186) Saladin, who divided all their territories among their sons and other heirs during their lifetimes, retaining for themselves a general, but extremely effective, supervision of the whole.

11. Among the evidence for these assertions is the following: 1) In contemporary epigraphy, among all various titles of royal authority and epithets, there are none which refer to the territorial possessions of the prince or sultan named. The only exceptions are a very few references to very specific historical situations, which do not comprise part of the ruler's ordinary protocol. As for titles like "*Khusrau-yi Iran Shahriyar-i Turan*" or "*Malik al-Sharq wa'l-Gharb*," these are merely conventional epithets without any real substantive reference. 2) In the chronicles of the period, a prince is normally identified only by his city of residence, not by any broader geographic term: e.g., *Sahib Hims*, *Sahib Dimashq*, etc. The exceptions are Egypt (*al-Diyar al-Misriyya*) and the lands east of the Euphrates (*al-Bilad al-Sharqiyya*); the former was of course a stable entity, while the latter had no one city which served as the royal residence—sometimes it was Harran, sometimes Raqqa, sometimes Edessa.

12. Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, 337, argues in similar terms for the centrality of Damascus in Ayyubid politics: "The history of the Ayyubids is but a tormented recital of the intrigues and struggles of the princes of the family, each with a territorial ambition equal to that of his neighbor. All the Syrian princes were at one in not admitting the sultan of Egypt's suzerainty, which this latter pretended to impose, while everyone—or almost everyone—coveted above all the possession of Damascus. The capital of Syria, the stake in the struggles which would extend throughout more than sixty years, was to become the center of Egyptian, Syrian, and Mesopotamian politics."

13. On the situation of Damascus on the major trade routes, see especially Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 42, 170-171; II, 457. On its role as entrepot for the coastal ports: *Ibid.*, I, 42, 174, 372-373. On its actual role in the thirteenth-century Mediterranean trade, the evidence is limited: *Ibid.*, I, 176, 373; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 215.

Chapter I

I. The Arabic texts use the term "*iqta*" for both royal appanages and military land assignments. For its full range of meanings, see Appendix B, "The Ayyubid *Iqta*." For Seljukid practice, which is closely related to Ayyubid, see Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 60-64.

2. On the financial problems of Egypt and Syria under Saladin, see Ehrenkreutz, "Dinar," 182; *idem*, *Saladin*, 103-104, 140, 142, 222-223. On the *iqta'* system, see Cahen, "Iqta'," 30, 32-33; Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 49-52.

3. The amirs' troops in many such *iqta'*-based Muslim states did become private armies, of course, but not under Saladin. However, his success in this regard was due to the loyalty of his amirs, for one can assume almost *a priori* that the ordinary soldier felt more closely bound to the amir he served than to the sultan, especially if he were a mamluk of the former. On the bonds between master and slave recruit, see Ayalon, "Esclavage," 27-29.

4. The only one of Saladin's commanders to be tempted into a private war for his own benefit was his nephew Taqi al-Din 'Umar, in 582/1186 and again in 587/1191.

As to Saladin's disposition of his forces in the field, the armies sent by allied or client states (Mosul, Mardin, etc.) did keep their commanders and identities, as one would expect. This point is further developed in my "Emergence of the Mamluk Army."

5 On the heritability of the Zangid and early Ayyubid *iqta'*, see Cahen, "Iqta'," 44-45; Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 577-578; III, 727. Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, 58-60, argues that *iqta'*s were not heritable. This may be true on the whole for Egypt, but the evidence for early Ayyubid Syria is all against him. As we shall see, there are several cases down to the death of al'Adil in 615/1218 of a minor succeeding to his father's *iqta'* under the guardianship of a tutor. And Rabie himself (pp. 29-30) cites similar evidence for Zangid Syria. The point is that an *iqta'* was heritable if the ruler chose to permit it, as he commonly did during this period, but men like Nur al-Din and Saladin were always strong enough to suspend this practice in particular cases.

Two clear cases of Saladin's confirmation of a succession: al-Amjad Bahramshah in Baalbek (578/1182)—*Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 33; al-Mujahid Shirkuh in Homs (582/1186)—*Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 69 (where part of the diploma is cited). The case of al-Mansur Muhammad of Hama is given in *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 194, 197; and *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 377-378. I know of one exception to the rule that Saladin kept all *iqta'* assignments in his own hands: in 571/1176 his brother al-Mu'azzam Turanshah appointed a new *muqta'* in Bosra and Salkhad—*Raud. (Cairo)*, I, 260.

6. A significant detail. The Asadiyya was the *'askar* of al-Mujahid's grandfather Shirkuh; an amir chosen from it could thus be expected to be loyal to the interests of the young prince. On the other hand, Saladin had incorporated the Asadiyya into his own forces (though retaining its original identity and commanders) upon his uncle's death and had relied heavily upon this corps. Hence he could also rely on an Asadi amir to look after his own interests.

7. al-Mujahid Shirkuh: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 69.

al-Afdal: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 86, 137; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 210, 247.

8. Gibb, "Achievement," 99, makes much the same point, albeit in a highly idealistic way: "... his singleminded devotion, which nobody and nothing could bend, to the service of his ideals."

9. These figures are derived from Gibb, "Armies," with some adjustments. Gibb submits the following figures (expressed here in round numbers) of regular cavalry: Egypt—9000; Mosul and the other Jaziran towns—6500; Syria—3500; Saladin's personal guard (*halqa*), supported from his *khassa* revenues—1000. The total is 20,000 regular cavalry. But if one excludes the troops from Mosul and the Artukid and Zangid client states, which were not directly subject to Saladin's commands, this would probably remove some 4000 troopers from the total.

10. Reports to al-Qadi al-Fadil: cf. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 221. A central *diwan al-istifa'* is never mentioned in the texts, though provincial ones are: e.g., Damascus—*Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 125, 138, 195; Aleppo—*Zubda*, III, 75. Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, 805-812, has considerable detail on administrative techniques, but nothing on the relations of the various financial departments to one another. He does speak as if Nur al-Din's state did have a central financial organism, but neglects to discuss this point explicitly. Ehrenkreutz, "Saladin in Naval History," 108, 115, states that the fleet was supported entirely by Egyptian revenues, in spite of its empire-wide role.

Al-'Adil's loan: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 52, citing Ibn Abi Tayy, who relies on an anonymous informant. 'Imad al-Din's account says nothing of this. It is put in the context of a story which has a grateful Saladin acceding to al-'Adil's request for Aleppo as a reward for his services. The brief account in *Zubda*, III, 75, is obviously an echo of Ibn Abi Tayy's original.

11. Gibb, "Achievement," 100.

12. Gibb, "Achievement," 99.

13. Gibb, "Achievement," 104-105.

14. Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 120-124, *et passim*.

15. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 238. For the effect of Saladin's policies on local society, *Ibid.*, 11-12, 222-223, 226. On the absence of a higher moral order in Saladin's state, *Ibid.*, 191.

16. The Arabic term for this class is "*muta'ammimin*." Briefly it comprised all those who had received the religio-legal education provided by the *madrasas*, whatever the career lines they might afterwards follow. See Appendix C, "The Muta'ammimin: 'Ulama' and Bureaucracy."

17. Gibb, "Armies," 77.

18. The figure of 600 men of religion is from 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, trans. by Henri Massé (Paris: Paul Geuthner for l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, 1972), 431. This leads to the empire-wide total of 3000 through the following calculation: 600 each in Damascus, Cairo, and Aleppo; a total of 600 in all the other major towns of Syria; a total of 600 in the Ayyubid possessions in the Jazira.

The figure of 150 elite members of the *muta'ammimin* is derived as follows:

a) the number of *madrasas* in territories which Saladin ruled directly as of 582/1186 was roughly 50 (there were 40 in the same area exclusive of Egypt at Nur al-Din's death—see Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, 915). This would give 50 *madrasa* professors, if every *madrasa* had had a different professor (which was not the case, as is easily confirmed by consulting Ibn Shaddad's *al-A'laq al-Khatira* for Damascus and Aleppo).

b) There were perhaps 15 major qadiships in Syria and the Jazira, and as many chiefs of local financial administrations in that area.

c) Egypt would have had as many as 10 major qadiships, and a maximum of 20 top-ranking administrative officials.

d) In Saladin's immediate entourage perhaps a half-dozen officials and men of religion were close to his councils—we shall arbitrarily name the figure of 10.

The total of the above is 120. To it should be added an indeterminate group of scholars and officials who were not of the highest ranks but were generally known and respected among the *muta'ammimin*.

19. There is no adequate study of the notable families of Aleppo and Damascus which supplied so many scholars and officials; provisionally see D. Sourdél, "Professeurs."

20. Ibn Rawaha: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 300; *Daris*, I, 266-267; *Perles*, 113 and n. 2. Al-Qadi al-Fadil: *DD*, III (1894), 304 n. 66, citing 'Umara al-Yamani.

21. Sourdél, "Professeurs," 113-115. Not all of these men had been born in the east, but at least their families had first entered Syria in the time of Nur al-Din or Saladin.

22. *Daris*, I, 361; Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, 929-930. Note also the lavish patronage extended by 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah to the Hanafi *faqih* and grammarian Taj al-Din al-Kindi, a native of Baghdad: *Mufarrij*, II (*Cairo*), 125-126.

23. Explicit proof of this in 'Imad al-Din's case, who had introduced his kinsman Jamal al-Din Isma'il into the *Diwan al-Insha'* as a specialist in Persian correspondence: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 195. As to the continuing role of the indigenous notables in the administration, we have no specific data on Damascus; for Aleppo a number of references in *Zubda*, III, show local figures in the administration (Shihab al-Din ibn al-'Ajami; Safi al-Din Tariq ibn al-Tarira).

24. Cahen, "Ayyubids," *EP*, I, 797; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 73-79, 81-82.

25. The Syrian military system as the model for Saladin's reforms in Egypt: Cahen, "Note additionelle," 110. For the early development of the Syrian military system in the twelfth century, see H. A. R. Gibb, *Damascus Chronicle*, 32-40. (His discussion is based chiefly on Ibn al-Qalanisi and Usama b. Munqidh.)

26. We have used the term "administrative *iqta'*" following Lambton,

Landlord and Peasant, 61-63.

Among the leading families of this hereditary aristocracy at the time of Saladin's rise to power are the following: the Banu al-Muqaddam, the Banu al-Daya, the Begtiginids of Irbil and Harran, the sons of Nasih al-Din Khumartigin in the Jabal Ansariyya, and the sons of Hassan al-Manbijī. The forebears of Saladin's Kurdish amir Sayf al-Din al-Mashtub had held castles around 'Imadiyya, north of Mosul, before Zangi's conquest of the area—Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 144.

27. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 139-146. The orders of battle for the fighting around Acre during the Third Crusade, as given in *Raud.*, II, 144, 179, indicate at least four tribal contingents of Kurds.

28. On the Kurdish political tradition, see Bosworth, *Dynasties*, 53-54, 88-91; and Minorsky, *Caucasian History*. Minorsky, "Kurds," *EI*¹, II, 1135-1140, gives a detailed sketch of their history from the Arab conquest down to the Ayyubids; *ibid.*, 1150-1151, brief but useful notes on social structure. The most striking example of a man with connections both to the native religious notables and the military aristocracy is Diya' al-Din 'Isa al-Hakkari, on whom see below, pp. 30-31, and Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 146.

There were perhaps a few Arab (*not* Bedouin) amirs in Saladin's forces as well. The only certain identification is Sayf al-Daula Mubarak b. Munqidh, who accompanied al-Mu'azzam Turanshah on his conquest of the Yemen and was Saladin's *na'ib* in Egypt in 588/1192—*Wafayat*, IV, 144-146. One other possibility, at least on the basis of his name (for nothing else is known about his background), is 'Izz al-Din Usama, *wali* of Beirut. The numbers involved are obviously insignificant, but the evidence at least suggests that Arab soldiers were not excluded *ipso facto* from high rank.

29. On their capacity to undercut Saladin's position, see the sharp criticism of Saladin's Jaziran campaigns by al-Qadi al-Fadil and others—Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 187-188. Likewise Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 104-106, shows that by 583/1187 Saladin was under strong pressure from his entourage to move against the Franks.

30. The Kipchak dwelt in regions easily accessible to slave raids from Khwarizm—between the Aral and Caspian Seas and north of the middle Jaxartes—and this fact probably accounts for their preponderance among the Turkish *mamluks*. They were widely used in the Khwarizmian army by the late twelfth century, both as *mamluks* and as pagan mercenaries. King David IV of Georgia had used Kipchak slave troops extensively early in the twelfth century. See Bosworth, "The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)," in *CHI*, 52, 141-142, 183; and Cahen, "The Turks in Iran and Anatolia before the Mongol Invasions," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 670.

31. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, I, 169, cited in Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 63.

32. On the other hand some of this related to political rather than properly ethnic tensions; it was an aspect of the struggle between Saladin and

Nur al-Din. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 68, 72.

33. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 199, citing Baha' al-Din. Capture of Sinjar: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 124. See also Gibb, "Achievement," 98.

34. In less controlled situations, however, the fear of massacre or violence may well have been much more immediate and hatreds more inflammable—see Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 138 and n. 3.

35. All three of these men appear in Ibn Khallikan, a solid testimony of their eminence. See also Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 139-146; and Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, index, 274, 282, 283. On the Kurdish tribal units: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 144, 179.

36. Gibb, "Rise of Saladin," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 582.

37. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 159.

38. E.g., Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri's *iqta'* of Harran and Edessa—a principality in itself—or Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam's of Baalbek. In 588/1192 Sayf al-Din al-Mashtub received Nablus, this being the largest Kurdish *iqta'* known to me.

39. Kurdish recruitment by the Zangids: Sourdél, "Professeurs," 113; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 144; Gibb, "The Career of Nur ad-Din," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 520; Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 372-374; III, 729.

40. 'Ismat al-Din was also Nur al-Din's widow; Saladin's marriage to her thus underlined still further his claims to be the true heir of Nur al-Din—cf. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 153. Rabi'a Khatun: *Daris*, II, 80.

41. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 9; *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 127; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 181-182, 232-234. On the earlier career of this family, see Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, index (Magd al-Din Abu Bakr ibn al-Daya), 1008.

42. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 2, 5; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 71. Ibn al-Muqaddam's appointment as viceroy in Damascus: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 33. See also Gibb, "Rise of Saladin," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 572; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 160-161, 177.

43. Ayalon, "Esclavage," 27-29; a more general discussion of the problem in Forand, "Slave and Client."

44. Ayalon, "Structure," I, 206-213, 216-222.

45. The criteria for distinguishing the members of this elite are those mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph—in brief, an amir must appear in a variety of major roles and over at least a decade of Saladin's reign to be included. Obviously there is something arbitrary about defining any given number as "the elite"—why not one more? But even if we go beyond fifteen men whose status is indisputable to include ten or twelve borderline cases, we can place in this elite only one additional *mamluk* of Saladin's—Mujahid al-Din Ayaz al-Tawil. By such an extension, we also admit at least one Arab (Sayf al-Dawla b. Munqidh).

The amirs included in this elite as more narrowly defined are the following:

- Kurds: 1) Diya, al-Din 'Isa al-Hakkari
 2) Husam al-Din Abu'l-Hayja' al-Hadhbani al-Samin

3) Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Ahmad al-Mashtub

Türkmen and freeborn Turks:

- 1) Badr al-Din Doldurum b. Baha' al-Daula b. Yürük
- 2) Nasir al-Din Mengüverish b. Nasih al-Din Khumartigin
- 3) Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri b. Zayn al-Din 'Ali Küçük b. Begtigin
- 4) Shams al-Din Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik, called Ibn al-Muqaddam
- 5) Sabiq al-Din 'Uthman ibn al-Daya
- 6) 'Alam al-Din Sulayman b. Jandar (ethnic origins uncertain)

- mamluks:*
- 1) Ghars al-Din Kilich al-Nuri
 - 2) 'Izz al-Din Jurdik al-Nuri
 - 3) Sayf al-Din Yazkuch al-Asadi
 - 4) Baha' al-Din Karakush al-Asadi
 - 5) Sarim al-Din Kiymaz al-Najmi
 - 6) Husam al-Din Sungur al-Khilati

In the last two or three years of Saladin's reign his own *mamluks* began to emerge into greater prominence. They received a number of important *iqta's* in Palestine and Lebanon, and they would play a crucial role in the decade after his death. But as of 589/1193 they were still far from dominating the high offices of state.

46. Gibb, "Achievement," 100.

47. Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, 812.

48. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 218.

49. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 125. As the Barada River enters the walled city of Damascus from the west, it flows between two low parallel ridges lying north and south of it respectively. These two ridges, in the open air outside the walls and above the "flood plain" of the Barada, have been a popular place for suburban villas, *madrasas*, etc., since the early twelfth century at least. In Arabic they are called *sharaf*, or "overlook."

50. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 107-108, has a good discussion of this point.

51. *Zubda*, III, 13-15, 17-19, 49-52. The defector was 'Alam al-Din Sulayman b. Jandar, a close friend of Saladin's from the time of Nur al-Din, but heretofore a loyal supporter of the Zangid succession in Aleppo. Moreover when Saladin appeared in Syria the following spring, he was invited across the Euphrates by Muzaffar al-Din Gökböri, who was annoyed with 'Izz al-Din of Mosul for different reasons (*Zubda*, III, 51-54, 57). This defection was serious in itself, in view of Gökböri's power and influence, but its real impact was to open the Jazira to penetration by Saladin. It thus counts as a major stage in the progressive collapse of Zangid resistance.

52. Cf. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 214-215, 217-220.

Chapter 2

1. Saladin's family of course included not only the sons of Najm al-Din Ayyub and Asad al-Din Shirkuh, but also persons related through the female side. But though this must have been a numerous group, only six of its members are known even by name. And of these only Saladin's maternal uncle, Shihab al-Din Mahmud b. Tekish al-Harimi, really seems to surpass in stature any other influential amir; on him see below, pp. 43, 43, 52. Another individual who seems to have been of real promise was a son of Saladin's sister, Sitt al-Sham Zumurrud Khatun, named Husam al-Din Muhammad b. 'Umar b. Lachin, but he died prematurely in 587/1191—on him see *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 88, 195; and *RCEA*, IX, 175 (no. 3448), where the correct form of his name is established. Finally we may mention Badr al-Din Maudud, the *shihna* or *wali* of Damascus and cointendant of its financial administration after 584/1188. He was the half-brother (on his mother's side) of Saladin's nephew 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah—see *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 125, 138, 157, 183. None of these men was ever included in the line of succession to the empire.

2. Relations between Nur al-Din and Saladin: Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 651-653, 670-674, 681-684, 692-693; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 58-59, 72-73, 75-76, 97-101, 105-108, 115-116.

Internal security and the Frankish threat: Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 642-650, 662-665, 676-678, 688-691; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 70-71, 75-84, 112-115.

3. The Egyptian *iqta'*, at whatever level, was never hereditary; even the largest governorships were never thought of as appanages. On the Ayyubid *iqta'* in Egypt, see especially Cahen, "Iqta'," 44-47; Poliak, "Ayyubid Feudalism"; and Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, 26-72. On the question of heritability, Rabie, *Financial System*, 29-30, 58-60. On the *iqta'*s of Ayyub and Turanshah, see Rabie, *Financial System*, 43-44; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 74-75, 82; Gibb, "Armies," 74-76.

4. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 76-112 *passim*.

5. Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, Index (pp. 1020, 1048, 1059), gives available data on the early careers of these three men. See also Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 130-132, for Ayyub and Shirkuh. Ayyub: *Wafayat*, I, 255-261; Turanshah: *Wafayat*, I, 306-309.

6. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 110-115, a complex but convincing interpretation of the affair. See also Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 684-686, 688-691.

7. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 82.

8. *Atabegs*, 287, cited in Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 673. Ibn al-Athir's penchant for reproducing in detail supposedly confidential conversations has disturbed many modern commentators and led to more than a few accusations of mendacity. But it seems very unlikely to me that these accounts are meant to be taken at face value, as a recounting of something which actually happened. Rather I believe that Ibn al-Athir uses them as a device

to permit himself personal comment on events without breaking his chronicle framework. They are in a sense interpretative essays in dramatic form. The story cited here, in its full version, seems to suggest the following interpretation: 1) that Saladin's position in Egypt was very weak, such that Nur al-Din could easily have ousted him if he had tried to do so; 2) that Saladin saved himself only by a skillful diplomacy which kept Nur al-Din from acting until it was too late; 3) finally, and only implicitly, that Nur al-Din's laxness alone left Saladin in power and permitted him to attack the Zangid states. For another example of this device in Ibn al-Athir, see below, pp. 58-59.

9. On Saladin's claims, see especially Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 93-100.

10. Al-'Adil's appointment as vicegerent: Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 126. Al-Qadi al-Fadil posted to Egypt: *Ibid.*, 141-142. Egypt's economic revival: *Ibid.*, 101-105, 168-169, 172. Inscriptions: Qal'at Guindi (578/1182-83)—*RCEA*, IX, 119 (no. 3374); Cairo citadel (579/1183)—*RCEA*, IX, 123-124 (no. 3380). Both inscriptions state that work was conducted under the supervision (*"bi-nazar"*) of al-'Adil; and his *mamluk* Sarim al-Din Barghash al-'Adili was the actual superintendent of construction at Qal'at Guindi.

11. The difference between the *niyaba* and the administrative *iqta'* may well seem more formal than real, since the latter too could be transferred at the sultan's discretion. The difference, I think, is in the attitude underlying the grant or appointment: the *na'ib* expected his position to be temporary, whereas the *muqta'* expected his to be on life tenure, or at least long-term.

12. Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 90; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, lv-lvi; *CIA*, Egypte, I, 210-212, 218-222.

13. Taqi al-Din's *iqta'*s: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 53; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 152; Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, 42. They comprised Alexandria, Damietta, Buhayra, and the Fayyum. These territories are precisely those (with the addition of the Fayyum) formerly held by Najm al-Din Ayyub. This parallel may imply that a defined group of districts was attached to the vicegerency.

14. The evidence for this point is far from conclusive. Badr al-Din Maudud clearly held his police powers (*al-shihnakiyya*) on a standing basis from his first appointment in 584/1188 until his death in 602/1206, but seems to have surrendered his general administrative authority to al-Qadi al-Fadil in the late summer of 587/1191. See *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 125, 138; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 365. Likewise 'Izz al-Din Farrukhshah seems to have retained his police powers in Damascus even when Saladin was resident there.

15. Farrukhshah: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 15, 19, 23; Ibn al-Muqaddam: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 5, 33; Taqi al-Din: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 53. A final example is the case of Nasir al-Din Mengüverish b. Khumartigin, the lord of Abu Qubays in the Jabal Ansariyya, who acted as the military governor (*mutawalli 'askar Hamah*) of Hama for nearly a year after the death of Shihab al-Din al-Harimi in 573/1177—*Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 5; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 70.

16. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 130, 142.

17. *Raud. (Cairo)*, I, 261-262; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 153, 160. As to Turanshah's taste for the perquisites of power, but not for its responsibilities, there are two revealing anecdotes in *Wafayat*, I, 307-308.

18. On Farrukhshah's tenure in Damascus: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 19, 23, 33; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 160, 162, 167, 171, 177.

19. Ibn al-Muqaddam; *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 33; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 177. Ibn al-Qabid: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 173.

20. Homs: *Raud. (Cairo)*, I, 250; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 35; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 59, 72, 136-137. Hama: *Raud. (Cairo)*, I, 250; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 34. Baalbek: *Raud. (Cairo)*, I, 261; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 48.

21. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 70, 74.

22. See above, pp. 33-34, and p. 49.

23. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 2, 5, 15, *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 73, 86; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 161-162. Referring to Turanshah's status in Alexandria, Ibn Wasil (*Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 86) says "an'ama 'alayhi s-sultanu bi-l-iskandariyya." In Ayyubid texts, this expression is demonstrably synonymous with "aqta'ahu iyyahu," so it seems safe to conclude that Alexandria was assigned as an *iqta'* rather than a simple *niyaba*.

24. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 33; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 86, 124.

25. Zayn al-Din: Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 618-620 (as of his retirement in 563/1168). Fakhr al-Din: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 22, 34 (on the eve of Saladin's invasion of 570/1174).

26. "When the peace [with 'Imad al-Din Zangi] had been arranged, Saladin came to the tent of his brother Taj al-Muluk in al-Khaniqiyya to visit him, and said, 'We have taken Aleppo, and it is yours.' And [Taj al-Muluk] said, 'Would it had been so while I was alive! But by God, you have paid a high price when you lose a man like me.'" Cited in *Zubda*, III, 69. Saladin's statement to his brother perhaps ought to be understood merely as a pious sentiment intended to comfort a dying man.

27. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 47; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 153.

28. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 47 (citing Ibn Abi Tayy). This expression was certainly not the title or status officially bestowed on al-Zahir. It may be retrospective, reflecting the position he would later attain. At any rate it is certainly to be taken in its popular sense, where it refers to any chief of government with effectively independent powers.

29. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 51-52; *Zubda*, III, 74-76; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 152-153.

30. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 52. Al-'Adil's position is described variously as *iqta'*, *wilaya*, and *mulk* in contemporary accounts of this event, thus underlining again the looseness and flexibility of administrative terminology among the Ayyubids.

31. *Zubda*, III, 21-22, 49-50, 64-69.

32. *Zubda*, III, 75-76.

33. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 53; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 152.

34. Gibb, "Rise of Saladin," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 575-580; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 176-177, 188-192. On the ambitions of Nasir al-Din Muhammad, see *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 119.

35. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 172-173. "Fa-hallafa s-sultanu n-nasa li-auladihi wa-ja'ala li-kullin minhum nasiban ma'luman wa-ja'ala akhahu l-Malika l-'Adila wasiyyan 'ala l-jami'i." (*Ibid.*, 173).

36. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 174; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 191-192; Gibb, "Rise of Saladin," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 583.

37. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 64-65; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 172; Gibb, "Rise of Saladin," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 580; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 192.

38. See above, p. 17; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 174-175; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 192-193.

39. Cited in *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 183-184; *Zubda*, III, 84-85. The anecdote thus appears to have had a wide circulation. Cf. pp. 44-45 and n. 8, above.

40. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 69-70. Al-'Aziz's position is here called *mulk*; also, he is to become 'aziz Misr—i.e., "the mighty one of Egypt." (On this phrase, see below, n. 44.) In a letter composed by 'Imad al-Din and sent to Baghdad in 584/1188, al-'Aziz is said to have been invested with the "wilayat Misr wa-mamlakat aqalimiha." *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 137.

41. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 69-70; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 177-180. Al-'Adil's rank is called "atabeg" only in Ibn Wasil; Abu Shama's contemporary source, 'Imad al-Din, uses the equivalent terms of *niyaba* and *tadbir (al-'Aziz)*.

42. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 70.

43. Taqi al-Din: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 70. al-'Adil and al-'Aziz: *Ibid.*, 70. al-Zahir: *Ibid.*, 70; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 179; *Zubda*, III, 89-90. al-Afdal: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 137 (letter of 'Imad al-Din to Cairo, dated 584/1188).

44. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 69, 137; *Zubda*, III, 90. "'Aziz Misr" (the mighty one of Egypt) is a Koranic expression (sura 12, vv. 30, 51, 78, 88) which refers to the Pharaoh's chief minister, and especially Joseph. See Bernard Lewis, "'Aziz Misr," *EP*, I, 825. Its use here by 'Imad al-Din is not only a clever pun, but also seems to suggest that al-'Aziz 'Uthman was to exercise, if not sovereignty over Egypt, at least plenipotentiary authority there.

45. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 137.

46. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 137; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 278.

47. Latin "Valania." Also called Banyas, which is its modern name, and hence easily confused with Banyas south of Mt. Hermon. See Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 292.

48. The clearest version in *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 340, 377-379, which simplifies slightly but is faithful to the more elaborate and confusing account in *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 164-165, 194-195, 197.

49. Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 93 ff.

50. Cahen, "Turkish Invasion," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 176. The attempt by Muslim military dynasts to show that their states had an ethical purpose

and were not founded merely on force goes back at least to the Ghaznavids — Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 48-54.

51. A brief statement of this tradition in A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire," *CHI*, 208-211. See also *idem*, "Quis Custodiet Custodes." The classic Muslim statements are to be found in Ibn Qutayba (*Uyun al-Akhbar*), Nizam al-Mulk (*Siyasat-nameh*) and al-Ghazali (*Nasihah al-Muluk*). I have omitted the "cult of justice" from my capsule definition of the tradition in spite of its immense importance within it, because Nur al-Din and Saladin conceived of justice as a practical concern, stemming from the Muslim sovereign's duty to uphold the *shari'a*, rather than as a mystical quality upholding society and the world order. An excellent general statement of the absolutist tradition in Islam in Hodgson, *Venture*, I, 280-284; II, 44-46.

52. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 268.

53. Bosworth, *Dynasties*, 83-96; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 110-116.

54. Cahen, "Turkish Invasion," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 164-166, 169-176; Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 87-98.

55. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 136. On the causes of the departure of Shadhi, *Ibid.*, 83, 85, 130-132. His argument as a whole is presented in pp. 132-139.

56. On the Shaddadids, see Bosworth, *Dynasties*, 90-91; and especially Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 1-106.

57. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 50, 58-59, 64, 82-83.

58. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 306-307; Cahen, "Turkish Invasion," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 156-157, 161; Bosworth, "Iranian World," *CHI*, 22, 49, 58.

59. For this title, see Bosworth, "Iranian World," *CHI*, 23, 135-136; *idem*, *Ghaznavids*, 267. Inscriptions from the reign of Malikshah: *RCEA*, VII, 193 (no. 2707, yr. 466); 214-219 (nos. 2734-2737, yr. 475); 240 (no. 2764, yr. 480); 245-246 (no. 2773, yr. 481).

60. Bosworth, "Iranian World," *CHI*, 58, 78, 88-89.

61. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 60; *idem*, "Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire," *CHI*, 235-236; Bosworth, "Iranian World," *CHI*, 111.

62. Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 389-395, 436-442, 657-661. After the death of Nur al-Din: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 5-6, 30-31, 36-37, 92-95.

63. On this point, see Cahen, "Traité financier," and Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, 26-30, 38-39, 144-150, *et passim*.

64. Cahen, "Ayyubids," *EI*², I, 801-802; *idem*, "Note additionelle," 110; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 12.

65. Egyptian commercial routes: Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, I, 209-217, 275-281, 295-301, *et passim*.

66. On Egyptian administrative continuity, see R. S. Cooper, "Land classification terminology and the assessment of the *kharaj* tax in medieval Egypt," *JESHO*, 17 (1974): 91-102; *idem*, "The assessment and collection of *kharaj* tax in medieval Egypt," *JAOS*, 96 (1976): 365-382; Rabie, *Financial System*

of Egypt, chaps. 3-4, *passim*.

67. Our texts name the component districts of the Hauran: al-Jaulan, al-Hauran, al-Sawad. For the Hauran as a whole, see Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, I, 261-275; D. Sourdel, "Hawran," *EI*², III, 292-293. *Idem*, "Djawlan," *EI*², II, 498. On the Sawad or Terre de Suète, Dussaud, *Topographie*, 381-382.

68. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 3-4; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 97. On Balatunus, see Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 285.

69. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 4; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 58-59. On al-Zafir Khidr and his background, see *Wafayat*, VII, 205; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 295, 313, 340.

70. *RCEA*, IX, 83 (no. 3320). The original editors (Dussaud and Macler) read the date as 571, but plainly it must be construed as 591; Arabic *sab'in* and *tis'in* are of course easily confused.

71. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 27. Ibn Wasil's information is confirmed by the fact that Sarim al-Din constructed *ribats* in Nawa and Khisfin, and a *qantara* (aqueduct) between the two towns: *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 305; *Daris*, I, 572-574. According to *A'laq (LPJ)*, 161, Sarim al-Din was also lord of Kaukab at this point and until his death in 596/1199-1200, at which point Kaukab was transferred to 'Izz al-Din Usama. Sarim al-Din had in fact been made *wali* of Kaukab upon its capture in 584/1188: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 135. On the other hand, Ibn Wasil, who is normally well informed about such matters, consistently identifies Usama as *Sahib Kaukab wa-'Ajlun* from the outset.

72. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 4 *et passim*; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 86-87, 161. 'Ajlun: Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, 66 and n. 4. On Usama, see also Sauvaget, "Un bain damasquin du xiii^e siècle," *Syria*, II (1930): 370-380.

73. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 142, 152; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 160; *Zubda*, III, 89.

74. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 154-155, 159. Ibn Shaddad ascribes Toron and Chastel-Neuf to Jaharkas as of 589/1193, but it seems more likely that he received these only in 598/1201, at the same time that he was awarded Banyas.

75. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 99. On the status of Sidon, see LaMonte, "Lords of Sidon," 183-184, 197-199.

76. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 161, 183, 207; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 102-103.

77. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 293. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 133, 197. See above, chap. 2, n. 1.

78. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 88, 196; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 381, 410-411; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 244. Nablus was conquered in the summer of 583/1187 by Saladin's nephew Husam al-Din Muhammad b. 'Umar b. Lachin, to whom it was assigned in *iqta'*. But upon his death in 587/1191 it had fallen vacant, and so it had remained until Rabi' II 588/April-May 1192. At that point it was assigned to Sayf al-Din al-Mashtub, but he too died after a brief tenure, in Shawwal 588/November 1192. When Saladin reassigned Nablus to 'Imad al-Din, however, he earmarked one-third of its revenues to be sent to Jerusalem, with the remainder to constitute his *iqta'*.

79. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 205; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 221. A full discussion of Jurdik's titles and position in *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 96-99. For other references see *RCEA*, IX, 187 (no. 3464).

80. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 205.
81. See above, chap. I, n. 9.
82. Ehrenkreutz, "Dinar," 182-184; *idem*, *Saladin*, 187-188, 220-223. Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, 338-341.
83. Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 620-621; B. Lewis, *Assassins*, III ff.; *idem*, "Ismailites and Assassins," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 120-127.
84. Doldurum: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 147. Mengüverish: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 129-130; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 274-275. Ibn al-Dayā: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 127; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 181-183. Ibn al-Muqaddam: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 131; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 312; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 191-193. Ibn Wasil lists the same group of amirs as of 589/1193, but with certain differences from our register. Specifically, Doldurum holds Tall Bashir only; Abu Qubays is ascribed to Ibn al-Dayā; Hisn Burzayh is ascribed to Mengüverish. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 4.
85. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 98. a) ". . . fa-ata'a [Shirkuh] l-Malika l-Afdala." b) ". . . fa-ata'ahu Muhammadun wa-sara ma'ahu."
86. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 31-32. a) Al-Amjad and al-Mujahid would be "mu'azirayni li-l-Maliki l-Afdali wa-tab'i'ayni lahu." b) Al-Mansur "yakuna fi hayzi l-Maliki z-Zahiri . . . wa-mu'aziran lahu." If it is of course possible that all this implies less a defined legal relationship between the princes than a formal recognition of the realities—viz., that Baalbek, Homs, and Hama were bound to be dominated by and subservient to their far more powerful neighbors. In this case the intention would be not to establish a suzerainty-vassalage relationship, but simply to ensure that the minor princes did not act against the interests of their respective neighbors.
87. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 4. Baalbek: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 33. Homs: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 174. Hama: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 279.
88. The Ayyubid territories east of the Euphrates are termed by contemporary writers *al-bilad al-sharqiyya*—a useful expression which we have tried to retain by the translation "Eastern Territories," or sometimes simply "the East."
89. Eastern territories: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 279. See above, pp. 64-66. Al-Muwazzar: Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, I, 140. Suwayda': *Ibid.*, I, 138. Hani: Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 114. In Transjordan al-Salt was later fortified, but only in the time of al-Mu'azzam (i.e., after 594/1198, when al-Mu'azzam was formally invested with Damascus)—Le Strange, *Palestine*, 529 (citing Abu l-Fida').
90. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 187-188.

Chapter 3

1. Gibb, "Rise of Saladin," in Setton, *Crusades*, I, 587-589; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 226. See also Ayalon's assessment of the Crusade: "Yasa," C2, 152-156.

2. On the *khiwan*, Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, xcvi, c. A medical description of Saladin's illness can be found in Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, *'Uyun al-Anba' fi Ta'rikh al-Atibba'*, ed. by A. Muller (Cairo, 1882), vol. 2, p. 206 (Citing 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi).

3. *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 212-215; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 418-419; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 97; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 272; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 227-231. Only the Syrian amirs were present for this oath, a fact which has occasioned some comment (e.g., Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 230). But there is no political significance in this fact; Saladin died in the winter, when all his amirs had scattered to their *iqta's* after his disbanding of his forces the previous autumn. The Egyptians amirs were absent from Damascus simply because of this and because of their need to see to their estates after many years of absence and neglect.

4. Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 209-210, 215. An opposing interpretation in Gibb, "Achievement," 100-102.

5. His full name was Diya' al-Din Abu-l-Fada'il al-Qasim b. Yahya b. 'Abd Allah al-Shahrazuri. He was Kurdish by descent but spent most of his life in Syria and Egypt. He died in Hama in 599/1202-3. *Wafayat*, IV, 244-245; *Raud. (Cairo)*, I, 262-263, 267, 278; II, 15, 19, 26, 139, 151.

6. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 102; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 5-8; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 279.

7. Egyptian forces did not participate in this campaign. Al-'Aziz did respond to al-'Adil's call and sent a detachment under the command of Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas (on whom see below, *passim*). But upon reaching Damascus, the Egyptians learned that there was no further need of their help and returned. *Bustan*, 152-153; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 99-101; *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 102; *Salih*, 209b; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 16-20; *Mansuri*, 216. (Ibn Wasil's account in the *Mufarrij* is largely derived from *Kamil*, but with supplementary information.)

8. Diya' al-Din b. al-Athir was a brother of the famous historian 'Izz al-Din. He was born in Jazirat ibn 'Umar (modern Cizre) in 558/1163. He received his advanced education in Mosul and Baghdad, concentrating on grammar, poetry, and rhetoric to such effect that he became one of the most important rhetoricians of medieval Islam, a worthy rival to his older contemporaries al-Qadi al-Fadil and 'Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani. He joined Saladin's service in 587/1191 as a protégé of al-Qadi al-Fadil, and a few months later he was invited by the heir apparent, al-Afdal, to become his *wazir*, a post which he retained after the latter's accession to the sultanate. See *Wafayat*, V, 389-397; Franz Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athir, *EF*², III, 724-725; Cl. Cahen, "Correspondance," *BSOAS*, 14 (1952): 34-43.

9. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 10-11. 'Imad al-Din's testimony on the politics of Damascus from the death of Saladin down to 597/1201, as recorded in two late epistles (*Risalat al-'Utba wa-l-'Uqba* and *Khatfat al-Bariq wa-'Atfat al-Shariq*, neither extant save as cited by Abu Shama and Ibn Wasil), is of the very highest importance, but it must be used critically. 'Imad al-Din was a leading member of the old guard in Damascus and bitterly resented al-Afdal's natural preference for the men of his own entourage. In particular Diya' al-Din was his *bête noir*, and he loses no opportunity to ridicule him or to make him responsible for any policies that went awry.

10. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 8-9; *Zubda*, III, 132. The latter dates this event to 591. For his life, see *Wafayat*, VII, 84-100.

11. *Ustadh al-Dar*, also *Ustadar*—literally, "majordomo," "mayor of the palace." On this office in Mamluk times, see Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 93; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, lx-lxi; *CIA, Cairo, index*. As the name implies, this official (always a military man and commonly, but not always, a freedman of the prince in question) was the intendant of the royal household. Since the palace staff comprised a key element in the administration, this was obviously a sensitive position, and many of its holders were men of great power and influence.

12. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 109-110; *Salihi*, 209b-210a; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 10-15; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 280; *Zubda*, III, 130. It is hard to imagine that al-'Aziz's confirmation of Sidon could have been effective, since al-Afdal must already have appointed a new governor for the place.

13. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 110; *Salihi*, 209a; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 14-15; *Wafayat* I, 180-181; *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 98-99, 106-108.

14. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 111; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 26.

15. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 111; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 27.

16. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 28-30; *Zubda*, III, 130-131. These two accounts are very different, but if read closely not contradictory. See also *Kamil (B)*, XII, 109-110; *Bustan*, 154; *Salihi*, 210b-211a.

17. Dussaud, *Topographie*, 343; Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, I, 263, 266-267. It is modern Dilli.

18. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 30. Midan al-Hasa: Ibn 'Asakir, *Description*, 170, n. 5; 171, n. 4.

19. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 113; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 31-37; *Salihi*, 211a.

20. See above, pp. 82-83.

21. *Zubda*, III, 131.

22. *Mufarrij. (Cairo)*, III, 34. Al-'Adil was already the father-in-law of al-Zahir Ghazi (see above, p. 60; add *Zubda*, III, 130-131) and would contract another such alliance with al-Mansur of Hama in 598/1202 (*Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 169b). Such relationships were no proof against dissension and mutual enmity, of course, but they did give al-'Adil a variety of direct personal bonds with his fellow princes, which could not easily be ignored.

23. *Mufarrij. (Cairo)*, III, 38-40. In *Salihi*, 211b, we are given the names

of Jamal al-Din b. al-Husayn (whom I have been unable to identify) and of the famous qadi Muhyi al-Din b. Zaki al-Din al-Qurashi. I suspect that the latter may be an error for Muhyi al-Din b. Abi 'Asrun. Under the events of 591, *Kamil (B)*, XII, 118, gives the following list of Salahi amirs who had been exiled to Egypt, but without more precise dates or any information as to circumstances: Fakhr al-Din Jaharkas, Asad al-Din Sara-Sungur, Zayn al-Din Karaja, Faris al-Din Maymun al-Qasri, Shams al-Din Sungur al-Kabir, and Aybeg Futays.

24. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 41-42; *Salihi*, 211b.

25. *Kamil (B)* XII, 118-119; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 41-44; *Zubda*, III, 132-133; *Salihi*, 211b-212b.

26. See above, pp. 76, 80, 81. *Zubda*, III, 131 dates the surrender of Jabala, Lattakia, and Balatunus to 590/1194, but the date given in *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 43 seems more logical and more consistent with other details. See also Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 285; and Wiet, "Zahir Ghazi," 276, 284.

27. On these two amirs, see above, p. 82.

28. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 44-46; *Zubda*, III, 131, 132-133; *Ibn abi al-Damm*, 167b. Note that Doldurum's shift of allegiance involved not only himself but also an important segment of the Yürük Türkmen of north Syria, of whom he was a tribal chief.

29. From its name this latter unit would seem to have been one of the several Kurdish contingents recruited and organized on a tribal basis by the Ayyubids. But its commandant, Abu-l-Hayja' al-Samin, was a member of the Hadhbani tribe. Possibly the Mihranis were considered a subgroup of the latter.

30. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 47-50; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 118; *Zubda*, III, 133-134; *Salihi*, 212b.

31. Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 674.

32. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 50-52; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 119; *Zubda*, III, 134; *Salihi*, 212b; *Bustan*, 155. According to Ibn al-Athir, Sayf al-Din Yazkuch, commandant of the Asadiyya, was instrumental in organizing the conspiracy in Cairo, but he does not say if he was a member of al-'Aziz's expeditionary force or if he was among those who abandoned the camp at al-Fawwar for Damascus. There are grounds for believing that he was at least not one of the deserters, for he retained his rank and continued to play a leading role in Egyptian politics after these events.

33. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 52-54; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 119-120; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 282-283; *Zubda*, III, 134-135; *Salihi*, 213b. These accounts contain important and irreconcilable differences of detail. But all writers assume that peace was made because al-'Adil saw in that course the best protection for his own interests. Ibn al-Athir assigns to al-'Adil a rather more passive role in the conspiracy against al-'Aziz than do Ibn Wasil and Ibn al-'Adim; according to him, al-'Adil simply exploited a situation which had already become a crisis and did not create a crisis out of mere ill-feeling.

34. S. M. Stern, "Ayyubid Decrees," 10-24. As Stern points out, the significance of the titles taken by al-'Adil in this decree is not altogether clear. In particular two indications of sovereign status which are fairly common in Ayyubid times are here missing: "*al-sultan*" and a title in "*al-dunya wa-l-din*." But in the circumstances in which this decree was issued, these omissions are far from demonstrating that al-'Adil held subordinate status or was acting simply as the agent of the true sovereign. 1) The title "*al-sultan*" first appears in Ayyubid epigraphy in 598 (and not 605, as Stern says): see Wiet, "Zahir Ghazi," 281 (= *RCEA*, IX, 238, no. 3543: the Great Mosque in Manbij). In Ayyubid chancery usage the earliest datable use of this title is in al-Afdal's decree of 595 on behalf of St. Catherine's—when he was *atabeg* to al-Mansur Muhammad (Stern, "Ayyubid Decrees," 25-26). Thus when al-'Adil issued his decree in 592, the title "*al-sultan*" was probably still not used at all among the Ayyubid princes. And when it was introduced shortly thereafter, it was not restricted to the chief of the family, since it was used by an *atabeg* and a prince of Aleppo. Unfortunately we do not know al-'Aziz's titulature very well; we have only one inscription in his name (*RCEA*, IX, 212-213: no., 3503), which contains only an abbreviated protocol. 2) Although in this decree al-'Adil styles himself simply as Sayf al-Din—i.e., the ordinary amirial form—he had already used the "sovereign form" in *al-dunya wa-l-din* in an extraordinary inscription in Jerusalem, dated 589, where the protocol otherwise closely parallels that in the decree of 592. (*CIA, Jerusalem*, I, no. 38, pp. 103-108 = *RCEA*, IX, 186, no. 3463). Moreover, it was commonplace among the Ayyubid princes for both forms of this title to be used; the criterion was not whether one wished to claim sovereignty for himself, but rather the degree of formality desired. See also Appendix A, 365 ff.

35. Ehrenkreutz, "Dinar," pp. 179, 181. Of the nine *dinars* from al-'Aziz's reign examined by Ehrenkreutz for standard of fineness, six are 100 percent gold. See also Wiet, *L'Egypte arabe*, 338-341.

36. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 57; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 283; *Zubda*, III, 135.

37. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 59-61; *Zubda*, III, 135.

38. The unique account of Falak al-Din's embassy is in the *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 60-61. Little is known of this amir beyond the present incident. He is mentioned but once in Abu Shama (*Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 197). His full name was Abu Mansur Sulayman b. Sharwa b. Khaldak and he died in Damascus on 27 Muharram 599/16 October 1202. *Daris*, I, 431-436; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 135.

39. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 61-62; *Kamil (Beirut)*, XII, 121-122; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 283; *Zubda*, III, 137; *Salihi*, 214b; *Bustan*, 156; *Mansuri*, 217. Wiet, *L'Egypte arabe*, 340, gives 19 June as the date of surrender, and has al-'Aziz and al-'Adil leaving Cairo for Syria on 9 April. The latter of these dates seems somewhat early.

40. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 64-65, 68, 70; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 283; *Zubda*, III, 137; *Salihi*, 215b; *Bustan*, 156. None of these accounts gives all the

information in this paragraph, but there are no essential contradictions. One matter must be noted, however. The historian Ibn al-Athir must have known that his brother was al-Afdal's *wazir*—he was himself in Damascus in 591/1196 for one thing—but not once does he name him in his account of the years 589-592. Since he is careful to emphasize the political role played in Mosul during the same period by his older brother Majd al-Din, it is obvious that he was not merely being modest. Majd al-Din's political career was highly successful, Diya' al-Din's was to be ignored. This strange omission thus provides support for the account of 'Imad al-Din, bitterly prejudiced as the latter may have been.

41. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 126-127; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 75; *Bustan*, 157. For the date, see Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 294; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 114; Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, 341; Gibb, "Aiyubids," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 695. Ibn al-Athir gives the date simply as Shawwal—i.e., 17 August-15 Sept.

42. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 111; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 26; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 96-97; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 295, n. 6. As Stevenson points out, the date of 1197 given in certain Christian sources cannot be accepted; to his argument we may add that the mere fact of al-Afdal's involvement in the affair makes that date impossible.

43. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 127-128; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 71, 74-75; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 291; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 102-103; *Salih*, 216a; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, 116.

44. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 128-129; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 76-78; *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 117; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 292-293; *Zubda*, III, 140; *Mansuri*, 218 (under events of 592!); Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 294-296; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 91-97; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 117; Gibb, "Aiyubids," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 695. I have followed Abu Shama's dates rather than those of Ibn al-Athir, since they seem more precise and based on better information. Ibn al-Athir also attributes al-'Aziz's hasty departure to a rumored plot against him in Egypt (said to have been fomented by al-'Adil). No other source mentions this, however, and I would guess that Ibn al-Athir has either confused this with the events of 590 or is guilty of willful distortion of his data.

45. Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 295-296; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 98; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 118. In discussing the truce of 1192, Stevenson (*Crusaders*, 286, n. 3) cites the *History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria* to show that the agreement included a division of the revenues of Sidon, Beirut, Jubayl, and Jabala. He thus takes it as established that the revenues of Sidon were already subject to division before the treaty of 1198 (*Crusaders*, 295, n. 6). This is supported by the *Estoire d'Eracles* (LaMonte, "Lords of Sidon," 198-199), though it seems odd that Muslim sources as well informed as 'Imad al-Din, Baha' al-Din and Ibn Shaddad do not mention it. See chap. 2, n. 75. The actual date of the truce is uncertain: Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 295, n. 3.

46. *Raud. (RHC)*, V, 117-118; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 78; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 284 (given under the events of 590!); *A'laq (LPJ)*, 99. Damascus was not

al-Mu'azzam's first possession. In 592/1196 his father had assigned him the then vacant *iqta'* of Sidon; in turn, al-Mu'azzam had bestowed it on his younger brother al-Mughith 'Umar. This sequence of events clearly indicates that, although an autonomous major appanage could be granted only by the sultan, a powerful governor (like al-'Adil) might grant more ordinary *iqta'*s. Al-Mu'azzam's act may imply an otherwise unattested right or practice of subinfeudation, but it is equally likely that it represented only a simple transferral or gift of property.

47. 'Imad al-Din Zangi II had died in Muharram 594/November-December 1197. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 132.

48. On the Artukids at this time: Bosworth, *Dynasties*, 119-120; Cahen, "Artukids," *El²*, I, 663, 665. Nur al-Din's attack on Nisibin: *Kamil (B)*, XII, 132-134; al-'Adil's attack on Mardin: *ibid.*, XII, 134, 138.

49. Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, 339.

50. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 72-73, 87-90; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 140-141; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 296; *Salihī*, 216b-217a; *Mansuri*, 218-219. Two versions are given in the *Mufarrij*: the first, longer and more convincing, is expressly cited from the *Kamil*, while the second is an expanded version of the *Salihī*'s account, whose provenance is unknown.

The dating of al-'Aziz's death is confused. Gibb, "Aiyubids," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 695, gives 29 November, following the *Mufarrij* but (as in Abu-l-Fida' and al-Maqrizi, both of whom are derived from Ibn Wasil) adding ten days to the reading there. Stevenson follows Abu Shama and Ibn al-Athir in giving 20 Muharram 595/22 November 1198: *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 234; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 140.

51. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 141-142; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 91-92; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 296; *Mansuri*, 219-220. Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Wasil give very similar accounts, but Ibn al-Athir attributes Jaharkas' desertion to an imagined slight from al-Afdal at Bilbays. Ibn Wasil's account seems the more persuasive.

The force of 700 cavalry under Maymun al-Qasri's command certainly does not represent the number of men which he was expected to support on the basis of his *iqta'* at Nablus, but rather the garrison which was posted in this important town, only a few of which would be his own men. The largest *iqta'* in Syria known to us from Ayyubid times is that of Nasir al-Din al-Qaymari (ca. 650/1252), which could support some 250 regular cavalry; it was considered almost the equal of a prince's.

52. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 142; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 93-94.

53. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 143; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 94-95; *Zubda*, III, 142.

54. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 95; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 297; *Mansuri*, 220; *Zubda*, III, 142-143. This event marks al-Kamil's first appearance in Ayyubid history.

55. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 96-97; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 143-144; *Zubda*, III, 143; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 297, 302. On Nasih al-Din (Abu-l-Faraj 'Abd al-Rahman b. Najm) and his influential family, established in Damascus since the time of Tutush, there is valuable data in *Daris*, II, 70 ff.

56. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 96-98; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 144; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 297, 302; *Zubda*, III, 143.

57. *Zubda*, III, 144; other sources as above.

58. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 95-101; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 144; *Zubda*, III, 144-146.

59. This constituted a useful rationalization of al-Mansur's territories: Manbij and Qal'at Najm both lay northeast of Aleppo, isolated from everything else he held, while Barin was some fifteen miles southwest of Hama. For Ibn al-Muqaddam, of course, the new towns were very isolated from his other possessions of Apamea and Kafartab.

60. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 148-150; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 102-103; *Zubda*, III, 144-145.

61. *Kamil (B)*, 145; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 104-107; *Zubda*, III, 145-147.

62. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 155-156; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 108-109; *Mansuri*, 221-222; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 302; Gibb, "Aiyubids," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 695; Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, 342. Both Gibb and Wiet give February 6 as the date of al-'Adil's entry into Cairo, but I cannot reconcile this with the dates in the sources here cited. On the region of Jabal Jur, see Yaqut, *Buldan*, II, 20.

63. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 110-113; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 303; *Mansuri*, 222-223. On al-'Adil's motives for seizing power in his own name, Ibn Wasil cites an interesting anecdote (p. 111) which he attributes to Ibn al-Athir, but which I cannot find in the published text of the latter. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 156, says that the coup d'état occurred in Shawwal 596/15 July-12 August 1200. Although Ibn al-Athir's chronology appears to be followed by Gibb ("Aiyubids," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 696-4 August) and Wiet (*L'Égypte arabe*, 342-25 July), Ibn Wasil's precise chronology inspires confidence. Also, a detail in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi may support the earlier date. He says that al-Kamil left Damascus on 3 Sha'ban/19 May to go to Egypt as his father's *na'ib* there; it seems likely that al-'Adil would not thus have invited his oldest son and presumptive heir until he had taken power in his own name. On the other hand, the late date is supported by the outbreak of overt resistance to al-'Adil among the Salahiyya in late autumn of 597/1200; it seems unlikely that resentful amirs would have required almost a year to form a conspiracy against a man whom they perceived as a usurper.

64. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 160; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 117.

65. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 160-161; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 119-120; *Zubda*, III, 148; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 168; *Mansuri*, 223-224.

66. A good example of this autonomy can be found in Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 375-376. In 1225 the Venetian ambassador Tomasino Foscari applied for separate treaties to al-'Aziz of Aleppo and to the Lord of Saone, Nasir al-Din Mengüverish. The latter had to be included in any treaty arrangements with Aleppo because his castle commanded the main road between that city and Lattakia, but al-'Aziz could not guarantee his conduct.

67. On al-Zahir's administrative centralization, see Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 235-237. For the specific incidents here cited: *Ibid.*, 231, 257. See also *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 265; III, 120; *Zubda*, III, 136-137, 138-140, 141; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 310; Wiet, "Zahir Ghazi," 285-286.

68. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 161-162; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 119-120; *Mansuri*, 225; *Zubda*, III, 148-149; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 168b-169a; Wiet, "Zahir Ghazi," 284-286; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 191-193, 201-203.

69. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 167-168; *Zubda*, III, 148, 150.

70. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 162; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 123-124; *Zubda*, III, 149-150; *Mansuri*, 226.

71. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 162; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 125; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 309; *Zubda*, III, 150; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 169a. As given in the epitaph on his own grave (*RCEA*, X, 236, no. 3539) al-Daula'i's full name is as follows: Diya' al-Din Abu-l-Qasim 'Abd al-Malik b. Zayd al-Taghlibi al-Daula'i; and he is further styled the *khatib*, *imam*, and *mufti* of Damascus. He was born in the village of Daula'iyya in the district of Mosul and eventually became *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus—i.e., one of the city's most prominent religious leaders. He was succeeded in this office by two of his nephews. See *Daris*, I, 242-243.

72. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 162-163; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 125-129; *Zubda*, III, 151-152; *Salihi*, 219a; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 169a; *Mansuri*, 226-229 (very detailed).

73. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 163; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 129-133; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 309-311; *Salihi*, 219a; *Zubda*, III, 152-153; *Mansuri*, 230-231, 232.

74. See above, p. 57.

Chapter 4

1. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 112-113, 133, 136; *Salihi*, 219b. It is true that al-Afdal had received several towns from al-'Adil, but in 599/1202-3 his uncle had stripped him of every one of them except Samosata. Even his recent ally al-Zahir Ghazi victimized him by forcing him to give up Qal'at Najm. These injuries ultimately induced al-Afdal to begin reciting the *khutba* in the name of the Rum Seljukid sultan in 600/1203-4. Al-Afdal's move was not mere pique, of course; the Rum Seljukids were a powerful force in the north Syrian marches and could be a useful brake on Aleppan expansion at his expense. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 182-183; *Mansuri*, 232-233, 249.

2. Cf. Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 596-598; Ehrenkreutz, *Saladin*, 189-190; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 146-156.

3. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 179-180; *Mansuri*, 248-249.

4. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 192-194; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 156; *Mansuri*, 250-252.

5. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 202-203.

6. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 253-254.
7. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 254-255, 272.
8. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 272-273, 274-275. On the size of the army of Harran, see Cahen, "Jazira," III.
9. On this period of Georgian history, see Allen, *Georgian People*, 104-108. The Georgian campaigns in eastern Anatolia before 606 presented in *Kamil (B)*, XII, 204-205, 240-241, 255-256, 279.
10. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 284-287; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 190-197, 201; *Mansuri*, 262-266 (under events of 605); *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 353; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 596-598.
11. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 291-294; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 201-208; *Mansuri*, 268. On the role and family background of the Georgian general Ivane, see Allen, *Georgian People*, 104-110; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 101-103. Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 149-150, states that part of the ransom demanded from Ivane was the marriage of his daughter to al-Auhad; when the latter unexpectedly died, she was instead wed to al-Ashraf.
12. In addition to Ehrenkreutz, "Dinar," *passim*, see Balog, "Etudes I," *passim*.
13. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 141; Riley-Smith, *Hospitallers*, 325.
14. Kafr Kanna: Dussaud, *Topographie*, Map I, B-3; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, 123-124.
15. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 194-195; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 159, 162; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 296-297; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 101-103; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 123. Ibn al-Athir, followed by Stevenson and Prawer, gives Ramla, Lydda, and Sidon; Ibn Wasil mentions only Ramla and Lydda. According to Ibn Shaddad, Sidon continued to be held in *iqta'* by al-Mughith 'Umar and al-Mughith Mahmud for many years. If accurate, this data would confirm Ibn Wasil's account.
16. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 195; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 163-164; *Mansuri*, 253-254.
17. Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 614, places this expedition in the context of the Antioch question which was then vexing north Syria. During these years there was a working alliance between Bohemond of Antioch and al-Zahir Ghazi on one side, and Leon of Cilicia and al-'Adil on the other. In Cahen's interpretation, when al-'Adil attacked Tripoli, which was the major southern possession of Antioch, he was aiding Leon against Bohemond and thus subtly embarrassing al-Zahir Ghazi, who was of course helpless to aid his ally. This is a very interesting possibility, but the need to suppress or at least retaliate against the Hospitaller raids in central Syria should not be ignored. Cahen dates these events to 1208, but 120 seems to accord better with the data of the Arabic sources. See also, *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 172-173; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 273-274; *Mansuri*, 259-260; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 133-134, 162; Riley-Smith, *Hospitallers*, 157, n. 1.
18. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 355-356. It was on this raid that Sibt ibn al-Jauzi first

met al-Mu'azzam 'Isa; the two men became such close friends that much of Sibṭ's information about this prince is probably a personal memoir.

19. For the origins of these organizations, see especially Cahen, "Mouvements populaires," and Ashtor-Strauss, "Administration urbaine." For volunteer participation in the *jihād* by religious elements, see Sivan, "Refugiés syro-palestiniens au temps des Croisades," *REI*, 35 (1967): 143.

20. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 215-216 (under events of 608, 609); *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 356; *Mansuri*, 267-268; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 298, n. 2; Berchem, "Inscripfen II," 33-45; *idem*, "Inscriptions," 459-463, 512-514; *RCEA*, X, 44 (no. 3660); 74 (no. 3705); 85-87 (nos. 3721-3723); 100 (no. 3744); 106-107 (no. 3753). An important new publication appeared too late to be consulted: A. Battista and B. Bagatti, *La Fortezza saracena del Monte Tabor* (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1976).

21. *Zubda*, III, 166-167; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 620-621; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 300 and n. 3.

22. Cahen, "Futuwwa," *EI*², II, 961-965; Hodgson, *Venture*, II, 279-285.

23. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 333.

24. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 121a-123a.

25. In addition to Cahen, "Mouvements populaires," see *idem*, "Ahdath," and "Futuwwa," *EI*², I and II.

26. On Suhrawardi, who is unrelated to the famous Suhrawardi al-Maqtul, see Hodgson, *Venture*, II, 281-282; *GAL*, I, 440-441; *Suppl.* I, 788-790.

27. In the text, "*al-qasr*," which I understand to refer to the Midan al-Qasr, also called the Midan al-Akhdar. See Ibn 'Asakir, *Description*, 165, n. 3. Ghassula is a village some twelve miles southeast of Damascus: Dus-saud, *Topographie*, 301; map IV, B-2.

28. This was the royal residence built in the old citadel of Damascus by the Seljukid Tutush for his son Ridwan, later to become prince of Aleppo. Built ca. 475/1082. *A'laq (Dam)*, 38.

29. Full discussions of the apparel named in this paragraph in R. Dozy, *Dictionnaire détaillé des Noms de vêtements chez les Arabes* (Amsterdam, 1849). The *khil'a*—the robe of honor and its accessories—is discussed at length in Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 189-190, 206-208. Useful discussions of *tiraz* in Serjeant, *Textiles*, index, 261-262; and in H. J. Schmidt, "Harir," *EI*², III, 218-221.

30. *Thauba*—see Dozy, *Supplément*, I, 166.

31. On Ibn Shukr, see 'Abd al-Latif, *Sira*, 114-115; *Daris*, II, 432-434; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, p. 23 and n. 1; index, p. 242. Born in an Egyptian Delta village in 548/1154, his first high office in the Egyptian administration was as Saladin's director of the *diwan al-ustul* in 576/1180. In the reorganization of the navy of 587/1191 he was joined in this position by al-'Adil, and the close association of the two men dates from this time. Ibn Shukr was disgraced in 609/1212-13 and exiled to the East, apparently due to al-Kamil's enmity. But al-Kamil recalled him during the Fifth Crusade to try

to see Egypt's finances through that crisis. In this he succeeded and died in honor shortly afterwards, in 622/1225.

32. Ar.: *Shahanshah maliku l-muluk khalilu amiri l-mu'minin*.

33. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 181-182; briefly noted in *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 348 and *Mansuri*, 260, 262.

34. P. Balog, "Études II," 34-37.

35. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 257; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 381. On Sadr al-Din and his family, see Gottschalk, "Awlad ash-Shaykh," *EI*², I, 765-766. The office of *shaykh al-shuyukh* seems to have been created by Nur al-Din with the dual purpose of giving official recognition to the Sufi movement and of supervising the activities and manner of life in the convents to ensure against excesses, antinomianism, heresy, sedition, etc.—all things that institutions of this kind, with their strong popular roots, were likely to harbor.

36. In addition to information gleaned *passim* from the major chroniclers, see *A'laq (LPJ)*, 60, 64, 73, 80, 99, 133, 142, 152, 155, 159, 244. The inscriptions also are useful if not always decisive. In addition to those for Jerusalem (cited below, pp. 150-152), see the following: *Bosra—RCEA*, IX, 241 (no. 3548, yr. 599); X, 62 (no. 3686, yr. 608), 87 (no. 3724, yr. 610), 108 (no. 3755, yr. 612), 152 (no. 3818-9, yr. 615). *Salkhad—RCEA*, IX, 265-266 (nos. 3593-4, yr. 601). *Al-Karak—RCEA*, X, 276 (no. 3800a, yr. 614). Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 27-31, 48 n. 1, gives detailed information on this subject, but his tableau differs from ours at several points.

37. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 344; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 133, 147.

38. On 'Izz al-Din Aybeg, see E. Littmann, "Aybeg," *EI*², I, 780.

39. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 175; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 351, 372; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 60; *RCEA*, X, 101 (no. 3745, yr. 611) confirms Aybeg's possession of Salkhad in 611/1214.

40. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 364-365; *Wafayat*, I, 381; *RCEA*, X, 63-64 (nos. 3687-9, yr. 608); *Daris*, II, 496-497. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 209, dates the cession of Banyas to al-'Aziz 'Uthman to 608, but that seems erroneous in light of the other evidence. After losing possession of his master's old *iqta'*, Sarim al-Din must have been recompensed elsewhere, since he died only in 635/1238—*Mir'at (Jewett)*, 466.

41. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 300; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 209-210; *Mansuri*, 267-270; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 366-367; *Salihi*, 221b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 128. Al-Makin dates these events to 611/1214, but this is clearly an error. The fullest account is that of Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, who was with al-Mu'azzam in Damietta when the affair began, but due to some apparent lacunae it is not entirely intelligible. Ibn Wasil's account is similar to Sibt's but is shorter and clearer. Ibn Nazif, dating these events to 608, differs on points of detail but tells the same story overall; significantly, he says nothing about Usama's rumored treason.

42. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 99-100, 154.

43. See Creswell, *MAE*, II, 1-40, *passim*; Stern, "Petitions," 10, 13, 21, 27.

44. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 391.

45. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 308, 331; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 170-171, 198, mentioning earthquakes in 597 and 600.

46. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 141; Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 210, n. 2 (*fasil—avant-mur*).

47. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 182; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 333, 429; *Salihi*, 221a; *A'laq (Dam.)*, 37-39; *Mansuri*, 262. Sibṭ dates the reconstruction to 599 but is unanimously contradicted by the other chronicles. Also, the first inscription dates from 605. See Sobernheim, "Inchriften," 4-8 (nos. 1-6); Sauvaget, "Citadelle," 62-63, 221; *idem*, *MHD*, vi, 44; Elisséeff, "Mu'azzam 'Isa," 25.

48. Sauvaget, "Citadelle," 226.

49. *A'laq (Dam.)*, 77; *Daris*, II, 386, 392-393; Sauvaget, *MHD*, 17.

50. *A'laq (Dam.)*, 76; *DD*, IX, no. 7 (1896), 231-232, 269 n. 113.

51. Elisséeff, "Mu'azzam 'Isa," 25. Prof. Elisséeff believes that al-Mu'azzam may have sponsored important work in Damascus during his father's reign, but that he is omitted from the inscriptions because these would naturally carry the name of the sovereign, al-'Adil. Although this is possible, the prevalence of al-Mu'azzam's name in Jerusalem during these years, together with the other evidence presented above, seems to refute it.

52. See chap. 4, n. 20 for the references to *RCEA*.

53. *RCEA*, IX, 264-265 (no. 3594, yr. 601); *CIA, Jerusalem*, II, 57-59 (no. 154).

54. *RCEA*, X, 81-82 (no. 3717, yr. 610); *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 131-141 (no. 43). On the office of the *shadd*, see Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 95, 119. Of the many officials listed by Popper with this title, the *shadd al-'ama'ir* seems the best equivalent to the function in question here.

55. He founded the Dar al-Hadith al-'Urwiyya in Damascus and was known as one of al-Mu'azzam's closest companions: *Daris*, I, 82.

56. *RCEA*, X, 45 (no. 3661, yr. 607), 133 (no. 3790, yr. 613); *CIA, Jerusalem*, II, 69-70 (no. 157), 99-100 (no. 164); Elisséeff, "Mu'azzam 'Isa," 4-5.

57. *RCEA*, X, 20-21 (no. 3630, yr. 604); *CIA, Jerusalem*, II, 303-304 (no. 229).

58. *RCEA*, X, 61-62 (no. 3685, yr. 608); *CIA, Jerusalem*, II, 73-82 (no. 161).

59. *RCEA*, X, 82-83 (no. 3718, 3719, yr. 610); *CIA, Jerusalem*, II, 82-84 (no. 162).

60. *RCEA*, X, 141 (no. 3802, yr. 614); *CIA, Jerusalem*, II, 415-419 (no. 281).

61. *RCEA*, X, 105-106 (no. 3752, yr. 612); al-Mu'azzam's endowment is also discussed in a study by Massignon, "Documents sur certains waqfs des lieux saints de l'Islam, principalement sur le waqf Tamimi à Hebron et sur le waqf tlemcénien Abu Madyan à Jérusalem," *REI* (1951), pp. 73 ff.

Chapter 5

1. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 313-314; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 212-213; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 379. By far the most interesting appreciations of al-Zahir Ghazi and al-'Adil are those in 'Abd al-Latif, *Sira*, 110-113.

2. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 320-331, gives a continuous account of the Fifth Crusade; Ibn Wasil essentially repeats Ibn al-Athir's information but adds some valuable details and clarifications. On the beginnings of the crusade, see *Kamil (B)*, XII, 320-321; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 256 ff.; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 382. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 54, says that al-'Adil left Egypt on 9 Rabi' I/16 June, when he first received news that a major new crusade was being mounted in Europe; the date seems early but there is no positive evidence to contradict it.

3. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 321; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 382-383; Oliver, *Damietta*, 53; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 302 and no. 1; van Cleve, "The Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 389-390. The crusaders' itinerary can be followed in Dussaud, *Topographie*, map I; the places are identified *ibid.*, 337, 340-342, 381, 385.

4. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 321-322; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 383; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 55; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 302; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 390-391. Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 137, has a good analysis of al-'Adil's strategy during this phase of the war.

5. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 322-323; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 384; Oliver, *Damietta*, 54; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 55; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 302 and n. 2; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 391-392. Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 140, on the strategic value to the Franks of Mt. Tabor. Among the dead was the amir Badr al-Din Muhammad b. Abi-l-Qasim al-Hakkari, who had been one of al-Mu'azzam's closest advisors during his Jerusalem years.

6. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 321-322 (a brief allusion only); *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 384; Oliver, *Damietta*, 55; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 56-57; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 302 and n. 3; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 392-393.

7. Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 149-150; Stevenson, *Crusades*, 303 and n. 1; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 395-397; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 148-149. See also *Kamil (B)*, XII, 323.

8. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 389; Oliver, *Damietta*, 58; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 142.

9. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 347-348; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 263-266; *Zubda*, III, 181-182; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 625-628. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 59-60, argues that Kaykawus's attack on north Syria, made precisely at the time when the crusaders were commencing the siege of Damietta, was neither coincidence nor skillful opportunism, but was rather the result of an anti-Ayyubid alliance between the crusaders and himself which had been formed at his own instigation. He (like his Rum Seljukid predecessors) had broad ambitions on north Syria but no real hope of occupying Palestine or Egypt, nor was he by himself strong enough to attack the Ayyubids. But if he

attacked in conjunction with the Franks, each party would gain the territories it most desired while disposing of an opponent dangerous to both. Thus Gottschalk reconstructs Kaykawus's reasoning. The idea is ingenious and plausible, but the evidence for it is rather thin. There is a statement in Sibṭ that Kaykawus was "the one who incited the Franks against Damietta." And Oliver (*Damietta*, 92-93) speaks very warmly of the "Sultan of Iconium" upon learning of his death; if not actually baptized, he was at least very kindly disposed toward the Christians. But Oliver's statement is hardly proof of Gottschalk's thesis, and one would suppose that the other Frankish and Muslim sources would have reported such an alliance if it really had existed.

10. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 348-350; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 267-268; *Zubda*, III, 181-183; *Mansuri*, 275-276; *Seltschuken*, 81-90; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 71-75.

11. Death of al-'Adil: *Kamil (B)*, XII, 350-351; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 270; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 389, 391; *Chron. Ayy.*, 130. On events relative to the war in Egypt at this point, see: *Kamil (B)*, XII, 323-324; *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 258-261, 270; Oliver, *Damietta*, 62-66; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 303 and nn. 2-3; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 398-401.

12. *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, III, 275-276; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 391; *Chron. Ayy.*, 130; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 69; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 152 (on the battle of Caymon).

13. Sources and special studies cited in van Cleve's excellent short account in Setton, *Crusades*, II. Gottschalk (*al-Kamil*, 58-87, 103-115) gives a careful survey of the military (but not the political and diplomatic) events based on the Arabic sources. Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 303-307, presents a concise but chronologically precise account.

14. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 325, 352-353; *Mufarrij (MC 119)*, 77b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 396; Oliver, *Damietta*, 74.

15. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 325; *Mufarrij (MC 119)*, 77b-78a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 396; *Mansuri*, 278-279.

16. *Mufarrij (MC 119)*, 82a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 395; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 88-89; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 158; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 409-410.

17. *Mufarrij (MC 119)*, 82a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 395; Oliver, *Damietta*, 76; *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 131-141. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 327, erroneously dates this event to the autumn of 1219, after the fall of Damietta.

18. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 392-393.

19. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 326-327; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 396; *Salihi*, 225a; Oliver, *Damietta*, 85-86; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 418. Ibn al-Athir gives 27 Sha'ban as the date of Damietta's capture; Ibn Wasil (*Salihi*) says "Tuesday, with five days remaining in Sha'ban," and his date accords with that of 5 December given by Oliver.

20. The chronology here is extremely confused. The Muslim sources do

not give the dates, which must be reconstructed from circumstantial evidence. Oliver seems to refer to two separate sieges of Château-Pèlerin but does not say so explicitly. Prawer gives the most detailed account of al-Mu'azzam's Syrian campaign but mistakenly dates his return from Damietta to the autumn of 1220, which is patently impossible. The crusaders had refortified Caesarea and Château-Pèlerin in the winter of 615/1218—see Oliver, *Damietta*, 56-58; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 145-148. On al-Mu'azzam's Syrian campaign after the fall of Damietta: *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 397; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 205a; Oliver, *Damietta*, 99, 108-110; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 162-166; van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 422; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 305.

21. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 327; *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 79b, 100b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 407; *Salihi*, 225b.

22. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 348-349; *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 74b-75a; *Zubda*, III, 182.

23. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 333-347, 355-366; *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 88b-92a, 93b; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 91-102. Gottschalk argues that these wars of succession in Mosul created for the Ayyubids the threat of a three-front war, with al-Ashraf simultaneously engaged against the Rum Seljukids and the Zangid rebels of Diyar Rabi'a. If this interpretation is correct, then al-Ashraf would have been fully justified in remaining in north Syria during the Fifth Crusade. But Kaykawus had died in winter 615/1219 and his successor showed no interest in foreign adventures. After that point there was no danger of a Rum Seljukid intervention, nor was 'Imad al-Din Zangi by himself a danger to anyone except Badr al-Din Lu'lu' of Mosul.

24. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 100b-101a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 407; *Zubda*, III, 189-190; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 328, 398-399; *Salihi*, 225b.

25. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 328-331; *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 100b-103a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 407-408 (the unique account of events in Homs); *Mansuri*, 290-291; *Zubda*, III, 190-191; *Salihi*, 225b; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 167-169. Ibn al-Athir portrays al-Ashraf as eager to be finished with his Jaziran wars so that he would be free to go to Egypt, but I do not find his interpretation persuasive. On the final phases of the Fifth Crusade, see Van Cleve, "Fifth Crusade," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 424-428; Oliver, *Damietta*, 111-130 (he notes the assembly of Syrian forces at Homs on p. 123).

26. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 329; *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 101b (apparently based on Ibn al-Athir). Van Cleve gives the most satisfactory account of al-Kamil's repeated peace offers.

27. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 115, 117, and *passim*, argues on almost diametrically opposed lines—that it was al-Mu'azzam's ambition and expansionism which lay at the root of the conflict between him and his two brothers during these years. I consider this interpretation to be fundamentally wrong, on the basis of considerations which should become clear as the narrative progresses. In essence Gottschalk argues that al-Mu'azzam was aiming for

the sultanate (*Vorherrschaft*), while I maintain that he was merely struggling to maintain his original status and power. Ibn al-Athir (*Kamil* [B], XII, 463-464) presents an interpretation which seems similar to mine.

28. *Mufarrij* (MC 199) 92a, 95b; (BN 1702), 205a; *Mansuri*, 289-290; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 171a-b.

29. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 206a.

30. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 104, 107, maintains that al-Mu'azzam's activities in the dispute over the succession in Hama were the first warning to al-Kamil and al-Ashraf of their brother's far-reaching ambitions. See also *Mansuri*, 291-292.

31. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 214a-216a, 218a-b; *Zubda*, III, 192-194; *Mansuri*, 292. The first two accounts are clearly derived from a common source, probably Kamal al-Din's *Bughya*. On the semiautonomy of the governor of Lattakia at this period, see Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 373 ff.

32. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 219a-b; *Salih*, 226b; *Mansuri*, 294.

33. *Kamil* (B), XII, 421-422; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 222a-b; *Zubda*, III, 195. Ibn al-Athir's is the basic account, with Ibn Wasil adding some useful detail. Kamal al-Din is independent but unfortunately appears to confuse events of 621/1224 and 623/1226.

34. *Kamil* (B), XII, 463; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 222a.

35. *Kamil* (B), XII, 422; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 222b. For 'Utna, see Dus-saud, *Topographie*, 263, 268, 278-279; map XIV, B-3.

36. *Kamil* (B), XII, 422; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 223a-b (verbally identical to Ibn al-Athir); *Zubda*, III, 195.

37. *Kamil* (B), XII, 423-424; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 222b-223a; *Mansuri*, 300-304.

38. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 246a, gives a figure of 4,000 cavalry for al-Mu'azzam's forces, but MC 119, 134a, which is not only an older manuscript but also represents a more finished recension, gives the number as 3,000.

39. Jamal al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. Abi-l-Fadl b. Zayd al-Taghlibi al-Arqami al-Daula'i. He was born in 555/1160 in the village of Daula'iyya, a village in the district of Mosul. He came to Damascus as a young man to study *fiqh* with his uncle Diya' al-Din 'Abd al-Malik, who was also a native of Daula'iyya and had become *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque. When Jamal al-Din's uncle died in 598/1201, he succeeded him as *khatib*, holding that post for thirty-seven years until his own death in 637/1239. He was a wealthy man and endowed a *madrasa* (with himself as professor); on the other hand Sibt ibn al-Jauzi declares that he was thoroughly ignorant in *fiqh*, to the point that al-Mu'azzam finally had to forbid him to issue *fatwas*. (Possibly this charge stems from professional jealousy, for Sibt was a popular preacher — *wa'iz* — at the Umayyad Mosque during Jamal al-Din's tenure there.) *Mir'at* (Jewett), 469-470; *Daris*, I, 242-243.

40. *Mir'at* (Jewett), 390. Sibt (*Mir'at*, 410) reports in a most intriguing anecdote another contact with the Khwarizmians. In 619/1222 Syria was

stricken with a plague of locusts, and to combat them al-Mu'azzam sent the *muhtasib* of Damascus, one Sadr al-Din al-Bakri, to Persia, where there was said to be a miraculous bird called the *samarmar* which fed on locusts. But this pioneer venture in managed ecology was in fact only a cover for the real purpose of al-Bakri's mission, which was to meet with the Khwarizmshah Jalal al-Din and sound out the possibilities of an alliance against al-Kamil and al-Ashraf. Al-Bakri was quite successful, we are told, and as a reward for his services he was made *shaykh al-shuyukh* in Damascus. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 117, 127, appears to accept this story at face value, but it seems spurious to me, especially if we are to accept the date 619/1222. For during the years 618/1221-622/1224 Jalal al-Din was a fugitive in India, hiding from the Mongols who had wrecked his father's empire. In 619/1222 there was no sign that he would ever again be a power to reckon with, especially in western Iran. Secondly, the anecdote's details regarding the *samarmar* seem far-fetched; one might expect Muslim writers to refer to wondrous birds in India or China, but not in familiar and much-visited Iran.

41. *Kamil* (B), XII, 425-427; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 225a-b; Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 324-325.

42. *Kamil* (B), XII, 428 ff., 453, 459; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702); 225b, 235b, 238b; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 417; *Zubda*, III, 197; *Mansuri*, 305-306; *Chron. Ayy.*, 236; *Sirat Jalal al-Din*, 209-210. Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi gives 621/1224 as the date of the first formal contact between al-Mu'azzam and Jalal al-Din, but one suspects he meant to date it to 622/1225, since it took place soon after the Khwarizmian conquest of Azerbaijan. Al-Makin says that al-Mu'azzam sent to Jalal al-Din as a consequence of the contacts between al-Kamil and Frederick II, which is almost the precise opposite of what did happen (see below, pp. 183-184).

43. *Raud.* (*Dhayl*), citing a lost passage of Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi—cited in Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 131. See also *Mansuri*, 312-314.

44. *Kamil* (B), XII, 453; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 235b; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 107, in referring to the marriage alliance of 618/1220 between al-Mu'azzam and Nasir al-Din of Mardin, says that "this alliance could only be directed against al-Ashraf and meant . . . a strengthening of the power of Damascus at the expense of the other two regional rulers." Again this is a plausible interpretation, but it is weakened by the fact that the ruler of Mardin did not participate in the first coalition against al-Ashraf, though his assistance would surely have been of considerable value. Undoubtedly al-Mu'azzam was trying to establish his presence in Diyar Bakr by this marriage, but that is a far different thing from concluding an alliance against a third party.

45. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 235b; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 133.

46. Elisséeff, "Mu'azzam 'Isa," 3-4; Ibn 'Asakir, *Description*, 140, n. 5 and index ("Bab as-Saghir"). *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 236a; *Mansuri*, 310 (under events of 622).

47. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 236b; *Zubda*, III, 197-198; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 454. The *Mufarrij* and the *Zubda* share a common source, probably the *Bughya*.

48. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 453-454; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 239a-b.

49. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 458-459; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 244a; *Seltschuken*, 122-126.

50. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 460-461, reproduced in *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 238b-240a; *Mansuri*, 320-321.

51. According to Ibn Nazif, al-Ashraf arrived in Damascus on 2 Ramadan/27 August (cited in Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 137). *Kamil (B)*, XII, 464, has him arriving only in Shawwal/October.

52. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 236a-237a, 245a-b; *Zubda*, III, 198-201. Both accounts have a common source, probably the *Bughya*. See also the useful but scattered data in *Mansuri*, 314-316 (Khwarizmian embassies to Damascus); 318-322 (al-Ashraf's sojourn in Damascus); 330-331 (the settlement between al-Ashraf and al-Mu'azzam).

53. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 245b; *Zubda*, III, 201; *Mansuri*, 331-335.

54. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 245b; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 310; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 184-185; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 176-177; van Cleve, "The Crusade of Frederick II," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 435. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 141-142, argues that al-Kamil did not really intend a serious alliance against his brother by his embassy to Frederick. Rather, having learned that a new crusade was in the offing, he hoped to forestall another calamity like Damietta by offering in advance everything that Frederick might demand. Secondarily he may have hoped by this means to induce al-Mu'azzam to submit to his authority.

55. The last months and death of al-Mu'azzam: *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 133b-134a; *Zubda*, III, 201; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 471-472; *Mansuri*, 342.

56. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 134a. On Khadija Khatun (foundress of the Madrasa Murshidiyya in Damascus) some information can be found in *Daris*, I, 576. Jeanette Wakin, "Ayyubid Coinage," presents a catalogue of 2,000 coins, including 431 from Damascus. There is *no* example of a coin with the name of Jalal al-Din. *Chron. Ayy.*, 136, followed by al-Maqrizi, states that al-Mu'azzam became "one of [Jalal al-Din's] clients, pronouncing the *khutba* in his name and striking *dinars* and *dirhams* in his name." But this assertion is contradicted by the numismatic evidence and by the counter-assertion of the usually fairer and better-informed Ibn Wasil.

57. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 60, 64, 73, 80, 88, 100, 133, 152-153, 155; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 392-393. Ibn Shaddad is quite confusing about the Bilad al-Shaqif, Chastel-Neuf, and Toron, all of which he assigns to the *muqta'* of Sidon, al-Mughith Mahmud. However Sibt ibn al-Jauzi, an earlier and usually more reliable source for this part of Syria, twice ascribes them to al-'Aziz 'Uthman. Except for Sidon and Jinin, where no epigraphic evidence survives for this period, the inscriptions support our ascriptions:

A) Salkhad—*RCEA*, X, 169 (no. 3844, yr. 617), 189 (no. 3877, yr. 619)

B) Bosra—*RCEA*, X, 192-193 (no. 3884, yr. 620), 222-223 (nos. 3925-6, yr. 622).

C) Banyas—*RCEA*, X, 235 (no. 3947, yr. 623).

It is clear that 'Izz al-Din Aybeg's *iqta*' included not only Salkhad but the entire Jabal ad-Duruz, for his inscriptions are found in towns throughout that area: Qal'at al-Rabad, Khan al-'Aqaba, Qal'at Azraq, Sala, al-'Ayin, I'nak, and Azra'.

58. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 397-398, 409, 421, 424; *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 125a-b; *Bughya*, I, 79b (on Shams al-Din al-Khuwayi). Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 90, suggests that the deposition of Zaki al-Din was closely connected with al-Mu'azzam's well-known partisan fervor in favor of the Hanafiyya. It is true that Zaki al-Din was a Shafi'i and that his successor Jamal al-Din al-Misri, was a Hanafi. On the other hand Jamal' al-Din's successor in 623/1226 was another Shafi'i. It seems to me that al-Mu'azzam's motives in this affair must remain a question.

59. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 401, 421-423.

60. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 418; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 128.

61. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 392, 418.

62. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 134a-b. On his apparel—the *kallawta* (variant of *kalfa*), the *shash 'alam*—see Dozy, *Suppl.*, I, 802; II, 482.

63. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 428.

64. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 425-427; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 246b-247a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 472. On Taj al-Din al-Kindi: *Wafayat*, II, 339-342. On Jamal al-Din al-Hasiri: *Wafayat*, IV, 258, 259; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 167. For al-Mu'azzam's polemic tract, see *GAL, Suppl.*, I, 652. On the Hanbalis of Damascus, see Laoust, *Précis*, introduction.

65. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 472; Blachère, "al-Azhari," *EI*², I, 822; Kopf, "al-Djawhari," *EI*², II, 495-497; J. W. Fück, "Ibn Durayd," *EI*², III, 757-758.

66. *GAL*, I, 391-392; *Suppl.*, I, 554.

67. *RCEA*, X, 140-141 (no. 3801); *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 168-173 (no. 55).

68. *A'laq (Dam.)*, 220; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 429; *Daris*, I, 581; *DD*, IX, 4, p. 280.

69. *RCEA*, XI, 130 (no. 4196); *DD*, IX, 4, p. 246, 295-296 and n. 15; *A'laq (Dam.)*, 77.

70. *Daris*, II, 393; Laoust, *Précis*, xxviii.

71. *A'laq (Dam.)*, 77.

72. On al-Mu'azzam's commercial structures: *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 429; Ibn Kathir, *al-Bidaya wa-l-Nihaya*, 14 vols., (Cairo, 1932-39), XIII, 330.

73. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 429; *Daris*, I, 584.

74. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 472; *DD*, IX, 4, pp. 279-281. His wish was of course not carried out; temporarily interred in the citadel cemetery, his body was transferred in 627/1229 to the funerary madrasa which he had built for his mother on Mt. Qasyun.

Chapter 6

1. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 250b-251a; (MC 119), 139a; *Mansuri*, 345; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 145.
2. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 477-478; *Mansuri*, 344; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 308-309; LaMonte, "Lords of Sidon," 201-203; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 179-183.
3. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 431. The text here is corrupt and not wholly intelligible; *Mansuri*, 346.
4. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 139b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 448-449; *Mansuri*, 346-347.
5. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 250b-251b; (MC 119), 139b-140a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 478-480; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 147-148.
6. 'Izz al-Din is described as "*mudabbir daulatih*," a phrase which is often a rough equivalent for the Turkish "*atabeg*." However the office of *atabeg* always carried connotations of tutelage and sometimes of effectively autonomous power. "*Mudabbir*" is a broader term, often referring to the official who conducted affairs of state for an inexperienced or uninterested prince, but without any suggestion that the prince was personally dependent on him.
7. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 117b; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 478-480; *Mansuri*, 349; *Zubda*, III, 202. Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 330-332.
8. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 117b-118a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 480; *Zubda*, III, 202. *Mansuri*, 350-353; *Chron. Ayy.*, 137. The last named is a tendentious account which ascribes al-Ashraf's desire to conquer Damascus to al-Nasir's tyranny and incompetence and his own loss of Armenia to Jalal al-Din. But the loss of Armenia did not occur till several months after the capture of Damascus by al-Ashraf and al-Kamil.
9. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 118b; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 480, 482-484. The latter states that al-Nasir's camp was at Baysan, about a day's journey north of Nablus.
10. Van Cleve, "Crusade of Frederick II," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 451-455; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 184-186 and 184, n. 1, where he follows Röhrich, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem* (Innsbruck, 1898), in giving the maximum strength of Frederick's army as 11,000—a force much reduced by desertion even before the emperor's arrival in the Holy Land. Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 308, gives 800 knights and 10,000 infantry.
11. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 152-156, where the course of the negotiations at Acre is described as closely as our sources permit.
12. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 482-483; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 432.
13. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 118b; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 146-151, gives the background of the agreement and the final terms.
14. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 252b; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 484; *Zubda*, III, 205. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 161, would date this meeting to early Muharram 626. Considering the dates of the siege of Damascus, this seems rather early.
15. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 253a; less important are *Zubda*, III, 206; *Kamil*

(*B*), XII, 484. The affair of Aydemir is discussed in *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 142b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 432; *Chron. Ayy.*, 138. Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī gives the size of his reward as 10,000 *dinars*.

16. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 253a.

17. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 253a; *Salihī*, 230a; *Zubda*, III, 206; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 484; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 162. Gottschalk's admirable account of the siege is based on Abu Shama, *Dhayl al-Raudatayn*, an eyewitness account: *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 154-156.

18. For the Muslim reaction to the surrender of Jerusalem, see Sivan, "Jerusalem," 173-177. For the Christian reaction: Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 313-315; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 187-188, 190-191; van Cleve, "Frederick II," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 456-457, 461-462; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 200-204.

19. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 253b, 120a; (MC 119), 144a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 482-483; *Zubda*, III, 205; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 172b-173a (an overt apologia for al-Kamil's policy). The terms as given by the western sources are summarized in Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 312-313; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 187; van Cleve, "Frederick II," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 458-459. To al-Kamil's concessions these would add Bethlehem, which the Muslim writers probably understood as being included with Jerusalem. The only irreconcilable difference between the Muslim and Christian versions concerns the Franks' right to refortify Jerusalem. On this point, there is a brief but useful analysis in *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 134-135, and more elaborate ones in Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 199 ff., Riley-Smith, *Hospitallers*, 166 ff., and Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 157-158. It seems clear at least that whatever the rights accorded to Frederick II, Jerusalem was in fact *not* refortified during the ten-year term of this treaty.

20. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 121a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 432.

21. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 121a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 432.

22. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 123a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 434; *Salihī*, 230a; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 162. Ibn Wasil dates the sultan's arrival to Jumada I, while Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī gives the month as Rabi' II and says that the siege lasted four months. Though both men were eyewitnesses of the siege, I have followed Gottschalk's dating (based on Abu Shama) because it is far and away the most precise for the entire period of the siege.

23. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 163.

24. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 164.

25. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 149a.

26. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 123b, 278b-279a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 484; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 433; *Chron. Ayy.*, 138.

27. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 148b.

28. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 255b-256a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 484; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 434; *Chron. Ayy.*, 138; *Ibn Abi al-Damm*, 173a; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 164. See the useful map in Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 207.

29. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 148b-152b; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 486-487; *Zubda*, III, 207-208; Ibn Abi al-Damm, 173a-174a; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 168.

30. Siege of Baalbek: *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 262b, 263b; *Salihi*, 231a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 435-436—an unintelligible passage, apparently garbled by a copyist. Murder of al-Amjad: *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 156b-157a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 441. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 172, gives the date of his murder as 12 Shawwal 628.

31. Sourdél, "al-Amidi," *EI*², I, 434; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 283b-285a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 457-458; *Wafayat*, III, 293-294. For the general tone of religious and intellectual life in Damascus in the reign of al-Ashraf, see Laoust, *Précis*, xlii-xliv; *DD*, no. 6, pp. 263-267.

32. Tahsin Yazici, "Kalandar," and "Kalandariyya," *EI*², IV, 472-474; *DD*, no. 5, pp., 397-399, 409 n. 46, 410 n. 53; *Daris*, II, 22.

33. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 440; *Daris*, II, 197-199; *DD*, no. 5, pp. 387-388, 404 n. 6. On Skaykh Raslan, see *DD*, no. 5, pp. 404-405, n. 9; *RCEA*, XII, 45 (no. 4462). See also D. S. Margoliouth, "al-Rifa'i," *SEI*, 475-476; L. Massignon, "Haririyya," *EI*², III, 222.

34. *A'laq (Dam.)*, 87; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 307b; *Wafayat*, V, 334; *Daris*, II, 292; *RCEA*, XI, 23 (no. 4039), 221 (no. 4332).

35. J. Robson, "Ibn al-Salah," *EI*², III, 927.

36. *Daris*, I, 19-20, 47; *DD*, no. 3, pp., 271-273, 273-274, 287 n. 1; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 448, 471-472; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 307b; *RCEA*, XI, 78 (no. 4117).

37. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 472; *RCEA*, XI, 111 (no. 4177), 214 (no. 4324); *A'laq (Dam.)*, 88; *Daris*, II, 341, 420; *DD*, no. 6, pp. 263-267; no. 7, p. 232; Ibn 'Asakir, *Description*, 143 and nn. 2 and 3, 188 n. 6.

38. On this point, see Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah* (tr. Rosenthal), I, 450; H. Laoust, *Précis*, 39-41.

39. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 471-472.

40. *DD*, no. 3, pp. 271-273.

41. *Wafayat*, V, 333-334.

42. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 307b. See also *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 472; *Daris*, II, 293; *A'laq (Dam.)*, 39.

43. Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 639, reaches much the same conclusion, saying that "al-Kamil, without having the absolute predominance of al-'Adil, was nevertheless in the position of being the undisputed head of the Ayyubid family." Al-Kamil had cemented his ties to Aleppo in 626/1229 by the marriage of his daughter Fatima to al-'Aziz Muhammad. *Zubda*, III, 206-207.

44. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 252a; *Kamil (B)*, XII, 476-477, 481; Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 332; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 177-180.

45. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 439. The other basic account of his death is *Kamil (B)*, XII, 485-486, essentially reproduced in *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 150a-b, which does however add useful information on the *Hajib's* patronage of architecture and public works. See also an interesting passage in *Sirat Jalal al-Din*, 299, which states that Aybeg al-Ashrafi sent to Jalal al-Din to inform him that

al-Ashraf had executed the *Hajib* because of the crimes he had committed against the Khwarizmshah, in the hope that the latter would not avenge himself on the people of Akhlat.

According to *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 439, the *Hajib* 'Ali came of a family of Mosul (though we are not told if he was born there.) He began life as a poor man indeed, being a stone-carrier in Damascus. Eventually he entered the service of Saladin's older brother Tughtigin in the menial position of a man-servant. But somehow he came to al-Ashraf's attention and eventually rose to great eminence, though we know nothing of the process.

46. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 487-488, followed by *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 265b; *Sirat Jalal al-Din*, 299, 320-324; *Zubda*, III, 208; *World-Conqueror*, II, 443-449. For the subsequent history of the Georgian princess (T'amt'a), see Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 155-156.

47. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 489; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 266a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 436; *Chron. Ayy.*, 139; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 186-187. *World-Conqueror*, II, 448, cites a *fath-nameh* written by Nasawi and sent to Hamadhan to announce the capture of Akhlat. *Seltschuken*, 153-163, describes the vain attempts of Kayqubadh to reach an understanding with Jalal al-Din, and then (p. 164) his overtures to the Ayyubids.

48. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 489; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 266a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 436; *Chron. Ayy.*, 139; *Zubda*, III, 209; *Seltschuken*, 164-166. The Aleppan commander was probably the son of one of Saladin's amirs, Mujalli ibn Marwan: see *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 144, 145. On the numbers of Ayyubid troops engaged in the battle, see 'Abd al-Latif, *Sira*, 122: 1500 cavalry from the 'askar Misr (possibly this refers to troops from al-Kamil's new possessions in Diyar Mudar); 1000 cavalry from Aleppo, Homs, and Hama (probably not the total from these places); 1000 Bedouin horsemen.

49. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 489-490, followed by *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 266b-267a, but with useful additions; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 437, transmitting the eyewitness account of the amir 'Imad al-Din ibn Musak; 'Abd al-Latif, *Sira*, 121-123; Gottschalk, "Jasycimen." The Seljukid version is reported in *Seltschuken*, 166-172. On the Khwarizmian side, see *Sirat Jalal al-Din*, 329-332; *World-Conqueror*, II, 450-451. See also Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 190-191; Minorsky, *Caucasian History*, 154; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 128-130.

50. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 490-491; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 267a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 437; *Seltschuken*, 172-174; *World-Conqueror*, II, 451; *Sirat Jalal al-Din*, 333-335; *Chronography*, 394-396.

51. *Kamil (B)*, XII, 495-501; reproduced verbatim by *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 269a-176a, but with additional notes on the end of Jalal al-Din; *World-Conqueror*, II, 459 and n. 33; *Sirat Jalal al-Din*, 374-383. The quotation is from *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 165b.

52. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 270b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 140.

53. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 277a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 445-446. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 205-206, maintains that the campaign was originally not aimed at

Amida at all, but was intended to counter the Mongol incursions of 628-9/1231. But by the time the Ayyubid armies had reached Harran, they learned that the Mongols had retreated back into Iran. So as not to waste such vast preparations, it was decided to direct an attack against Amida. I know of only one brief text in Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī which would support such an interpretation, and it seems more likely to me that the offensive against the Mongols was only propaganda whose purpose was to disguise the true import of the campaign.

54. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 154a, 169b-170a, 174a; the date is given in Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 204. On al-Salīh Ayyub, see *Chron. Ayy.*, p. 139.

55. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 277b-278a; (MC 119), 169a-b.

56. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 283b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 447; *Salihī*, 243b; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 208.

57. Possibly al-'Azīz had made himself into a direct client or vassal of the sultan when he abandoned al-Nasir for him in 626/1229 shortly before the siege of Damascus. See *A'laq (LPJ)*, 100, 142, 154; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 290b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 449; *Salihī*, 233a. Ibn Shaddad sometimes gives the name al-Mughith Mahmūd, sometimes al-Mughith Yūsuf. Since the former name is often attested elsewhere, while the latter occurs in no other source, I assume that Ibn Shaddad has simply become confused here. As to the claims of al-'Azīz 'Uthman and al-Sa'id Hasan to autonomy in Banyas, the protocol in their inscriptions there is highly suggestive: *RCEA*, X, 234 (no. 3947, yr. 623); 257-258 (no. 3984, yr. 625); XI, 113 (no. 4168, yr. 637).

58. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 289b; *Zubda*, III, 216; *Seltschuken*, 178-180; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 131; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 209.

59. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 290a-b; (MC 119), 184b-185a; *Zubda*, III, 216-217. Both accounts derived from a common source, presumably the *Bughya*. See also Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 213.

60. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 290b-291a; (MC 119), 185a; *Zubda*, III, 217-218—common source continues; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 452-453; *Seltschuken*, 184; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 213-214.

61. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 291a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 453; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 213-214; "Memoires de Sa'd al-Din," 324.

62. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 291a-292a; (MC 119), 184b-185b. Ibn Wasil gives the only detailed account of the battle and siege from the Ayyubid side, though they are referred to in *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 453, and *Zubda*, III, 218. Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī says that al-Nasir Da'ūd and al-Salīh Ayyub were in the advance force, but that al-Nasir had fallen behind before the crucial battle was joined. He also gives the advance force's numbers as 5,000 cavalry, in contrast to Ibn Wasil, who supplies two figures: 3,500 in BN 1702, and 2,500 in MC 119. Since Ibn Wasil's figures seem more plausible and better attested, and since MC 119 is the better ms., I have adopted the last-named figure. On the other hand, Ibn Bibi gives the same

figure as Sibṭ (p. 186). Seljukid version in *Seltschuken*, 185-190.

63. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 190b; *Zubda*, III, 220; *Seltschuken*, 190-193; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 219; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 131-132.

64. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 193a; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 460; *Zubda*, III, 220; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 132-133; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 220; *Chronography*, 400-401 (brief, but with interesting details); Mongol incursion, *ibid.*, p. 402.

65. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 296a-b, 299a-b.

66. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 195a-b; *Zubda*, III, 221, 225a—again a common source, presumably the *Bughya*. Jamal al-Din al-Akram ibn al-Qifti, best known not as a statesman but as the author of the famous *Ta'rikh al-Hukama'*, a biographical dictionary of the great physicians of ancient and medieval times. There are two inscriptions in Aleppo in the name of Dayfa Khatun, both located on the beautiful Madrasat al-Firdaus, but neither has an indisputably sovereign character. In both she carries the protocol *al-Sitr al-Rafi' al-Janah al-Mani' 'Ismat al-Dunya wa-l-Din*, and in one there is the additional title *al-Malika al-Rahima*. *RCEA*, XI, 56-58 (nos. 4084, 4086, yr. 633). On the other hand I know of no other Ayyubid princesses who carry a title in "malika."

67. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 301a-b; *Zubda*, III, 225-226—substantially identical accounts, both presumably derived from the *Bughya*; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 223-224.

68. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 301b-302a; *Zubda*, III, 226-227—common source continues; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 463.

69. *Zubda*, III, 227, 232, states that al-Muzaffar had been persuaded to join al-Ashraf and al-Mujahid before al-Ashraf sought Aleppan support, but the more detailed account of Ibn Wasil—*Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 302a-302b—seems more persuasive. According to *Chron. Ayy.*, 142, al-Ashraf managed to draw some of al-Kamil's amirs into the scheme by promising them *iqta's* in Syria, and many amirs did abandon the sultan. This story seems plausible, but there is no other evidence for it. The embassy to Anatolia is given in *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 196a. Death of Kayqubadh: *Seltschuken*, 197 ff.

70. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 302b-303a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 142.

71. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 303b; *Zubda*, III, 228.

72. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 303b, 305b-306a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 143, 146; *Zubda*, III, 233; *Salihi*, 234b; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 473; *Bughya*, III, 180a.

73. *Ghashiya*: "a cover, more or less ornate, which one places over a horse's saddle. Under the Seljukids, Mamluks, etc. it was one of the insignia of sovereignty, and was carried before the sultan by an equerry." Dozy, *Suppl.* II, 214.

74. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 308a-309a; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 474; *Zubda*, III, 233-235; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 228-229.

75. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 131-134; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 305a;

Zubda, III, 232. On their brief career in Rum: *Seltschuken*, 180 ff., 201-202.

76. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 309b-310a; *Zubda*, III, 233, 235; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 474. All these have valuable information on al-Salih Isma'il's preparations for the siege, but surprisingly, the best account of this (and indeed of the entire siege) is in *Salihi*, 235a. Ibn Wasil's account of this siege in *Salihi* is drawn from a letter written to him by a friend who had been in Damascus at that time, the *faqih* 'Afif al-Din 'Abd al-'Aziz b. 'Ali al-Mausili al-Hanafi. I suspect that when Ibn Wasil came to compose his later and generally far more comprehensive *Mufarrij*, he had lost his notes from 'Afif al-Din and did not have at hand a copy of *Salihi*, completed in Egypt some thirty years before. Thus he would have had to work from memory and from other, less satisfactory materials. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 229-231, gives a good account of the siege, but does not use the *Salihi*. On this important event Abu Shama is very terse: *Raud (Dhayl)*, 165.

77. *Salihi*, 235b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 474; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 309b-310a. Of much less importance are *Chron. Ayy.*, 143, and *Zubda*, III, 235.

78. *Salihi*, 236a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 474; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 310a.

79. *Salihi*, 236b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 467, 474; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 310a. On the *harafisha*, see W. Brinner, "Harfush," *EI*², III, 206.

80. *Salihi*, 236b-237a; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 310a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 143; *Zubda*, III, 235.

81. Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich has been mentioned previously as al-Ashraf's envoy to al-Kamil in 626/1229. We first hear of him as the lord of Ra'ban north of Aleppo, which he was assigned after its recapture from 'Izz al-Din Kaykawus in 615/1218. He remained in Aleppo until the death of al-'Aziz Muhammad in 634/1236, when he and his brother 'Imad al-Din left to join the service of al-Kamil in Egypt. They remained in the Egyptian army until al-Salih Ayyub usurped the sultanate in 637/1239, at which time Sayf al-Din was sent into exile. He then joined the service of al-Nasir Da'ud in al-Karak and was assigned the castle of 'Ajlun as his *iqta'*. After al-Salih Ayyub's conquest of Damascus in 643/1245, Sayf al-Din voluntarily surrendered 'Ajlun and came to live out the rest of his life in Damascus, where he died in 645/1247. His career is summarized in *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 265.

82. *Salihi*, 237a; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 310b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 467; *Chron. Ayy.*, 143; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 231. Gottschalk cites the figure of 100,000 *dinars* as al-Mujahid's indemnity.

83. *Chron. Ayy.*, 144; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 310b-311a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 467; *Zubda*, III, 236.

Chapter 7

I. Al-Hayjawi is a shadowy figure, though he was obviously a man of

influence under al-Kamil and al-Salih Ayyub. Of his background we know only that he had served as al-Mu'azzam's envoy to al-Ashraf in 623/1226, when the latter had been invited to Damascus. We do not know when he entered al-Kamil's service or how he rose to such eminence as to serve in this junta. See Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 136-137.

2. This figure is named as a participant in the junta only in *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468, under the name of 'Izz al-Din Aybeg. I presume the commandant of the Ashrafiyya is meant and not the more famous lord of Salkhad on two grounds: 1) the latter would presumably have retired to his *iqta'* after the end of the siege, while the Ashrafiyya regiment, once Damascus had fallen, would have had nowhere to go; 2) Aybeg al-Asmar plays a considerable role in Damascus in the months immediately following the death of al-Kamil, whereas we hear nothing of the lord of Salkhad for some time. This person is thus the third 'Izz al-Din Aybeg to appear in our text; there will be one more—the first Mamluk sultan of Egypt.

3. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468-469; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 313b-314a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 145. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 233-234, briefly recounts the election of al-Kamil's successors.

4. On al-Jawad's background: *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 139a; (BN 1702), 303a; Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 129. Shams al-Din Maudud is mentioned in *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 326, as a commander of one of al-'Adil's units at the siege of Acre in 586/1190; he was al-'Adil's oldest son but never received a principality in his own name.

5. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468-469; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 313b-314a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 145.

6. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468, *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 314a.

7. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 314a. On Qasr Umm Hakim, see Dussaud, *Topographie*, 322.

8. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468-469; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 314a-b. The *Mir'at* cites two sums: 700,000 *dinars* and 6,000,000 *dinars*. The latter is an impossibly large figure; it is doubtful that the treasury of Damascus ever contained such a sum at one time. But if one assumes that Sibṭ meant 6,000,000 *dirhams* instead of *dinars*, then this figure is not too badly out of line with that of 700,000 *dinars*.

9. Correspondence with al-'Adil II: *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 314b. For the attack on Gaza, see also *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468.

10. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 468—a detailed, but confusing, account. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 319a-b, places the affair at Zuhr al-Himar near Nablus, and *Chron. Ayy.*, 145, at Sabastiyya.

11. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 319b-320a; *Zubda*, III, 244, *Chron. Ayy.*, 145.

12. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 321a.

13. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 320a-321a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 477. "Mémoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 325; Gottschalk, "Aulad," 80-81. On the conference between al-'Adil II and the "Aulad al-Shaykh," al-Makin (*Chron. Ayy.*, 145) gives a

drastically different account from that presented in our other sources. He states that al-Nasir Da'ud had come to Egypt and managed to convince the weak-minded al-'Adil that Fakhr al-Din had conspired with the princes Taqi al-Din 'Abbas and Mujir al-Din Ya'qub to overthrow him — a falsehood which led to the imprisonment of Fakhr al-Din and the exile of the two princes. Al-Nasir then turned the sultan's suspicions against 'Imad al-Din ibn al-Shaykh, as a result of which the latter offered to go to Damascus to prove his good faith. Fakhr al-Din was indeed imprisoned by al-'Adil, and al-Nasir Da'ud did come to Egypt, but the two events occurred somewhat later and had no connection with each other.

14. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 321a; *Zubda*, III, 244; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 475; *Chron. Ayy.*, 146. The last two sources refer to the agreement with al-Salih Ayyub, but they seem to date it after the assassination of 'Imad al-Din. However, the *Mufarrij* and the testimony of Sa'd al-Din b. Hamawiya al-Juwayni (cited *Mir'at*, 478, and "Mémoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 326) make it clear that the territorial exchange between al-Jawad and al-Salih Ayyub was agreed upon either before or shortly after the arrival of 'Imad al-Din. Sa'd al-Din, who was a participant in these events, has al-Jawad threatening to surrender Damascus to al-Salih when confronted with 'Imad al-Din's demand that he abdicate; this might well imply that al-Jawad had already begun negotiations with al-Salih.

15. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 477-478; "Mémoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 326; *Chron. Ayy.*, 146.

16. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 478; "Mémoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 326-327; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 321b. The correct date is given in *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 167-168, and Gottschalk, "Aulad," 81-82. Sa'd al-Din gives 26 Rabi' I as the date of the murder, but this is impossible to reconcile either with other accounts or with the course of events. Probably the error is due either to a lapse of memory or to a mistranscription of his account by Sibt ibn al-Jauzi.

17. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 321b-322a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 475; *Zubda*, III, 236-239, 244-245.

18. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 422a.

19. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 475-476; *Chron. Ayy.*, 146; *Tali*, 4a-b. The *Tali*, written by a Coptic *katib*, seems related to the account of Makin but is not identical; since both writers were Copts, a common source seems indicated.

20. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 323a, 324a. On al-Salih's Jaziran problems, see *Zubda*, III, 237-243. On Ibn Jarir, *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 479.

21. *Mufarrij* (MC 119), 111a, 148b-149a; (BN 1702), 322a, 323a; *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, II, 77-83 (sub anno 658).

22. *Wafayat*, II, 332-338; VI, 258-266; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 323a.

23. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 322b; *Zubda*, III, 245.

24. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 322b-324a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 146-147.

25. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 324a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 147.

26. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 324b-325a.

27. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 479; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 326a; *Bughya*, III, 181a.
28. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 476, 480; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 328a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 150.
29. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 326a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 479, 480.
30. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 326a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 150.
31. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 327a-b. On the crusade of Theobald of Champagne, see Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 211-217; Sidney Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 463-481; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 317-320. The incident in Hama is referred to in *Philip of Novara*, 195-196.
32. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 328a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 480; *Chron. Ayy.*, 150.
33. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 328a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 480; *Chron. Ayy.*, 150; *Zubda*, III, 245-246.
34. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 328b-329b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 150; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 480. The latter states that Taqi al-Din and Mujir al-Din at first set out with the intention of relieving Damascus, but when they learned of its capture, they decided to go on to the city and ask asylum of Isma'il, fearing for the safety of their families and property there.
The *amir-jandar* had a variety of duties, all of them more or less connected with the ruler's personal dignity and security: he acted as chamberlain to the throne room, chief executioner, and chief of the royal bodyguard. See Barthold, *Turkestan*, 312 n. 2; and Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, lix, c.
35. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 329b-330a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 151.
36. Of Zahir al-Din we know very little prior to this point, only that his father Mubariz al-Din Sungur, an important Aleppan amir, had led the first north Syrian contingent to the relief of al-Kamil during the Fifth Crusade. Zahir al-Din himself had joined the entourage of al-Mu'azzam at an early date, making the pilgrimage with him in 611/1214. Gottschalk, *al-Kamil*, 74, n. 1.
37. Of al-Salih Ayyub's capture, the best account is in *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 480-481, based on the author's conversations with Ayyub himself, and hence more than a little biased. See also *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 330b-331a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 151. According to Gaston Wiet, "Baybars I," *El²*, I, 1124, this Baybars is the future sultan, Baybars al-Bunduqdari, but that is erroneous. Baybars al-Salihi became one of Ayyub's chief generals, led the Egyptian army at the great battle of La Forbie, but was soon afterwards imprisoned and then executed by his master on suspicion of disloyalty.
38. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 313b-332a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 150-151.
39. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 482; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 332a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 147.
40. Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 214-215; Painter, "Crusade of Theobald," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 475-478; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 317; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 272-274 (Gaza); 275 ff. (Jerusalem). The Egyptian commander at Gaza was of course not Rukn al-Din Baybars, as stated in *Philip of Novara*, 195, but Rukn al-Din al-Hayjawi.

41. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 332b-333a.

42. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 333a-b.

43. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 334a, 335b-336a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 482; *Chron. Ayy.* 151. Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzī quotes al-Salīh Ayyūb thus: "He [al-Nasir Da'ūd] made me swear to something which all the kings on earth could not do, that I should capture for him Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Jazīra, Mosul, Diyar Bakr, and more, and half of Egypt, and [that I should give him] half the contents of the treasury in money, jewels, horses, vestments, etc. I swore to all this under force and the sword." According to Ibn Wasil, al-Nasir demanded simply "*al-Sham wa-l-Sharq*." This could mean all Syria and the Jazīra; but more likely "al-Sham" refers to south Syria only—i.e., Damascus and its usual dependencies—and "al-Sharq" to al-Salīh Ayyūb's possessions east of the Euphrates. Finally al-Makin says that al-Nasir asked only for assistance in the conquest of Damascus and 400,000 *dinars*.

44. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 336a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 482.

45. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 337a-b.

46. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 337b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 482; *Chron. Ayy.*, 147-148; *Zubda*, III, 246-247 (a very brief account of Ayyūb's captivity and triumph, but confirms the dates). Makin gives the date as 23 Shawwāl, which is adopted by modern scholars; I have used that given by Ibn Wasil and Sibṭ.

47. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 338b, 340a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 482; *Chron. Ayy.*, 151-152. *Chron. Ayy.* says that Sayf al-Dīn 'Alī b. Kilich only left to join the service of al-Nasir Da'ūd at this time, but other evidence would suggest that this is erroneous.

48. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 340a; *Zubda*, III, 247-248.

49. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 35b-36a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 485; *Chron. Ayy.*, 153; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 100, 134, 147-148, 153, 155-156, 159; *Ibn al-Furat (LRS)*, II, 62, 170-171 (nn. 6, 7). Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 318; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 216; Painter, "Crusade of Theobald," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 478-479; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 279-286. Neither the sources nor modern studies agree in detail as to what Isma'il conceded to the Franks, and the question of Jerusalem is particularly difficult. Prawer's distinction between the *de jure* authority of Ayyūb in Galilee and the *de facto* power of Isma'il there seems pointless, since at this time neither man recognized the legitimacy of the other.

50. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 35b-36b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 483, 485; Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade*, 149-152. On Ibn al-Hajīb, see H. Fleisch, "Ibn al-Hadjīb," *EIF*, III, 781.

51. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 155-156; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 493. This event is dated by Sibṭ to 642/1244—i.e., the time of the second Frankish alliance.

52. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 148. The story seems apocryphal; the slaughter of 1000 prisoners would surely have found an echo in some other Muslim source, if not in the Christian texts. It is striking that it is not mentioned in the text of *de constructione castri Saphet*, though the editor refers to it in his introduc-

tion (Huygens, "Saphet," 361).

53. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 338b, 339b-340a; Ayalon, "Yasa," CI, 117-124, discusses the drastic changes in the slave markets of Islam caused by the Mongol invasions and attributes the viability of the Mamluk military-caste system largely to these changes.

54. The Muslim accounts are sketchy here, and I have followed the analyses of modern scholars: Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 318-319; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 216-217; Painter, "Crusade of Theobald," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 480-481; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 280-282; Riley-Smith, *Hospitallers*, 170-180.

55. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 342b; *Zubda*, III, 248-254; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 486-487; *Seltschuken*, 212-213. The first two accounts have a common source, probably the *Bughya*.

56. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 342b-343b; *Zubda*, III, 254-260; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 486-487; *Seltschuken*, 212-216; "Memoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 327. The common source of *Mufarrij* and *Zubda* continues.

57. Khwarizmian campaigns of 639-640: *Zubda*, III, 260-265. Raid on Nablus: *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 36a; *Fawa'id*, 45a-46b, 46b-48a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 492; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 219-220.

58. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 34a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 487, 492; *Chron. Ayy.*, 152-153. These three sources are unfortunately in almost irreconcilable contradiction, to the point that they hardly seem to be talking about the same man, time, or place. But all do agree that in the end al-Jawad was connected with the Franks and that he was probably put to death by al-Salih Isma'il. I have followed Sibt ibn al-Jauzi as to his end.

59. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 44a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 490.

60. Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali: *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 44b-45a. Al-Mughith: *Ibid.*, 45a.

61. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 44b-45a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 490. For the numismatic evidence, see Balog, "Etudes II," 30-31; and Wakin, "Ayyubid Coinage," Table VI. As Wakin shows, al-Salih Isma'il was the only Ayyubid prince of Damascus who minted coinage in his own name without at the same time claiming the sultanate of the Ayyubid empire. The far more imposing al-Mu'azzam and al-Ashraf, for example, never placed their names on their Damascus coinage.

Additional evidence that Isma'il gave formal recognition to al-Salih Ayyub's claim to the sultanate is provided by epigraphy. For the period of Isma'il's second reign, the walls and gates of Damascus yield three inscriptions in his name, two from 639, and one from 643. But on the Bab al-Salama there is a superb inscription in the name of al-Salih Ayyub, with a very full protocol; it is dated 641. See *RCEA*, XI, 131, (no. 4197, yr. 639); 132 (no. 4198, yr. 639); 148-149 (no. 4223, yr. 641); 163 (no. 4246, yr. 643).

62. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 45a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 490. Numismatic evidence for the break in relations is provided by Balog, "Etudes II," 23; and Wakin,

"Ayyubid Coinage," Code Book (coins of al-Salih Isma'il minted in 642).

63. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 45b-46b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 155. Ibn Wasil says that in order to gain this new alliance, Isma'il had to surrender Kaukab, Tiberias, and Ascalon in addition to Jerusalem. But Ascalon was already in Frankish hands by 642/1244, and Isma'il had never held it anyhow. My opinion is that Tiberias had been surrendered in the first Franco-Syrian alliance (638/1240), but this is a vexing question. As to Kaukab, the only reason to doubt Ibn Wasil's statement is that no one else mentions its surrender at this point. Cf. Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 322, n. 2, where a letter in M. Paris says that only Nablus, Hebron, and Baysan now remained in Muslim hands. Cf. p. 266 and n. 49 above.

64. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 46a-47a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 491; *Chron. Ayy.*, 155; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 223-225; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 322.

65. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 47a-48b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 493-494; *Chron. Ayy.*, 155; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 323; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 225-227. Valuable notes on the battle in *Ibn al-Furat (LRS)*, II, 173-175 (nn. 2-9). On the Egyptian commander, see chap. 7, n. 37.

66. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 497; *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 48b, 50a.

67. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 48a-b; *Bughya*, III, 181a-b. The *Bughya* contains the unique notice of the rapprochement between Cairo and Aleppo. In Aleppo al-Nasir Yusuf was now ruling in his own name, his grandmother Dayfa Khatun having died on 11 Jumada I 640/6 November 1242. He was still a youth, of course, and the reins of state were now held by Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini. Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim was the Aleppan envoy to Cairo. It is possible that the Aleppan approach was also motivated by the collapse of the Rum Seljukid kingdom in 641/1243, which deprived Aleppo of her chief ally since the death of al-Kamil. On the career of Mu'in al-Din down to his siege of Damascus, see Gottschalk, "Aulad," 84-85.

68. The accounts of the siege are rather disappointing; on the destruction, see *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 498; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 175; "Memoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 329. Embassy to Baghdad: *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 48a. On the location of the various fires, Ibn 'Asakir, *Description*, 153, nn. 7, 8.

69. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 499 (date of surrender: month of Jumada I); *Chron. Ayy.*, 155 (10 Jumada II); *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 176 (eyewitness account, 9 Jumada I); *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 50a-b; Gottschalk, "Aulad," 85-86.

70. *Bughya*, III, 181b.

71. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 330a-b.

72. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 486.

73. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 483, 493, 496; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 330b.

74. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 496-497; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 173-174; *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 107a-b. On these madrasas, see *Daris*, I, 301 ff., 359 ff., 376 ff.

Chapter 8

1. Abu-l-'Abbas Ahmad b. Yahya al-Tha'labi al-Dimashqi. He was a member of the important Shafi'i clan of the Banu Sani al-Daula. Born in 590/1194, he began teaching as early as 615/1218 and held professorships in the Iqbaliyya and Jarukhiyya Madrasas. His first administrative post was as *wakil bayt al-mal*. He seems to have remained chief qadi of Damascus from this time until his death in 658/1260. Later (in 654/1256) he became the first professor of the splendid new Madrasa Nasiriyya intramuros. His father Shams al-Din (552/1157-635/1238) had also been chief qadi of Damascus for a time and was a student of two of the most prestigious twelfth-century *faqih*s, Qutb al-Din al-Nisaburi and Sharaf al-Din ibn Abi 'Asrun. *Daris*, I 158-159, 459; *DD*, no. 3, p. 455, n. 51; *Bughya*, II, 124a.

2. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 50a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 499; *Chron. Ayy.*, 156.

3. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 51a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 156; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 500; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 177.

4. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 51a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 155-156. Only the latter claims that *iqta's* had in fact been granted to the Khwarizmians. Cf. Ayalon, "Wafidiyya," 91, 94-95.

5. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 51a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 499; *Chron. Ayy.*, 156. *Mir'at* and *Chron. Ayy.* both state that al-Salih Isma'il was the motive force behind this affair and that he had invited the Khwarizmians to join him as they were wandering back to Diyar Mudar. But I have followed Ibn Wasil's account, which is altogether more coherent and detailed.

6. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 52a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 499; *Chron. Ayy.*, 156. Joinville, 236, 251, alludes to the arrest and execution of Rukn al-Din and considers this event to have been a key element in the decision of Turan-shah's amirs to murder him. On the terrible suffering caused by the Khwariz-mian blockade, *Ruad. (Dhayl)*, 178.

7. "When al-Salih Ayyub sent to al-Malik al-Mansur and detached him from al-Salih Isma'il, [al-Mansur] wrote to the Aleppans. . . ." *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 504.

8. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 507; "A group of Damascenes told me that [al-Mansur] had negotiated for Damascus [*'amala 'ala Dimashqa*] and if he had lived a few days longer he would have taken possession of it." This passage refers to al-Mansur's arrival in Damascus after his victory at al-Qasab.

9. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 346a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 504. The correct date is given by the epitaph on Berke Khan's tomb in Jerusalem (*RCEA*, XI, 169, no. 4254). Abu Shama says that Damascus learned of the victory on 2 Muharram—*Raud. (Dhayl)*, 178. Sibṭ's assertion that the army of Damascus was present seems unlikely in view of the circumstances. I have been unable to identify al-Qasab; possibly it is the same as Qouseib (Dussaud, *Topographie*, map 6: B, 1. On Berke Khan, see also *CIA, Jerusalem*, I, 186-190.

10. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 346b; *Bughya*, III, 181b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 505;

Chron. Ayy., 156.

11. See above, chap. 8, n. 8.

12. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 349a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 157; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 507.

13. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 51a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 156.

14. Accounts of the fall of Baalbek differ somewhat. According to *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 346a-347a, and *A'laq (LPJ)*, 49, only Husam al-Din was ever involved in the siege of the town. According to *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 504-505, al-Mansur Ibrahim overran the town, while Husam al-Din later besieged the citadel. *Chron. Ayy.*, 156, claims that both men participated in the siege of the citadel. But if the date of Rabi' II (given only in *A'laq*) is correct, the latter must be in error, for al-Mansur died in Safar.

15. *Chron. Ayy.*, 157 (the fullest account); *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 504; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 247a-b. Sibṭ states that 'Izz al-Din Aybeg of Salkhad was present at the battle of al-Salt, but fled afterwards to his own domains. Ibn Wasil does not mention the Khwarizmians at all in this situation, perhaps in order to protect the reputation of his friend al-Nasir Da'ud. Wiet, *L'Egypte arabe*, 374, gives the date of 12 August 1246 for the battle of al-Salt, presumably because his source gives 27 Rabi' I instead of our date; given the oddities of Arabic orthography, the two dates could easily be confused, and there seems no certain way to resolve the conflict.

16. *Chron. Ayy.*, 157; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 505; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 64. The leader of the defense of Bosra is perhaps to be identified with the Shihab al-Din Ghazi b. Aybeg al-Rukni who appears (in a subordinate position) in three inscriptions of Bosra, dating from 612 and 615: *RCEA*, X, 108, no. 3755; 152, nos. 3818, 3819. At that time he was a junior officer attached to the *muqta'* of the place, Rukn al-Din Mengüverish al-Falaki al-'Adili. On Fakhr al-Din's campaign, see also Gottschalk, "Aulad," 73.

17. *Khazindar*: an Arabic title, probably derived from the Perso-Arabic *khazinadar* (cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 229-230), meaning "treasurer of the palace." The office was always held by a military officer, as was ordinarily the case with court ranks of this kind. He was in charge not only of the coined money kept in the palace, but of its precious stuffs and objects as well. This office was probably not connected with or parallel to the civil office of *mustaufi*, which oversaw the whole process of revenue collections, disbursements, etc. See Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, ix-ixi, 148.

18. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 350a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 157. On Mujahid al-Din, see *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, I, 14-15.

19. Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe*, 374, gives 26 March, probably by reading 17 Dhu-l-Qa'da.

20. As a point of comparison, the founder of the Madrasa Qaymariyya intramuros, built ca. A.H. 660, spent 40,000 *dirhams* on the clocks placed over its portal alone. *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, II, 366.

21. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 506, 509; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 61-62; *Chron. Ayy.*, 158; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 347a. All sources agree that 'Izz al-Din died in 645 save

A'laq, which gives Jumada I 646.

22. *Mir'at* (Jewett), 508; *A'laq* (LPJ), 142; "Memoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 329-330.

23. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 351a; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 508; *A'laq* (LPJ), 134, 262; *Chron. Ayy.*, 158; "Memoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 330-331 (detailed eyewitness account; its dating, adopted here, is confirmed by *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 180.) The Christian sources, followed by Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 228-229, and Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 315, give mid-October. See also Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 324.

24. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 351a; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 508.

25. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 353a-b.

26. Al-Salih reached Damascus only on 1 Sha'ban/19 November; in addition to his illness he was probably delayed by the need to see what Louis IX, then enroute to Cyprus, intended to do. Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 325.

27. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 351b, 352b-354a; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 511; *Chron. Ayy.*, 158.

28. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 354b-355a, 357b-358b; *Mir'at* (Jewett), 513; *Chron. Ayy.*, 158-159; Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, 36.

29. The Mamluk provinces were as follows (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, and Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 14-16):

a) Damascus (comprising the Ghuta, Homs, the Biqa', Judaea, Samaria, the Hauran, and Transjordan north of the Dead Sea);

b) Gaza (ordinarily a part of the province of Damascus, but when autonomous comprising the Palestinian coast as far north as Jaffa);

c) Safad (comprising Galilee, south Lebanon, Acre, and Tyre);

d) al-Karak (Transjordan east and south of the Dead Sea). In principle these were mutually independent and tied directly to Cairo, but in fact the viceroy of Damascus enjoyed a natural primacy in the region.

30. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 355a-b; (BN 1703), 71b. An excellent summary of Ibn Matruh's career in *Wafayat*, VI, 258-260. Both Ibn Khallikan and Ibn Wasil were close friends of Ibn Matruh, and Ibn Wasil even accompanied him on the return journey to Egypt in 647, but neither writer is able or willing to reveal the cause of his disgrace. At about the same time Baha' al-Din Zuhayr also fell from favor, for reasons equally obscure.

31. For the Mamluk administration of Damascus, see Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, 141-169, and esp. 141-146, 151-152.

32. This is not to say that these *mamluks* dominated the positions of power during his reign; in fact, the majority of his senior officers were free-born and had risen to prominence under his father. Jamal al-Din b. Yaghmur was a Türkmen of the Yürük tribe of north Syria. Fakhr al-Din ibn al-Shaykh and his brother Mu'in al-Din were members of a distinguished Khurasani family, and Husam al-Din ibn Abi 'Ali was a Kurd of the Hadhbani tribe. Only Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Salihi and Shihab al-Din Rashid al-Kabir were of slave origin. For more detail see my study, "Emergence of

the Mamluk Army.”

33. See, for example, the near encomium in Ayalon, “Yasa,” C₁, 156-158.

34. The dates are from Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 325-326, who differs slightly from Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 261-264.

35. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 356b, 368a-369b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 514, 516; *Chron. Ayy.*, 159-160. Fakhr al-Din's role in these events is summarized in Gottschalk, “Aulad,” 75-78.

36. Turanshah's behavior towards al-Salih's entourage: “Memoires de Sa'd al-Din,” 332-334. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 370a-371a; (BN 1703), 88a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 518, 520; *Chron. Ayy.*, 160; *Sirat Baybars*, 2a-b. On his murder: *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 371a-372a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 520-521; *Chron. Ayy.*, 160; *Sirat Baybars*, 3a-b; Joinville, 251-252 (a vivid eyewitness account); Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 272-273; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 332. For date of the crusade's collapse: Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 328 and n. 2.

37. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 372a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 160-161; *Sirat Baybars*, 5a; *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, I, 54-60, esp. p. 55.

38. This point discussed in Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 107-108; see also above, p. 37.

39. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 75-76; *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 374a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 161.

40. On Nasir al-Din see *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, II, 366-367; *DD*, no. 3, pp. 438 and 494 n. 310. His formal titlature is given in *RCEA*, XII, 6-7 (no. 4410, yr. 654). His full name was Nasir al-Din Abu-l-Ma'ali al-Husayn b. 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Abi-Fawaris al-Qaymari al-Kurdi. He first came to prominence under al-Salih Ayyub. He seems to have entered Ayyub's service while that prince was viceroy in Diyar Bakr and apparently accompanied him to Damascus in 636/1239. He was al-Salih's *na'ib* in Damascus during his first abortive attempt to seize Egypt, but after that we hear little of him for several years. His Qaymari kinsmen first entered Syria in large numbers when they accompanied the Khwarizmians in 642/1244. Nasir al-Din al-Qaymari reached the height of his power under al-Nasir Yusuf, when he is said to have held an *iqta'* of 250 horsemen—by far the largest nonroyal *iqta'* recorded for Ayyubid Syria—and to have commanded more respect among the Kurds than the sultan himself. After the fall of al-Nasir Yusuf he retained his high status under Baybars, being appointed *na'ib al-saltana* for the latter's reconquests in Palestine. He died before Acre in Rabi' I 665/December 1266.

41. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 373b-374b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 518; *Chron. Ayy.*, 161-162.

42. Sayf al-Din was the first cousin of Nasir al-Din, and of almost equal eminence. His full name was Sayf al-Din Abu-l-Hasan b. *al-amir* Asad al-Din Yusuf b. Diya' al-Din Abi-l-Fawaris b. Musak al-Qaymari. He died on 3 Sha'ban 654/26 August 1256 and was buried in Damascus. He is the founder of the superb hospital in Salahiyya; this was begun in 646/1248 with the financial assistance of al-Salih Ayyub and was completed under

al-Nasir Yusuf. See his inscriptions: *RCEA*, XII, 5-9, nos. 4408-4411; and *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, I, 43-45.

43. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 374b-375b; "Memoires de Sa'd Din," 334.

Chapter 9

1. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 50-51, 74-75, 89, 142-143; *Chron. Ayy.*, 164.

2. The minor principalities of the Jazira at this period are best described in Cahen, "Jazira," 119-121.

3. The figures for the towns of Diyar Mudar are given in Cahen, "Jazira," 111-112; for Homs and Damascus, see above, pp. 176, 269. For Aleppo Ibn Shaddad's data is copied in Ibn al-Shihna, *Perles*, 163-167.

4. On the policy of al-'Aziz Muhammad and al-Zahir Ghazi and the reduced role of nonregnant princes of the blood in Aleppo, see Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 185, 235-237, 257. On the descendants of Nasih al-Din Khumartigin, see *ibid.*, 277, 285; and *RCEA*, XII, 65: no. 4488—an inscription in the village of Dibsho. It should be noted that in north Syria, throughout the entire reign of al-Nasir Yusuf (634/1237-658/1260), there are no inscriptions in the name of any prince but himself, excepting two in the name of his grandmother Dayfa Khatun, who was his regent until her death in 640/1242.

5. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 98a-b.

6. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 375b-376a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 161. "Mémoires de Sa'd al-Din," 334, puts these events a few days earlier: 22 Rabi' II and 2 Jumada I.

7. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 376b-377a; "Mémoires de Sa'd al-Din," 335.

8. *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 377a.

9. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 102a-b.

10. *Mufarrij*, (BN 1703), 102b-103a. In modern usage "jinsiyya" commonly means "nationality, citizenship"—see Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. by J. Milton Cowan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), 141. Its classical meaning was more abstract—"the generic quality of something"—see E. W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, II, 470. But it is clear that Ibn Wasil is referring to race or ethnic identity. See also the texts collected in Ayalon, "Yasa," C1, 117-124, 126.

11. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 103a-b.

12. G. Wiet, "'Abbasa," *EI*², I, 14.

13. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 103b-104b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 162; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 519. Although the sources generally agree as to the course of the battle, there are numerous differences in detail. According to al-Makin, the 'Aziziyya abandoned al-Nasir at the outset of the battle. But Ibn Wasil, tacitly recog-

nizing the currency of this version, says that the commandant of the 'Aziz-iyya, Jamal al-Din Aydughdi, swore to him that he did not abandon his sovereign until al-Nasir had fled from the field. A second important issue is whether or not Shams al-Din Lu'lu' al-Amini knew of al-Nasir's action when he attacked al-Mu'izz Aybeg; but here, too, we lack decisive evidence.

14. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 104b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 519; *Chron. Ayy.*, 162.

15. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 105a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 163.

16. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 106b, 107b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 163. *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 186, gives the date of Isma'il's execution as 20 Dhu-l-Qa'da.

17. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 75, 241, 247-248.

18. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 108b-109a, 111a; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 522, 525; *Chron. Ayy.*, 164; Joinville, 274, 281-282; 295-296; 300. Joinville dates al-Nasir's invasion of Egypt just prior to the Ayyubid-Mamluk truce. This is an obvious slip of memory—Joinville was a very old man when he dictated his memoirs—and in general the section of his book dealing with Louis' sojourn in Palestine, though of great value, is impossibly vague as to chronology. See also Runciman, *Crusades*, I, 276, II; Strayer, "Louis IX," in Setton, *Crusades*, II, 505-506; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 329-33² (brief but solid); Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 340-348.

19. Joinville, 301-303, estimates the Ayyubid forces at 2,000 Saracens (i.e., regular cavalry) and 10,000 Bedouin. The former figure is certainly plausible, but the latter seems much exaggerated.

20. Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 328 and n. 6. The source for the attack on Tyron is *A'laq (LPJ)*, 159, which possibly confirms Matthew Paris, VI, 196 (capture of Canan Turoris). Ibn Shaddad dates these events to the early part of al-Nasir Yusuf's reign in Damascus, but that seems awkward; it would accord far more neatly with the course of events to place them in the months preceding his capture of Damascus. LaMonte, "Lords of Sidon," 207; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 330, 335.

21. Joinville, 303; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 100.

22. Joinville, 306-310, 317-318; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 100, 135, 143, 159; *Chron. Ayy.*, 165; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 277, 280-281; Strayer, "Louis IX," 507-508; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 331; LaMonte, "Lords of Sidon," 207; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 305-352.

23. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 111a, 112a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 527; *Chron. Ayy.*, 164; *Sirat Baybars*, 4b-6b.

24. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 112b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 164; *Sirat Baybars*, 7a.

25. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 112b; Cahen, "Jazira," 120 (yrs. 643, 645), 121-122 (yrs. 649, 651, 653).

26. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 113a-b.

27. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 113b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 164; *Sirat Baybars*, 6b.

28. J. A. Boyle, "Ibn al-'Alkami," *EI*², III, 702.

29. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 116b-117a.

30. Not to be confused with the onetime commandant of the Bahriyya,

who had been murdered by Aybeg two years previously.

31. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 119a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 165-166.

32. *Chron. Ayy.*, 166.

33. An excellent discussion of this tactic, the basic field maneuver of Muslim armies in the high Middle Ages, in Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, 743-745.

34. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 122b-123b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 168; *Sirat Baybars*, 7a-b. Al-Makin's is a summary account, erroneously dated to 656. Just as one would expect in a work devoted to the glorification of Baybars, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir has nothing to say of his hero's defeat by al-Nasir.

On the town of Zughar, see Marmardji, *Textes sur Palestine*, 88-89.

35. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 122b, 123b-124a; *Sirat Baybars*, 7b-8b.

36. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 126b, 128a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 170; *Sirat Baybars*, 8b-9b. The date is given in Wiet, *HNE*, 408.

37. Haylan: see Dussaud, *Topographie*, Map XII, C, 3.

38. Siege of 642: Cahen, "Jazira," 119-120, citing Ibn Shaddad, Sa'd al-Din ibn Hamawiya, and Sibṭ ibn al-Jauzi; "Mémoires de Sa'd ad-Din," 328; *Chronography*, 409.

39. Zayn al-Din was a key figure at the end of al-Nasir's reign and served for a few years as a high-ranking official under the Mongol Hülegü; this phase of his career is summarized in *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, II, 234-239. Unfortunately little is known of him earlier. His name (Sulayman b. al-Mu'ayyad b. 'Amir al-'Aqrabani) shows that he or his family were natives of 'Aqraba, which is the name both of a Ghuta and a Haurani village. An anecdote in al-Yunini shows him in the service of al-Amjad Bahramshah of Baalbek (as a doctor) and then, as his personal *nisba* confirms, of al-Hafiz Arslanshah of Qal'at Ja'bar, until this place was annexed by al-Nasir in 638/1240.

40. These are marks or insignia used by the Mongol khans as their signatures on official diplomas and decrees. For the former, see Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 36-37; for the latter, Dozy, *Suppl.*, II, 674. According to Rashid al-Din (*Mongols de la Perse*, 327), Zayn al-Din was given a *yarligh* and *payzeh*—i.e., an imperial command and an accompanying document stating that the bearer had the authority to execute it. (Cf. Quatremère's lengthy discussion of these two terms: *Mongols de la Perse*, n. 43, pp. 177-179; n. 44, pp. 179-181. They occur paired in the text on pp. 177, 207, 217, 295, 327, 373.)

41. *Chron. Ayy.*, 163; Cahen, "Jazira," 121.

42. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 523; *Chron. Ayy.*, 163; Cahen, "Jazira," 121. Cf. account in Boyle, "Journey of Het'um I." The Mongol attack on Mayyafariqin was very nearly the occasion for a second army coup d'état against the Ayyubids. When al-Kamil withdrew to Hisn Kayfa, his *atabeg*, 'Izz al-Din Aybeg al-Saqi, remained behind to defend Mayyafariqin. Upon al-Kamil's return to his capital, however, the garrison there tried to raise the *atabeg* to the throne. But al-Kamil, a man of far more intelligence and energy than his unfortunate cousin Turanshah, succeeded in drawing the ringleaders into a

trap and imprisoned them all, while the *atabeg* was forced to flee to Anatolia. Cahen, "Jazira," 121.

43. *Mongols de la Perse*, 119-145, esp. pp. 129, 141-145. *World-Conqueror*, II, 607-611, has Kitbugha departing in spring 650/1252. Hülegü himself on 24 Sha'ban 651/19 October 1253.

44. *Mongols de la Perse*, 153; Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 341. Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 299; *World-Conqueror*, II, 611 ff.

45. *Chron. Ayy.*, 163-165; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 703. This marriage seems to be merely the consummation of one contracted for in 635/1238 as part of the alliance between Aleppo and Konya.

46. Hülegü's advance on Baghdad: *Mongols de la Perse*, 229-253; Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 345-347. Investiture of al-Nasir: *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 124a.

47. The career of al-Nasir Da'ud after he abandoned al-Karak makes a fascinating tale, but it is too long to be recounted in detail here. He had come to Damascus with al-Nasir Yusuf in 648/1250, but just before the Egyptian expedition he had been imprisoned in Homs, for reasons obscure even to contemporaries. There he remained for five years, until 653/1255, when he was released at the instance of the caliphal ambassador Najm al-Din al-Badhira'i. Having thus obtained his freedom, he made his way to Baghdad and lived there for a time. But then, infuriated by the neglect he had suffered from the caliph, he went to live among the Bedouin of the middle Euphrates basin. Al-Nasir Yusuf, fearful lest he use these tribesmen for his own purposes, induced him to return to Damascus, where he was kept under house arrest until 655/1257. Again released through the representations of al-Badhira'i, he went to live among the Bedouin of the Tih Bani Isra'il (Sinai). This time it was al-Mughith 'Umar who was afraid of him. He sent out a raiding party, which seized al-Nasir Da'ud and brought him back to Transjordan. Al-Mughith's original intention was to imprison his captive in al-Shaubak, but before he could act, al-Nasir Yusuf called for his release so that he could lead the proposed relief expedition to Baghdad. After that project fell through, al-Nasir Da'ud remained in Damascus in humiliating circumstances until his death on 26 Jumada I 656/31 May 1258 as a result of the pestilence then ravaging Damascus.

The materials for al-Nasir Da'ud's last years are extraordinarily rich. On the events of 648: *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 100b-101b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 518-519; *Fawa'id*, 83a-84a. On the final years (653-656): *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 116b, 117b, 119a, 124a-125a, 129b-130a; *Fawa'id*, 12b-13a, 14b-15b, 75a-76a, 83b-88a, 90a-b, 96b. Although Ibn Wasil's information here is largely adapted from the *Fawa'id*, it is both more clearly organized and written in simpler language.

48. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 129b-130a; *Fawa'id*, 12b-13a. Fall of Baghdad: *Mongols de la Perse*, 255-311; Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 347-349. Boyle, "Last Abbasid Caliph"; Wickens, "Fall of Baghdad"; *Chronography*, 429-431.

49. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 141a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 167-169; *Mongols de la Perse*,

311-313, 327; *Chronography*, 434; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 299. On the influence of Dokuz Khatun, see *Mongols de la Perse*, 93-95, 145; and G. Levi Della Vida, "Tartari in Siria," 360, 363-364 (citing a courtier of al-Ashraf of Homs, Sarim al-Din Özbek).

50. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 140b-141a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 167; *Mongols de la Perse*, 373-375; Cahen, "Jazira," 122; Amedroz, "Mayyafariqin," 805-806.

51. *Chron. Ayy.*, 168-169; Ayalon, "Wafidiyya," 97.

52. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 144a; *Sirat Baybars*, 9b-10a. On Nur al-Din: *Mir'at (Dhayl)*, I, 433; on Mujir al-Din: *ibid.*, II, 8.

53. *Chron. Ayy.*, 168-169; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 241, 248, 265.

54. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 144a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 169; *Sirat Baybars*, 10a; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 265.

55. Badr al-Din Lu'lu had submitted to Mongol authority as early as 650/1252, when his son al-Salih Isma'il had journeyed on his behalf to Karakorum. In 656/1258 Badr al-Din was given the doubtless unwelcome opportunity of proving his loyalty when the Mongols invaded Iraq. This involved sending troops to aid in the siege of Irbil; permitting Bayju's corps from Anatolia to cross his territories as it marched south against Baghdad; displaying the heads of three high-ranking caliphal dignitaries (one of whom had been a close personal friend of Badr al-Din's); and undertaking a personal journey to Maragha in the summer of 656/1258, in spite of his being ninety-six years of age. Cahen, "Jazira," 121; *Mongols de la Perse*, 297-299, 315-317, 321.

56. Badr al-Din Lu'lu had died in Sha'ban 657/July-August 1259. He was succeeded in Mosul by his eldest son al-Salih Isma'il, while Sinjar and Jazirat ibn 'Umar fell to younger sons. At first al-Salih cooperated with the Mongols, and at the height of his power under their aegis held Mosul, Sinjar, Nisibin, and Qarqisiyya. But his revolt against Mongol hegemony in Rajab 659/June 1261 spelled the inevitable end of his regime, and Mosul fell to the Mongols in Ramadan 660/July-August 1262 to the accompaniment of terrible pillage and slaughter. Cahen, "Jazira," 127-128; *Mongols de la Perse*, 379-389.

57. The sources for this paragraph are vague in their chronology and extremely difficult to reconcile. Mayyafariqin: Cahen, "Jazira," 122-124; *Mongols de la Perse*, 329-331, 361-375; *Chronography*, 434, 436-437. Diyar Mudar: Cahen, "Jazira," 125; *Mongols de la Perse*, 327-333; *Chron. Ayy.*, 169; *Chronography*, 435.

58. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 145b-146a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 169-170.

59. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 145a, 146b, 147b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 170; *Sirat Baybars*, 10b; Cahen, "Jazira," 123.

60. In the Iranian dynasties of the high Middle Ages, the term *amir-hajib* meant the commander-in-chief of the army—see Sourdél, Bosworth, Lambton, "Hadjib," *EI*², III, 45-48. In the Mamluk empire this was the title of the army's chief judiciary officer, whose competence was in the beginning

restricted to administrative and legal problems affecting the soldiery, but was eventually widened to include the whole range of *mazalim* justice. See Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, lviii, 146-147; Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 539-544.

61. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 146b, 147b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 170.

62. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 148b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 170-171; *Sirat Baybars*, 10b. There are significant and irreconcilable differences between Ibn Wasil and al-Makin.

63. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 148b-149a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 171-172.

64. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 149a; *Sirat Baybars*, 10b.

65. *Chron. Ayy.*, 171.

66. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 147b, 149a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 171; *Mongols de la Perse*, 333-339; Cahen, "Jazira," 125; *idem*, *Syrie du Nord*, 705-706. Rashid al-Din seems to imply that the Aleppo citadel was taken by storm, but a close reading shows that he can be understood in either sense (probably a deliberate ambiguity), and the other sources specify a surrender on terms.

67. *Mongols de la Perse*, 339; *Chronography*, 436. On the Jabal Ansariyya in this period, see Berchem-Fatio, *Voyage*, 277, 285; *RCEA*, XII, 65: no. 4488; Berchem, "Inscriptions," 516-520.

68. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 150a.

69. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 152a; "Tartari in Siria," 358-364.

70. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 150a, 152a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 172. The exact route of the retreat is unknown, but according to the first-person testimony in "Tartari in Siria," 361, al-Ashraf's retainer rejoined his master at Birkat Ziza in Transjordan.

71. The exact duties of the *naqib al-'askar* are hard to define, all the more as the discussion in Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, xxxiv, 148-149, confines itself to his ceremonial duties. Presumably he was the chief staff officer of the army; his title could be translated as "adjutant general" perhaps. Cf. Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 94, 105-106, under "*naqib al-jaish*."

72. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 150a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 172; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 63. Al-Makin says that al-Zahir was given Salkhad even before al-Nasir had left Damascus and that he left Gaza to go and reside there. The latter half of this statement is implausible, because the two brothers were captured together at Birkat Ziza. Ibn Shaddad provides an apparent solution to the discrepancy by stating that when al-Zahir received Salkhad, he sent a governor there as his vicegerent.

73. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 116a, 151a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 174; *A'laq (LPJ)*, 248. According to al-Makin, Kutuz interpreted the Syrian advance into Egypt as a ruse to rob him of his throne. He thus wrote to several units of al-Nasir's army and induced them to desert him and proceed to Cairo on their own. But Ibn Wasil's account, followed here, seems more in harmony with the realities of the situation.

74. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 151b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 174.

75. *Chron. Ayy.*, 173; *Mongols de la Perse*, 339-341. Rashid al-Din's data are hard to reconcile with al-Makin's, for he says that Zayn al-Din al-Hafizi was appointed as governor of Aleppo by Hülegü. This seems difficult to reconcile with the indisputable fact that Zayn al-Din was a leading figure in Damascus during the Mongol occupation up until 'Ayn Jalut. After that catastrophe, of course, the Mongols and their administrators were compelled to abandon Syria as quickly as possible. In general one may note that while Rashid al-Din has some useful information on the Mongol conquest of the Jazira and Syria, he seems to be rather poorly informed on the area overall; even his long notices on the siege of Mayyafariqin and 'Ayn Jalut have more the character of epic than of sober history.

76. *Naqib al-qal'a*. Cf. chap. 9, n. 71 above. Presumably this officer oversaw the staff work of the citadel. In Mamluk times he was the commandant's second-in-command. Popper, *Circassian Sultans*, I, 105.

77. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 152b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 173-174; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 203, 204; Berchem, "Inscriptions," 465-469, 514-515; Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 333 and n. 6. I believe I have resolved the dating problem noted by the last two authors. Abu Shama clearly implies that the citadel revolted during Kitbugha's absence and that he returned to Damascus *early* in Rabi' II. Ibn Wasil says that the Mongols did not subject the citadel to a regular siege until later. This would harmonize with Abu Shama's statement that siege engines were not used until 12 Jumada I. Both authors agree on the date of surrender. In this case, the date of the citadel inscription (21 Jumada II) is probably in error, for Abu Shama was an eyewitness and normally gives very precise dates.

78. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 51-52; *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 152b, 154a, 159a; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 207 (date of execution: Sha'ban/July-August; commandant's name given as Badr al-Din ibn Qaraja).

79. Perhaps an early member of the Shiite Buhturid dynasty of Lebanon.

80. *A'laq (LPJ)*, 100, 159, 236, 242; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 207 (date of Sidon: 8 Ramadan/17 August). For Frankish relations with the Mongols, see Stevenson, *Crusaders*, 333; LaMonte, "Lords of Sidon," 208; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 307-309, 311-312; Prawer, *Royaume latin*, II, 428-432.

81. *Chron. Ayy.*, 173; *Mongols de la Perse*, 341; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 309-310; Boyle, "Il-Khans," *CHI*, 351.

82. Cahen, "Jazira," 124-126; *Mongols de la Perse*, 375-379.

83. *Tabardar*: "axe-bearer"—a minor ceremonial office. See Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Syrie*, lxiii, xcvi.

84. Capture of al-Nasir Yusuf: *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 154a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 174-175; *Mongols de la Perse*, 341; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 206. Abu Shama says that al-Nasir Yusuf was brought to Damascus on 6 Rajab/17 June and was dispatched to Hülegü on 14 Rajab/25 June. The journey from al-Karak (where Abu Shama places al-Nasir's capture) to Damascus required thirty-five days, during which period the Mongols were seizing and dismantling the

castles in the Hauran and Transjordan. (These dates are further evidence that the Damascus citadel could not have been taken in late Jumada II.)

85. For this battle, see esp. Bernard Lewis, "‘Ayn Djalut," *EI*², I, 786-787. To the sources there cited, add *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 160a-b; G. Levi Della Vida, "Tartari in Siria," 365-366.

86. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 154b, 170b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 176. Rashid al-Din (*Mongols de la Perse*, 341, 353-359) gives a sharply different account of al-Nasir's death. According to him, Hülegü had formally invested al-Nasir with the government of Syria on the day before the news of ‘Ayn Jalut reached Tabriz. Upon his investiture al-Nasir set out on the road to Syria with an escort of 300 Syrian cavalry. But when Hülegü learned of the disastrous battle, a Syrian in his entourage denounced al-Nasir as a traitor, and Hülegü sent a Mongol detachment in pursuit of his new vassal. Overtaking al-Nasir, his pursuers deceived him into attending a feast in his honor; then, when he was completely drunk, he and his entire entourage were slaughtered.

87. According to Rashid al-Din (*Mongols de la Perse*, 347), Kitbugha was in Baalbek when he learned of the Egyptian advance, and the Mongol commander at Gaza was named Baidar.

88. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 159a; *Chron. Ayy.*, 175; Cahen, "Jazira," 127; *Raud (Dhayl)*, 207; Berchem, "Inscriptions," 467.

89. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 159a-b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 175-176; *Raud. (Dhayl)*, 208; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 707.

90. Located between al-Qadam and Darayya: see Dussaud, *Topographie*, 303.

91. *Mufarrij* (BN 1703), 159b, 160b-162b; *Chron. Ayy.*, 176; "Tartari in Siria," 365-366; Cahen, "Jazira," 126-127.

92. Ayalon, "Structure," II, 464-467, 472-475.

Appendix A

I. This assertion is mildly inaccurate. Oleg Grabar, "On Two Coins of Muzaffar Ghazi, ruler of Mayyafariqin (A.H. 617-642/A.D. 1220-1244)," *ANS Mus. Notes* 5 (1952): 167-178, shows that al-Muzaffar Ghazi of Mayyafariqin assumed the title of *al-sultan* on his coinage before his death in 642/1244. (Grabar's date, taken from Ibn Wasil, is an error for 645/1247—see Cahen, "Jazira," 120.) But he was the only Ayyubid to do this until al-Salih Ayyub; moreover his was a unique situation, since he was almost isolated from the rest of the family's dominions by the Rum Seljukid conquest of Diyar Bakr. It is also true that Saladin, both in his coinage and epigraphy, very commonly used the epithet of *sultan al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin*, beginning in 576/1181; in this usage, moreover, he was followed by several of his successors in the sultanate. (See Wakin, "Coinage of the Ayyubids," table

VII, and N. Elisséeff, "La titulature de Nur ad-Din d'après ses inscriptions," *BEO*, 14 (1952-54): 180.) However this epithet is not a title granted by the caliph, but a self-bestowed honorific used for propaganda purposes: to vaunt Saladin's claims vis-à-vis the rival Zangids or the status of the sultan as against his fellow princes of the blood. If Saladin had intended to claim the *saltana* in the full legal sense which it still enjoyed in the twelfth-century—as the right to act as the caliph's protector and agent in all the affairs of this world and the next, he would have used the simple title *al-sultan* and placed it at the beginning of his protocol. Only in this position does it indicate a claim to sovereignty. See *CIA, Egypte*, I, 299-300; Wiet, "Saladin," 313-314, 317.

2. Balog, "Etudes," II, 34, 41.

3. *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 499, 500.

4. Balog, "Etudes," II, 34; see also chap. 3, n. 34.

5. It was not only the princes of Banyas who arrogated this title to themselves, but also those of Bosra and (with more reason) Baalbek as well. Al-Amjad of Baalbek, whose little principality was one of the oldest in the Ayyubid empire, claimed this rank as early as 611/1214-15 in his epigraphy. (It should be noted that the chroniclers of the time do not agree with his estimate of his status; they never call him *al-sultan*.) As for Bosra and Banyas, they seem to have been assigned in *iqta'* by al-Mu'azzam 'Isa to two of his brothers, al-Salih Isma'il and al-'Aziz 'Uthman, shortly after the death of their father al-'Adil. Although both of these princes were clearly vassals of al-Mu'azzam, however, they were not slow to claim the dignity of the *saltana*: al-Salih Isma'il of Bosra adopted it in 620/1223, and he was followed by al-'Aziz 'Uthman of Banyas in 623/1226.

A) Baalbek: *RCEA*, X, 102: no. 3747 (yr. 611); 225-226: no. 3930 (yr. 622). *RCEA*, XI, 102: no. 4155 (yr. 636); 124: no. 4186 (yr. 638). In names of al-Amjad Bahramshah and al-Salih Isma'il.

B) Bosra: *RCEA*, X, 192: no. 3884 (yr. 620); 222-223: no. 3925 (yr. 622); 257: no. 3983 (yr. 625); XI, 21-22: no. 4037 (yr. 629). In name of al-Salih Isma'il.

C) Banyas: *RCEA*, X, 234: no. 3947 (yr. 623); 257-258: no. 3984 (yr. 625)—in name of al-'Aziz 'Uthman. *RCEA*, XI, 113: no. 4168 (yr. 637)—in name of al-Sa'id Hasan.

6. S. M. Stern, "Petitions," 10, 13, 21, 27.

7. Balog, "Etudes," II, 34.

Appendix B

1. C. Cahen, "Iqta'," 25-52. See also A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 26-72. A. N. Poliak, "Ayyubid Feudalism," 428-432, concentrating on Egypt, is interesting but perverse. Finally, Cahen, "Correspondance," 34-

43, has important texts and comments. There are of course valuable materials in Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, chap. 2 (pp. 26-72).

2. In addition to the examples of these different categories found in the text, the following examples may be cited. Cat. 1: *Mufarrij (Cairo)*, II, 174; *Raud. (Cairo)*, II, 52 (citing Ibn Abi Tayy). Cat. 4: *Zubda*, III, 71. Instances of the second and third categories are far too numerous to cite, of course.

3. The above five categories of *iqta'* in Ayyubid Syria are thus very similar to those which Lambton identifies in Seljukid Iran. See Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 60-64.

4. In Ayyubid Egypt, which belonged to a different administrative tradition, *iqta's* were measured by their fiscal value. This was expressed in a theoretical unit of account called the *dinar jayshi*. Cahen, "Iqta'," 46-48; Rabie, *Financial System of Egypt*, 45-49.

5. Ayalon, "Structure," II, 471-472, reaches the same conclusion independently.

6. Cahen, "Correspondance," 38.

7. Cahen, "Iqta'," 44-45; Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, II, 577-578; III, 727.

8. E.g., Rukn al-Din Mengüverish al-Falaki, governor of Bosra (*Daris*, I, 519-520); Sayf al-Din 'Ali b. Kilich, lord of 'Ajlun (*Daris*, I, 569); Sarim al-Din Kiymaz al-Najmi (*Daris*, I, 572-574); Zayn al-Din Karaja al-Salahi, lord of Salkhad (*Daris*, II, 270-271).

Appendix C

1. On Nizam al-Mulk's reform of the *madrassa* system, see especially George Makdisi, "Institutions of Learning," I-56. A more traditional view of the subject can be found in J. Pedersen, "Madrassa," *SEI*, 300-310, esp. pp. 302-304.

2. E.g., the feelings expressed towards al-'Adil's Christian *katib al-insha'* Sani'at al-Mulk ibn al-Nahhal in *Zubda*, III, 75, 89; or towards al-Salih Isma'il's Jewish *wazir* Amin al-Daula al-Samiri in *Mufarrij* (BN 1702), 330a-b; *Mir'at (Jewett)*, 486.

3. For the persons above, see the following: H. Gottschalk, "Awlad ash-Shaykh," *EI*², I, 765-766; F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athir," *EI*², III, 723-725; Sourdel, "Professeurs," 107-108; Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, III, index (Kamal ad-Din Abu l-Fadl Muhammad b. ash-Shahrazuri); *DD*, no. 3, pp. 430-431, 489 n. 277; H. Massé, "'Imad ad-Din," *EI*², III, 1157-1158.

4. Sourdel, "Professeurs," 112; *A'laq (Dam.)*, contains innumerable examples.

5. On all three offices, Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, gives comprehensive treatment. See also Cahen, "Hisba," *EI*², III, 485-489; and *idem*, "Bayt al-Mal," *EI*², I, 1143-1147.

6. Tyan, *Organisation judiciaire*, 342-429 (a thorough survey from a for-

mal, normative point of view); Sourdél, "Professeurs," 113; R. Le Tourneau, *Fez in the Age of the Marinids* (Norman, Okla.: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 37-38, 53, has an excellent summary of the qadi's role in the urban administration.

7. There are no documents or handbooks from Ayyubid Syria, but an idea of the sophistication of medieval Islamic fiscal techniques may be obtained from several sources. See especially Cahen, "Quelques problèmes économiques et fiscaux de l'irak bouyide d'après un traité de mathématiques," *AIEO* 10 (1952): 326-363; the treatises of al-Makhzumi and Ibn Mammātī, on which see Cahen, "Traité financier," 139-159; and finally, from Timurid Iran, W. Hinz, "Die Rechnungswesen orientalischer Reichsfinanzämter im Mittelalter," *Islam*, 29 (1949): 1-29, 113-141.

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(Certain names are entered here only selectively, to refer to places where they are dealt with in a substantive way rather than mentioned only in passing. These include Ayyubids, Cairo, Damascus, Egypt, Syria, and a very few others. However, all names of persons are exhaustively indexed.

Persons are entered under their *laqab* rather than by their *ism*: thus, not Kutuz but Sayf al-Din Kutuz. Ayyubid princes are listed under their title in *al-Malik*—e.g., al-Afdal, al-Zahir; amirs and most others are listed under their honorifics in *al-Din*.

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
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
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
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
Ila. Egypt and the Fertile Crescent in the Ayyubid Period



I Ib. The Ayyubid Empire and its Neighbors at the Death of al-'Adil (615/1218)



III. Central Syria and Palestine: Damascus and its Sphere of Interest



IV. Carte des Environs de Damas (by permission of N. Elisséeff and the Institut français d'études arabes de Damas.)

unitary autocracy. Finally, it was under the Ayyubids that the army ceased to be an arm of the state and became in effect the state itself. When these internal developments are seen in the broader context of world history as it affected Syria during the first half of the thirteenth century—Italian commercial expansion, the Crusades of Frederick II and St. Louis, the Mongol expansion—then the great intrinsic interest of Ayyubid history becomes apparent.

Professor Humphreys has developed these themes through a close examination of the political fortunes of the Ayyubid princes of Damascus. For Damascus, though seldom the capital of the Ayyubid confederation, was nevertheless its hinge. The struggle for regional autonomy vs. centralization, for Syrian independence vs. Egyptian domination, was fought out at Damascus, and the city was compelled to stand no less than eleven sieges during the sixty-seven years of Ayyubid rule. Almost every political process of real significance either originated with the rulers of Damascus or was closely reflected in their policy and behavior.

The book is cast in the form of a narrative, describing a structure of politics which was in no way fixed and static, but dynamic and constantly evolving. Indeed, the book does not so much concern the doings of a group of rather obscure princes as it does the values and attitudes which underlay and shaped their behavior. The point of the narrative is precisely to show what these values were, how they were expressed in real life, and how they changed into quite new values in the course of time.

The author, R. Stephen Humphreys, is Visiting Assistant Professor of History at the University of Chicago.

